Dharmakirtis Criticism Of Jaina Doctrine Of Multiplexity Of Reality Anekantavada

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz

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Dhamakini's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda)
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(c) the contention: everything has a double form,' viz. either it has the form of itself and of the other, i.c. Vx (x is.x &
-X), or it has the form of the universal and of the particular; (d) .xis, in a certain sense, both x and y (nāpi sa evostrah yenānyo 'pi syād ustrah: näpi tad eva dadhi venänyad api
syad dadhi), i.c. 0 (uis (X & X)); (c) there is some ultimate quality (aliśaya) by virtue of which an entity x can be treated as non-x; (1) everything is of the nature of everything (sarvātmalve ca sarveşām), i.e. Vx Vy (x = y); (g) there is no essential distinction between entities (vibhāgābhāvād bhävänäm); in other words, absolute distinction
between things is not a part of the empirical world (bhedägrahai); (h) the universal character of entities may consist in the distinction of essential natures of entities (bhāvānām
svabhāvabhedalı sämänyam). In other words, the essence of a class of entities (A} instantiating a universal A may be defined in negative terms, and the universal A is not that which the entities of the class (A) have in common in positive terms, but rather the fact that the entities do not share their universal character A with other entities of another class {A} that are not subsumed under that universal. On the basis of PVSV it is not possible to determine, however, how far the above idea is presented as a genuine constituent element of the doctrine of anekünlaväda (1 consider it less likely) and how far the idea is a hypothetical reply to Dharmakini's criticism, being in fact a concession to the Buddhist theory of apola (I consider it more probable).
3. Before I proceed to assess the reliability of Dharmakirti's description, let us see what Jaina sources he might have used, how these sources outlined the doctrine of multiplexity of reality and what the crucial points it were. In the following, I am going neither to give a detailed exposition of the anekāntavāda nor to enlist a complete inventory of relevant passages from Canonical and nonCanonical literature etc., because any systematic account, including historical development, would turn into a large-size monograph. I will merely focus on some elements of the theory that are, in my opinion, relevant in our case.
3.1. One of the most conspicuous early components of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality, one of the most hotly criticised by other schools of thought, but also one which is explicitly mentioned by Dharmakūti, are the three basic angles (bhanga), or ways of analysing an object within a consistent conceptual framework:
- syādasti x is, in a certain sense, P), i.e. a (x is P). - syān nāsti ('x is, in a certain sense, not-P), i.e. o (xis -P),
- syād avaktavyam (*x is, in a certain sense, inexpressible'), o (x is (P&-P)), the nature of which will be briefly discussed below (???). They are mentioned on a few occasions both in later Canonical strata (being absent from early portions of the Canon) and, especially, in non-Canonical literature. Some are enumerated, for instance, by Kāpadia 1940-1947: cxi ff., Upadhye 1935: 81-84, discussed by Schubring 1962: 1163-165 and occasionally in Shah 2000; stray occurrences are listed also in JSK (entry "syādvāda,' Vol. 4, pp. 496-502). I just list a couple of examples where the bharigas are used as well as some occurrences of the modal operator siya / siyā / syāt: (a) Viy 12.10 (p. 608-614): ...siya athi siya nanthi..., esp.: 610,15ff.: rayanuppabhā puthavi siya äyä, sya no āyā,
siya avalluvyum - āyā li ya, no ātā li ya; and 611,201f.: dupaesie khamdhe siya āyā, siya no äyä, siya avattavvam - āyā li ya no āyā li ya, siya äyä ya no äyå ya, siya ayā ya avaliavvam - āyā li ya no äyä ti ya, siya no āyā ya
avullavvam --āvā li ya no āyā li ya. (b) Viy 5.7.1 (210,20-21ff.): paramānupoggale nam bhamte! eyati veyati jāva lam tam bhāvam parinamali? goyamā!
siyā eyali veyali jāva purinamati, siya no eyati jāva no parinamali.