Dignagas Theory Of Direct Knowledge

Author(s): Massaki Hattori
Publisher: Massaki Hattori

Page 12

DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE the congregation (of atoms) as their respective object"? 29) (The object of the sense being a single atom (paramanu), the congregation (samcita) should be apprehended by means of the thought-construction which unites together the perception of each constituent atom. It seems, therefore, to be incongruous to hold that the direct knowledge is free from thought-construction and yet it cognizes the congregation of atoms.) Again it is mentioned (in the Abhidharmakosa) that "these (mental functions) make the particular their respective object, so far as it is the particularity of outer seats (ayatana-svalaksana) and not of substance (=atom, dravya-svalaksana)" 30). How is this statement to be understood ? V. 4cd: There (in the Abhidharmakosa), (the perception, being caused by (the sense-organ through its contact with) many objects (=congregation of many atoms), makes the whole (samanya) its object when cognizing its own object31). Since it (=perception) is caused by the sense-organ through its contact with (congregated) many substances (=atoms), it is said to take the undivided whole (=the congregation itself) as its object on cognizing its own (outer) seats32). It, however, does not apprehend the whole through the thought-construction which, after perceiving split substances (=atoms), unites them together. (Therefore, there is no incongruity with the statement of the Abhidharma in asserting that the direct knowledge is free from thought-construction.) However, the author does not completely agree the above Abhidharma statement in respect of the object of the sense. The author's own view) is stated as follows:-33) 29) VPM, p. 176: samcitalambanah panca vijnanakayah. A similar passage is found in Abhidharmakosa, p. 12a, 26-28 : ...... Fitt i parit (sancitasrayalambanatvat, AKV, p. 86, 9-10), and this is attributed to the Vaibhasika. According to Vimsatika, k. 11 & Com., Alambanapariksa, kk. 1-5 & Com. and Trimsikabhasya, ad. k. 1, realists are divided into three groups in view of their theory concerning the object of cognition (alambana). The first group maintains that the object of cognition is an individual atom (paramanu), the second the congregation or the gathering of many atoms (samcita) and the third the union of atoms (samghata). It is obvious that the theory here referred to is that of the second group, which is reported by Kuei-chi to be the Vaibhasika, cp. Yamaguchi, Seshin Yuishiki no Genten Kaimei, p. 78, note 2. Vimsatikatika of Vinitadeva quotes exactly the same sentence explainig the theory of the second group. 30) Abhidharmakosa, p. 3a, 9-11 : *UHL FL IXH , H (ayatana-svalaksanam praty ete svalaksana-visaya na dravya-svalaksanam prati, cp. AKV p. 28, 10-16). Cp. VPM, p. 176. 31) VPM, p. 176, VA, p. 279, 10: tatranekartha-janyatvat svarthe samanya-gacaram // 4c-d // 32) ayatana=bahya-ayatana ; form, sound etc. When the perception operates, what is perceived is a form in its wholeness (ayatana-svalaksana), and is not the individual atom (dravyasvalaksana) which is the constituent of the form. 33) PSVT, 225, 2-33: Rejecting a divergent view in regard to the object to be cognized (spyod-yul las log par rtogs pa=gocara-vipratipatti), the author states definitely the impossiblity of the object being conceptually cognized (rnam par rtog pa med pa nid=avikalpatva).