Book Title: Dharmakirtis Criticism Of Jaina Doctrine Of Multiplexity Of Reality Anekantavada
Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz
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Piotr Balcerowicz
The idea indicated in the verse is that a particular entity a may - when certain parameters (typical of its own class) are emphasised, in other words when it is considered from a certain angle o - be predicated of as a member of a class of objects endowed with a fixed set of qualities: o (a EA); whereas when other set of parameters is taken into account, it can be predicated of as a member of another class: o (a E-A). However, this style of predication can be reduced to the idea that a particular thing can, from a certain angle, be said to either possess a property P (which it shares with other members of its class A) or not to possess it, etc. In other others words: 0 (x is P), o (x is -P) and o (x is (P&-P)).
In his Prusamaratiprakarana, Umāsvāti likewise speaks of ghata and mrd" as does Siddhasenaganin, giving an impression that these are the only entities used in the sources to exemplify the seven-fold modal description. There are some rare exceptions, such as the pair of visa and modaka (poison and medicine') in Haribhadrasūri's Anekantajayapatākā".
In none of the literature, prior to Dharmakīrti, I have managed to consult, is there any mention of 'camel' (ustra, karabha etc.) or any kind of diary product' (dadhi, kșira etc.) as the subject of the proposition. That throws some doubt whether the camel-yoghurt' example Dharmak inti adduces is a genuine one. The only mention of 'yoghurt' is found in the Aptamīmāmsā:
A person who has taken a vow to eat only) milk does not partake of yoghurt; a person who has taken a vow to eat only) yoghurt, does not partake of milk; a person who has taken a vow to refrain from all dairy products does not Ipartake of both milk and yoghurt). Therefore, reality has triple nature (origination, cessation and continuation).'
what is mcant by the second angle: "the vessel is non-existent (as a EA." By the same token, when one wishes to speak of any pot with no exception when, being predicated of, it is simultaneously emphasised - through its own modes, through the modes of another thing) and through both [in the same breath) - as something (both] existent and non-existent, then it becomes inexpressible. [It becomes inexpressible), because it is not possible to speak, by means of any conceivable, numerically singular speech element which is not convention-bound, of any thing at all simultaneously as both existent and non-existent. These (angles present a complete account of a thingl. Now, the Iremaining four are explained in its turn explained as incomplete account of a thing)... See also VÄBh 911,9ff.:
kumbhal akumbhah avaktavyah ... and p. 912 (on pata). « PRP, and PRPT 202-206 (p. 139-144), esp. PRPT 205-206 (p. 143): ghatūrtho mrtpinde nästi nābhūd it yarihah....
etc. 10 TT 5.21 (407,26-27): vathā ghatah patādir api bhavali syātkārasamläñcchanaśabdābhidheyatāyām....
AJP I 294,5-6: na visam vişam eva, modakādyabhinnasāmānyavyatirekāt. Haribhadra notices that, despite the fact both poison and medicinc can be predicated of as the same from a certain angle, there is a fundamental practical difference between the two. After taking a medicine, one does not die as it is the case with poison. Therefore, purely out of practical considerations, one should reject the idea of the identity between the poison and the medicine, see AJPI 295,10-11: elena "vise bhaksite modako 'pi bhakṣitah syār" ityādy api pratiksiplam avagantavyam, Tulyayogakşemalvād iti. According to Haribhadra, these practical considerations, which reflect Jaina realism, are decisive to falsify Dhurmakini's misrepresentation, inasmuch people apply medicine, instead of poison, albeit one could find an angle from which they could be described to share similar property, because they clearly see the difference between two different entities, see AJP 1 295,5-9: ato yady api dvayam apy (= vişamodakau) ubhayarūpam tathāpi vişārthi visa eva pravartale, advisesaparināmas yaiva tatsamānaparināmāvinābhāvāt tadvisesaparināmasyeli atah
prayāsamätraphalā pravrtiniyamocchedacodaneli. "2 AMT 60: payowalo na dadhy alli na payo 'tti dadhivratah/
agorasawalo nobhe tasmāt tallivun trayāmakam //