Dharmakirtis Criticism Of Jaina Doctrine Of Multiplexity Of Reality Anekantavada

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz

Page 19

Dharmakini's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda)
Despite seemingly irrelevant character of this verse, its pertinence to the theory of anekānta is independently confirmed by Vidyānanda" commenting on the verse and it is perhaps Samantabhadra who might have been a source of possible inspiration for Dharmnakirti. That suggestion seems to me exceedingly unlikely not only because of the exact contents of the verse but also because, despite an often repeated claim, Samantabhadra does not seem to have predated Dharmakirtis and should be, instead, considered a contemporary of Dharmakirti and Kumārila.
4. The question now is how Jaina thinkers reacted to Dharmakirti's attacks and how his criticism relates to what the Jainas themselves understood under anekānta.'
4.1. In most cases the reply of Jaina philosophers who flourished after Dharmakirti is the same and can be summarised briefly as: 'we have never professed the opinions which Dharmakirti ascribes to us.'
4.1.1. One of very few Jaina philosophers who seriously responded to Dharmakirti's critical remarks on anekānta is Abhayadevasüri (c. 1050-1100).
4.1.1.1. According to Abhayadeva Dharmakirti misrepresents the Jaina idea of the universal, which is his opinion underlies the alleged equation of the camel and the yoghurt and thus Dharmakīrti's whole account of anekāntavāda is flawed: 'For we do not accept that there exists one synchronic homogeneity, such as "being the real thing" etc., [which would be common) for both yoghurt and camel, fand] which would be established by virtue of the non-difference (selfsameness) of [respective] individuals (sc. as independent of individuals); [we do not accept this], because there appears no representation [in mind) of something of such kind. However, we do accept [some homogeneity) which is different from all particular individuals (comprised by it) which exists as having as its contents the mental idea of "similar things” [and] which is of such kind that - when the verbal designation of this shomogeneity) of such kind [is made] by a speech element [expressing
AS ad loc., 212,17-18: lutali süklum sarvam vastu syān nityam eva, syad anilyam evelievam syad ubhayam eva, syād uvaklavyum eva.syan nilyävaktavyam eva, syād anilyävaktavyam eva, syad ubhayāvaklavyam eveti api yojaniyaт. See, for instance, Pathak 1893, Pathak 1930, Pathak 1930-1931, Fujinaga 2000. Pathak's erroneous conclusions are aptly summarised in his own words: 'I have proved that Kumärila has allached the view of Samantabhadra and Akalankadeva that Arhan alone is sarvajña' (Pathak 1930-1931: 123). These analyses do not take into account other possible sources for Kumārila's statements, e.g. Jinabladra-ganin's Višesāvas yakabhāsya or Mallavādin Ksamāśrumuna's Dvādasāranayacakra. That issue is going to be dealt with in a separate paper 'On the relative chronology of Dharmakirti and
Samantabhadra.” "The notion of tiryaksāmānya is post-Akalankian, cf. Balcerowicz 1999: 218-219: 'the terms synchronic homogeneity (tiryaksāmānya) and diachronic homogeneity (ürdhvatāsāmānya) must have been coined not earlier than in post-Akalankian literature. As late as at the turn of the 9th/10th centuries we can observe certain laxity in use of the two terms. Beside ürdhvalāsāmānya and tiryaksāmānya, we find such forms as ürdhvasāmänya and iruścinasāmānya.'