Dharmakirtis Criticism Of Jaina Doctrine Of Multiplexity Of Reality Anekantavada

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269204/1

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to be published in the Proceedings of the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference (August 23-27, 2005)
Dharmakīrti's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda)
Piotr Balcerowicz, Warszawa
1. As it is well-known, in his PV/PVSV 3.181-184 Dharmakīrti briefly criticises the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda). In this paper I will attempt to identify possible sources of Dharmakīrti's inspiration in Jaina literature, to analyse his account of the Jaina theory as well as discuss Jaina response to his criticism.
1.1. The whole passage of PV/PVSV4 3.183-187 (59,2461,29) = PV/PVSV, 3.181-185 (89,22– 93,5) = PV/PVSV, 3.181cd-185 (262,18–265,20) reads as follows:
(181.1) etenaiva yad ahrīkāh kim apy aslilam akulam / pralapanti pratiksiplam tad apy ekäntasambhavāt // 181 // By this (refutation of the Sāmkhya theory, viz. by proving that all things are discrete,'] that really primitive and confused [theory] the shameless (Jainas) nonsensically profess is also disproved, because singular character [of
reality] (sc. absolutely discrete entities) is possible. (181.2) yad ayam ahrikah syad ustro dadhi syān neti kim apy aslilam ayuktam aheyopädeyam aparinisthänād akulam pralapanti. (181.3) tad apy anena nirastam svabhāvenaikāntabhedät. What the shameless [Jainas) nonsensically profess, namely: "a camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, (and) is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt," [a theory] which is really primitive, inconsistent and is not relevant to what should be avoided and to what should be appropriated (sc. is useless) - insofar as it does not help establish [that which should be avoided and that should be appropriated] - [and is therefore] confused, also that [theory) is refuted by this [refutation of the Samkhya theoryl, because [things) in (their) essential nature are different in the absolute sense {181.3) tadanvaye vā.
(182.1) sarvasyobhayarūpalve tadviseşaniräkrteh /
codito dadhi khädeti kim ustram näbhidhävati // 182 112 Or, if [one admits that there is (some kind of) association [between entities (or: between a camel and yoghurt) that are discrete in their essential natures, then...)
Since - if everything [is supposed to have a form of both – [any) distinction between these [entities (or: between the camel and yoghurt)] would be revoked, then why does a person enjoined as follows: "Eat yoghurt!", not run towards the camel?
PVSVT: etenaiveti sarvasyārthasya bhedasädhanena. 2 The verse is quoted in: TBV 242,27-28; NASV 35 $ 30, p. 93,27; NKC 620,20-21; AJP I 23,2-3; AVP 7; AșS 9,
92,22-93,1; NViV I 177,19-20; NViV 2.203 (233,11); SVR 837,##; [SVIT 124,27]; [SVIT 212,24]: [SViȚ 615,19); [SVIT 749,11). Viz. either (1) 'of the universal and of the particular' (sāmānyavisesarūpa) or (2) 'of itself and of the other' (sva

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(182.2) tathā hy ustro 'pi syād dadhi näpi sa evostrah yenānyo 'pi syād ustrah. tathā dadhy api syâd ustrah nāpi tad eva dadhi yenānyad api syöd dadhi. (182.3) iad anayor ekasyāpi kasyacil tadrūpābhāvas yābhāvāt svarūpasya vātadbhāvinah svuniyalasyābhāvāt na kaścid višesa iti. (182.4) dadhi khädeti codita ustram api khādet. For it is as follows: a camel is, as you say,] in a certain sense, yoghurt; it is not the case that the camell is only a camel, because likewise the camel is also, in a certain sense, something else [than merely a camel). Similarly, also yoghurt is, in a certain sense, a camel; it is not the case that this (yoghurt) is only yoghurt, because yoghurt is also, in a certain sense, something else (than merely yoghurt). Therefore, since any of these two (the camel and yoghurt) lacks the absence of the form of the other or (any of these two (e.g. the camel)] lacks the intrinsic nature which is not present in the other (e.g. in yoghurt) (and) which is confined [only] to itself (e.g. to the camel), there is no distinction whatsoever between the camel and yoghurt). [Accordingly, someone enjoined as follows: "Eat yoghurt!" could eat camel as well.
(183.1) athasty atiśayah kaścid yena bhedena vartale/ sa eva dadhi so 'nyalra nästīty anubhayam param // 183 //' If the Jaina says that there is indeed some ultimate quality by virtue of whose singular character [the person enjoined as above) acts with respect to the yoghurt, not with respect to the camel, then what follows is that the entity] does not have both natures but eventually) is (only something different: that very lultimate quality is
yoghurt and that ultimate quality is not present in any other thing, c.g. in the camel). {183.2} athānayoh kaścid aliśayo 'sti yenäyam tathā coditah kşīravikāra eva pravarlate nânyatra. (183.3) sa' evālisavo 'rthakriyârihipravritivisayo dadhi. taiphalaviseşopūdānabhāvalakṣitasvabhāvam hi vastu dadhiti. (183.4} sa ca tādrsah svabhāvo nyara nāstīti" pravrilyabhāvād arthinah. tasmāt tan nobhayarūpamily ekantavādah. api ca. If the Jaina says that these two (sc. the camel and yoghurt) indeed have some ultimate quality by virtue of which this person enjoined in such a manner [to eat yoghurt) proceeds only towards the modification of milk (sc. yoghurt), and not towards anything else (c.g. the camel), then precisely this ultimate quality alone is yoghurt (itself), which is the scope of the activity of the person) aiming at executing causally efficient action. For yoghurt is [here the real thing whose essential nature is characterised by the condition that allows the appropriation of its particular result. And such essential nature of this kind does not exist in any other thing (e.g. in the camel), because the person enjoined to eat curd and) aiming at (executing causally efficient action does not undertake activity with respect to the other thingl. Therefore, this lyoghurt) does not have both forms (viz. of itself and of the camel). Such is the proof of the doctrine of absolutely singular character of reality (sc. the refutation of Jaina anekāntavāda).
(184.1) sarvärmalve ca sarveșām bhinnau syātām na dhidhvani/
pararüpa). For the discussion on the meaning of ubhayarüpa see $ 1.3. + PVSVs: napi. $ AJPI 23,8: ad evam. Reading confirmed also in AJP. PVSV : vä tadbhävinah.
The verse is quoted in: TBV 242,29-30; NViV I 177,21-22; NViV II 233,15-16; AJP 1 24,5-6. * Cf. the paraphrase of the argument by Vädirājasūri in NViV II 2.203 (233,11-16): tad uktam "sarvasyobhayari
palve" (PV 3.182) ityādi. vidyata eva dadhani kaścid viseso yato na karabhatvam tasyeli cel, tarhi sa eva dadlīti vaktavyam tata eva tatphalasya trplyāder bhāvāt, sa ca na karabhādau astīti katham tadatatsvabhāvaivam bhāvänäm yala ekāntavāda eva prašasto na bhavel, idam apy abhihitam:
arhāsty alisavah kaścid yenu bledena vartale /
sa eva dadhi so 'nyatra nāstīty anubhayam varam // [PV 3.183] AJP I 24.8: evam larhi sa. 10 AJP I 24.10: năsti. " AJP I 24,11: Tasmān noblayarūpam. 12 AJP I 25.6: bhāvānām.

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bhedasamhäravādasya tadabhāvād asambhavah // 184 // If everything were of the nature of everything, then cognitions (mental images) and linguistic units would not be different [from each other]. Since these [cognitions and linguistic units] are not [non-different], the doctrine
of the intermixed character of individual entities is impossible. (184.2) so 'yam alrikah' kvacid apy ekam ākāram pratiniyatam apaśyan vibhāgābhāvād bhāvānām katham asamsrstānyākāravatyā buddhyādhimucyetārthān" abhilaped vā. {184.3) tato bhedāgrahāt tatsamhāravādo na syāt syād ustro dadhi syān neti. atha punar asamsrstāv ākārau pratipadya samharet! (184.4) ekarūpasamsarginyāh buddheh kvacit pratiniyamăt tatpratibhasabhedakrta eva tayo" rūpayoh svabhāvabhedo 'pi syāt, ekānekavyavasthiteh pratibhāsavisayatvāt. (184.5) tathā ca naikas tadubhayarūpah syād iti mithyāvāda eşah. (184.6) sthitam etat na bhāvānām kaścit svabhävänvayo 'sti bhedalaksanam eva tu sämānyam. (184.7) athaca prakrtyā kecid ekajñānādiphalāh kecin neli. This very shameless [Jaina] does not notice that one (particular] form is invariably confined to a certain entity (e.g. a camel or yoghurt); since there is supposedly) no (essential] distinction between entities, how would he get actively
13 A possible response to the above PV 3.40 41 is AMi 11:
sarvātmakam tad ekam syād anyāpohavyatikrame / anyatra samavāyena vyapadiśyeta sarvatha // This (real thing (AşS: tattvam)] is in a certain sense of the nature of everything, if we put aside (the Buddhist theory of the exclusion of the other. If [the real thing) resided in something else [than itself (its own nature)], it
could not be designated in any respect (at all). That AMill is treated as a reply to Dharmakirti is confirmed by PVSVȚ ad PVSV 40, p. 109 which quote ĀMillab: yo 'pi digambaro manyate "sarvatmakam ekam syâd anyāpohavyatikrame" tasmād bheda evānyathā na syäd anyonyābhāvo bhāvānām yadi na bhaved iti. In the background of the discussion regarding the charge 'if everything were of the nature of everything, there is also the theory of sarvasarvātmakatva, viz. 'the identity of everything with everything,' which is mentioned side by side with, and clearly distinguished from the doctrine of satkāryavāda by Mallavādin Ksamāśramana in DNC 173,1-2: evam ca kalpyamānam sarvasarvātmakatvasatkāryatvamülarahasyänatiremena kalpitam. On sarvasarvatmakatva see Wezler: Wezler 1981 and Wezler 1982. Whereas the well-known doctrine of the pre-existence of effect [in its cause)' (satkāryavāda) was to explain how phenomena occur, being only transformations of (from) an already existent substratum, the concept of sarvasarvālmakatva stated that the substratum (here: conscious substratum) continues to exist in all its transformations which all have the same nature, being the transformations of the same substratum, see DNCV 173,12–14: evam hi "sarvam sarvātmakam sac ca kāryam" it mülarahasyam etan nātikrāntam bhavati purusātmakatvāt sarvasya tadvikāramátratvāc ca bhedānām tatraivāntarlayāvirbhāvāt sarvakāryānām krkalāsavarnavišeşānām iva krkalāse. - 'For in this way, [the doctrine of the conscious principle] does not violate the following principal esoteric doctrine that everything has the essence of everything and is the existent effect," because everything has the essence of the conscious principle and because all individual things are merely modifications of this [conscious principle], insofar as all effects (sc. individual things) inhere in and have their manifestation in this [conscious principle), just like (all) particular colours of a chameleon [inhere in and are manifested in the chameleon.' Interestingly, Dharmakirti treats Jaina and Samkhya doctrines together (PV/PVSV43.183a: etenaiva), as against
Mallavādin's criticism of both Samkhya and the theory of sarvasarvatmakatva. 14 AJP I 26,5: 'yam anekāntavādi.
AJP I 26,5 6: buddhyādhibuddhyetārthān. Cf. n. 19. 16 PVSV. = PVSV, samhared. " Reading confirmed also in AJP. PVSV4 = PVSV,: O-krta etayo. 18 PVSV, -rüpa.

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involved in things with his cognitive awareness, in which various forms images of things) are present as not intermixed, or talk about distinct) things? For this reason, since he does not admit any labsolute distinction [between things), there could not be any doctrine of the mixed character of these findividual entities in the form: "La camell is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, [and] is not, in a certain sense, Lyoghurt]." If, however, la person] intermixed two different unmixed forms (of the camel and yoghurt), having cognised [them as unmixed], then - since cognitive awareness, which intermixes (them) into one form, is invariably confined to a certain entity (e.g. either a camel or yoghurt, not to both) - there would still be some distinction in essential natures of these two forms, la distinction] which would be based on the distinction of [mental] representations of these two things (e.g. a camel or yoghurt)). [It would be so), because the determination of many [forms] as one has [their representations as its contents. And, accordingly, it would not be the case that one sentity (e.g. either the camel or yoghurt)] could not have the form of both of them. Hence, this is a false doctrine. Indeed it has been established that there is no association of essential natures of entities at all, but (rather their universal character is characterised by distinction (sc. discrete character). Furthermore, some (entities generate) their results (in the form of one (common cognition by virtue of their nature, whereas others do not. (184.8) bhavalu nama bhävänām svabhāvabhedah sāmānyam. yeşām tu nirupākhyānām svabhāva eva năsti Tatra kaihan svabhāvabhedavisavāh sabdah. [The Jaina opponent]: "Let the universal character of entities consist in the distinction of essential natures of entities, if you wish. But how can speech elements have as their contents essential natures of entities such as inexpressible (particulars) which do not have, [as you claim any essential nature at all?" {184.9} test avasyam sabdapravrityā bhāvyam. kaihancid avyavasthāpileşu vidhipratiședhāyogar (Reply:1 Of course speech elements refer necessarily to these finexpressible particulars), because affirmation (xis P') and negation (*.x is not P') are not possible with regard to [entities that are not determined one way or another (sc. cither through cognition or specch). (184.10} tathā ca sarvatrāyam anvayavyalirekasrayo vyavahāro na syāt usnasvabhavo gnir nānusna ity.api. svabhāvāntarasyāsalah kathamcid avyavasthāpanāt. (184.11) sarvathāpratipatter? agnisvabhāvasyāpratipattir iti vyāmūdham jagul syāt. [Jaina opponent:] And, thus, this practical action which is based on positive concomitance (affirmation) and negative concomitance (negation) could not take place with respect to anything, that is: (the affirmation]: "fire is hot in its essential nature" and also the implied negation]: "[fire) is not not-hot," because one cannot determine one way or another something non-existent that is different from the essential nature of an entity one wants to cognise]. Since there could be no comprehension [of, say, something not-hot in every respect, there would be no comprchension of the essential nature of fire. Thus, the world would be stupefied. {184.12) syād elal na latra kasyacid asalo nisedhah anusnam sad evārthāntaram nişidhyata iti. (Reply:] That would be the case; [however, in this case [of, e.g., fire, there is no negation of anything non-existent: only something really existent such as something not-hot, which is something different [from fire), is negated. {184.13) katram idānīm sad asan nāma. Jaina opponent: How then something which you say is non-existent is something existent? (184.14) na brūmah (184.15) sarvatrāsal. tatra nāstīti deśakāladharmanisedha eva sarvabhāvesu kriyale na dharminah, tannisedhe ladvisayasabdapravrilyabhāvāt, anirdistavisayasya naño 'prayogāi.
Haribhadrusüri, while quoling the passage in AJP 26,5-6, replaces adhimucyeta with adhibuddhiyeta (n. 15), for apparently the strictly Buddhist meaning of the rare ver adhiv muc is not known to him. However, the verb is very well attested in Buddhist literature in the sense of 'intent upon; take interest in; be actively interested in.' For a list
of occurrences see BHSD II 13-15, entries: adhimukta / adhimucyate. 20 Cl. SvSt, 5.5 = SvSt. 25: vidhir nişedhas ca kathancid istau vivakṣayā mukhyagunavyavasthā /
ili pranii sumales lave yam malipravekah stuvalo 'stu näiha // 21 PVSV.: sarvathā pralipaller. 22 PVSV = PVSV,: sarvatra bhäveşu.

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[Reply:) We do not say that (something not-hot) is non-existent in all cases. Merely the negation of place, time and property with respect to all entities is expressed in the form: "[something not-hot] is not in this [fire)," but not (the negation of the property-possessor (sc. fire), because when one negates the property-possessor), speech element the contents of which is this (property-possessor) cannot be applied, because the negation particle, the contents of which remaining unexpressed, cannot be verbally employed. (184.16) so 'pi tarhi deśādipratisedhah katham. [Jaina opponent:) That being the case, how is the negation of place etc. (possible)? (184.17) yasmān na tatrāpi deśādinām pratiședho nāpy arthasya. [Reply:) [It is possible), because even in that case there is neither negation of place etc. nor of the object [as such). (184.18) sambandho nişedhyata iti cet. [Jaina opponent:) "[Here] the relation [between the property (e.g. not-hot) and property-possessor (e.g. fire)] is negated." (184.19) nanu tanniședhe 'pi tulyo doso 'nişedhād"4 asati sabdāpravsttir ityādi. (184.203 asato vāsya nisedhe tadvad dharmino 'pi nişedhah. [Reply:) Also when this [relation] is negated, there is the same fault, because the negation is not expressed], in view of the fact that speech elements cannot be applied with respect to something non-existent (sc. relation) etc. Or, when a negation of this [relation] which is non-existent (could be expressed, this is the case of] the negation of the property-possessor as well, just like [of] the relation. (184.21) na vai sambandhasya nāstīti nisedhah. kim tarhi. neha ghato nedānim naivam ity uktau2 nănena sambandho 'sti naitaddharmā vā iti pratitih. tathā ca sambandho nişiddho bhavariti
Jaina opponent:] [With the words:) "[the relation] does not exist," [one expresses] absolutely no negation of the relation. Rather, when one says: "There is no pot here," (or) "[There is no pot] now," [or] "[There is no pot) in this condition," the understanding (arises) that there is no relation (of the pot) with this (particular place] or that [this pot) does not possess such and such properties. And in this manner the relation is negated. (184.22) tathāpi kaiham nişiddho yāvad asya sambandho dharmo vā nāstīti matir na bhavali. na cāsyāḥ kathamcid bhāve sambhavo 'bhāvesu tathābhāvāt, tasmāt sambandhābhāvapratīter nāyam ihetyādyā pratītih. sā tadabhāve28 na syāt. pratītau vā tadabhāvasya. yathā pratītimatas tatprabhavāh sabdah kena nivāryante. sa eva hi sabdānām na vişayo yo na vitarkānām. te cei pravrttah ko vacanasya nişeddhā. na hy avācyam artham buddhayah samīhante. sambandhasya tu svarūpenānabhidhānam uktam. abhidhāne sambandhitvena buddhāv upasthānāı. yathābhiprāyam apratītih. tad ayam pratīyamāno 'pi sambandhirūpa eveti svarūpena nābhidhīyate. tasmān nābhāvavat sambandhe 'pi prasangahapi cāyam abhāvam abhidheyam bruvānam prati pratividadhann" abruvānah katham pratividadhyāt. vacane cāsya katham abhāvo 'nuktah. athābhāvam eva necchet, tenāvacanam, tad evedānim katham abhāvo nästīti. yat punar etad (uktam)" arthanişedhe anarthakaśabdāprayogān nirvişayasya naño 'prayoga ity atroliaram vakşyate. tasmäl santy abhäveșu sabdah.
23 PVSVA= PVSV,: yasmāt taträpi na deśādinām.
PVSVs: nişedhād. PVSV, ukto. PVSV = PVSV,: bhavati.
PVSVT ad loc.: nelyādi parah. 28 PVSV = PVSV, ihetyädyä pratitih spät tadabhāve.
PVSV4 pratividadhad(nn). PVSVs: pratividadhad. 30 PVSVs: vāsya. "PVSVȚ ad loc.: yat punar etad uktam. PVSV4 = PVSVs = PVSV, omit uktam: punar etad.

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(Reply:]'? Nevertheless, how can [this relation] be negated as long as its relation or property does not exist? Hence there exists no cognition of that). And the cognition (of the kind that the relation does not exist) is not possible, when the relation] exists, because it is absent as such among non-existent things. Due to the cognition that the relation is absent, there arises) cognition the contents of which is: "there is no relation here" etc. This (cognition would not occur, if there were no (cognition of the absence of the relation), or if there were cognition of the absence of this [relation), just like for a person who has the cognition (of the absence of the relation], what prevents [him from using the speech elements which have their origin in this (cognition that there is no relation]? For whatever is not [the contents of conceptual cognitive acts is certainly not the contents of speech elements. If these conceptual cognitive acts operate, what is the factor preventing (their) expression? For acts of cognitive awareness do not concern inexpressible thing. However, it has been said that the relation, as [being grasped] by its intrinsic nature, is not explicitly expressed, because when it is expressed it is presented in cognitive awareness as a relatum (term of a relation). There is no such] cognition of it) in accordance with the intention to express it). Therefore, this [relation], even when it is being cognised, [is cognised) as having the form a relatum; consequently, it is not expressed in its intrinsic nature. Thus, there is no undesired consequence also with respect to the relation, just as
there is no undesired consequence) with respect to the absence of relation. Furthermore, how could possibly such a person who wishes to contradict someone maintaining that absence can be expressed, [and] who (himself] does not maintain lit, be able to contradict? And how it is possible that absence is not expressed when this word "absence") is uttered? If one does not accept (that) absence (can be expressed), then it is inexpressible by virtue of the (nonexistence of absence). Now, how could this very [expression): "there is no absence," be possible? As regards to what is being said I now), namely: when the meaning is negated, insofar as one does not employ meaningless speech elements, then the negation particle, having no contents, cannot be employed, [and] that [ideal will be explained later on sin PV 3.207). Therefore, there are speech elements which refer to non-existent entities. (184.23) Teşu katham svabhāvabheda iti. Jaina opponent:How is the distinction in essential natures among these (non-existent entities) possible? (184.24) tatrāpi. Reply: Also with respect to these (non-existent entities we say the following:
(185.1) rūpābhāvād abhāvasya sabda rüpābhidhāyinah/ na āšarkyā eva siddhās te vyavacchedasya vācakāh //185/1 Since absence has no intrinsic nature, speech elements are expressive of intrinsic nature. [Speech elements are
by no means liable to doubt. They convey the exclusion. (185.2) vastuv!llinām sabdūnām kim rūpam ablidhe yam āhosvid bheda iti sanka" syūl. abhävas tu vivekalaksanu eva nimillikariavyasya kasyacid rüpas yābhāvāt tadbhāve.'+ 'bhāvāyogāt, tadbhāvalaksanalvād bhāvasya. Tasmād ayam eva sa mukhyo vivekah. tasya tathābhāvakhyāpinah sabdāḥ kim vivekaviņayā ily asthānam evaitad āśarkāyā). Tasmãi siddham elal sarve sabdā vivekavisaya vikalpas ca ta ete" ekavastupratiśaranā api yathāsvam avadhibhedopakalpitair bhedair bhinnes iva pratibhātsu buddhau vivekesūpalayanädbhinnavisavā eva. tena svabhāvas yaiva sädhyasādhanabhāve 'pi na sādhyasādhanasamsargah. Ian na pratijñārthaikadeso heturiti sa cāyam helulvenāpadis yamūnah.
.
32 PVSVT ad loc.: luthāpītyācāryah. 3. PVSV. = PVSV,: sarkāpi.
PVSV, cmends tadabhāve to tudbhāve. PVSV.: lad bhāve. PVSV = PVSV.: lathākhyāpinah.
PVSV. emends vikalpālpās ca to vikalpāt: vikalpāt(lpās ca). PVSV,: vikalpālpās ca. 37 PVSVA = PVSV, omitta: ete. 38 PVSV4 = PVSV,: vivekesüpasthāpanād. PVSVT: vivekeșu bhede şu vikalpanām copasthāpanāt. 39 PVSV = PVSV,: -deśahetur.

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A doubt might be raised as follows: "Do speech elements which refer to real things have as their designatum [a positive) form or difference?" Absence is, however, characterised by the exclusion (of the other) only, because there is no (positive) form at all which could be taken as the factor (causing cognition / verbal concept of absence (sc. a point of reference)], insofar as if such a positive form) existed, it would not be consistent to assume absence, insofar as an [existent) entity is characterised by this (positive form). Therefore, this very (existent entity) is what is [known as the primary exclusion (of the other]. [Objection:] "Do speech elements (expressing this [exclusion of the other) which conveys absence in such a manner have [this] exclusion (of the other) as [their contents?" This is an improper way indeed [to express) doubt. Therefore, it has been established that all speech elements as well as concepts have exclusion (of the other) as [their contents. Even though they accommodate [only] one real thing, these very (speech elements and concepts) - because they refer to exclusions (present) in cognitive awareness which are represented as if different by virtue of individual entities made up of differences in their individual applications - have in fact different contents. Consequently, even though (the logical reason as) essential nature itself consists in the relationship between the inferable property and the proving property, there is no intermixture (sc. merging as identical) of the inferable property and the proving property. Thus, the logical reason does not extend only to a part of the object of the thesis. And this sessential nature] itself is referred to as the logical reason.
1.2. Before I proceed to deal with the analysis of the passage, there are some additional relevant issues to be discussed first. A larger portion of the above passage of PV/PVSV 3.182-184 is quoted in AJP I 23,1-27,2, being introduced as follows: tathā parenāpy uktam -
sarvas yobhayarūpalve tadviseşaniräkrteh... Separate sections of the above-quoted passage of PV/PVSV are subsequently disproved by Haribhadrasūri in AJP:
section(s) of PV/PVSV
quoted in AJP
refuted in AJP
(182.1)
AJP I 23,4-5
AJP I 295, 10ff. (182. 2 183.1}
AJP I 23,6-24,6
AJP I 297,13-14 (183.2H183.4)
AJP I 24,6-11
AJP I 300,5-12 (183.***
AJP I 25,3-5
AJP I 300,5–302,6 {184.1}
AJP I 25,6-26,3
AJP I 302,7–8 and 316,7 (184.2H184.5)
AJP I 26,4-27,4
AJP I 317,4-10 and AJP II 124ff. The passage of PV/PVSV 3.182-184 is quoted by Haribhadrasūri AJP faithfully, and the variae lectionis (enumerated in nn. 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15) are negligible. The only major difference is the deliberate replacement of the offensive "so'yam ahrīkah" in with neutral expression "so 'yam anekāntavādi" in Section PVSV (181.2). This could be easily be deemed a case of light censorship or the whitewashing of the offensive character of Dharmakirti's statement. Generally, the authenticity - in terms of strictly internal analysis of AJP - of the quotation PV/PVSV 3.182-184 is additionally supported by two factors: the sections quoted are first commented upon by Haribhadrasūri in his commentary AJPSV and then refuted in succeeding portions of AJP/AJPSV. We do, however, come across an intriguing insertion in the AJP quote. Interestingly, AJP I 25,3-5 inserts - between (183.4) and (184.1} - a passage (183.***] which is absent from PV/PVSV but is subsequently refuted by Haribhadrasūri in AJP I 300,5–302,6:
kimca sarvavastusabalavādinah kvacid anyäsamsgstākārabuddhyasiddheh tathāvācakābhāvät samhäravädānupapatti, tatsiddhau và taia eva talsvabhāvabledat tadekarapataiveti. Furthermore, since it is not established for the proponent of manifoldness of all things that there exists cognitive awareness of a real thing (e.g. camel) which has the form (of the real thingl which is not intermixed with another [object (e.g. yoghurt)], and therefore there exists no referring term [denoting the real thing) in such a manner (as not

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intermixed with other things), the doctrine of the intermixed character (of individual entities] (sc. the object having its own form and the form of the other) is inexplicable (sc. is not meaningful). Or, leven if it were established [that there can be cognitive awareness of a real thing which has the form not intermixed with another object), then the result would be that because of the singular character of the essential nature of the (real thing! - this real thing is represented in cognition as having singular form (sc. of its own, not that of the other thing) due to this very fact
that there can be cognitive awareness of a real thing which has the form not intermixed with another object) The interpolated passage is later repeated in the refutation section of AJPI 300,3-5. This interpolation apparently bears all the marks of an authentic quotation from PVSV for the following reasons:
| It is commented by Haribhadrasuri in AJPSV I 25,13-21 and treated by him as genuine. 2 The only element of the passage (183.-; that might suggest that it is Haribhadra's own
interpolation is the marker iti at the end of it (tadekarūpataiveti). However, Haribhadrasuri himself takes it to belong to the original text of PVSV, for he comments on it in AJPSVI 25,21: iti na samhäravādo västavah - "Thus the doctrine of the intermixed character [of individual entities] is not true,' which is merely a paraphrase of PV 184.cd: bhedasamhāravādasya ... asambhavah ("the doctrine of the intermixed character of individual entities is
impossible'). 3 It is subsequently refuted in AJP I 300,5-302,6, after being repeated verbatim (AJP 1 300,3-5). 4 The refutation of the passage is introduced by Haribhadra with the standard formula: yac
coktam - 'survavastusabalavādinah ... tadekarūpataiva' ity etad apy ayuktam, and this particular refutation is the whole portion refuting PV/PVSV, e.g. it is immediately followed by
the criticism against the verse of PV 184 (section (184.1)). 5 Additionally, Haribhadrasūri comments in AJPSVI 300,14 on the refuted quotation: yac
coktam mülapürvapakşe... demonstrating that this interpolated passage belongs to PV/PVSV
as he had it in front of him. 6 Haribhadra sets off to refute the verse of PV 184 with the words: etena "survātmatve ca
bhāvānām" ilyády api pratyuktam. In his AJPSV I 302.22, he comments on this portion as follows: etena anantaroditena vastunā sarvātmakatve ca... In his opinion the pronoun etena refers to the real thing which has been mentioned immediately before' (anantaroditena vastunā). Indeed, we do find the mention of 'vastu' three times in the interpolated passage: sarvavastusabalavādinah..., tatsvabhāvabhedāt and tadekarūpatā. However, there is no mention of vastu' in the immediate vicinity of verse 184 in the preserved reading of PV/PVSV. The immediately preceding verse 183 does not mention it. PVSV does mention 'vastu' slightly before in section (183.3) (vastu dadhi), however, the reference to it is made in passing, whereas the whole passage (183.2)-(183.4; discusses the issue of ultimate quality (atisaya). Furthermore, the mention of 'vastu dadhi' in section (183.3} is separated from the interpolated passage (183 ***) with section (183.4), which does not deal with real thing (vastu) directly. Accordingly, Haribhadrasūri's remark etena anantaroditena vastunä sarvātmakatve ca cannot
refer to any portion of PVSV other than the passage (183.**). 7 In the interpolated passage, anekāntavādin is called sabalavādin ('the proponent of the varie
gated'), and the unusual term sabala signifies here the idea of anekānta (multiplexity of reality). This is indeed a highly uncommon term with respect to anekantavāda, to a degree that I have personally never come across it in Jaina literature in this sense. Also for this reason it would be incorrect, in my opinion, to assume that the problematic passage, containing the atypical locution sarvavastusabalavādinah, was Haribhadrasūri's, or any of the Jaina authors' for that matter, own insertion. However, the rare term śabala is used, at least once, in by

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Dharmakirti's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda)
Dharmakirti himself in PV 4.132ab in a related context, namely with reference to perception which has non-dual character: advayam sabalābhāsasyādṛṣṭer buddhijanmanaḥ / (*...for [we] do not see any production of cognitive awareness which has manifold representation."). That is why it is not improbable that that the compound sarvavastuśabalavādinaḥ may have stemmed from Dharmakirti himself.
On the other hand, the passage is not only absent from extant editions and manuscripts of PV/ PVSV but also is not referred to by Karnakagomin in his PVSVT. Although there is nothing in the passage as such that would speak against Dharmakirti as its author, we would need some independent additional confirmation in Buddhist sources to accept the passage (183) as genuine part of PVSV.
Interestingly, the passage AJP I 23,1-27,2 seems to be the only Jaina text which quotes any larger portion of PV/PVSV 181-184. Apart from this singular occurrence, Jaina authors quote only two PV verses: 182 (see n. 2) and 183 (see n. 7); in addition, Vādirājasūri in NViV 2.203 (233,1116) paraphrases the argument of verse 183 (see n. 8).
One has the impression that that the remaining verses of the PV passage on anekānta, and the whole commentary of PVSV, were either unknown to Jaina authors, with some notable exceptions, or did not stimulate them to any reaction or refutation. In view of the fact that only a restricted selection of verses from rival philosophical works are cited in Jaina works, at the same time their selection remains constant and always the same verses/passages are repeated (often with the same variae lectionis), this may confirm the prevailing tendency among Indian authors in general, especially after 7th/8th centuries, that they either relied on earlier quotations as they had been reproduced in earlier Jaina works or (2) relied on some anthologies that presented a selection of verses, which became the major source of information on rival schools, whereas direct, first-hand readership of original sources gradually became scarce.
1.3. A separate issue is the reliability of commentators of PV/PVSV. In the expositions of the verse PVSV 182 (the most often quoted verse of the whole passage) offered by commentators we encounter various interpretation of the expression ubhayarūpatve.
1.3.1. Dharmakirti's criticism directed against the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekäntavāda) follows his criticism of the Samkhya and verse 182 should be read in such context (verse 181 is merely an introduction which marks the change of the opponent, not the change of the topic: etenaiva ... kim apy ... pratikṣiptam). Accordingly, ubhayarūpatve should be taken to mean samanyaviseṣarapatve, especially in view of the following two passages, which directly precede PV/PVSV 181-184:
1 PV/PVSV5 3.179d-180c (58,23-59,2) = PV/PVSV, 3.177 (88,13-20) = PV/PVSV, 3.177d178c (260,16-261,9):
na hi kvacid asyaikāntiko bhedo 'bhedo vā vivekena vyavasthāpanāt – sāmānyam viseṣa iti.
yenätmana tayoḥ/
bhedaḥ sāmānyam ity etad yadi bhedas tadātmanā // 177 // bheda eva [178a]

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yadi sämänyavisesayor yam ātmānam āśritya sāmānyam višesa iti sthitis tenätmanā bhedas tada bheda eva. yasmāt
tau hi tayoh svātmānau tau ced vyatirekiņauo vyatireka eva sämänyaviseșayoh svabhāvabhedāt. 2 PVSV43.182 (59,18-19) = PVSV, 3.179 (89,13–14) = PVSV, 3.181ab (262,13–14): ...gavādisamāveśāt tadātmabhūtānām cānanvayena tatrānubhayarūpatvāt. The expression anubhayarūpa occurring in the passage clearly means asāmānyaviseșarūpa, as it is correctly explained in PVSVT: anubhayarūpatvād asāmānyaviseşarūpatvād eveti yāvat. And that is how, analogously, ubhayarūpa should be understood in PV 3.182a.
1.3.2. Karņakagomin, however, is inclined to interpret the expression ubhayarūpatve strictly in the context of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda) as referring to an object being both itself and being the other.''
1.3.3. Also Manorathanandin, apparently following Karņakagomin, takes ubhayarūpatve to mean '[every object having] its own form and the form of the other.42
1.3.4. It is only the Jaina author Haribhadrasūri who properly understands the expression the way Dharmakirti himself did, viz. sāmānyaviseșarüpa."
For certain reasons, that will be discussed below, both Karņakagomin and Manorathanandin - either having better knowledge of anekāntavāda than Dharm akinti or being more faithful to the unbiased presentation of the Jaina doctrine - felt obliged to introduce their own interpretation of the phrase, thus brining it in line with the typical expositions of anekāntavāda, in accordance with which the double nature of any object that is both itself (svarūpa) and shares in the nature of another thing (pararūpa) is vital, whereas the double nature of a thing based on its universal-cumparticular character (sāmānyavisesarūpa) is secondary. That was not Dharmakirti's concem: he either distorted the picture of the Jaina theory deliberately or was not sufficiently well informed.
2.1. The passage PV/PVSV 181-184 mentions some elements that are vital for the reconstruction the doctrine of multiplexity of reality in the form as it may have been known to Dharmakirti. These expressions have been underlined in § 1.1.
Beside the allusion to the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda) by name (ekāntain (181.1}, {181.3), (183.4}), there is also an explicit reference to be found in the PV/PVSV passage - with the words: syād ustro dadhi syān na in sections (181.2) and (1843), where the modal operator syāt (= kathamcit) occurs – which concerns a particular element of the doctrine, namely to the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description, known under the names saptabhangi and syādvāda. It is merely one of three complementary cognitive-linguistic procedures within the scope of
40 PVSV,: vyatirekini. 4. PVSVT ad loc.: sarvasyobhayarüpatvam. ubhayagrahanam anekatvopalaksanārtham tasmin sati tadviseşasya ustra
ustra eva na dadhi. dadhi dadly eva nostra ity evam laksanasya niräkrteh. 12 PVV ad loc.: sarvasya vastuna ubhayarüpatve svapararüpatve sati... 4. AJPSV ad loc., 23,11: ubhayarüpatve sämänyaviseşarūpatve. ubhayagrahanam anekalvopalaksanam. 44 On syāl see below p. Błąd! Nie zdefiniowano zakladki.ff.

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anekāntavāda, beside the doctrine of viewpoints (nayavada) and the method of the four standpoints (nikṣepavāda, nyāsavāda). The expressions are the following ones:
(181.2) (184.3) syad ustro dadhi syan na
(183.1) asty atisayaḥ kaścid yena bhedena vartate
1184.9) kathamcid avyavasthapiteṣu vidhipratisedhāyogāt
The exact sources for Dharmakirti cannot be identified. Furthermore, it seems that none of these passages is a genuine quotation, albeit they do have authentic Jaina sources in the background.
2.2. The first and most conspicuous reference to the anekāntavāda is the phrase syad ustro dadhi syan na ((181.2) = (184.3)). This is clearly an echo of, or what should look like a quotation from a Jaina source instantiating the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description (syādvāda), the characteristic trait of which is the use of the modal operator syāt. I shall first attempt to reconstruct the picture of syādvāda as it emerges from Dharmakirti's exposition and criticism of it, including the commentaries.
11
2.2.1. In none of the two occurrences of the phrase in question does Dharmakirti offer the logical reason why a camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, and is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt. In not supplying the logical reason for the syat thesis Dharmakirti is in agreement with Jaina practice, insofar as no Jaina text consulted by me mentions logical reason in such a context either. Only Karnakagomin and Manorathanandin supply the justification for the Jaina thesis: 'A camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, because [these two] are identical as consisting in a substance etc. [A camel] is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt, because the circumstances of yoghurt are different from the circumstances of the camel;"45 and 'A camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, because [both] are real things. On the other hand, [a camel] is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt as something that has a particular."
The logical reasons adduced by them (dravyādirūpatayaikatvāt and °—avasthāyā bhinnatvāt, vastutvāt and viseṣarūpatayā, respectively) are clear references to the substance-expressive (dravyarthika) and the mode-expressive (paryayarthika) viewpoints, already amply attested in the Jaina literature prior to Dharmakirti, e.g. in Kundakunda's Pavayaṇasāra, in Siddhasena Divākara's
46
45
or PVSVT 183 (339,23-24): syad ustro dadhi, dravyādirūpatayaikatvāt. syān na dadhi uṣṭrāvasthāto dadhyavasthāyā bhinnatvät.
PVV2 3.180 (352,8-9) = PVV, 3.181 (212,15-16) PVV, 3.181 (262,21-22): syad ustro dadhi vastutvāt. na vā syad ustro viseṣarūpatayā.
47 PSă 2.22-23 (p. 144-146): davvatthiena savvam davvam tam pajjayatthiena puno
havadi ya annam aṇannam takkale tammayattādo //
atthi tti ya natthi tti ya havadi avattavvam idi puno davvam payyayena du kena vi tad ubhayam adiṭṭham annam vā ||
[22] From a substance-expressive viewpoint every substance is the same. However, from a mode-expressive viewpoint, [every substance] becomes also different. [Every substance] is non-different, [i.e. identical with other substances], because it consists in it (sc. substance) at its own time, [viz. when it is taken into consideration]. [23] Further, the substance can be said (1) to exist, (2) not to exist and (3) to be inexpressible. However, taking a particular mode [into consideration] it is explained to (4) be both (sc. it both exists and does not exist) or otherwise.

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Sammatitarkaprakarana (ca. 450-50048)49 in Mallavādin's Dvādaśüranayacakra (ca. 550-600)50, in Pūjyapāda Devanandin's Sarvārthasiddhil etc. What Manorathanandin refers to by vastu corresponds to what the Jainas usually call dravya, a substance, and avasthā parallels what the Jainas call paryāya, a mode. They served as a kind of parameters that qualified an angle under which a thing was predicated of. Neither these two viewpoints nor any other kind of parameterisation should not be confused with what Dharmakirti called atiśaya (vide supra § 3.5.) inasmuch they were not a special quality of the thing as such.
Dharmakirti must therefore have known these two viewpoints, or any other parameters for that matter, and their absence in PV was in all probability not dictated by his poor knowledge of Jaina arguments but rather by the fact that he considered a detailed account of Jaina line of reasoning unnecessary.
2.2.1. How accurate and faithful was then his account of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality? To answer this, we should first identify central components of the anekānta theory as it emerges in Dharmakūti's exposition. Indeed, we can distinguish a number of important elements there that appear to underlie the Jaina doctrine at his times: (a) the assertion: is, in a certain sense, y,' i.e. o (xis y), where the symbol o represents the modal operator syär; (b) the assertion: *x is, in a certain sense, not-y,' i.e. a (x is y);
Three remaining permutations of the three principal options (sc, asti, nästi, avaktavyam) are implied by annan vā ("otherwise'); (5) the substance both exists and is inexpressible, (6) the substance both does not exist and is
inexpressible, (7) the substance simultaneously exists, does not exist and is inexpressible. 4* For the dating see Balcerowicz 2003a. +" These are referred to in STP 2.1: jam sāmannaggahanam damsanam eyam visesiyam nānamn /
donho vi nayana eso padekkum anthapajjāo // Insight is the grasp of the general. Cognition is one, characterised by the particular. This modality of the object (viz. its general and particular aspect) is individually [the contents for both viewpoints, li.c. substance
expressive (dravyārthika) and the modal, or mode-expressive paryayarthika). They are also taken for granted in the formulation of STP 3.10:
do una nayā bahavayā davvatthiyapajjavattiya niyaya /
etto ya gunavisese gunatthiyanao vi jujjamio II See also STP 3.57: davvanthiyavallavvam sāmannam pajjavassa ya viseso /
ee samovaniū vibhajjavāyam visesemti // 30 DNC 6,2-7,1: dravyarihaparyāyārthadvitvādyanantāntavikalpopakiptavidhibhedapadārıhaikavākyavidhividhānād
... DNC 876, 1-2: tešām dravyārthaparyāyārthanayau dvau mūlabhedau, tatprabhedah sangrahādayah. - 'Among these viewpoints), there are two main divisions, viz. the viewpoint the object of which is the substance and the
view point the object of which is the mode. Their subdivisions are the collective viewpoint etc. 5 SSi 1.33 (100,8-10): sa dvedhā dravyārthikah paryāyārthikas ceti. dravyam sāmānyam utsargah anuvrtir ity
arthah. Iadvişayo dravyathikah. paryāyo višeşo 'pavādo vyāvrtir ity arthah. tadvişayah pāryāyārihikah. layor bhedā naigumādayah. Compare e.g. the way Mallavādin describes the nature of (1) vastu and (2) dravya: (1) DNC 864,8-9: lathā ca sarvātmakam ekam evästi vasiv ili pratyaksādipramānair upalabhāmale; DNC 869,1-2: adrūpasaktivivariumāram IV elal sarvam bhāvaik val. ato nanisthitam vastu, anārabdhārahdhatvāl sik yakādivat; (2) DNC 866,1-2: ghato mri, mrdah prihivirum, prilivyā druvyarvam druvikärul väl...

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13
(c) the contention: everything has a double form,' viz. either it has the form of itself and of the other, i.c. Vx (x is.x &
-X), or it has the form of the universal and of the particular; (d) .xis, in a certain sense, both x and y (nāpi sa evostrah yenānyo 'pi syād ustrah: näpi tad eva dadhi venänyad api
syad dadhi), i.c. 0 (uis (X & X)); (c) there is some ultimate quality (aliśaya) by virtue of which an entity x can be treated as non-x; (1) everything is of the nature of everything (sarvātmalve ca sarveşām), i.e. Vx Vy (x = y); (g) there is no essential distinction between entities (vibhāgābhāvād bhävänäm); in other words, absolute distinction
between things is not a part of the empirical world (bhedägrahai); (h) the universal character of entities may consist in the distinction of essential natures of entities (bhāvānām
svabhāvabhedalı sämänyam). In other words, the essence of a class of entities (A} instantiating a universal A may be defined in negative terms, and the universal A is not that which the entities of the class (A) have in common in positive terms, but rather the fact that the entities do not share their universal character A with other entities of another class {A} that are not subsumed under that universal. On the basis of PVSV it is not possible to determine, however, how far the above idea is presented as a genuine constituent element of the doctrine of anekünlaväda (1 consider it less likely) and how far the idea is a hypothetical reply to Dharmakini's criticism, being in fact a concession to the Buddhist theory of apola (I consider it more probable).
3. Before I proceed to assess the reliability of Dharmakirti's description, let us see what Jaina sources he might have used, how these sources outlined the doctrine of multiplexity of reality and what the crucial points it were. In the following, I am going neither to give a detailed exposition of the anekāntavāda nor to enlist a complete inventory of relevant passages from Canonical and nonCanonical literature etc., because any systematic account, including historical development, would turn into a large-size monograph. I will merely focus on some elements of the theory that are, in my opinion, relevant in our case.
3.1. One of the most conspicuous early components of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality, one of the most hotly criticised by other schools of thought, but also one which is explicitly mentioned by Dharmakūti, are the three basic angles (bhanga), or ways of analysing an object within a consistent conceptual framework:
- syādasti x is, in a certain sense, P), i.e. a (x is P). - syān nāsti ('x is, in a certain sense, not-P), i.e. o (xis -P),
- syād avaktavyam (*x is, in a certain sense, inexpressible'), o (x is (P&-P)), the nature of which will be briefly discussed below (???). They are mentioned on a few occasions both in later Canonical strata (being absent from early portions of the Canon) and, especially, in non-Canonical literature. Some are enumerated, for instance, by Kāpadia 1940-1947: cxi ff., Upadhye 1935: 81-84, discussed by Schubring 1962: 1163-165 and occasionally in Shah 2000; stray occurrences are listed also in JSK (entry "syādvāda,' Vol. 4, pp. 496-502). I just list a couple of examples where the bharigas are used as well as some occurrences of the modal operator siya / siyā / syāt: (a) Viy 12.10 (p. 608-614): ...siya athi siya nanthi..., esp.: 610,15ff.: rayanuppabhā puthavi siya äyä, sya no āyā,
siya avalluvyum - āyā li ya, no ātā li ya; and 611,201f.: dupaesie khamdhe siya āyā, siya no äyä, siya avattavvam - āyā li ya no āyā li ya, siya äyä ya no äyå ya, siya ayā ya avaliavvam - āyā li ya no äyä ti ya, siya no āyā ya
avullavvam --āvā li ya no āyā li ya. (b) Viy 5.7.1 (210,20-21ff.): paramānupoggale nam bhamte! eyati veyati jāva lam tam bhāvam parinamali? goyamā!
siyā eyali veyali jāva purinamati, siya no eyati jāva no parinamali.

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(c) Pann 784 (195,21ff.): caupaesie nam khamdhe siya carime no acarime siya avattavvae no carimāim no
acarimäim no avattavvayāim, ... siya carimăim ca acarime ya siya carimāim ca acarimäim ca siya carime ya
avattavvae ya siya carime ya avattavvayāim ca ..., etc. (d) AņD 415 (166,22ff.): tathā nam je te baddhellayā te nam siyā atthi siyā natthi, jai atthi jahannenam ego vā do vā
tinni vā... (e) AņD 473 (p. 182): siyā dhammapadeso siyā adhammapadeso siyā āgāsapadeso siya jīvapadeso siya
khamdhapadeso. Occasionally, similar three basic angles (bhanga) are mentioned, however, the modal operator syāt (siya, siyā) is missing, which may reflect an earler historical layer: (f) Pann 781-788 (p. 194ff.), e.g. 194,25ff.: paramāņupoggale nam bhamte! kim carime acarime avattavaye
carimāim acarimāim avattavayāim, udāhu carime ya acarime ya udahu carime ya acarimăim ca udahu carimāim
ca acarime ya udāju carimāi ca acarimāim ca..., etc. (g) Viy 8.2.29 (337,20ff.): jīvā ņam bhamte! kim nāņi annāņi? goyamā jīvā nāni vi, annāņi vi. These three basic angles (bhanga) are subsequently permuted so that, in a full version of the doctrine of the modal description (syādvāda, saptabhangī), the total of seven basic angles is reached.
Perhaps the earliest non-Canonical occurrences of the basic angles (bhanga), some of them including the modal operator syāt, are to be found in works ascribed to Kundakunda (between 3th6th centuries). (h) PSSä, 14 already offers what is later known as pramānasaptabhangi":
In a certain sense, [the substance) is...; [in a certain sense, the substance) is not ...; [in a certain 'sense, the substance] is both; [in a certain sense, the substance) is inexpressible; and further, [in a certain sense, the substance is the triplet of these (sc. is predicated of according to the permutations of the these). [In such a
manner), the substance is, as one should realise, possible as seven-angled on account of the description.54 (i) Another example is found in PSa 2.22-23:
[22] From the substance-expressive viewpoint everything is a substance. From the mode-expressive viewpoint, (any thing] becomes different. It is (nevertheless) non-different, because it consists in that (substance in the time of its (existence]. [23] The substance is said - on account of any particular mode - to be..., and not to be..., and again [the substance) becomes inexpressible; but further (the substance) is both, (viz. is... and is not... at the same time) or is otherwise, (viz. any other permutation of the three basic angles (bhanga)]."
53 See NC 254ab (p. 128): satteva humti bhangā pamānanayadunayabhedajuttävi/ ("There are as many as seven
conditional perspectives with divisions with respect to cognitive criteria, viewpoints and defective viewpoints.') and
SBT 1.7: iyam eva pramänasaptabhangi nayasaptabhangīti ca kathyate. Cf. Balcerowicz 2003b: 37. 54 PSSā, 14 (p. 30): siya atthi natthi uhayam avvattavvam puno ya tattidayam /
davvam khu sattabhamgam ādesavasena sambhavadi // $ The verse is rather obscure. Another possibility to translate it as follows: 'From the substance-expressive viewpoint
and from the mode-expressive viewpoint, any substance is [both] different and non-different, because [the particular consists in that [universal] in the time of its [existence],' where annam corresponds to visesam and anannam to sāmānyam. The difficulty with that translation is that the idea it renders is that everything is different from the substance-expressive viewpoint, and everything is the same from the mode-expressive viewpoint.' On the other hand dravyārthika relates to sāmānya, whereas paryāyārthika to visesa (comp. p. 16, STP 3.57), which finally yields a contradiction. That is why the commentators Amrtasena and Jayasena (p. 144-145) are at pains to relate
dravyārthika-sāmänya-ananya and paryayarthika anya-viseșa. 30 PSa 2.22-23 (p. 146ff.): davvatthiena savvam davvam tam paijayatthiena puno /
havadi ya annam anannam takkāle tammayattādo // 22 //

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(1) Also Siddhasena Diväkara in his STP 1.36-40 describes all the seven angles (bhanga). The picture presented there
is already a mature concept, wherein Siddhasena supplies also additional parameters such as: atthamtarabhūhi ya niyaehi ya (in view of the qualities of another thing and the substance's own qualities,' STP 1.36ab), sabbhāve ... asabbhāvapajjave (with respect to the substance's own existence ... (and) with respect to the mode in which it does not exist,' STP 1.37ab). He also regularly speaks of aspects (deso) from which the substance can be predicated of.
3.2. An essential and well-known element of the theory is the modal operator syāt (kathamcit): 'in a certain sense, somehow.' It is well described in many sources, just to mention two references dating to the times around Dharmakirti. It is said to operate by means of affirmation (vidhi) and negation (nişedha, pratişedha, niyama). They are extensively detailed and elaborated by Mallavādin, e.g. in DNC 6,2ff. (vidhibheda), and DNC 9,7–8: vidhiniyamabhangavrttivvatiriktat vad... All the permutations of vidhi and niyama are enumerated also in DNC 10,1-11,2. Also, Samantabhadra refers to them in his Svayambhūstotra:
Affirmation and negation are accepted [in the sense of] "somehow." (Thereby) the distinction between primary and secondary /angle) is established. Such is the guideline of the wise (or: of the fifth tirtham-kara Sumati). That is your
most excellent creed. Let the worshipper praise you" Thus, as we can see, by approximately the end of the fifth century we find a developed idea of the seven-fold modal description, which had needed some centuries to take shape.
3.3. It is difficult to determine when the term saptabhangi was used for the first time. Although is seems to be absent from the Cannon, it is, however, used by such pre-Dinnägu authors as Siddhasena Divākaru and Kundak unda. (a) Siddhascna Divākara speaks of 'a verbal procedure that consists of seven options' (saplavikalpali vacanapan
thah), which he has just described before in STP 1.36-40: In this way, there emerges a verbal procedure that consists of seven options, taking into account the substantial modes. However, taking into account momentary manifestations, (the method of analysis) has cither options (of
description, viz. the object can be predicated of from various viewpoints, or it has no optionsS8.59 (b) Another occurrence of the technical term saltabhamgam is found in Kundak unda's verse of PSSāz 14 (p. 30ff.),
already cited above (p. 14). (c) Further, the same author refers to the saptabhangi method as a capacity of the soul:
The great soul is one (viz. cither 'self-same,' or 'one perceiving organ' (akşa) or 'it is possessed of cognitive application (upuyoga)'). It is (also two (viz. 'it is possessed of two-fold cognitive application: cognition and perception'). It becomes of threefold characteristics, it is said to roam in four [types of existence]. And it is
anihili ya nanhi ya huvudi avallavvam idi puno davvam/
pajjāvenu du kena vi tad ubhayam ūdittham annam va // 23 // SvSt, 5.5 = SvS12 25: vidhir nişedhas ca kathañcid istau vivakşayä mukhyagunavyavasthā /
ili pranīti sumules lave ya malipravekah stuvato 'stu nátha // For later descriptions see c.g. RVär 2.8. p. 122,15ff.. esp. RVār 1.6, p. 33,15/1. ** Lc. it is not possible to predicate of an object because momentary manifestations, being transient and infinite, are
beyond the scope of the language (sc. there are not enough words to describe each of them). The verse offers another possibility of interpretation, see TBV. STP 1.41: evam sallaviyappo vayanapaho hoi anihapaijāe /
vamjanapaijāe una saviyappo nivviyapppo ya //

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grounded in five primary qualities (viz. karmic states (bhāva)). It is endowed with the capability to move in six [directions). It is cognitively apt as having the existence of (viz. as being to apply) the sevenfold modal description. It has eight substrata (viz. qualities). It has nine objects (sc. the nine categories (tattva) [to cognise). It has ten states. It is called the living element.
3.3. The term saptabhangi is occasionally juxtaposed with various 'aberrations' of the anekāntavāda. Some of these are listed by Siddhasena Divākara in STP 3.56-59, who displays an awareness that there is indeed certain, albeit superficial similarity between the Jaina anekantavāda and the Buddhist theory vibhajyavāda (vibhajjavāyam):
The universal should be spoken of from the substance-expressive viewpoint, and the particular (relates to the mode. When these two are brought together (sc, confused), they are defined as the doctrine of conditional analysis.o2
3.4. The idea of syādvāda does not, however, have to necessarily involve the usage of the term 'multiplexity' (anekānta). And indeed, the term occurs only some time later, in the work of Pujyapāda Devanandin (6th c.) for the first time. The sources of the term anekānta can be traced back to the following two passages: (1) The general and particular definition of these (seven viewpoints (naya) enumerated in TS 1.33] should be
formulated. The general definition, to begin with, [states that) a viewpoint is a verbal procedure (formal pronouncement) that aims - with respect to a real thing, which is of multiplex nature - at conveying, in conformity with essence (of the real thing), a particular (property of it) which one intends to establish, by laying emphasis on
[a particular) reason without contradiction [by virtue of which that particular property is established].04 (2) On account of the purpose (which) a real thing, which is of multiplex nature, [is to serve or is to be referred to),
prominence is extended to, or is emphasised, i.e. [prominence] is given to a certain property in accordance with the expressive intent [of the speaker). [The property] which is contrary to that (emphasised property] is notemphasised [property. Since (such a not-emphasised property serves) no purpose (at a particular time), even though it exists, there is no expressive intent [to assert it]; hence it is called subordinate (property]. Since these two kinds of properties) are establish, viz. "because emphasised [property] and not-emphasised (property] are established," there is no contradiction.
3.5. A brief reference to STP 1.36 40 above (p. 15) indicated a use of a series of certain parameters which determine the angle from which the thing under consideration is judged. And this is another
60 PS Sa, 71-72 (p. 123): eko ceva mahappa so duviyappo ttilakkhano hodi/
cadusamkamano bhanido pamcaggagunappadhāno ya // 71 // chakkāpakkamajutto uvautto sattabhangasabbhāvo/
atthäsao navautho jivo dasathānago bhanido // 72 // For a brief comparison of vibhajyavāda and anekāntavāda, see Matilal 1981: 7-11. 62 STP 3.57: davvatthiyavaltavvam sämannam pajjavassa ya viseso/
ee samovania vibhajjaväyam visesemti // 63 See Soni 2003: 34: *As for the word anekānta itself, in the sense in which it can be associated with the theory of
manifoldness unique to the Jainas, it seems that Pujyapāda was the first person to explicitly use it.' 64 SSi 1.33. $ 241, p. 100,7f.: eteșäm sämänyaviseşalakşanam vaktavyam. sämänyalaksanam tävad vastuny anekan
tātmany avirodhena hetvarpanät (cf. TS 5.32] sādhyavićeşasya yäthätmyapräpanapravanah prayogo nayah. SSi 5.32, 8 588, p. 231,91f.: anekāntātmakasya vastunah prayojanavasād yasya kasyacid dharmasya vivakṣayā präpitam pradhanyam arpitam upanītam iti yavat. tadviparītam anarpitam. prayojanäbhävät sato 'py avivaksā bhavatity upasarjanitam iti ucyate. täbhyām siddher "arpitānarpitasiddher" [TS 5.32] nästi virodhah.

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17
important feature indispensable for the proper assessment of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality as the Jainas conceived of it. In the classical formulation of the theory we come across a set of four such parameters: substance (dravya) = S, place (ksetra) = P, time (kāla) = T, condition (bhāva) = C; see e.g. TT 5.31 (409,29ff.), RVār 4.42 (254,14ff.), SVM 23.113 (143,12) or JTBh 1.22 $ 63 (JTBh. p. 19; JTBh2, p. 19), DNCV 3.6. Interestingly, the concept of the parameters to specify the angle (bhanga) from which an object is analysed developed over some centuries, and as early as in the sixth century we find elaborated attempts to list them. That is done by Siddhasena Divāk ara, who treats of 8 such parameters:
The proper method of exposition of entities [in accordance with syādvāda) is based on substance, place, time,
condition as well as mode, aspect and relation, and also distinction. The list comprises more than four 'classical' parameters already mentioned. The parameters were an important device to show that method of the seven-fold modal description (syādvāda) was not trivial or beset with contradictions, but a rather complex analytical framework, which contained, alongside the seven angles (bhanga), a kind of second-level parametrisation. Historically speaking, the parameters evolved from the Canonical theory of descriptive standpoints (niksepa, nyāsa), the locus classicus of which is the enumeration found in the Tattvārthasūtra.67 3.6. Let us see how the angles of the seven-fold modal description were practically applied by Jaina authors prior to Dharmakīrti and what instances are used. Typical examples in genuine Jaina syātsentences are generally restricted to the terms: pata, ghata and kumbha. An interesting reference is found in Jinabhadra-ganin's Viseşāvas yakabhāsya (6th/7th century):
Being something the existence, non-existence and both [the existence and non-existence] of (a particular property of it) is emphasised through [the pitcher's] own mode and through the mode of something else, this (pitcher) is differentiated as "a pitcher," as "something else than a pitcher," as "something inexpressible" and as "both [a pitcher and something else than a pitcher].96*
STP 3.60: duvvyum khillum kälam bhavam pajjāyadesasamjoge /
bhedam ca paducca sumā bhāvanam pannavanapajjä // 6 TS 1.5: nämasthāpanādravyabhāvatas tannyāsah. Ample material on the niksepa is supplied in the monograph by
Bhatt 1978. 118 VABI 2232 (p. 910): sabbhäväsabbhävobhayappio saparapajjaobhayao
kumbhakumbhāvallavyobhayarūvāibheo so II Hemacundru Muladhürin aptly claborates on the verse in VĀVr 910,12 ff: saptabhangīm pratipadyala ily arihah, lad vatha - ürdinugrīväkapälakukşibudhnādiblih svaparyāyaih sadbhāvenārpito višeșitah kumbhah kumbho bhanyale - "san ghalal" ili pruihamo bhango bhavatity arthah. tathā pasādigalais Ivakirāņādibhih paraparyāyair asadbhavenärpilo višeşilo 'kumbho bhavali - sarvasyāpi ghatasya paraparyāyair asallvavivakṣāyām "asan ghatah" ili dvirryo bhango bhavality arthu. tathā sarvo 'pi ghatah svaparobhayaparyayaih sadbhäväsadbhavabhyām saltvāsalivablyüm arpito višeşilo yugapad vaktum isto 'vaktavyo bhavati, svaparaparyayasallväsaltvābhyām ekena kenūpy usāmerikenu sabdena sarvasväpi tasya yugapad vaktum asakyatvād iti. ete irayah sakalādeśāh. atha cuiūro 'pi vikulpädesal procyante... - 'The idea is that the author of the verse) demonstrates the seven-fold modal description, namely: a (particular pitcher is called "pitcher' when, being predicated of, it is emphasised, through its own modes such as an upward neck, a hull, a spherical shape, a base etc., as something existent (se, as something which is a member of a class A). That is what is meant by the first angle: "the vessel is existent as a E A]." Similarly, la particular pitcher is taken to be something else than a pitcher when, being predicated of, it is emphasised, through the modes of another [thing) such as the protection of the skin, as something non-existent (sc. as something which is a member of a class -A). When the expressive intent is to emphasise the non-existence (sc. its being something else) in the case of any pot whatever through the modes [typical] of another thing), that is

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The idea indicated in the verse is that a particular entity a may - when certain parameters (typical of its own class) are emphasised, in other words when it is considered from a certain angle o - be predicated of as a member of a class of objects endowed with a fixed set of qualities: o (a EA); whereas when other set of parameters is taken into account, it can be predicated of as a member of another class: o (a E-A). However, this style of predication can be reduced to the idea that a particular thing can, from a certain angle, be said to either possess a property P (which it shares with other members of its class A) or not to possess it, etc. In other others words: 0 (x is P), o (x is -P) and o (x is (P&-P)).
In his Prusamaratiprakarana, Umāsvāti likewise speaks of ghata and mrd" as does Siddhasenaganin, giving an impression that these are the only entities used in the sources to exemplify the seven-fold modal description. There are some rare exceptions, such as the pair of visa and modaka (poison and medicine') in Haribhadrasūri's Anekantajayapatākā".
In none of the literature, prior to Dharmakīrti, I have managed to consult, is there any mention of 'camel' (ustra, karabha etc.) or any kind of diary product' (dadhi, kșira etc.) as the subject of the proposition. That throws some doubt whether the camel-yoghurt' example Dharmak inti adduces is a genuine one. The only mention of 'yoghurt' is found in the Aptamīmāmsā:
A person who has taken a vow to eat only) milk does not partake of yoghurt; a person who has taken a vow to eat only) yoghurt, does not partake of milk; a person who has taken a vow to refrain from all dairy products does not Ipartake of both milk and yoghurt). Therefore, reality has triple nature (origination, cessation and continuation).'
what is mcant by the second angle: "the vessel is non-existent (as a EA." By the same token, when one wishes to speak of any pot with no exception when, being predicated of, it is simultaneously emphasised - through its own modes, through the modes of another thing) and through both [in the same breath) - as something (both] existent and non-existent, then it becomes inexpressible. [It becomes inexpressible), because it is not possible to speak, by means of any conceivable, numerically singular speech element which is not convention-bound, of any thing at all simultaneously as both existent and non-existent. These (angles present a complete account of a thingl. Now, the Iremaining four are explained in its turn explained as incomplete account of a thing)... See also VÄBh 911,9ff.:
kumbhal akumbhah avaktavyah ... and p. 912 (on pata). « PRP, and PRPT 202-206 (p. 139-144), esp. PRPT 205-206 (p. 143): ghatūrtho mrtpinde nästi nābhūd it yarihah....
etc. 10 TT 5.21 (407,26-27): vathā ghatah patādir api bhavali syātkārasamläñcchanaśabdābhidheyatāyām....
AJP I 294,5-6: na visam vişam eva, modakādyabhinnasāmānyavyatirekāt. Haribhadra notices that, despite the fact both poison and medicinc can be predicated of as the same from a certain angle, there is a fundamental practical difference between the two. After taking a medicine, one does not die as it is the case with poison. Therefore, purely out of practical considerations, one should reject the idea of the identity between the poison and the medicine, see AJPI 295,10-11: elena "vise bhaksite modako 'pi bhakṣitah syār" ityādy api pratiksiplam avagantavyam, Tulyayogakşemalvād iti. According to Haribhadra, these practical considerations, which reflect Jaina realism, are decisive to falsify Dhurmakini's misrepresentation, inasmuch people apply medicine, instead of poison, albeit one could find an angle from which they could be described to share similar property, because they clearly see the difference between two different entities, see AJP 1 295,5-9: ato yady api dvayam apy (= vişamodakau) ubhayarūpam tathāpi vişārthi visa eva pravartale, advisesaparināmas yaiva tatsamānaparināmāvinābhāvāt tadvisesaparināmasyeli atah
prayāsamätraphalā pravrtiniyamocchedacodaneli. "2 AMT 60: payowalo na dadhy alli na payo 'tti dadhivratah/
agorasawalo nobhe tasmāt tallivun trayāmakam //

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Dharmakini's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda)
Despite seemingly irrelevant character of this verse, its pertinence to the theory of anekānta is independently confirmed by Vidyānanda" commenting on the verse and it is perhaps Samantabhadra who might have been a source of possible inspiration for Dharmnakirti. That suggestion seems to me exceedingly unlikely not only because of the exact contents of the verse but also because, despite an often repeated claim, Samantabhadra does not seem to have predated Dharmakirtis and should be, instead, considered a contemporary of Dharmakirti and Kumārila.
4. The question now is how Jaina thinkers reacted to Dharmakirti's attacks and how his criticism relates to what the Jainas themselves understood under anekānta.'
4.1. In most cases the reply of Jaina philosophers who flourished after Dharmakirti is the same and can be summarised briefly as: 'we have never professed the opinions which Dharmakirti ascribes to us.'
4.1.1. One of very few Jaina philosophers who seriously responded to Dharmakirti's critical remarks on anekānta is Abhayadevasüri (c. 1050-1100).
4.1.1.1. According to Abhayadeva Dharmakirti misrepresents the Jaina idea of the universal, which is his opinion underlies the alleged equation of the camel and the yoghurt and thus Dharmakīrti's whole account of anekāntavāda is flawed: 'For we do not accept that there exists one synchronic homogeneity, such as "being the real thing" etc., [which would be common) for both yoghurt and camel, fand] which would be established by virtue of the non-difference (selfsameness) of [respective] individuals (sc. as independent of individuals); [we do not accept this], because there appears no representation [in mind) of something of such kind. However, we do accept [some homogeneity) which is different from all particular individuals (comprised by it) which exists as having as its contents the mental idea of "similar things” [and] which is of such kind that - when the verbal designation of this shomogeneity) of such kind [is made] by a speech element [expressing
AS ad loc., 212,17-18: lutali süklum sarvam vastu syān nityam eva, syad anilyam evelievam syad ubhayam eva, syād uvaklavyum eva.syan nilyävaktavyam eva, syād anilyävaktavyam eva, syad ubhayāvaklavyam eveti api yojaniyaт. See, for instance, Pathak 1893, Pathak 1930, Pathak 1930-1931, Fujinaga 2000. Pathak's erroneous conclusions are aptly summarised in his own words: 'I have proved that Kumärila has allached the view of Samantabhadra and Akalankadeva that Arhan alone is sarvajña' (Pathak 1930-1931: 123). These analyses do not take into account other possible sources for Kumārila's statements, e.g. Jinabladra-ganin's Višesāvas yakabhāsya or Mallavādin Ksamāśrumuna's Dvādasāranayacakra. That issue is going to be dealt with in a separate paper 'On the relative chronology of Dharmakirti and
Samantabhadra.” "The notion of tiryaksāmānya is post-Akalankian, cf. Balcerowicz 1999: 218-219: 'the terms synchronic homogeneity (tiryaksāmānya) and diachronic homogeneity (ürdhvatāsāmānya) must have been coined not earlier than in post-Akalankian literature. As late as at the turn of the 9th/10th centuries we can observe certain laxity in use of the two terms. Beside ürdhvalāsāmānya and tiryaksāmānya, we find such forms as ürdhvasāmänya and iruścinasāmānya.'

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it][one wonders] why a person urged [by it] towards one thing (sc. yoghurt) should run towards another thing (sc. camel), unless he were a madman.'77
The above comment by Abhayadevasuri, albeit being directed against Dharmakirti, seems to have been prompted also by a passage from Manorathanandin's Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti: 'In a certain sense yoghurt is camel, because [both] are real things. Or, in a certain sense [yoghurt] is not camel, because it consists in particular."
78
While commenting on PVSV, 3.181 passage, Manorathanandin not only elaborates on Dharmakirti's argument but converts Dharmakirti's wording, which appears seemingly incomplete to the commentator, of PVSV 181: syad ustro dadhi syan na, into a full-fledged proof formula (prayoga), by supplying logical reasons for both theses (vastutvät, viseṣarupataya). These are clearly reflected in Abhayadeva's response. The similarities between PVV and TBV in wording and contents are as follows:
(1)
Manorathanandin
vastutvāt
Abhayadevasini
na... asmābhir ... ekam tiryaksāmānyam vastutvādikam... abhyupagamyate
na... asmābhir ekam tiryaksamanyam vyaktyabhedena vyavasthitam... abhyupugamyate
(2) viseṣarupatayā
Abhayadevasüri's reply is meant to invalidate Dharmakirti's criticism, seen through the prism of Manorathanandin's statements, by rendering it into a flawed and inaccurate account of Jaina thesis.
It is worth noting in passing that Abhayadevasūri's reference to Manorathanandin's account may help establish a relative chronology between Manorathanandin and Abhayadevasuri who both lived at more or less the same time: 2nd half of the 11th century. If my assessment is correct, Manorathanandin must have preceded Abhayadevasüri.
Another possible inspiration for Abhayadevasüni's remark could be the statement of PVSVT 183 (339,23-24): syad ustro dadhi, dravyadirupatayaikatvāt. syan na dadhi uṣtrāvasthāto dadhyavasthaya bhinnatvāt. The ideas and formulations, however, are slightly different and thus Karnakagomin is much less probable a source.
4.1.1.2. Abhayadevasüni rejects also what he takes for Dharmakirti's misrepresentation of Jaina idea of the particular.
If this real thing, which is [supposedly] excluded from [all] things that belong to the same class and from things that belong to a different class [and] which is undiversified (homogeneous), is represented in exactly such a manner in perception which has the efficacy to [represent] it, then, however, acts of conceptual cognition which take place in subsequent time [and] which [merely] represent something unreal, arise as manifesting with respect to the
77 TBV 242,31-243,2: na hy asmabhir dadhyuştrayor ekam tiryaksāmanyam vastutvādikam vyakıyabhedena vyavasthitam tathabhutapratibhasabhävad abhyupagamyate, yadṛgbhūtam tu prativyaktibhinnam "samānāḥ" ili praIyayaviṣayabhutam abhyupagamyate tathabhutasya tasya sabdenābhidhane kim ity anyatra prerito 'nyatra khadanaya dhäveta yady unmatto na syat. This passage follows Abhayadevasuri's criticism (TBV 242,19-26) against Dharmakirti's understanding of the universal, as it is found e.g. in PV4 3.109 PV4 3.107, pada d of which being quoted in TBV 242,19: samana iti tadgrahat.
78 PVV2 3.180 (352,8-9)= PVV, 3.181 (212,15-16) PVV, 3.181 (262,21-22): syad ustro dadhi vastutvāt. na vā syad ustro viseṣarupataya.

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excluded real thing - various universals, which are based on the exclusion of everything else by virtue of the real thing to be excluded. It is not consistent (to assume that the distinctive nature of the universals is established by virtue of this real thing, because of too far-reaching consequence."
4.1.2. Another Jaina thinker in whose work we come across a refutation of Dharmakīti's account of the universal is Vādinājasūri:
For it is as follows. This criticism, which one wishes to raise against Cour doctrine of multiplexity of reality that states that the real thing consists in positive aspect (P) and in negative aspect (non-P) cannot hold true, to begin with, with respect to such a real thing) that consists in the universal or in the particular, because there is no single universal which is concomitant with [both) yoghurt and (camel) etc. For the universal is the transformation pertaining to likeness, and it is indeed confined to yoghurt etc., there is no other entity at all or anything else associated with it, and independent of it), just like the likeness between something blue and the cognition of it. Therefore, how can oneness between yoghurt and camel be possible, on the basis of which some activity were
possible with respect to one thing (even though the injunction concerning the other [thing were expressed]? The main line of his argumentation is, again, that Dharmakirti misrepresents the Jaina concept of the universal and his criticism might hold valid only with respect to a theory which would understand the universal the way the Jainas do not.
4.1.3. Not only Abhayadeva and Vādirāja, but generally no Jaina text consulted by me refers to any kind of universal (sāmānya) in the sense of a special quality (atisaya), over and above the thing itself, by virtue of which two entities could be associated or dissociated as it is done in the exposition above (vastutvāt, see p. 11). We come across clear statements that deny such an approach, see e.g. Akalanka's Svarūpasambodhana: 'Acknowledge that the essence of the real thing is the thing) itself and the other by virtue of the nature of the real thing." Clearly, atiśaya cannot be considered to correspond to parameters or stand for the dravyārthika and paryāyārthika viewpoints.
Further, Akalanka's riposte to Dharmakīrti (PV 3.182) in his Nyāyaviniscaya points out the general misrepresentation of the main idea behind the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description. His strutegy is to demonstrate that Dharmakirti commits 'the fallacy of criticism' (dūşaņābhāsa):
Your false riposte with respect to the [inferable property of our thesis) is a counterfeit rejoinder (as a formal flaw in discourse to blame) on the enemies of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality, just like one injunction (concerning
both yoghurt and camel] due to the undesired consequence of non-difference of yoghurt and camel.2 He further ironically points out the consequences of Dharmakirti's understanding of anekānta:
19 TBV 243,1211.: athu sajūliyavijatiyavyävrtiam niramsam vastu latsāmarthyabhāvini ca pratyakşe tat tathaiva
pralibhāli, lad ullarakālabhāvinas Iv avastusamnsparsino vikalpāh vyāvartyavastuvasavibhinnavyāvrilinibandhanan
sāmānyabhedän vyāville vastuny upakalpayantah samupajāyante na ladvaśāi iadvyavasthā yuktā, ariprasargāl. NO NViV 2.203 (233,1911.): lathā hi - tad api tadatadātmake vastuni düşanam uddhusyamānam na lävat sāmānya
višesälmake bhuvitum arhari, dadhyādyanvayinah sāmānyasyaikasyābhāväl. sädrsyapariņāmo hi sämūnyam, tac ca dadhyādiparyavasilum eva na kimcid api salvam anyad vā samanvitam asti nilatajjnanayoh sārüpyaval. tat katham
dudhyustruyor ekuivam yala ekacodanāyām unyatrāpi pravruih. " SSam 20ab: sum purumi celi vastu vani vasturüpena bhävaya/ 82 NVI, 371 (79,29-30) = NVi, 2.203 (vol. II 233,2,6):
tatra mith yollaram jātih yarhānekāntavidvişäm / dadliyuştrūder abhedarvaprasangad ekacodanam //

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Also the Buddha was (once] born as a deer, and the deer is known as the [future] Buddha. Nevertheless, the Buddha is venerated, [whereas the deer is eaten, in accordance with what is accepted. Since the [relative difference and non-difference [between things (e.g. the Buddha and the deer)] is established only by force of the real thing (which is emphasised) in such a manner, why should the person enjoined as follows: "Eat
yoghurt!", run towards the camel?"83 These two verses, especially the phrase mrgaḥ khyādyo yathesyate, parodies Dharmakirti's ridicule contained in PV 3.182 (codito dadhi khāda...).
4.2. The above comparison of the main features in Dharmakirti's account of anekānta (see § 2.2.) and the way the doctrine is explicated by the Jainas themselves ( 3.) leads us to the conclusion that, in his account of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality, Dharmakīrti is off the mark as regards several points. Apart from the arguments formulated by the Jaina thinkers and summarised above that concern Dharmakirti's account of the Jaina understanding of the universal (88 4.1.1.1.. 4.1.2.) and the particular ($ 4.1.1.2.), we can mention a few more in the following.
4.2.1. The qualified identity or difference, predicated of with the modal operator syāt, does not entail complete (ekänta) identity or difference of the predicated object.
4.2.2. No Jaina text consulted by me refers to some ultimate quality (atiśaya)reported in PVSV (183.1), or any kind of special character (višeşa) which would qualify things and by virtue of which we could predicate of the things as being either identical or different. In Jaina works there seems to be no mention of things that are x-visişta, where x would be such a special quality. On the contrary, some Jaina thinkers explicitly deny there exists any such ultimate quality (atiśaya). Haribhadra, while refuting Dharmakirti's account of anekāntavāda, ironically states in his Anekāntajayapatākā:
[9] Hence, there is indeed) some ultimate quality in this [yoghurt) by virtue of whose singular character (the person enjoined) acts (with respect to the yoghurt, not with respect to the camel]. [And] that is nothing but yoghurt. Thus it is not [the case that there exists the ultimate quality], because that would go against the fact that (yoghurt) is an existing substance. [10] Therefore this ultimate quality does exist (as the substance of yoghurt as such). It does not exist in anything else, and there is nothing else at all except for these two (sc. the yoghurt and the camel). Accordingly, since the true nature [of yoghurt) is well established, there is no fault (with the doctrine of multiplexity of reality).
* NVI, 373-4 (p. 80) = NVi2 2.204-5 (vol. II 234, 1-4):
sugato 'pi mrgo jato mrgo 'pi sugatah smrtah/ tathāpi sugato vandyo mrgaḥ khyādyo yathesyate II tathā vastubalād eva bhedäbhedavyavasthiteh/
codito dadhi khäderi kim ustram abhidhävati // 84 Vol. I 297,13-14 (kā. 9-10):
alo 'sty alisayas tatra yena bhedena vartate / sa dadhy every ado neti saddravyarvänuvedhatah // 9 // fatah so 'sti na canyatra na cäpy anubhayam param/ evam tallvavyavasthāyām avadyam nästi kimcana // 10 //

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Dharmakini's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekäntavāda)
23
Another example of a philosopher who rejects it is Prabhācandrasūris. The existence of any kind of special quality is thus denied, and indeed it is hard to find a trace of it also in earlier Jaina sources.
4.2.3. In opposition to what Dharmakirti claims (vide supra $ 2.2.1.f.), no Jaina text consulted by me speaks of the identity of two unrelated things x = y. Instead, the formulation of the syāt proposition is one of the following:
(a) an incomplete sentence of the sort: 0 (uis ...), o (x is not ... ), etc., in which no explicit predicate is mentioned; (b) a modal statement in which the subject is predicated of in terms of a predicate: 0 (x is P), where P is a property,
0 (x is non-P), etc.: (c) a modal statement-c.g. syāt ghato ghatah, syāt ghato 'ghatah etc. (see $ 3.6.) - that links a member of a class to
the class of the kind oa EA, (a E-A), etc. by virtue of a property P all the members of the class possess;
therefore, this kind of statements can be reduced to the pattern of $ 4.2.3.(b): 0 (x is P), o (x is non-P), etc.; (d) rather rare type: 0 (xis x-related), o (x is non-x-related) etc., where the relation is strictly causal, based on the idea
of the triad: origination (utpäda), cessation (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya), e.g. 'a pot is, in a certain sense, a lump of clay (syūd ghalo mrdpindah: 0 (uis X-related)), 'a pot is not, in a certain sense, a lump of clay' (syād ghalo mrdpindo năsti, o x is non-X-related)); what Haribhadrasūri formulates is already implied by the two verses of Prasamurutiprakarana: (204) Whatever is characterised by origination, destruction and permanence, all that with no exception exists. It is predicated of as something existent, something non-existent or otherwise (sc. inexpressible as well as the remaining permutations) on account of whether a particular (property) is emphasised or not emphasised. [205] The production, [caused] by [the substratum) y, is of such an object x which was not there in the substratum ), and is seen presently there in the substratum) y. The opposite of this is the destruction of the object)
4.2.4. In Dharnakūti's account we see absolute absence of the four parameters dravyaksetrakālabhāva (vide supra $ 3.5.) which, at a point, become essential in Jaina exposition of syādvāda.
4.2.5. Dharmakirti does not seem to notice an important distinction between the substantial aspect of dravya and the modal, transient aspect of paryāya that are at the basis of such propositions as syäd asti and syān nästi, respectively, etc. That oversight is unhesitatingly pointed out by Säntisūri in the Nyāyāvatārasütravāritika, while directly referring to Dharmakirti's verse: 'One should not claim the following: ... [PV 3.182], because also the aspect of the mode is to be taken into account. It is only in that way that the seven-fold modal description is [properly] established. For it is as follows: When one wants to express the primary character of the substance, then one asserts: "ris, in a certain sense, [P]." Similarly, [When one wants to express the primary character) of the mode, one [asserts): "ris, in a certain sense, not-[P]." When one wishes to express the contention that both
** NKC, Vol. 2 463,5-6: ...kimcil sat samastasad iti, evam asad api. sampurnaniratiśayas vātmana eva tu vastulvād
nirūpyam - katamat tal kva vā kimcilsallvam asaltvam vā? etarhi nirüpyate - nanv idam eva tad ekasaltāsad asad
api asamarthagavaval. 0 Comp. Haribhudrusüri's account in PRPT. * PRP 204 205: ulpädavi gamanilyalvalaksanam yar tad asli sarvam api /
sad asud vā bhavality anyathārpilānarpitaviseșät // 204 // yo roho yasmin näbhul sampralakäle ca drsyale latra / lenolpädas tasya vigumus tu tusmād viparyāsah // 205 //

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are primary at the same time, then [one asserts]: "x is, in a certain sense, inexpressible." These [three) are the cases of the complete (sc. basic) account. The combinations of precisely these [three] yield another four angles. And these [remaining four] are the cases of the incomplete account insofar as they are based on the arrangement of the elements of these three). [The permutations] are as follows: ".xis, fin a certain sense,] [P] and is not-Pl": "x is, sin a certain sense. [P] and is inexpressible"; "x is, [in a certain sense,] [P] and is not-[P], and is inexpressible." Thus, no other angle is possible. 88
What is important, the parameterisation of the modal propositions within the framework of the seven-fold modal description had already become a standard procedure among the Jainas before Dharmakīrti, for examples see $$ 3.1.3., 3.5., 3.6, so Dharmakirti must, at least should, have been aquatinted with it.
4.2.6. We come across similar criticism against a charge of the identity of two unrelated things x = y (vide supra $ 2.2.1.f. and 4.2.3.), expressed by Samantabhadra. He explains that any two things can be regarded as equal and unequal the way a substance and its modes can be interpreted as identical and different:
[70] Because of the contradiction, there cannot be selfsameness of nature of both phenomena that are opposed in nature, which is incriminated) by the enemies of the method of the seven-fold modal description. Also when la charge is expressly formulated by the opponents that if sa thing is indescribable it is findescribable in the absolute sense, then (such a charge] is not logically tenable because, [that being the case, it is seen to be expressible. 171] The substance and the mode are one, insofar as there is no disassociation of these two (sc. they are invariably related) and insofar as these two always undergo [their respectivel particular kind of transformation due to the relationship that holds between these two of the potentiality bearer (sc. substance) and the potentialities (sc. modes). 172] On the other hand, since these two have their particular designations and their particular numerical character (SC. substance is one, modes are many), since they have their unique natures and since there is a distinction between them in terms of their purpose etc.. [therefore there is difference between them. However, [the difference is not in the absolute sense.
** NASV 35 8 30, p. 93.26-94.4: na caitad vāc yam
sarvasyobhayarūpafve ladviseșaniräkrieh/
codito dadhi khăderi kim ustra näbhidhāvari // PV 3.182 11 paryāyanayasyāpy abhyupagamäl, ata eva saplabhangi siddhyati. tatha hi - yada dravyasya prādhanyam Vivaksate lada "syād asti ili katlyule. yathä paryāyāņām tadā "syān năsti" iti. yada yugapad ublayapradhanyapratipādanan vivaks yale taldā "avaklavyam." ele sakalādeśāh. tatsamyoga eväpare calvaro bhanga bhavanti. le ca svāvayavāpekşuyä vikalādesah. Tad yuiha-asli ca nāsti ca. asti cāvaktavya ca. nästi cävaktavyam ca, asti ca năsti
cüvaktavyam cu ili näparabhangasambhavah. * Here: avācva-avaklavya, in the sense of the third (or fourth) modal proposition (syäd avaklavyam).
AMi 70cd is apparently a reply to PVSV (184.22}: na hy avāc yam artham buddhayah samihante. The verse of AMi 70 (kārya-kärana) is a repetition of ĀMi 13 (abhāva-bhāva), and it recurs again and again in Samantabhadra's work: 32 (sāmānya-viseșa), 55 (nilya-anitya), 74 (apeksika-anapekṣika), 77 (pratyakşa-agama), 82 (antarjñevabahirjñeya), 90 (daiva-adaiva), 94 (punya-pāpa), 97 (ajñāna-jñāna). In each case ublaya (in ubhayaikāmyam)
changes its meaning, here supplied by me in brackets. ° AMi 70-72:
virodhän nobhayaikātmyam syädvädanyayavidvisām /

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The implication of Samantabhadra's exposition, which I believe is directly prompted by Dharmakirti, is that any two entities can be considered both as identical and different in accordance with the substance-expressive (dravyärthikanaya) and the mode-expressive (paryāyarthikanaya) viewpoints (see pp. 11, 14, 16), where the two viewpoints serve as parameters.
5. To conclude, we easily see some points in Dharmakīrti's account of the anekāntavāda that significantly diverge from the genuine doctrine as it is represented by Jaina philosophers themselves. Now wonder that the Jainas are keen to demonstrate how greatly Dharmakīti misrepresents it. It is particularly Akalanka who ridicules Dharmakīrti on that basis:
You who are someone who proves the manifold continuum of cognition (which grasps) something impermanent (as represented in falsc appearance (and) who criticises, indeed, the statements (sc. saptabhangi) of cognition of truth,
you are a jester. Vādirājasūri follows the suit: 'Therefore, (when Dharmakinti] has not understood the opinion of the propounder of modal description, and [still] formulates this [objection) against him, [the objection] reveals Dharmakirti's nature of jester: "Someone who has not understood the initial position [of his opponents) and yet criticises is a jester", 19 the last line being a pun (avijñāya DŪŞAKO 'pi VIDŪŞAKAN).
In these acts of derision they reciprocate Dharmakīrti's own tactics, who calls his opponents shameless' (ahrikāh) and their theory 'primitive and confused' (aslīlam ākulam) in PV 3.181. Both approaches seem to be compatible neither with the Jaina and Buddhist principles of ahimsā or kurunā.
The question arises whether the points Dharmakirti 'missed' can be justified historically with his poor acquaintance with the Jaina doctrine? That supposition seems highly unlikely to me, although one cannot exclude the possibility that what Dharmakirti depicts are some early developments of the theory. Rather Dharmak ürti deliberately invents his own example of the camel and the yoghurt in order to graphically emphasise the paradoxes he believed Jaina theory contained, but also in order to draw a caricature of it with his sharp tongue. His approach is reductionist in the sense that
avāc yalaikänie 'py ukrir nāvācyam iti yujyate // 70 // dravyaparyāyor aik vam tayor avyatirekatah/ parināmuviseşác ca sakrimacchaktibhāvatah // 71 // sanjūsurikliyāvisesūc ca svalaksanavišesatah/
prayojunüdibhedäc ca tannānārvam na sarvatha // 72 // SVI 3.26 (412):
mitlivärthabhäsilirajnánacitrasantänasādhakah/
Tallvajñünagiram anga düşakas tvain vidūsakah // See also SVIV 6.37 (437,22-25):
dadhyādau na pravarteta bauddhah tadbhuktaye janah/ adrsyāmi sungain latra tanüm samankamānakah // dadhyüdikeluha bhukie na bhuktam kañcikädikam/
ily asou vellu no veli na bhuktā saugali tanuh // NViV 2.203 (233.26 27): fatah syödvädimatam anavabuddhya tatredam ucyamanam dharmakirler vidulisakatvam ävedayali "purvapakşam uvijñaya düşako 'pi vidūşakal" INVi) ili prasiddheh.

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he redraws and simplifies essential elements of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality for his main objective is not a doxographic report but a successful tactics to win over the opponent.
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PV
Piotr Balcerowicz
Prakāśana, Vārāṇasī 1949, 1955 [2nd edition: Bharatiya Jñānapṛha Prakāśana, New Delhi 2000]. Vādirājasūri: Nyāyaviniścayavivarana. See: NViz.
Pannavaṇāsulta [Prajñāpanāsūtra]. Muni Punyavijaya, Dalsukh Mälvania, Amritlal Mohanlal Bhojak (ed.): Pannavanäsuttam. 2 parts, Jaina-Agama-Series 9 (Part 1, 2), Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyalaya, Bombay 1969, 1971.
Umāsvāti: Prasamaratiprakaraṇa. (1) Rajakumāra
(ed.):
[Śrīharibhadrasuriviracitațīkānkita]. prabhavaka Mandala, Śrīmad Rajacandra Āśrama, Agās 2514 (Vīra Samvat) [= 1989].
Śrīmadumāsvātiviracita Śrīmad-rājacandra-jaina-śāstra-mālā,
Prasamaratiprakarana Śrī-parama-śruta
(2) Yajneshwar S. Shastri: Acārya Ūmāsvāti Vācaka's Prasamaratiprakaraṇa. Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 107, Bharatiya Sanskrit Vidyamandir - L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad 1989.
Haribhadrasuri: Prasamaratiṭīkā. See: PRP, and PRP2.
Kundakunda: Pavayaṇasara [Pravacanasara]. A.N. Upadhye (ed.): Śrī Kundakundācārya's Pravacanasara (Pavayaṇasāra), a Pro-Canonical Text of the Jainas, the Prakrit Text critically edited with the Sanskrit Commentaries of Amṛtacandra and Jayasena. Śrī ParamaśrutaPrabhavaka-Mandala, Śrīmad Rajacandra Asrama, Agās (Gujarat) 1984. [first edition: Bombay
1935].
Kundakunda: Pavayaṇasara [Pravacanasara]. A.N. Upadhye (ed.): Śrī Kundakundācārya's Pravacanasara (Pavayaṇasāra), a Pro-Canonical Text of the Jainas, the Prakrit Text critically edited with the Sanskrit Commentaries of Amṛtacandra and Jayasena. Parama-Śruta-Prabhavaka Mandal, Shrimad Rajachandra Ashrama, Agās-Gujarat 1984. [First edition: Bombay 1935]. Kundakunda: Pamcatthiyasamgaha [Pañcāstikāyasamayasāra].
(1) A. Chakravartinayanar and A.N. Upadhye (ed.): Pañcāstikāyasāra. The Building of the Cosmos. Prakrit text, Sanskrit chāyā, English commentary etc. Bharatiya Janapitha Prakāśana, New Delhi 1975. [1. edition: The Sacred Books of the Jainas 3, Kumar Kendra Prasada - The Central Jaina Publishing House, Arrah 1920].
(2) Manoharlal (ed.): Śrīmatkundakundasvāmiviracitaḥ Pañcāstikāyaḥ TattvapradipikātātparyavṛttiBālāvabodhakabhāṣeti tīkātrayopetaḥ. Śrī Paramaśruta-Prabhavaka-Mandala, Śrīmad Rajacandra Asrama, Agās (Gujarat) 1997.
Dharmakirti: Pramāṇavārttika.
(1) Rāhula Sankṛtyāyana (ed.): Pramāṇavārttikam by Acārya Dharmakirti. Appendix to Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24, Patna 1938: 1–123.
(2) Rahula Sankṛtyāyana (ed.): Pramāṇavārttikam AcāryaManorathanandikṛtayā vṛityā samvalitam [Dharmakirti's Pramāṇavārttikam with a commentary by Manorathanandin]. Parts III, Appendix to Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24-26, Patna 1938-1940. (3) See: PVA.
(4) Dalasukha Malavaniyā (ed.): Acārya Dharmakirti kṛta Svārthānumānapariccheda. General Edition: V.S. Agarwala, Hindu Vishvavidyalaya Nepal Rajya Sanskrit Series 2, Varanasi [1959]. (5) Raniero Gnoli (ed.): The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakirti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes. Serie Orientale Roma 23, Ismeo, Roma 1960. (6) See: Mookerjee-Nagasaki (1964).
(7) Svāmī Dvārikādās Sastri (ed.): Dharmakirtti Nibandhawali (1): Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakirti with the Commentary 'Vṛtti' of Acharya Manorathanandin. BBS 3, 1968 [reprinted: 1984].
(8) Yusho Miyasaka (ed.): 'Pramāṇavārttikakārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan).' [Chapter 2 = Pramāṇasiddhi, Chapter 3 = Pratyakṣa, Chapter 4 = Parārthānumāna]. Acta Indologica [indokoten-kenkyu] 2 (1971/72) 1-206 [Narita: Naritasan Shinshoji].
(9) Ram Chandra Pandeya (ed.): The Pramāṇavārttikam of Acārya Dharmakirti with

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Dharmakini's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda)
PVA
PVSV PVSVT
PVV
RVār
SBT
Schubring 1962
Shah 2000
Soni 2003
Subcommentaries: Svopajsavrti of the Author and Pramāņavārtikavrti of Manorathanandin. MB, 1989. [the chapter numbering follows: PV2). Prajñākarugupia: Pramāņavārttikālankāra. Tripitakācharya Rahula Sankrtyāyana (ed.): Pramūnavārtikabhāsyam or Vārtikālankārah of Prajñākaragupta. (Being a commentary on Dharmakirti's Pramānavārtikam). Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1953. Dharmakirti: Pramāņavārttikasvavrtti. See: (4) PV4. (5) PVs and (9) PV.. Karnakagomin: Pramānavārtikasvavrtritikā. Rāhula Sankrtyāyana (ed.): ĀcāryaDharmakirteh Pramūnavārtikam (svārthānumānaparicchedah) svopajñavrttyā Karnakagomiviracitayā tattīkayā ca sahitam. Kitab Mahal, Ilāhābād [Allahabad) 1943 (reprinted: Kyoto 1982]. Manorathanandin: Pramāņavārttikavrti. See: PV, PV, PV, Akalanka: Tall värthavärlika (Rajavārtika). Mahendra Kumar Jain (ed.): Taltvārthavārtika [Rajavarttikal of Sri Akalarkadeva. Edited with Hindi Translation, Introduction, Appendices, Variant Readings, Comparative Notes etc. Parts I-II. First edition, JMJG 10, 20 [Sanskrit Graniha), D 1953-1957. [2. ed.: D 1982). Vimaladūsa: Saptabhangītarangini. Manoharlal (ed.): Srimadvimaladāsaviracilā Saptabhangitarangini. Sri Parunasrutu-Prabhävaka-Mandala, Srimad Rājacandra Asrama, A gäs (Gujara) 1995 [first edition.: 1913). W. Schubring: The Doctrine of the Jainas. Translated from the German by Wolfgang Beurlen, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi 1962 [reprinted: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi 1978. Reedited with the three indices enlarged and added by Willem Bollée and Jayandra Soni, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi 2000). J.N. Shah (ed.): Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truih. Bhogilal Leharchand Institute of Indology, Delhi 2000. J. Soni: Kundak unda and Umāsvāti on Anekānta-vāda." In: Piotr Balcerowicz (ed.): Essays in Jaina Philosophy and Religion. Warsaw Indological Studies 2, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi 2003 25-35. Akalanka: Svarūpasambodhana. Kallapa Bharamāppa Nitve (hrsg.): Laghiyasirayādisangrahah. 1. bhuttākalarkadevakriam Laghiyastrayam, Anantakīrtiracitatāt pāryavrttisahitam, 2. bhattakalankudevakram Svarūpasambodhanam, 3-4. Anantakirtikrtalaghubrhatsarvajñasiddhi ca. Mānikacandra-Digambara-Jaina-Grantha-mālā 1, Bombay 1975: 7-4-106. Pūjyupāda Devanandin: Sarvārthasiddhi. (1) Phoolchandra Shastri (ed.): Acārya Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi The commentary on Acārya Griddhapiccha's Tanvārthasūtral. Edited and translated into Hindi). Varanasi 1934 [reprinted: Jñānapitha Mūrtidevi Jaina Grantha-mālā, Bharatiya Jñanapitha Prakāśana 13, Delhi 2000). Siddhusena Divākara: Sammatitarkaprakarana. (1) Sukhlal Sanghavi; Becurdās Doši (ed.): Sarmalitarkaprakaranam by Siddhasena Divākara with Abhayadevasūri's Tatívabodhavidhāyini. Gujarātpurătattvamundirgranthāvali 10, 16, 18, 19, 21, Gujarāl-purū-tattva-mandir, Amdāvād 1924-1931 (reprinted: 2 Vols., Rinsen Buddhist Text Series VI-1, 2; Kyoto 1984). Akalanka Bhatta: Siddhiviniscaya. Mahendrakumār Jain (ed.): Siddhiviniscaya of Akalarka edited with the commentary Siddhiviniscayarīkā of Anantavirya. 2 Vols. BhJP, V 1959. Ananiavīrya: Siddhiviniscayaţika. See: SVI. Akalanka Bhatta: Siddhiviniscayavivrti. See: SVI. Mallisenasūri: Svadvādamañjari. (1) See: AYVD. (2) Jagadisacandra Jain (ed.): Srimallisenasūripranila Syūdvādamañjari. Sri Param asruta-Prabhāvaka-Mandala, Srimad Rajacandra Asrama, A gūs (Gujarat) 1992. Vādidevasūri: Syādvādaratnākara. Motilal Lālāji (ed.): Srimadvādidevasūriviracitah Pramānanavalallvālokālarikārah tadvyakhyā ca Syādvādaratnākarah. 5 Vols., Poona 1926-1930 /reprinted: 2 Vols., Bhāruliya Buk Kārporesan, Dillī (Delhi) 1988). Samantabhadra: Svayambhūstotra. (1) Jugal Kisor Mukhtar 'Yugavīra' (ed., introd.): Srimatsvāmi
SSam
SSI
STP
SVi
SVIT SViV
SVM
SVR
SvSt

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30 Piotr Balcerowicz TBh TBV TS samangabhadracaryaviracita caturvimsatijinastavanatmaka Svayambhustotra (stutiparaka jainagama). Virasevamandiragranthamala 7, Vira-seva Mandira, Sarasava Jila Saharanapura 1951. (2) Devendra K. Goyal (ed., tr.): The Path to Enlightenment. Svayambhu Stotra by Acharya Samantabhdra Svami. English Translation with introduction. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi 2000. Umasvati: Tattvarthadhigamablasya. See: TS, TS2. Abhayadevasuri: Tattvabodhavidltayini. See: STP. Umasvamin: Tattvarthasutra. (1) M.K. Mody (ed.): Tattvarthadhigama by Umasvati being in the Original Sanskrit with the Bhasya by the author himself. Bibliotheca Indica Nos. 1044, 1079, 1118, Calcutta 1903, 1904, 1905. [= Svetambara Recension). (2) See: TT. [= Svetambara Recension) (3) See: SSi. [= Digambara Recension). (4) See: RVar. [= Digambara Recension). Siddhasena-ganin: Tattvarthadhigamatika. Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia (ed.): Tattvarthadhigamasutra (A Treatise on the Fundamental Principles of Jainism) by His Holiness Sri Umasvati Vachaka, together with His connective verses commented upon by Sri Devaguptasuri & Sri Siddhasenagani and His own gloss elucidated by Sri Siddlasenagani, edited with Introduction in English and Sanskrit. 2 Vols., Sheth Devchand Lalbhai Jain Pustakoddhar Fund Series Nos. 67 and 76, Jivanachand Sakerchand Javeri, Bombay 1926 (Part I: Chapters l-V), 1930 (Part II: Chapters VI-X). A.N. Upadhye: "Introduction,' See: PSa, pp. 1-120. Jinabhadra-ganin: Visesavasyakabhasya. Haragovinda Das (ed.): Visesavasyakabhasyam. Muladharisrihemacandrasuriviracitaya sisyahitanamnaya brhadvrtlya vibhusitam. . $17-Yasovijayajaina-grantha-mala 25, 27, 28, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, Shah Harakhchand Bhurabhai, Varanasi 1915. Hemacandra Maladharin Gandhavimukta: Visesavasyakavrii (Brhadvrti). See: VABh. Viyahapannalli / Viyahapannatti | Bhagavaiviyalapannatti [Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti / Bhagavatisutra). Bechardas J. Doshi; Amritlal Mohanlal Bhojak (ed.): Viyahapannattisultain. 3 parts, Jaina-Agama-Series 4 (Part 1, 2, 3), Sri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, Bombay 1974, 1978, 1982. Upadhye 1935 VABh VAV! Viy