Dharmakirtis Criticism Of Jaina Doctrine Of Multiplexity Of Reality Anekantavada

SR No.: 269204
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz
Publication Year: 2005
Total Pages: 30
Language: English
Classification: Article
File Size: 4 MB

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Dharmakirti's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda)
anekāntavāda, beside the doctrine of viewpoints (nayavada) and the method of the four standpoints (nikṣepavāda, nyāsavāda). The expressions are the following ones:
(181.2) (184.3) syad ustro dadhi syan na
(183.1) asty atisayaḥ kaścid yena bhedena vartate
1184.9) kathamcid avyavasthapiteṣu vidhipratisedhāyogāt
The exact sources for Dharmakirti cannot be identified. Furthermore, it seems that none of these passages is a genuine quotation, albeit they do have authentic Jaina sources in the background.
2.2. The first and most conspicuous reference to the anekāntavāda is the phrase syad ustro dadhi syan na ((181.2) = (184.3)). This is clearly an echo of, or what should look like a quotation from a Jaina source instantiating the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description (syādvāda), the characteristic trait of which is the use of the modal operator syāt. I shall first attempt to reconstruct the picture of syādvāda as it emerges from Dharmakirti's exposition and criticism of it, including the commentaries.
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2.2.1. In none of the two occurrences of the phrase in question does Dharmakirti offer the logical reason why a camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, and is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt. In not supplying the logical reason for the syat thesis Dharmakirti is in agreement with Jaina practice, insofar as no Jaina text consulted by me mentions logical reason in such a context either. Only Karnakagomin and Manorathanandin supply the justification for the Jaina thesis: 'A camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, because [these two] are identical as consisting in a substance etc. [A camel] is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt, because the circumstances of yoghurt are different from the circumstances of the camel;"45 and 'A camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, because [both] are real things. On the other hand, [a camel] is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt as something that has a particular."
The logical reasons adduced by them (dravyādirūpatayaikatvāt and °—avasthāyā bhinnatvāt, vastutvāt and viseṣarūpatayā, respectively) are clear references to the substance-expressive (dravyarthika) and the mode-expressive (paryayarthika) viewpoints, already amply attested in the Jaina literature prior to Dharmakirti, e.g. in Kundakunda's Pavayaṇasāra, in Siddhasena Divākara's
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or PVSVT 183 (339,23-24): syad ustro dadhi, dravyādirūpatayaikatvāt. syān na dadhi uṣṭrāvasthāto dadhyavasthāyā bhinnatvät.
PVV2 3.180 (352,8-9) = PVV, 3.181 (212,15-16) PVV, 3.181 (262,21-22): syad ustro dadhi vastutvāt. na vā syad ustro viseṣarūpatayā.
47 PSă 2.22-23 (p. 144-146): davvatthiena savvam davvam tam pajjayatthiena puno
havadi ya annam aṇannam takkale tammayattādo //
atthi tti ya natthi tti ya havadi avattavvam idi puno davvam payyayena du kena vi tad ubhayam adiṭṭham annam vā ||
[22] From a substance-expressive viewpoint every substance is the same. However, from a mode-expressive viewpoint, [every substance] becomes also different. [Every substance] is non-different, [i.e. identical with other substances], because it consists in it (sc. substance) at its own time, [viz. when it is taken into consideration]. [23] Further, the substance can be said (1) to exist, (2) not to exist and (3) to be inexpressible. However, taking a particular mode [into consideration] it is explained to (4) be both (sc. it both exists and does not exist) or otherwise.