Dignagas Theory Of Direct Knowledge

Author(s): Massaki Hattori
Publisher: Massaki Hattori

Page 18

18 DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE appearance of the subject) and the self-cognition (procuced through the relation between apparent object and apparent subject, which actually are two sides of the same cognition). Therefore, these three factors of cognition are not different each other9). 88. TWO KINDS OF COGNITION AND SELF-COGNITION (96a, 5) How, then, is it recognized that cognition is of two kinds ? V. 11ab: Cognition is of two kinds, because of the constitutional difference between the cognition of the object and the cognition of that (cognition)50). That cognition by virture of which the (external) object such as form and the like is cognized consists of two sides, i.e.,) the image of the object and the apparent subject. But that cognition which introspects the above said cognition of the external object consists of the idea, which reflects the external object, and the corresponding apparent subject51). Otherwise, if the (first) cognition is in conformity with the (external) object only (and is lacking subjective side), or if it consists of the apparent subject only (and is devoid of the objective side), then the cognition of that (first) cognition would be of the same nature as (the first one, i. e.,) the cognition of the external object. Further, (if the difference between these two kinds of cognition be not admitted,) then there would be no possibility of subsequent cognitions appearing in conformity with the (form of) the past, remote object. Why? Because the past object, (being not there at the time of subsequent congnitions)52), cannot be their object. Hence, (there must be the cognition which is other in constitution than the cognition of the external thing and by virture of which the form of the past, remote thing is cognized. That kind of cognition is none other than the cognition which cognized the previous cognition possessed of the image of external thing. Thus) it is proved that the cognition is of two kinds. 49) VPM, p. 221, 229, Nyayamanjari, p. 67, 30-31 : yad abhasam prameyam tat pramana-phalate punah / grahak'akara-svasamvitti trayan natah prthak-kytam // 10 cp. above note 46). 50) VPM, p. 232, 244, VA, p. 425, 12 : visaya-jnana-taj-jnanavisesat tu dvi-rupata / 11a-b 51) Cp. note 46). 52) As all things are momentary, the object of the previous cognition does not continue to exist till the subsequent cognition arises. There is, accordingly, no possiblility of the same object being cognized by a series of perception, cp. note 48).