Dharmakirtis Criticism Of Jaina Doctrine Of Multiplexity Of Reality Anekantavada

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269204/1

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to be published in the Proceedings of the Fourth International Dharmakirti Conference (August 23-27, 2005) Dharmakirti's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) Piotr Balcerowicz, Warszawa 1. As it is well-known, in his PV/PVSV 3.181-184 Dharmakirti briefly criticises the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada). In this paper I will attempt to identify possible sources of Dharmakirti's inspiration in Jaina literature, to analyse his account of the Jaina theory as well as discuss Jaina response to his criticism. 1.1. The whole passage of PV/PVSV4 3.183-187 (59,2461,29) = PV/PVSV, 3.181-185 (89,22- 93,5) = PV/PVSV, 3.181cd-185 (262,18-265,20) reads as follows: (181.1) etenaiva yad ahrikah kim apy aslilam akulam / pralapanti pratiksiplam tad apy ekantasambhavat // 181 // By this (refutation of the Samkhya theory, viz. by proving that all things are discrete,'] that really primitive and confused [theory] the shameless (Jainas) nonsensically profess is also disproved, because singular character [of reality] (sc. absolutely discrete entities) is possible. (181.2) yad ayam ahrikah syad ustro dadhi syan neti kim apy aslilam ayuktam aheyopadeyam aparinisthanad akulam pralapanti. (181.3) tad apy anena nirastam svabhavenaikantabhedat. What the shameless [Jainas) nonsensically profess, namely: "a camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, (and) is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt," [a theory] which is really primitive, inconsistent and is not relevant to what should be avoided and to what should be appropriated (sc. is useless) - insofar as it does not help establish [that which should be avoided and that should be appropriated] - [and is therefore] confused, also that [theory) is refuted by this [refutation of the Samkhya theoryl, because [things) in (their) essential nature are different in the absolute sense {181.3) tadanvaye va. (182.1) sarvasyobhayarupalve tadvisesanirakrteh / codito dadhi khadeti kim ustram nabhidhavati // 182 112 Or, if [one admits that there is (some kind of) association [between entities (or: between a camel and yoghurt) that are discrete in their essential natures, then...) Since - if everything [is supposed to have a form of both - [any) distinction between these [entities (or: between the camel and yoghurt)] would be revoked, then why does a person enjoined as follows: "Eat yoghurt!", not run towards the camel? PVSVT: etenaiveti sarvasyarthasya bhedasadhanena. 2 The verse is quoted in: TBV 242,27-28; NASV 35 $ 30, p. 93,27; NKC 620,20-21; AJP I 23,2-3; AVP 7; AsS 9, 92,22-93,1; NViV I 177,19-20; NViV 2.203 (233,11); SVR 837,##; [SVIT 124,27]; [SVIT 212,24]: [SViT 615,19); [SVIT 749,11). Viz. either (1) 'of the universal and of the particular' (samanyavisesarupa) or (2) 'of itself and of the other' (sva

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Piotr Balcerowicz (182.2) tatha hy ustro 'pi syad dadhi napi sa evostrah yenanyo 'pi syad ustrah. tatha dadhy api syad ustrah napi tad eva dadhi yenanyad api syod dadhi. (182.3) iad anayor ekasyapi kasyacil tadrupabhavas yabhavat svarupasya vatadbhavinah svuniyalasyabhavat na kascid visesa iti. (182.4) dadhi khadeti codita ustram api khadet. For it is as follows: a camel is, as you say,] in a certain sense, yoghurt; it is not the case that the camell is only a camel, because likewise the camel is also, in a certain sense, something else [than merely a camel). Similarly, also yoghurt is, in a certain sense, a camel; it is not the case that this (yoghurt) is only yoghurt, because yoghurt is also, in a certain sense, something else (than merely yoghurt). Therefore, since any of these two (the camel and yoghurt) lacks the absence of the form of the other or (any of these two (e.g. the camel)] lacks the intrinsic nature which is not present in the other (e.g. in yoghurt) (and) which is confined [only] to itself (e.g. to the camel), there is no distinction whatsoever between the camel and yoghurt). [Accordingly, someone enjoined as follows: "Eat yoghurt!" could eat camel as well. (183.1) athasty atisayah kascid yena bhedena vartale/ sa eva dadhi so 'nyalra nastity anubhayam param // 183 //' If the Jaina says that there is indeed some ultimate quality by virtue of whose singular character [the person enjoined as above) acts with respect to the yoghurt, not with respect to the camel, then what follows is that the entity] does not have both natures but eventually) is (only something different: that very lultimate quality is yoghurt and that ultimate quality is not present in any other thing, c.g. in the camel). {183.2} athanayoh kascid alisayo 'sti yenayam tatha coditah ksiravikara eva pravarlate nanyatra. (183.3) sa' evalisavo 'rthakriyarihipravritivisayo dadhi. taiphalavisesopudanabhavalaksitasvabhavam hi vastu dadhiti. (183.4} sa ca tadrsah svabhavo nyara nastiti" pravrilyabhavad arthinah. tasmat tan nobhayarupamily ekantavadah. api ca. If the Jaina says that these two (sc. the camel and yoghurt) indeed have some ultimate quality by virtue of which this person enjoined in such a manner [to eat yoghurt) proceeds only towards the modification of milk (sc. yoghurt), and not towards anything else (c.g. the camel), then precisely this ultimate quality alone is yoghurt (itself), which is the scope of the activity of the person) aiming at executing causally efficient action. For yoghurt is [here the real thing whose essential nature is characterised by the condition that allows the appropriation of its particular result. And such essential nature of this kind does not exist in any other thing (e.g. in the camel), because the person enjoined to eat curd and) aiming at (executing causally efficient action does not undertake activity with respect to the other thingl. Therefore, this lyoghurt) does not have both forms (viz. of itself and of the camel). Such is the proof of the doctrine of absolutely singular character of reality (sc. the refutation of Jaina anekantavada). (184.1) sarvarmalve ca sarvesam bhinnau syatam na dhidhvani/ pararupa). For the discussion on the meaning of ubhayarupa see $ 1.3. + PVSVs: napi. $ AJPI 23,8: ad evam. Reading confirmed also in AJP. PVSV : va tadbhavinah. The verse is quoted in: TBV 242,29-30; NViV I 177,21-22; NViV II 233,15-16; AJP 1 24,5-6. * Cf. the paraphrase of the argument by Vadirajasuri in NViV II 2.203 (233,11-16): tad uktam "sarvasyobhayari palve" (PV 3.182) ityadi. vidyata eva dadhani kascid viseso yato na karabhatvam tasyeli cel, tarhi sa eva dadliti vaktavyam tata eva tatphalasya trplyader bhavat, sa ca na karabhadau astiti katham tadatatsvabhavaivam bhavanam yala ekantavada eva prasasto na bhavel, idam apy abhihitam: arhasty alisavah kascid yenu bledena vartale / sa eva dadhi so 'nyatra nastity anubhayam varam // [PV 3.183] AJP I 24.8: evam larhi sa. 10 AJP I 24.10: nasti. " AJP I 24,11: Tasman noblayarupam. 12 AJP I 25.6: bhavanam.

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Dharmakirti's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) bhedasamharavadasya tadabhavad asambhavah // 184 // If everything were of the nature of everything, then cognitions (mental images) and linguistic units would not be different [from each other]. Since these [cognitions and linguistic units] are not [non-different], the doctrine of the intermixed character of individual entities is impossible. (184.2) so 'yam alrikah' kvacid apy ekam akaram pratiniyatam apasyan vibhagabhavad bhavanam katham asamsrstanyakaravatya buddhyadhimucyetarthan" abhilaped va. {184.3) tato bhedagrahat tatsamharavado na syat syad ustro dadhi syan neti. atha punar asamsrstav akarau pratipadya samharet! (184.4) ekarupasamsarginyah buddheh kvacit pratiniyamat tatpratibhasabhedakrta eva tayo" rupayoh svabhavabhedo 'pi syat, ekanekavyavasthiteh pratibhasavisayatvat. (184.5) tatha ca naikas tadubhayarupah syad iti mithyavada esah. (184.6) sthitam etat na bhavanam kascit svabhavanvayo 'sti bhedalaksanam eva tu samanyam. (184.7) athaca prakrtya kecid ekajnanadiphalah kecin neli. This very shameless [Jaina] does not notice that one (particular] form is invariably confined to a certain entity (e.g. a camel or yoghurt); since there is supposedly) no (essential] distinction between entities, how would he get actively 13 A possible response to the above PV 3.40 41 is AMi 11: sarvatmakam tad ekam syad anyapohavyatikrame / anyatra samavayena vyapadisyeta sarvatha // This (real thing (AsS: tattvam)] is in a certain sense of the nature of everything, if we put aside (the Buddhist theory of the exclusion of the other. If [the real thing) resided in something else [than itself (its own nature)], it could not be designated in any respect (at all). That AMill is treated as a reply to Dharmakirti is confirmed by PVSVT ad PVSV 40, p. 109 which quote AMillab: yo 'pi digambaro manyate "sarvatmakam ekam syad anyapohavyatikrame" tasmad bheda evanyatha na syad anyonyabhavo bhavanam yadi na bhaved iti. In the background of the discussion regarding the charge 'if everything were of the nature of everything, there is also the theory of sarvasarvatmakatva, viz. 'the identity of everything with everything,' which is mentioned side by side with, and clearly distinguished from the doctrine of satkaryavada by Mallavadin Ksamasramana in DNC 173,1-2: evam ca kalpyamanam sarvasarvatmakatvasatkaryatvamularahasyanatiremena kalpitam. On sarvasarvatmakatva see Wezler: Wezler 1981 and Wezler 1982. Whereas the well-known doctrine of the pre-existence of effect [in its cause)' (satkaryavada) was to explain how phenomena occur, being only transformations of (from) an already existent substratum, the concept of sarvasarvalmakatva stated that the substratum (here: conscious substratum) continues to exist in all its transformations which all have the same nature, being the transformations of the same substratum, see DNCV 173,12-14: evam hi "sarvam sarvatmakam sac ca karyam" it mularahasyam etan natikrantam bhavati purusatmakatvat sarvasya tadvikaramatratvac ca bhedanam tatraivantarlayavirbhavat sarvakaryanam krkalasavarnavisesanam iva krkalase. - 'For in this way, [the doctrine of the conscious principle] does not violate the following principal esoteric doctrine that everything has the essence of everything and is the existent effect," because everything has the essence of the conscious principle and because all individual things are merely modifications of this [conscious principle], insofar as all effects (sc. individual things) inhere in and have their manifestation in this [conscious principle), just like (all) particular colours of a chameleon [inhere in and are manifested in the chameleon.' Interestingly, Dharmakirti treats Jaina and Samkhya doctrines together (PV/PVSV43.183a: etenaiva), as against Mallavadin's criticism of both Samkhya and the theory of sarvasarvatmakatva. 14 AJP I 26,5: 'yam anekantavadi. AJP I 26,5 6: buddhyadhibuddhyetarthan. Cf. n. 19. 16 PVSV. = PVSV, samhared. " Reading confirmed also in AJP. PVSV4 = PVSV,: O-krta etayo. 18 PVSV, -rupa.

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Piotr Balcerowicz involved in things with his cognitive awareness, in which various forms images of things) are present as not intermixed, or talk about distinct) things? For this reason, since he does not admit any labsolute distinction [between things), there could not be any doctrine of the mixed character of these findividual entities in the form: "La camell is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, [and] is not, in a certain sense, Lyoghurt]." If, however, la person] intermixed two different unmixed forms (of the camel and yoghurt), having cognised [them as unmixed], then - since cognitive awareness, which intermixes (them) into one form, is invariably confined to a certain entity (e.g. either a camel or yoghurt, not to both) - there would still be some distinction in essential natures of these two forms, la distinction] which would be based on the distinction of [mental] representations of these two things (e.g. a camel or yoghurt)). [It would be so), because the determination of many [forms] as one has [their representations as its contents. And, accordingly, it would not be the case that one sentity (e.g. either the camel or yoghurt)] could not have the form of both of them. Hence, this is a false doctrine. Indeed it has been established that there is no association of essential natures of entities at all, but (rather their universal character is characterised by distinction (sc. discrete character). Furthermore, some (entities generate) their results (in the form of one (common cognition by virtue of their nature, whereas others do not. (184.8) bhavalu nama bhavanam svabhavabhedah samanyam. yesam tu nirupakhyanam svabhava eva nasti Tatra kaihan svabhavabhedavisavah sabdah. [The Jaina opponent]: "Let the universal character of entities consist in the distinction of essential natures of entities, if you wish. But how can speech elements have as their contents essential natures of entities such as inexpressible (particulars) which do not have, [as you claim any essential nature at all?" {184.9} test avasyam sabdapravritya bhavyam. kaihancid avyavasthapilesu vidhipratisedhayogar (Reply:1 Of course speech elements refer necessarily to these finexpressible particulars), because affirmation (xis P') and negation (*.x is not P') are not possible with regard to [entities that are not determined one way or another (sc. cither through cognition or specch). (184.10} tatha ca sarvatrayam anvayavyalirekasrayo vyavaharo na syat usnasvabhavo gnir nanusna ity.api. svabhavantarasyasalah kathamcid avyavasthapanat. (184.11) sarvathapratipatter? agnisvabhavasyapratipattir iti vyamudham jagul syat. [Jaina opponent:] And, thus, this practical action which is based on positive concomitance (affirmation) and negative concomitance (negation) could not take place with respect to anything, that is: (the affirmation]: "fire is hot in its essential nature" and also the implied negation]: "[fire) is not not-hot," because one cannot determine one way or another something non-existent that is different from the essential nature of an entity one wants to cognise]. Since there could be no comprehension [of, say, something not-hot in every respect, there would be no comprchension of the essential nature of fire. Thus, the world would be stupefied. {184.12) syad elal na latra kasyacid asalo nisedhah anusnam sad evarthantaram nisidhyata iti. (Reply:] That would be the case; [however, in this case [of, e.g., fire, there is no negation of anything non-existent: only something really existent such as something not-hot, which is something different [from fire), is negated. {184.13) katram idanim sad asan nama. Jaina opponent: How then something which you say is non-existent is something existent? (184.14) na brumah (184.15) sarvatrasal. tatra nastiti desakaladharmanisedha eva sarvabhavesu kriyale na dharminah, tannisedhe ladvisayasabdapravrilyabhavat, anirdistavisayasya nano 'prayogai. Haribhadrusuri, while quoling the passage in AJP 26,5-6, replaces adhimucyeta with adhibuddhiyeta (n. 15), for apparently the strictly Buddhist meaning of the rare ver adhiv muc is not known to him. However, the verb is very well attested in Buddhist literature in the sense of 'intent upon; take interest in; be actively interested in.' For a list of occurrences see BHSD II 13-15, entries: adhimukta / adhimucyate. 20 Cl. SvSt, 5.5 = SvSt. 25: vidhir nisedhas ca kathancid istau vivaksaya mukhyagunavyavastha / ili pranii sumales lave yam malipravekah stuvalo 'stu naiha // 21 PVSV.: sarvatha pralipaller. 22 PVSV = PVSV,: sarvatra bhavesu.

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Dharmakirti's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) [Reply:) We do not say that (something not-hot) is non-existent in all cases. Merely the negation of place, time and property with respect to all entities is expressed in the form: "[something not-hot] is not in this [fire)," but not (the negation of the property-possessor (sc. fire), because when one negates the property-possessor), speech element the contents of which is this (property-possessor) cannot be applied, because the negation particle, the contents of which remaining unexpressed, cannot be verbally employed. (184.16) so 'pi tarhi desadipratisedhah katham. [Jaina opponent:) That being the case, how is the negation of place etc. (possible)? (184.17) yasman na tatrapi desadinam pratisedho napy arthasya. [Reply:) [It is possible), because even in that case there is neither negation of place etc. nor of the object [as such). (184.18) sambandho nisedhyata iti cet. [Jaina opponent:) "[Here] the relation [between the property (e.g. not-hot) and property-possessor (e.g. fire)] is negated." (184.19) nanu tannisedhe 'pi tulyo doso 'nisedhad"4 asati sabdapravsttir ityadi. (184.203 asato vasya nisedhe tadvad dharmino 'pi nisedhah. [Reply:) Also when this [relation] is negated, there is the same fault, because the negation is not expressed], in view of the fact that speech elements cannot be applied with respect to something non-existent (sc. relation) etc. Or, when a negation of this [relation] which is non-existent (could be expressed, this is the case of] the negation of the property-possessor as well, just like [of] the relation. (184.21) na vai sambandhasya nastiti nisedhah. kim tarhi. neha ghato nedanim naivam ity uktau2 nanena sambandho 'sti naitaddharma va iti pratitih. tatha ca sambandho nisiddho bhavariti Jaina opponent:] [With the words:) "[the relation] does not exist," [one expresses] absolutely no negation of the relation. Rather, when one says: "There is no pot here," (or) "[There is no pot] now," [or] "[There is no pot) in this condition," the understanding (arises) that there is no relation (of the pot) with this (particular place] or that [this pot) does not possess such and such properties. And in this manner the relation is negated. (184.22) tathapi kaiham nisiddho yavad asya sambandho dharmo va nastiti matir na bhavali. na casyah kathamcid bhave sambhavo 'bhavesu tathabhavat, tasmat sambandhabhavapratiter nayam ihetyadya pratitih. sa tadabhave28 na syat. pratitau va tadabhavasya. yatha pratitimatas tatprabhavah sabdah kena nivaryante. sa eva hi sabdanam na visayo yo na vitarkanam. te cei pravrttah ko vacanasya niseddha. na hy avacyam artham buddhayah samihante. sambandhasya tu svarupenanabhidhanam uktam. abhidhane sambandhitvena buddhav upasthanai. yathabhiprayam apratitih. tad ayam pratiyamano 'pi sambandhirupa eveti svarupena nabhidhiyate. tasman nabhavavat sambandhe 'pi prasangahapi cayam abhavam abhidheyam bruvanam prati pratividadhann" abruvanah katham pratividadhyat. vacane casya katham abhavo 'nuktah. athabhavam eva necchet, tenavacanam, tad evedanim katham abhavo nastiti. yat punar etad (uktam)" arthanisedhe anarthakasabdaprayogan nirvisayasya nano 'prayoga ity atroliaram vaksyate. tasmal santy abhavesu sabdah. 23 PVSVA= PVSV,: yasmat tatrapi na desadinam. PVSVs: nisedhad. PVSV, ukto. PVSV = PVSV,: bhavati. PVSVT ad loc.: nelyadi parah. 28 PVSV = PVSV, ihetyadya pratitih spat tadabhave. PVSV4 pratividadhad(nn). PVSVs: pratividadhad. 30 PVSVs: vasya. "PVSVT ad loc.: yat punar etad uktam. PVSV4 = PVSVs = PVSV, omit uktam: punar etad.

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Piotr Balcerowicz (Reply:]'? Nevertheless, how can [this relation] be negated as long as its relation or property does not exist? Hence there exists no cognition of that). And the cognition (of the kind that the relation does not exist) is not possible, when the relation] exists, because it is absent as such among non-existent things. Due to the cognition that the relation is absent, there arises) cognition the contents of which is: "there is no relation here" etc. This (cognition would not occur, if there were no (cognition of the absence of the relation), or if there were cognition of the absence of this [relation), just like for a person who has the cognition (of the absence of the relation], what prevents [him from using the speech elements which have their origin in this (cognition that there is no relation]? For whatever is not [the contents of conceptual cognitive acts is certainly not the contents of speech elements. If these conceptual cognitive acts operate, what is the factor preventing (their) expression? For acts of cognitive awareness do not concern inexpressible thing. However, it has been said that the relation, as [being grasped] by its intrinsic nature, is not explicitly expressed, because when it is expressed it is presented in cognitive awareness as a relatum (term of a relation). There is no such] cognition of it) in accordance with the intention to express it). Therefore, this [relation], even when it is being cognised, [is cognised) as having the form a relatum; consequently, it is not expressed in its intrinsic nature. Thus, there is no undesired consequence also with respect to the relation, just as there is no undesired consequence) with respect to the absence of relation. Furthermore, how could possibly such a person who wishes to contradict someone maintaining that absence can be expressed, [and] who (himself] does not maintain lit, be able to contradict? And how it is possible that absence is not expressed when this word "absence") is uttered? If one does not accept (that) absence (can be expressed), then it is inexpressible by virtue of the (nonexistence of absence). Now, how could this very [expression): "there is no absence," be possible? As regards to what is being said I now), namely: when the meaning is negated, insofar as one does not employ meaningless speech elements, then the negation particle, having no contents, cannot be employed, [and] that [ideal will be explained later on sin PV 3.207). Therefore, there are speech elements which refer to non-existent entities. (184.23) Tesu katham svabhavabheda iti. Jaina opponent:How is the distinction in essential natures among these (non-existent entities) possible? (184.24) tatrapi. Reply: Also with respect to these (non-existent entities we say the following: (185.1) rupabhavad abhavasya sabda rupabhidhayinah/ na asarkya eva siddhas te vyavacchedasya vacakah //185/1 Since absence has no intrinsic nature, speech elements are expressive of intrinsic nature. [Speech elements are by no means liable to doubt. They convey the exclusion. (185.2) vastuv!llinam sabdunam kim rupam ablidhe yam ahosvid bheda iti sanka" syul. abhavas tu vivekalaksanu eva nimillikariavyasya kasyacid rupas yabhavat tadbhave.'+ 'bhavayogat, tadbhavalaksanalvad bhavasya. Tasmad ayam eva sa mukhyo vivekah. tasya tathabhavakhyapinah sabdah kim vivekavinaya ily asthanam evaitad asarkaya). Tasmai siddham elal sarve sabda vivekavisaya vikalpas ca ta ete" ekavastupratisarana api yathasvam avadhibhedopakalpitair bhedair bhinnes iva pratibhatsu buddhau vivekesupalayanadbhinnavisava eva. tena svabhavas yaiva sadhyasadhanabhave 'pi na sadhyasadhanasamsargah. Ian na pratijnarthaikadeso heturiti sa cayam helulvenapadis yamunah. . 32 PVSVT ad loc.: luthapityacaryah. 3. PVSV. = PVSV,: sarkapi. PVSV, cmends tadabhave to tudbhave. PVSV.: lad bhave. PVSV = PVSV.: lathakhyapinah. PVSV. emends vikalpalpas ca to vikalpat: vikalpat(lpas ca). PVSV,: vikalpalpas ca. 37 PVSVA = PVSV, omitta: ete. 38 PVSV4 = PVSV,: vivekesupasthapanad. PVSVT: vivekesu bhede su vikalpanam copasthapanat. 39 PVSV = PVSV,: -desahetur.

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Dharmakirti's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) A doubt might be raised as follows: "Do speech elements which refer to real things have as their designatum [a positive) form or difference?" Absence is, however, characterised by the exclusion (of the other) only, because there is no (positive) form at all which could be taken as the factor (causing cognition / verbal concept of absence (sc. a point of reference)], insofar as if such a positive form) existed, it would not be consistent to assume absence, insofar as an [existent) entity is characterised by this (positive form). Therefore, this very (existent entity) is what is [known as the primary exclusion (of the other]. [Objection:] "Do speech elements (expressing this [exclusion of the other) which conveys absence in such a manner have [this] exclusion (of the other) as [their contents?" This is an improper way indeed [to express) doubt. Therefore, it has been established that all speech elements as well as concepts have exclusion (of the other) as [their contents. Even though they accommodate [only] one real thing, these very (speech elements and concepts) - because they refer to exclusions (present) in cognitive awareness which are represented as if different by virtue of individual entities made up of differences in their individual applications - have in fact different contents. Consequently, even though (the logical reason as) essential nature itself consists in the relationship between the inferable property and the proving property, there is no intermixture (sc. merging as identical) of the inferable property and the proving property. Thus, the logical reason does not extend only to a part of the object of the thesis. And this sessential nature] itself is referred to as the logical reason. 1.2. Before I proceed to deal with the analysis of the passage, there are some additional relevant issues to be discussed first. A larger portion of the above passage of PV/PVSV 3.182-184 is quoted in AJP I 23,1-27,2, being introduced as follows: tatha parenapy uktam - sarvas yobhayarupalve tadvisesanirakrteh... Separate sections of the above-quoted passage of PV/PVSV are subsequently disproved by Haribhadrasuri in AJP: section(s) of PV/PVSV quoted in AJP refuted in AJP (182.1) AJP I 23,4-5 AJP I 295, 10ff. (182. 2 183.1} AJP I 23,6-24,6 AJP I 297,13-14 (183.2H183.4) AJP I 24,6-11 AJP I 300,5-12 (183.*** AJP I 25,3-5 AJP I 300,5-302,6 {184.1} AJP I 25,6-26,3 AJP I 302,7-8 and 316,7 (184.2H184.5) AJP I 26,4-27,4 AJP I 317,4-10 and AJP II 124ff. The passage of PV/PVSV 3.182-184 is quoted by Haribhadrasuri AJP faithfully, and the variae lectionis (enumerated in nn. 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15) are negligible. The only major difference is the deliberate replacement of the offensive "so'yam ahrikah" in with neutral expression "so 'yam anekantavadi" in Section PVSV (181.2). This could be easily be deemed a case of light censorship or the whitewashing of the offensive character of Dharmakirti's statement. Generally, the authenticity - in terms of strictly internal analysis of AJP - of the quotation PV/PVSV 3.182-184 is additionally supported by two factors: the sections quoted are first commented upon by Haribhadrasuri in his commentary AJPSV and then refuted in succeeding portions of AJP/AJPSV. We do, however, come across an intriguing insertion in the AJP quote. Interestingly, AJP I 25,3-5 inserts - between (183.4) and (184.1} - a passage (183.***] which is absent from PV/PVSV but is subsequently refuted by Haribhadrasuri in AJP I 300,5-302,6: kimca sarvavastusabalavadinah kvacid anyasamsgstakarabuddhyasiddheh tathavacakabhavat samharavadanupapatti, tatsiddhau va taia eva talsvabhavabledat tadekarapataiveti. Furthermore, since it is not established for the proponent of manifoldness of all things that there exists cognitive awareness of a real thing (e.g. camel) which has the form (of the real thingl which is not intermixed with another [object (e.g. yoghurt)], and therefore there exists no referring term [denoting the real thing) in such a manner (as not

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Piotr Balcerowicz intermixed with other things), the doctrine of the intermixed character (of individual entities] (sc. the object having its own form and the form of the other) is inexplicable (sc. is not meaningful). Or, leven if it were established [that there can be cognitive awareness of a real thing which has the form not intermixed with another object), then the result would be that because of the singular character of the essential nature of the (real thing! - this real thing is represented in cognition as having singular form (sc. of its own, not that of the other thing) due to this very fact that there can be cognitive awareness of a real thing which has the form not intermixed with another object) The interpolated passage is later repeated in the refutation section of AJPI 300,3-5. This interpolation apparently bears all the marks of an authentic quotation from PVSV for the following reasons: | It is commented by Haribhadrasuri in AJPSV I 25,13-21 and treated by him as genuine. 2 The only element of the passage (183.-; that might suggest that it is Haribhadra's own interpolation is the marker iti at the end of it (tadekarupataiveti). However, Haribhadrasuri himself takes it to belong to the original text of PVSV, for he comments on it in AJPSVI 25,21: iti na samharavado vastavah - "Thus the doctrine of the intermixed character [of individual entities] is not true,' which is merely a paraphrase of PV 184.cd: bhedasamharavadasya ... asambhavah ("the doctrine of the intermixed character of individual entities is impossible'). 3 It is subsequently refuted in AJP I 300,5-302,6, after being repeated verbatim (AJP 1 300,3-5). 4 The refutation of the passage is introduced by Haribhadra with the standard formula: yac coktam - 'survavastusabalavadinah ... tadekarupataiva' ity etad apy ayuktam, and this particular refutation is the whole portion refuting PV/PVSV, e.g. it is immediately followed by the criticism against the verse of PV 184 (section (184.1)). 5 Additionally, Haribhadrasuri comments in AJPSVI 300,14 on the refuted quotation: yac coktam mulapurvapakse... demonstrating that this interpolated passage belongs to PV/PVSV as he had it in front of him. 6 Haribhadra sets off to refute the verse of PV 184 with the words: etena "survatmatve ca bhavanam" ilyady api pratyuktam. In his AJPSV I 302.22, he comments on this portion as follows: etena anantaroditena vastuna sarvatmakatve ca... In his opinion the pronoun etena refers to the real thing which has been mentioned immediately before' (anantaroditena vastuna). Indeed, we do find the mention of 'vastu' three times in the interpolated passage: sarvavastusabalavadinah..., tatsvabhavabhedat and tadekarupata. However, there is no mention of vastu' in the immediate vicinity of verse 184 in the preserved reading of PV/PVSV. The immediately preceding verse 183 does not mention it. PVSV does mention 'vastu' slightly before in section (183.3) (vastu dadhi), however, the reference to it is made in passing, whereas the whole passage (183.2)-(183.4; discusses the issue of ultimate quality (atisaya). Furthermore, the mention of 'vastu dadhi' in section (183.3} is separated from the interpolated passage (183 ***) with section (183.4), which does not deal with real thing (vastu) directly. Accordingly, Haribhadrasuri's remark etena anantaroditena vastuna sarvatmakatve ca cannot refer to any portion of PVSV other than the passage (183.**). 7 In the interpolated passage, anekantavadin is called sabalavadin ('the proponent of the varie gated'), and the unusual term sabala signifies here the idea of anekanta (multiplexity of reality). This is indeed a highly uncommon term with respect to anekantavada, to a degree that I have personally never come across it in Jaina literature in this sense. Also for this reason it would be incorrect, in my opinion, to assume that the problematic passage, containing the atypical locution sarvavastusabalavadinah, was Haribhadrasuri's, or any of the Jaina authors' for that matter, own insertion. However, the rare term sabala is used, at least once, in by

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Dharmakirti's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) Dharmakirti himself in PV 4.132ab in a related context, namely with reference to perception which has non-dual character: advayam sabalabhasasyadrster buddhijanmanah / (*...for [we] do not see any production of cognitive awareness which has manifold representation."). That is why it is not improbable that that the compound sarvavastusabalavadinah may have stemmed from Dharmakirti himself. On the other hand, the passage is not only absent from extant editions and manuscripts of PV/ PVSV but also is not referred to by Karnakagomin in his PVSVT. Although there is nothing in the passage as such that would speak against Dharmakirti as its author, we would need some independent additional confirmation in Buddhist sources to accept the passage (183) as genuine part of PVSV. Interestingly, the passage AJP I 23,1-27,2 seems to be the only Jaina text which quotes any larger portion of PV/PVSV 181-184. Apart from this singular occurrence, Jaina authors quote only two PV verses: 182 (see n. 2) and 183 (see n. 7); in addition, Vadirajasuri in NViV 2.203 (233,1116) paraphrases the argument of verse 183 (see n. 8). One has the impression that that the remaining verses of the PV passage on anekanta, and the whole commentary of PVSV, were either unknown to Jaina authors, with some notable exceptions, or did not stimulate them to any reaction or refutation. In view of the fact that only a restricted selection of verses from rival philosophical works are cited in Jaina works, at the same time their selection remains constant and always the same verses/passages are repeated (often with the same variae lectionis), this may confirm the prevailing tendency among Indian authors in general, especially after 7th/8th centuries, that they either relied on earlier quotations as they had been reproduced in earlier Jaina works or (2) relied on some anthologies that presented a selection of verses, which became the major source of information on rival schools, whereas direct, first-hand readership of original sources gradually became scarce. 1.3. A separate issue is the reliability of commentators of PV/PVSV. In the expositions of the verse PVSV 182 (the most often quoted verse of the whole passage) offered by commentators we encounter various interpretation of the expression ubhayarupatve. 1.3.1. Dharmakirti's criticism directed against the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) follows his criticism of the Samkhya and verse 182 should be read in such context (verse 181 is merely an introduction which marks the change of the opponent, not the change of the topic: etenaiva ... kim apy ... pratiksiptam). Accordingly, ubhayarupatve should be taken to mean samanyavisesarapatve, especially in view of the following two passages, which directly precede PV/PVSV 181-184: 1 PV/PVSV5 3.179d-180c (58,23-59,2) = PV/PVSV, 3.177 (88,13-20) = PV/PVSV, 3.177d178c (260,16-261,9): na hi kvacid asyaikantiko bhedo 'bhedo va vivekena vyavasthapanat - samanyam visesa iti. yenatmana tayoh/ bhedah samanyam ity etad yadi bhedas tadatmana // 177 // bheda eva [178a]

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10 Piotr Balcerowicz yadi samanyavisesayor yam atmanam asritya samanyam visesa iti sthitis tenatmana bhedas tada bheda eva. yasmat tau hi tayoh svatmanau tau ced vyatirekinauo vyatireka eva samanyavisesayoh svabhavabhedat. 2 PVSV43.182 (59,18-19) = PVSV, 3.179 (89,13-14) = PVSV, 3.181ab (262,13-14): ...gavadisamavesat tadatmabhutanam cananvayena tatranubhayarupatvat. The expression anubhayarupa occurring in the passage clearly means asamanyavisesarupa, as it is correctly explained in PVSVT: anubhayarupatvad asamanyavisesarupatvad eveti yavat. And that is how, analogously, ubhayarupa should be understood in PV 3.182a. 1.3.2. Karnakagomin, however, is inclined to interpret the expression ubhayarupatve strictly in the context of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) as referring to an object being both itself and being the other.'' 1.3.3. Also Manorathanandin, apparently following Karnakagomin, takes ubhayarupatve to mean '[every object having] its own form and the form of the other.42 1.3.4. It is only the Jaina author Haribhadrasuri who properly understands the expression the way Dharmakirti himself did, viz. samanyavisesarupa." For certain reasons, that will be discussed below, both Karnakagomin and Manorathanandin - either having better knowledge of anekantavada than Dharm akinti or being more faithful to the unbiased presentation of the Jaina doctrine - felt obliged to introduce their own interpretation of the phrase, thus brining it in line with the typical expositions of anekantavada, in accordance with which the double nature of any object that is both itself (svarupa) and shares in the nature of another thing (pararupa) is vital, whereas the double nature of a thing based on its universal-cumparticular character (samanyavisesarupa) is secondary. That was not Dharmakirti's concem: he either distorted the picture of the Jaina theory deliberately or was not sufficiently well informed. 2.1. The passage PV/PVSV 181-184 mentions some elements that are vital for the reconstruction the doctrine of multiplexity of reality in the form as it may have been known to Dharmakirti. These expressions have been underlined in SS 1.1. Beside the allusion to the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) by name (ekantain (181.1}, {181.3), (183.4}), there is also an explicit reference to be found in the PV/PVSV passage - with the words: syad ustro dadhi syan na in sections (181.2) and (1843), where the modal operator syat (= kathamcit) occurs - which concerns a particular element of the doctrine, namely to the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description, known under the names saptabhangi and syadvada. It is merely one of three complementary cognitive-linguistic procedures within the scope of 40 PVSV,: vyatirekini. 4. PVSVT ad loc.: sarvasyobhayarupatvam. ubhayagrahanam anekatvopalaksanartham tasmin sati tadvisesasya ustra ustra eva na dadhi. dadhi dadly eva nostra ity evam laksanasya nirakrteh. 12 PVV ad loc.: sarvasya vastuna ubhayarupatve svapararupatve sati... 4. AJPSV ad loc., 23,11: ubhayarupatve samanyavisesarupatve. ubhayagrahanam anekalvopalaksanam. 44 On syal see below p. Blad! Nie zdefiniowano zakladki.ff.

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Dharmakirti's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) anekantavada, beside the doctrine of viewpoints (nayavada) and the method of the four standpoints (niksepavada, nyasavada). The expressions are the following ones: (181.2) (184.3) syad ustro dadhi syan na (183.1) asty atisayah kascid yena bhedena vartate 1184.9) kathamcid avyavasthapitesu vidhipratisedhayogat The exact sources for Dharmakirti cannot be identified. Furthermore, it seems that none of these passages is a genuine quotation, albeit they do have authentic Jaina sources in the background. 2.2. The first and most conspicuous reference to the anekantavada is the phrase syad ustro dadhi syan na ((181.2) = (184.3)). This is clearly an echo of, or what should look like a quotation from a Jaina source instantiating the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description (syadvada), the characteristic trait of which is the use of the modal operator syat. I shall first attempt to reconstruct the picture of syadvada as it emerges from Dharmakirti's exposition and criticism of it, including the commentaries. 11 2.2.1. In none of the two occurrences of the phrase in question does Dharmakirti offer the logical reason why a camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, and is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt. In not supplying the logical reason for the syat thesis Dharmakirti is in agreement with Jaina practice, insofar as no Jaina text consulted by me mentions logical reason in such a context either. Only Karnakagomin and Manorathanandin supply the justification for the Jaina thesis: 'A camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, because [these two] are identical as consisting in a substance etc. [A camel] is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt, because the circumstances of yoghurt are different from the circumstances of the camel;"45 and 'A camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, because [both] are real things. On the other hand, [a camel] is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt as something that has a particular." The logical reasons adduced by them (dravyadirupatayaikatvat and deg--avasthaya bhinnatvat, vastutvat and visesarupataya, respectively) are clear references to the substance-expressive (dravyarthika) and the mode-expressive (paryayarthika) viewpoints, already amply attested in the Jaina literature prior to Dharmakirti, e.g. in Kundakunda's Pavayanasara, in Siddhasena Divakara's 46 45 or PVSVT 183 (339,23-24): syad ustro dadhi, dravyadirupatayaikatvat. syan na dadhi ustravasthato dadhyavasthaya bhinnatvat. PVV2 3.180 (352,8-9) = PVV, 3.181 (212,15-16) PVV, 3.181 (262,21-22): syad ustro dadhi vastutvat. na va syad ustro visesarupataya. 47 PSa 2.22-23 (p. 144-146): davvatthiena savvam davvam tam pajjayatthiena puno havadi ya annam anannam takkale tammayattado // atthi tti ya natthi tti ya havadi avattavvam idi puno davvam payyayena du kena vi tad ubhayam adittham annam va || [22] From a substance-expressive viewpoint every substance is the same. However, from a mode-expressive viewpoint, [every substance] becomes also different. [Every substance] is non-different, [i.e. identical with other substances], because it consists in it (sc. substance) at its own time, [viz. when it is taken into consideration]. [23] Further, the substance can be said (1) to exist, (2) not to exist and (3) to be inexpressible. However, taking a particular mode [into consideration] it is explained to (4) be both (sc. it both exists and does not exist) or otherwise.

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Piotr Balcerowicz Sammatitarkaprakarana (ca. 450-50048)49 in Mallavadin's Dvadasuranayacakra (ca. 550-600)50, in Pujyapada Devanandin's Sarvarthasiddhil etc. What Manorathanandin refers to by vastu corresponds to what the Jainas usually call dravya, a substance, and avastha parallels what the Jainas call paryaya, a mode. They served as a kind of parameters that qualified an angle under which a thing was predicated of. Neither these two viewpoints nor any other kind of parameterisation should not be confused with what Dharmakirti called atisaya (vide supra SS 3.5.) inasmuch they were not a special quality of the thing as such. Dharmakirti must therefore have known these two viewpoints, or any other parameters for that matter, and their absence in PV was in all probability not dictated by his poor knowledge of Jaina arguments but rather by the fact that he considered a detailed account of Jaina line of reasoning unnecessary. 2.2.1. How accurate and faithful was then his account of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality? To answer this, we should first identify central components of the anekanta theory as it emerges in Dharmakuti's exposition. Indeed, we can distinguish a number of important elements there that appear to underlie the Jaina doctrine at his times: (a) the assertion: is, in a certain sense, y,' i.e. o (xis y), where the symbol o represents the modal operator syar; (b) the assertion: *x is, in a certain sense, not-y,' i.e. a (x is y); Three remaining permutations of the three principal options (sc, asti, nasti, avaktavyam) are implied by annan va ("otherwise'); (5) the substance both exists and is inexpressible, (6) the substance both does not exist and is inexpressible, (7) the substance simultaneously exists, does not exist and is inexpressible. 4* For the dating see Balcerowicz 2003a. +" These are referred to in STP 2.1: jam samannaggahanam damsanam eyam visesiyam nanamn / donho vi nayana eso padekkum anthapajjao // Insight is the grasp of the general. Cognition is one, characterised by the particular. This modality of the object (viz. its general and particular aspect) is individually [the contents for both viewpoints, li.c. substance expressive (dravyarthika) and the modal, or mode-expressive paryayarthika). They are also taken for granted in the formulation of STP 3.10: do una naya bahavaya davvatthiyapajjavattiya niyaya / etto ya gunavisese gunatthiyanao vi jujjamio II See also STP 3.57: davvanthiyavallavvam samannam pajjavassa ya viseso / ee samovaniu vibhajjavayam visesemti // 30 DNC 6,2-7,1: dravyarihaparyayarthadvitvadyanantantavikalpopakiptavidhibhedapadarihaikavakyavidhividhanad ... DNC 876, 1-2: tesam dravyarthaparyayarthanayau dvau mulabhedau, tatprabhedah sangrahadayah. - 'Among these viewpoints), there are two main divisions, viz. the viewpoint the object of which is the substance and the view point the object of which is the mode. Their subdivisions are the collective viewpoint etc. 5 SSi 1.33 (100,8-10): sa dvedha dravyarthikah paryayarthikas ceti. dravyam samanyam utsargah anuvrtir ity arthah. Iadvisayo dravyathikah. paryayo viseso 'pavado vyavrtir ity arthah. tadvisayah paryayarihikah. layor bheda naigumadayah. Compare e.g. the way Mallavadin describes the nature of (1) vastu and (2) dravya: (1) DNC 864,8-9: latha ca sarvatmakam ekam evasti vasiv ili pratyaksadipramanair upalabhamale; DNC 869,1-2: adrupasaktivivariumaram IV elal sarvam bhavaik val. ato nanisthitam vastu, anarabdharahdhatval sik yakadivat; (2) DNC 866,1-2: ghato mri, mrdah prihivirum, prilivya druvyarvam druvikarul val...

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Dhamakini's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) 13 (c) the contention: everything has a double form,' viz. either it has the form of itself and of the other, i.c. Vx (x is.x & -X), or it has the form of the universal and of the particular; (d) .xis, in a certain sense, both x and y (napi sa evostrah yenanyo 'pi syad ustrah: napi tad eva dadhi venanyad api syad dadhi), i.c. 0 (uis (X & X)); (c) there is some ultimate quality (alisaya) by virtue of which an entity x can be treated as non-x; (1) everything is of the nature of everything (sarvatmalve ca sarvesam), i.e. Vx Vy (x = y); (g) there is no essential distinction between entities (vibhagabhavad bhavanam); in other words, absolute distinction between things is not a part of the empirical world (bhedagrahai); (h) the universal character of entities may consist in the distinction of essential natures of entities (bhavanam svabhavabhedali samanyam). In other words, the essence of a class of entities (A} instantiating a universal A may be defined in negative terms, and the universal A is not that which the entities of the class (A) have in common in positive terms, but rather the fact that the entities do not share their universal character A with other entities of another class {A} that are not subsumed under that universal. On the basis of PVSV it is not possible to determine, however, how far the above idea is presented as a genuine constituent element of the doctrine of anekunlavada (1 consider it less likely) and how far the idea is a hypothetical reply to Dharmakini's criticism, being in fact a concession to the Buddhist theory of apola (I consider it more probable). 3. Before I proceed to assess the reliability of Dharmakirti's description, let us see what Jaina sources he might have used, how these sources outlined the doctrine of multiplexity of reality and what the crucial points it were. In the following, I am going neither to give a detailed exposition of the anekantavada nor to enlist a complete inventory of relevant passages from Canonical and nonCanonical literature etc., because any systematic account, including historical development, would turn into a large-size monograph. I will merely focus on some elements of the theory that are, in my opinion, relevant in our case. 3.1. One of the most conspicuous early components of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality, one of the most hotly criticised by other schools of thought, but also one which is explicitly mentioned by Dharmakuti, are the three basic angles (bhanga), or ways of analysing an object within a consistent conceptual framework: - syadasti x is, in a certain sense, P), i.e. a (x is P). - syan nasti ('x is, in a certain sense, not-P), i.e. o (xis -P), - syad avaktavyam (*x is, in a certain sense, inexpressible'), o (x is (P&-P)), the nature of which will be briefly discussed below (???). They are mentioned on a few occasions both in later Canonical strata (being absent from early portions of the Canon) and, especially, in non-Canonical literature. Some are enumerated, for instance, by Kapadia 1940-1947: cxi ff., Upadhye 1935: 81-84, discussed by Schubring 1962: 1163-165 and occasionally in Shah 2000; stray occurrences are listed also in JSK (entry "syadvada,' Vol. 4, pp. 496-502). I just list a couple of examples where the bharigas are used as well as some occurrences of the modal operator siya / siya / syat: (a) Viy 12.10 (p. 608-614): ...siya athi siya nanthi..., esp.: 610,15ff.: rayanuppabha puthavi siya aya, sya no aya, siya avalluvyum - aya li ya, no ata li ya; and 611,201f.: dupaesie khamdhe siya aya, siya no aya, siya avattavvam - aya li ya no aya li ya, siya aya ya no aya ya, siya aya ya avaliavvam - aya li ya no aya ti ya, siya no aya ya avullavvam --ava li ya no aya li ya. (b) Viy 5.7.1 (210,20-21ff.): paramanupoggale nam bhamte! eyati veyati java lam tam bhavam parinamali? goyama! siya eyali veyali java purinamati, siya no eyati java no parinamali.

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14 Piotr Balcerowicz (c) Pann 784 (195,21ff.): caupaesie nam khamdhe siya carime no acarime siya avattavvae no carimaim no acarimaim no avattavvayaim, ... siya carimaim ca acarime ya siya carimaim ca acarimaim ca siya carime ya avattavvae ya siya carime ya avattavvayaim ca ..., etc. (d) AnD 415 (166,22ff.): tatha nam je te baddhellaya te nam siya atthi siya natthi, jai atthi jahannenam ego va do va tinni va... (e) AnD 473 (p. 182): siya dhammapadeso siya adhammapadeso siya agasapadeso siya jivapadeso siya khamdhapadeso. Occasionally, similar three basic angles (bhanga) are mentioned, however, the modal operator syat (siya, siya) is missing, which may reflect an earler historical layer: (f) Pann 781-788 (p. 194ff.), e.g. 194,25ff.: paramanupoggale nam bhamte! kim carime acarime avattavaye carimaim acarimaim avattavayaim, udahu carime ya acarime ya udahu carime ya acarimaim ca udahu carimaim ca acarime ya udaju carimai ca acarimaim ca..., etc. (g) Viy 8.2.29 (337,20ff.): jiva nam bhamte! kim nani annani? goyama jiva nani vi, annani vi. These three basic angles (bhanga) are subsequently permuted so that, in a full version of the doctrine of the modal description (syadvada, saptabhangi), the total of seven basic angles is reached. Perhaps the earliest non-Canonical occurrences of the basic angles (bhanga), some of them including the modal operator syat, are to be found in works ascribed to Kundakunda (between 3th6th centuries). (h) PSSa, 14 already offers what is later known as pramanasaptabhangi": In a certain sense, [the substance) is...; [in a certain sense, the substance) is not ...; [in a certain 'sense, the substance] is both; [in a certain sense, the substance) is inexpressible; and further, [in a certain sense, the substance is the triplet of these (sc. is predicated of according to the permutations of the these). [In such a manner), the substance is, as one should realise, possible as seven-angled on account of the description.54 (i) Another example is found in PSa 2.22-23: [22] From the substance-expressive viewpoint everything is a substance. From the mode-expressive viewpoint, (any thing] becomes different. It is (nevertheless) non-different, because it consists in that (substance in the time of its (existence]. [23] The substance is said - on account of any particular mode - to be..., and not to be..., and again [the substance) becomes inexpressible; but further (the substance) is both, (viz. is... and is not... at the same time) or is otherwise, (viz. any other permutation of the three basic angles (bhanga)]." 53 See NC 254ab (p. 128): satteva humti bhanga pamananayadunayabhedajuttavi/ ("There are as many as seven conditional perspectives with divisions with respect to cognitive criteria, viewpoints and defective viewpoints.') and SBT 1.7: iyam eva pramanasaptabhangi nayasaptabhangiti ca kathyate. Cf. Balcerowicz 2003b: 37. 54 PSSa, 14 (p. 30): siya atthi natthi uhayam avvattavvam puno ya tattidayam / davvam khu sattabhamgam adesavasena sambhavadi // $ The verse is rather obscure. Another possibility to translate it as follows: 'From the substance-expressive viewpoint and from the mode-expressive viewpoint, any substance is [both] different and non-different, because [the particular consists in that [universal] in the time of its [existence],' where annam corresponds to visesam and anannam to samanyam. The difficulty with that translation is that the idea it renders is that everything is different from the substance-expressive viewpoint, and everything is the same from the mode-expressive viewpoint.' On the other hand dravyarthika relates to samanya, whereas paryayarthika to visesa (comp. p. 16, STP 3.57), which finally yields a contradiction. That is why the commentators Amrtasena and Jayasena (p. 144-145) are at pains to relate dravyarthika-samanya-ananya and paryayarthika anya-visesa. 30 PSa 2.22-23 (p. 146ff.): davvatthiena savvam davvam tam paijayatthiena puno / havadi ya annam anannam takkale tammayattado // 22 //

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Dharmakirti's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) (1) Also Siddhasena Divakara in his STP 1.36-40 describes all the seven angles (bhanga). The picture presented there is already a mature concept, wherein Siddhasena supplies also additional parameters such as: atthamtarabhuhi ya niyaehi ya (in view of the qualities of another thing and the substance's own qualities,' STP 1.36ab), sabbhave ... asabbhavapajjave (with respect to the substance's own existence ... (and) with respect to the mode in which it does not exist,' STP 1.37ab). He also regularly speaks of aspects (deso) from which the substance can be predicated of. 3.2. An essential and well-known element of the theory is the modal operator syat (kathamcit): 'in a certain sense, somehow.' It is well described in many sources, just to mention two references dating to the times around Dharmakirti. It is said to operate by means of affirmation (vidhi) and negation (nisedha, pratisedha, niyama). They are extensively detailed and elaborated by Mallavadin, e.g. in DNC 6,2ff. (vidhibheda), and DNC 9,7-8: vidhiniyamabhangavrttivvatiriktat vad... All the permutations of vidhi and niyama are enumerated also in DNC 10,1-11,2. Also, Samantabhadra refers to them in his Svayambhustotra: Affirmation and negation are accepted [in the sense of] "somehow." (Thereby) the distinction between primary and secondary /angle) is established. Such is the guideline of the wise (or: of the fifth tirtham-kara Sumati). That is your most excellent creed. Let the worshipper praise you" Thus, as we can see, by approximately the end of the fifth century we find a developed idea of the seven-fold modal description, which had needed some centuries to take shape. 3.3. It is difficult to determine when the term saptabhangi was used for the first time. Although is seems to be absent from the Cannon, it is, however, used by such pre-Dinnagu authors as Siddhasena Divakaru and Kundak unda. (a) Siddhascna Divakara speaks of 'a verbal procedure that consists of seven options' (saplavikalpali vacanapan thah), which he has just described before in STP 1.36-40: In this way, there emerges a verbal procedure that consists of seven options, taking into account the substantial modes. However, taking into account momentary manifestations, (the method of analysis) has cither options (of description, viz. the object can be predicated of from various viewpoints, or it has no optionsS8.59 (b) Another occurrence of the technical term saltabhamgam is found in Kundak unda's verse of PSSaz 14 (p. 30ff.), already cited above (p. 14). (c) Further, the same author refers to the saptabhangi method as a capacity of the soul: The great soul is one (viz. cither 'self-same,' or 'one perceiving organ' (aksa) or 'it is possessed of cognitive application (upuyoga)'). It is (also two (viz. 'it is possessed of two-fold cognitive application: cognition and perception'). It becomes of threefold characteristics, it is said to roam in four [types of existence]. And it is anihili ya nanhi ya huvudi avallavvam idi puno davvam/ pajjavenu du kena vi tad ubhayam udittham annam va // 23 // SvSt, 5.5 = SvS12 25: vidhir nisedhas ca kathancid istau vivaksaya mukhyagunavyavastha / ili praniti sumules lave ya malipravekah stuvato 'stu natha // For later descriptions see c.g. RVar 2.8. p. 122,15ff.. esp. RVar 1.6, p. 33,15/1. ** Lc. it is not possible to predicate of an object because momentary manifestations, being transient and infinite, are beyond the scope of the language (sc. there are not enough words to describe each of them). The verse offers another possibility of interpretation, see TBV. STP 1.41: evam sallaviyappo vayanapaho hoi anihapaijae / vamjanapaijae una saviyappo nivviyapppo ya //

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Piotr Balcerowicz grounded in five primary qualities (viz. karmic states (bhava)). It is endowed with the capability to move in six [directions). It is cognitively apt as having the existence of (viz. as being to apply) the sevenfold modal description. It has eight substrata (viz. qualities). It has nine objects (sc. the nine categories (tattva) [to cognise). It has ten states. It is called the living element. 3.3. The term saptabhangi is occasionally juxtaposed with various 'aberrations' of the anekantavada. Some of these are listed by Siddhasena Divakara in STP 3.56-59, who displays an awareness that there is indeed certain, albeit superficial similarity between the Jaina anekantavada and the Buddhist theory vibhajyavada (vibhajjavayam): The universal should be spoken of from the substance-expressive viewpoint, and the particular (relates to the mode. When these two are brought together (sc, confused), they are defined as the doctrine of conditional analysis.o2 3.4. The idea of syadvada does not, however, have to necessarily involve the usage of the term 'multiplexity' (anekanta). And indeed, the term occurs only some time later, in the work of Pujyapada Devanandin (6th c.) for the first time. The sources of the term anekanta can be traced back to the following two passages: (1) The general and particular definition of these (seven viewpoints (naya) enumerated in TS 1.33] should be formulated. The general definition, to begin with, [states that) a viewpoint is a verbal procedure (formal pronouncement) that aims - with respect to a real thing, which is of multiplex nature - at conveying, in conformity with essence (of the real thing), a particular (property of it) which one intends to establish, by laying emphasis on [a particular) reason without contradiction [by virtue of which that particular property is established].04 (2) On account of the purpose (which) a real thing, which is of multiplex nature, [is to serve or is to be referred to), prominence is extended to, or is emphasised, i.e. [prominence] is given to a certain property in accordance with the expressive intent [of the speaker). [The property] which is contrary to that (emphasised property] is notemphasised [property. Since (such a not-emphasised property serves) no purpose (at a particular time), even though it exists, there is no expressive intent [to assert it]; hence it is called subordinate (property]. Since these two kinds of properties) are establish, viz. "because emphasised [property] and not-emphasised (property] are established," there is no contradiction. 3.5. A brief reference to STP 1.36 40 above (p. 15) indicated a use of a series of certain parameters which determine the angle from which the thing under consideration is judged. And this is another 60 PS Sa, 71-72 (p. 123): eko ceva mahappa so duviyappo ttilakkhano hodi/ cadusamkamano bhanido pamcaggagunappadhano ya // 71 // chakkapakkamajutto uvautto sattabhangasabbhavo/ atthasao navautho jivo dasathanago bhanido // 72 // For a brief comparison of vibhajyavada and anekantavada, see Matilal 1981: 7-11. 62 STP 3.57: davvatthiyavaltavvam samannam pajjavassa ya viseso/ ee samovania vibhajjavayam visesemti // 63 See Soni 2003: 34: *As for the word anekanta itself, in the sense in which it can be associated with the theory of manifoldness unique to the Jainas, it seems that Pujyapada was the first person to explicitly use it.' 64 SSi 1.33. $ 241, p. 100,7f.: etesam samanyavisesalaksanam vaktavyam. samanyalaksanam tavad vastuny anekan tatmany avirodhena hetvarpanat (cf. TS 5.32] sadhyavicesasya yathatmyaprapanapravanah prayogo nayah. SSi 5.32, 8 588, p. 231,91f.: anekantatmakasya vastunah prayojanavasad yasya kasyacid dharmasya vivaksaya prapitam pradhanyam arpitam upanitam iti yavat. tadviparitam anarpitam. prayojanabhavat sato 'py avivaksa bhavatity upasarjanitam iti ucyate. tabhyam siddher "arpitanarpitasiddher" [TS 5.32] nasti virodhah.

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Dharmakini's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (unekantavada) 17 important feature indispensable for the proper assessment of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality as the Jainas conceived of it. In the classical formulation of the theory we come across a set of four such parameters: substance (dravya) = S, place (ksetra) = P, time (kala) = T, condition (bhava) = C; see e.g. TT 5.31 (409,29ff.), RVar 4.42 (254,14ff.), SVM 23.113 (143,12) or JTBh 1.22 $ 63 (JTBh. p. 19; JTBh2, p. 19), DNCV 3.6. Interestingly, the concept of the parameters to specify the angle (bhanga) from which an object is analysed developed over some centuries, and as early as in the sixth century we find elaborated attempts to list them. That is done by Siddhasena Divak ara, who treats of 8 such parameters: The proper method of exposition of entities [in accordance with syadvada) is based on substance, place, time, condition as well as mode, aspect and relation, and also distinction. The list comprises more than four 'classical' parameters already mentioned. The parameters were an important device to show that method of the seven-fold modal description (syadvada) was not trivial or beset with contradictions, but a rather complex analytical framework, which contained, alongside the seven angles (bhanga), a kind of second-level parametrisation. Historically speaking, the parameters evolved from the Canonical theory of descriptive standpoints (niksepa, nyasa), the locus classicus of which is the enumeration found in the Tattvarthasutra.67 3.6. Let us see how the angles of the seven-fold modal description were practically applied by Jaina authors prior to Dharmakirti and what instances are used. Typical examples in genuine Jaina syatsentences are generally restricted to the terms: pata, ghata and kumbha. An interesting reference is found in Jinabhadra-ganin's Visesavas yakabhasya (6th/7th century): Being something the existence, non-existence and both [the existence and non-existence] of (a particular property of it) is emphasised through [the pitcher's] own mode and through the mode of something else, this (pitcher) is differentiated as "a pitcher," as "something else than a pitcher," as "something inexpressible" and as "both [a pitcher and something else than a pitcher].96* STP 3.60: duvvyum khillum kalam bhavam pajjayadesasamjoge / bhedam ca paducca suma bhavanam pannavanapajja // 6 TS 1.5: namasthapanadravyabhavatas tannyasah. Ample material on the niksepa is supplied in the monograph by Bhatt 1978. 118 VABI 2232 (p. 910): sabbhavasabbhavobhayappio saparapajjaobhayao kumbhakumbhavallavyobhayaruvaibheo so II Hemacundru Muladhurin aptly claborates on the verse in VAVr 910,12 ff: saptabhangim pratipadyala ily arihah, lad vatha - urdinugrivakapalakuksibudhnadiblih svaparyayaih sadbhavenarpito visesitah kumbhah kumbho bhanyale - "san ghalal" ili pruihamo bhango bhavatity arthah. tatha pasadigalais Ivakiranadibhih paraparyayair asadbhavenarpilo visesilo 'kumbho bhavali - sarvasyapi ghatasya paraparyayair asallvavivaksayam "asan ghatah" ili dvirryo bhango bhavality arthu. tatha sarvo 'pi ghatah svaparobhayaparyayaih sadbhavasadbhavabhyam saltvasalivablyum arpito visesilo yugapad vaktum isto 'vaktavyo bhavati, svaparaparyayasallvasaltvabhyam ekena kenupy usamerikenu sabdena sarvasvapi tasya yugapad vaktum asakyatvad iti. ete irayah sakaladesah. atha cuiuro 'pi vikulpadesal procyante... - 'The idea is that the author of the verse) demonstrates the seven-fold modal description, namely: a (particular pitcher is called "pitcher' when, being predicated of, it is emphasised, through its own modes such as an upward neck, a hull, a spherical shape, a base etc., as something existent (se, as something which is a member of a class A). That is what is meant by the first angle: "the vessel is existent as a E A]." Similarly, la particular pitcher is taken to be something else than a pitcher when, being predicated of, it is emphasised, through the modes of another [thing) such as the protection of the skin, as something non-existent (sc. as something which is a member of a class -A). When the expressive intent is to emphasise the non-existence (sc. its being something else) in the case of any pot whatever through the modes [typical] of another thing), that is

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18 Piotr Balcerowicz The idea indicated in the verse is that a particular entity a may - when certain parameters (typical of its own class) are emphasised, in other words when it is considered from a certain angle o - be predicated of as a member of a class of objects endowed with a fixed set of qualities: o (a EA); whereas when other set of parameters is taken into account, it can be predicated of as a member of another class: o (a E-A). However, this style of predication can be reduced to the idea that a particular thing can, from a certain angle, be said to either possess a property P (which it shares with other members of its class A) or not to possess it, etc. In other others words: 0 (x is P), o (x is -P) and o (x is (P&-P)). In his Prusamaratiprakarana, Umasvati likewise speaks of ghata and mrd" as does Siddhasenaganin, giving an impression that these are the only entities used in the sources to exemplify the seven-fold modal description. There are some rare exceptions, such as the pair of visa and modaka (poison and medicine') in Haribhadrasuri's Anekantajayapataka". In none of the literature, prior to Dharmakirti, I have managed to consult, is there any mention of 'camel' (ustra, karabha etc.) or any kind of diary product' (dadhi, ksira etc.) as the subject of the proposition. That throws some doubt whether the camel-yoghurt' example Dharmak inti adduces is a genuine one. The only mention of 'yoghurt' is found in the Aptamimamsa: A person who has taken a vow to eat only) milk does not partake of yoghurt; a person who has taken a vow to eat only) yoghurt, does not partake of milk; a person who has taken a vow to refrain from all dairy products does not Ipartake of both milk and yoghurt). Therefore, reality has triple nature (origination, cessation and continuation).' what is mcant by the second angle: "the vessel is non-existent (as a EA." By the same token, when one wishes to speak of any pot with no exception when, being predicated of, it is simultaneously emphasised - through its own modes, through the modes of another thing) and through both [in the same breath) - as something (both] existent and non-existent, then it becomes inexpressible. [It becomes inexpressible), because it is not possible to speak, by means of any conceivable, numerically singular speech element which is not convention-bound, of any thing at all simultaneously as both existent and non-existent. These (angles present a complete account of a thingl. Now, the Iremaining four are explained in its turn explained as incomplete account of a thing)... See also VABh 911,9ff.: kumbhal akumbhah avaktavyah ... and p. 912 (on pata). << PRP, and PRPT 202-206 (p. 139-144), esp. PRPT 205-206 (p. 143): ghaturtho mrtpinde nasti nabhud it yarihah.... etc. 10 TT 5.21 (407,26-27): vatha ghatah patadir api bhavali syatkarasamlancchanasabdabhidheyatayam.... AJP I 294,5-6: na visam visam eva, modakadyabhinnasamanyavyatirekat. Haribhadra notices that, despite the fact both poison and medicinc can be predicated of as the same from a certain angle, there is a fundamental practical difference between the two. After taking a medicine, one does not die as it is the case with poison. Therefore, purely out of practical considerations, one should reject the idea of the identity between the poison and the medicine, see AJPI 295,10-11: elena "vise bhaksite modako 'pi bhaksitah syar" ityady api pratiksiplam avagantavyam, Tulyayogaksemalvad iti. According to Haribhadra, these practical considerations, which reflect Jaina realism, are decisive to falsify Dhurmakini's misrepresentation, inasmuch people apply medicine, instead of poison, albeit one could find an angle from which they could be described to share similar property, because they clearly see the difference between two different entities, see AJP 1 295,5-9: ato yady api dvayam apy (= visamodakau) ubhayarupam tathapi visarthi visa eva pravartale, advisesaparinamas yaiva tatsamanaparinamavinabhavat tadvisesaparinamasyeli atah prayasamatraphala pravrtiniyamocchedacodaneli. "2 AMT 60: payowalo na dadhy alli na payo 'tti dadhivratah/ agorasawalo nobhe tasmat tallivun trayamakam //

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Dharmakini's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) Despite seemingly irrelevant character of this verse, its pertinence to the theory of anekanta is independently confirmed by Vidyananda" commenting on the verse and it is perhaps Samantabhadra who might have been a source of possible inspiration for Dharmnakirti. That suggestion seems to me exceedingly unlikely not only because of the exact contents of the verse but also because, despite an often repeated claim, Samantabhadra does not seem to have predated Dharmakirtis and should be, instead, considered a contemporary of Dharmakirti and Kumarila. 4. The question now is how Jaina thinkers reacted to Dharmakirti's attacks and how his criticism relates to what the Jainas themselves understood under anekanta.' 4.1. In most cases the reply of Jaina philosophers who flourished after Dharmakirti is the same and can be summarised briefly as: 'we have never professed the opinions which Dharmakirti ascribes to us.' 4.1.1. One of very few Jaina philosophers who seriously responded to Dharmakirti's critical remarks on anekanta is Abhayadevasuri (c. 1050-1100). 4.1.1.1. According to Abhayadeva Dharmakirti misrepresents the Jaina idea of the universal, which is his opinion underlies the alleged equation of the camel and the yoghurt and thus Dharmakirti's whole account of anekantavada is flawed: 'For we do not accept that there exists one synchronic homogeneity, such as "being the real thing" etc., [which would be common) for both yoghurt and camel, fand] which would be established by virtue of the non-difference (selfsameness) of [respective] individuals (sc. as independent of individuals); [we do not accept this], because there appears no representation [in mind) of something of such kind. However, we do accept [some homogeneity) which is different from all particular individuals (comprised by it) which exists as having as its contents the mental idea of "similar things" [and] which is of such kind that - when the verbal designation of this shomogeneity) of such kind [is made] by a speech element [expressing AS ad loc., 212,17-18: lutali suklum sarvam vastu syan nityam eva, syad anilyam evelievam syad ubhayam eva, syad uvaklavyum eva.syan nilyavaktavyam eva, syad anilyavaktavyam eva, syad ubhayavaklavyam eveti api yojaniyat. See, for instance, Pathak 1893, Pathak 1930, Pathak 1930-1931, Fujinaga 2000. Pathak's erroneous conclusions are aptly summarised in his own words: 'I have proved that Kumarila has allached the view of Samantabhadra and Akalankadeva that Arhan alone is sarvajna' (Pathak 1930-1931: 123). These analyses do not take into account other possible sources for Kumarila's statements, e.g. Jinabladra-ganin's Visesavas yakabhasya or Mallavadin Ksamasrumuna's Dvadasaranayacakra. That issue is going to be dealt with in a separate paper 'On the relative chronology of Dharmakirti and Samantabhadra." "The notion of tiryaksamanya is post-Akalankian, cf. Balcerowicz 1999: 218-219: 'the terms synchronic homogeneity (tiryaksamanya) and diachronic homogeneity (urdhvatasamanya) must have been coined not earlier than in post-Akalankian literature. As late as at the turn of the 9th/10th centuries we can observe certain laxity in use of the two terms. Beside urdhvalasamanya and tiryaksamanya, we find such forms as urdhvasamanya and iruscinasamanya.'

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20 Piotr Balcerowicz it][one wonders] why a person urged [by it] towards one thing (sc. yoghurt) should run towards another thing (sc. camel), unless he were a madman.'77 The above comment by Abhayadevasuri, albeit being directed against Dharmakirti, seems to have been prompted also by a passage from Manorathanandin's Pramanavarttikavrtti: 'In a certain sense yoghurt is camel, because [both] are real things. Or, in a certain sense [yoghurt] is not camel, because it consists in particular." 78 While commenting on PVSV, 3.181 passage, Manorathanandin not only elaborates on Dharmakirti's argument but converts Dharmakirti's wording, which appears seemingly incomplete to the commentator, of PVSV 181: syad ustro dadhi syan na, into a full-fledged proof formula (prayoga), by supplying logical reasons for both theses (vastutvat, visesarupataya). These are clearly reflected in Abhayadeva's response. The similarities between PVV and TBV in wording and contents are as follows: (1) Manorathanandin vastutvat Abhayadevasini na... asmabhir ... ekam tiryaksamanyam vastutvadikam... abhyupagamyate na... asmabhir ekam tiryaksamanyam vyaktyabhedena vyavasthitam... abhyupugamyate (2) visesarupataya Abhayadevasuri's reply is meant to invalidate Dharmakirti's criticism, seen through the prism of Manorathanandin's statements, by rendering it into a flawed and inaccurate account of Jaina thesis. It is worth noting in passing that Abhayadevasuri's reference to Manorathanandin's account may help establish a relative chronology between Manorathanandin and Abhayadevasuri who both lived at more or less the same time: 2nd half of the 11th century. If my assessment is correct, Manorathanandin must have preceded Abhayadevasuri. Another possible inspiration for Abhayadevasuni's remark could be the statement of PVSVT 183 (339,23-24): syad ustro dadhi, dravyadirupatayaikatvat. syan na dadhi ustravasthato dadhyavasthaya bhinnatvat. The ideas and formulations, however, are slightly different and thus Karnakagomin is much less probable a source. 4.1.1.2. Abhayadevasuni rejects also what he takes for Dharmakirti's misrepresentation of Jaina idea of the particular. If this real thing, which is [supposedly] excluded from [all] things that belong to the same class and from things that belong to a different class [and] which is undiversified (homogeneous), is represented in exactly such a manner in perception which has the efficacy to [represent] it, then, however, acts of conceptual cognition which take place in subsequent time [and] which [merely] represent something unreal, arise as manifesting with respect to the 77 TBV 242,31-243,2: na hy asmabhir dadhyustrayor ekam tiryaksamanyam vastutvadikam vyakiyabhedena vyavasthitam tathabhutapratibhasabhavad abhyupagamyate, yadrgbhutam tu prativyaktibhinnam "samanah" ili praIyayavisayabhutam abhyupagamyate tathabhutasya tasya sabdenabhidhane kim ity anyatra prerito 'nyatra khadanaya dhaveta yady unmatto na syat. This passage follows Abhayadevasuri's criticism (TBV 242,19-26) against Dharmakirti's understanding of the universal, as it is found e.g. in PV4 3.109 PV4 3.107, pada d of which being quoted in TBV 242,19: samana iti tadgrahat. 78 PVV2 3.180 (352,8-9)= PVV, 3.181 (212,15-16) PVV, 3.181 (262,21-22): syad ustro dadhi vastutvat. na va syad ustro visesarupataya.

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Dharmakini's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) 21 excluded real thing - various universals, which are based on the exclusion of everything else by virtue of the real thing to be excluded. It is not consistent (to assume that the distinctive nature of the universals is established by virtue of this real thing, because of too far-reaching consequence." 4.1.2. Another Jaina thinker in whose work we come across a refutation of Dharmakiti's account of the universal is Vadinajasuri: For it is as follows. This criticism, which one wishes to raise against Cour doctrine of multiplexity of reality that states that the real thing consists in positive aspect (P) and in negative aspect (non-P) cannot hold true, to begin with, with respect to such a real thing) that consists in the universal or in the particular, because there is no single universal which is concomitant with [both) yoghurt and (camel) etc. For the universal is the transformation pertaining to likeness, and it is indeed confined to yoghurt etc., there is no other entity at all or anything else associated with it, and independent of it), just like the likeness between something blue and the cognition of it. Therefore, how can oneness between yoghurt and camel be possible, on the basis of which some activity were possible with respect to one thing (even though the injunction concerning the other [thing were expressed]? The main line of his argumentation is, again, that Dharmakirti misrepresents the Jaina concept of the universal and his criticism might hold valid only with respect to a theory which would understand the universal the way the Jainas do not. 4.1.3. Not only Abhayadeva and Vadiraja, but generally no Jaina text consulted by me refers to any kind of universal (samanya) in the sense of a special quality (atisaya), over and above the thing itself, by virtue of which two entities could be associated or dissociated as it is done in the exposition above (vastutvat, see p. 11). We come across clear statements that deny such an approach, see e.g. Akalanka's Svarupasambodhana: 'Acknowledge that the essence of the real thing is the thing) itself and the other by virtue of the nature of the real thing." Clearly, atisaya cannot be considered to correspond to parameters or stand for the dravyarthika and paryayarthika viewpoints. Further, Akalanka's riposte to Dharmakirti (PV 3.182) in his Nyayaviniscaya points out the general misrepresentation of the main idea behind the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description. His strutegy is to demonstrate that Dharmakirti commits 'the fallacy of criticism' (dusanabhasa): Your false riposte with respect to the [inferable property of our thesis) is a counterfeit rejoinder (as a formal flaw in discourse to blame) on the enemies of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality, just like one injunction (concerning both yoghurt and camel] due to the undesired consequence of non-difference of yoghurt and camel.2 He further ironically points out the consequences of Dharmakirti's understanding of anekanta: 19 TBV 243,1211.: athu sajuliyavijatiyavyavrtiam niramsam vastu latsamarthyabhavini ca pratyakse tat tathaiva pralibhali, lad ullarakalabhavinas Iv avastusamnsparsino vikalpah vyavartyavastuvasavibhinnavyavrilinibandhanan samanyabhedan vyaville vastuny upakalpayantah samupajayante na ladvasai iadvyavastha yukta, ariprasargal. NO NViV 2.203 (233,1911.): latha hi - tad api tadatadatmake vastuni dusanam uddhusyamanam na lavat samanya visesalmake bhuvitum arhari, dadhyadyanvayinah samanyasyaikasyabhaval. sadrsyaparinamo hi samunyam, tac ca dadhyadiparyavasilum eva na kimcid api salvam anyad va samanvitam asti nilatajjnanayoh sarupyaval. tat katham dudhyustruyor ekuivam yala ekacodanayam unyatrapi pravruih. " SSam 20ab: sum purumi celi vastu vani vasturupena bhavaya/ 82 NVI, 371 (79,29-30) = NVi, 2.203 (vol. II 233,2,6): tatra mith yollaram jatih yarhanekantavidvisam / dadliyustruder abhedarvaprasangad ekacodanam //

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Piotr Balcerowicz Also the Buddha was (once] born as a deer, and the deer is known as the [future] Buddha. Nevertheless, the Buddha is venerated, [whereas the deer is eaten, in accordance with what is accepted. Since the [relative difference and non-difference [between things (e.g. the Buddha and the deer)] is established only by force of the real thing (which is emphasised) in such a manner, why should the person enjoined as follows: "Eat yoghurt!", run towards the camel?"83 These two verses, especially the phrase mrgah khyadyo yathesyate, parodies Dharmakirti's ridicule contained in PV 3.182 (codito dadhi khada...). 4.2. The above comparison of the main features in Dharmakirti's account of anekanta (see SS 2.2.) and the way the doctrine is explicated by the Jainas themselves ( 3.) leads us to the conclusion that, in his account of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality, Dharmakirti is off the mark as regards several points. Apart from the arguments formulated by the Jaina thinkers and summarised above that concern Dharmakirti's account of the Jaina understanding of the universal (88 4.1.1.1.. 4.1.2.) and the particular ($ 4.1.1.2.), we can mention a few more in the following. 4.2.1. The qualified identity or difference, predicated of with the modal operator syat, does not entail complete (ekanta) identity or difference of the predicated object. 4.2.2. No Jaina text consulted by me refers to some ultimate quality (atisaya)reported in PVSV (183.1), or any kind of special character (visesa) which would qualify things and by virtue of which we could predicate of the things as being either identical or different. In Jaina works there seems to be no mention of things that are x-visista, where x would be such a special quality. On the contrary, some Jaina thinkers explicitly deny there exists any such ultimate quality (atisaya). Haribhadra, while refuting Dharmakirti's account of anekantavada, ironically states in his Anekantajayapataka: [9] Hence, there is indeed) some ultimate quality in this [yoghurt) by virtue of whose singular character (the person enjoined) acts (with respect to the yoghurt, not with respect to the camel]. [And] that is nothing but yoghurt. Thus it is not [the case that there exists the ultimate quality], because that would go against the fact that (yoghurt) is an existing substance. [10] Therefore this ultimate quality does exist (as the substance of yoghurt as such). It does not exist in anything else, and there is nothing else at all except for these two (sc. the yoghurt and the camel). Accordingly, since the true nature [of yoghurt) is well established, there is no fault (with the doctrine of multiplexity of reality). * NVI, 373-4 (p. 80) = NVi2 2.204-5 (vol. II 234, 1-4): sugato 'pi mrgo jato mrgo 'pi sugatah smrtah/ tathapi sugato vandyo mrgah khyadyo yathesyate II tatha vastubalad eva bhedabhedavyavasthiteh/ codito dadhi khaderi kim ustram abhidhavati // 84 Vol. I 297,13-14 (ka. 9-10): alo 'sty alisayas tatra yena bhedena vartate / sa dadhy every ado neti saddravyarvanuvedhatah // 9 // fatah so 'sti na canyatra na capy anubhayam param/ evam tallvavyavasthayam avadyam nasti kimcana // 10 //

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Dharmakini's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) 23 Another example of a philosopher who rejects it is Prabhacandrasuris. The existence of any kind of special quality is thus denied, and indeed it is hard to find a trace of it also in earlier Jaina sources. 4.2.3. In opposition to what Dharmakirti claims (vide supra $ 2.2.1.f.), no Jaina text consulted by me speaks of the identity of two unrelated things x = y. Instead, the formulation of the syat proposition is one of the following: (a) an incomplete sentence of the sort: 0 (uis ...), o (x is not ... ), etc., in which no explicit predicate is mentioned; (b) a modal statement in which the subject is predicated of in terms of a predicate: 0 (x is P), where P is a property, 0 (x is non-P), etc.: (c) a modal statement-c.g. syat ghato ghatah, syat ghato 'ghatah etc. (see $ 3.6.) - that links a member of a class to the class of the kind oa EA, (a E-A), etc. by virtue of a property P all the members of the class possess; therefore, this kind of statements can be reduced to the pattern of $ 4.2.3.(b): 0 (x is P), o (x is non-P), etc.; (d) rather rare type: 0 (xis x-related), o (x is non-x-related) etc., where the relation is strictly causal, based on the idea of the triad: origination (utpada), cessation (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya), e.g. 'a pot is, in a certain sense, a lump of clay (syud ghalo mrdpindah: 0 (uis X-related)), 'a pot is not, in a certain sense, a lump of clay' (syad ghalo mrdpindo nasti, o x is non-X-related)); what Haribhadrasuri formulates is already implied by the two verses of Prasamurutiprakarana: (204) Whatever is characterised by origination, destruction and permanence, all that with no exception exists. It is predicated of as something existent, something non-existent or otherwise (sc. inexpressible as well as the remaining permutations) on account of whether a particular (property) is emphasised or not emphasised. [205] The production, [caused] by [the substratum) y, is of such an object x which was not there in the substratum ), and is seen presently there in the substratum) y. The opposite of this is the destruction of the object) 4.2.4. In Dharnakuti's account we see absolute absence of the four parameters dravyaksetrakalabhava (vide supra $ 3.5.) which, at a point, become essential in Jaina exposition of syadvada. 4.2.5. Dharmakirti does not seem to notice an important distinction between the substantial aspect of dravya and the modal, transient aspect of paryaya that are at the basis of such propositions as syad asti and syan nasti, respectively, etc. That oversight is unhesitatingly pointed out by Santisuri in the Nyayavatarasutravaritika, while directly referring to Dharmakirti's verse: 'One should not claim the following: ... [PV 3.182], because also the aspect of the mode is to be taken into account. It is only in that way that the seven-fold modal description is [properly] established. For it is as follows: When one wants to express the primary character of the substance, then one asserts: "ris, in a certain sense, [P]." Similarly, [When one wants to express the primary character) of the mode, one [asserts): "ris, in a certain sense, not-[P]." When one wishes to express the contention that both ** NKC, Vol. 2 463,5-6: ...kimcil sat samastasad iti, evam asad api. sampurnaniratisayas vatmana eva tu vastulvad nirupyam - katamat tal kva va kimcilsallvam asaltvam va? etarhi nirupyate - nanv idam eva tad ekasaltasad asad api asamarthagavaval. 0 Comp. Haribhudrusuri's account in PRPT. * PRP 204 205: ulpadavi gamanilyalvalaksanam yar tad asli sarvam api / sad asud va bhavality anyatharpilanarpitavisesat // 204 // yo roho yasmin nabhul sampralakale ca drsyale latra / lenolpadas tasya vigumus tu tusmad viparyasah // 205 //

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24 Piotr Balcerowicz are primary at the same time, then [one asserts]: "x is, in a certain sense, inexpressible." These [three) are the cases of the complete (sc. basic) account. The combinations of precisely these [three] yield another four angles. And these [remaining four] are the cases of the incomplete account insofar as they are based on the arrangement of the elements of these three). [The permutations] are as follows: ".xis, fin a certain sense,] [P] and is not-Pl": "x is, sin a certain sense. [P] and is inexpressible"; "x is, [in a certain sense,] [P] and is not-[P], and is inexpressible." Thus, no other angle is possible. 88 What is important, the parameterisation of the modal propositions within the framework of the seven-fold modal description had already become a standard procedure among the Jainas before Dharmakirti, for examples see $$ 3.1.3., 3.5., 3.6, so Dharmakirti must, at least should, have been aquatinted with it. 4.2.6. We come across similar criticism against a charge of the identity of two unrelated things x = y (vide supra $ 2.2.1.f. and 4.2.3.), expressed by Samantabhadra. He explains that any two things can be regarded as equal and unequal the way a substance and its modes can be interpreted as identical and different: [70] Because of the contradiction, there cannot be selfsameness of nature of both phenomena that are opposed in nature, which is incriminated) by the enemies of the method of the seven-fold modal description. Also when la charge is expressly formulated by the opponents that if sa thing is indescribable it is findescribable in the absolute sense, then (such a charge] is not logically tenable because, [that being the case, it is seen to be expressible. 171] The substance and the mode are one, insofar as there is no disassociation of these two (sc. they are invariably related) and insofar as these two always undergo [their respectivel particular kind of transformation due to the relationship that holds between these two of the potentiality bearer (sc. substance) and the potentialities (sc. modes). 172] On the other hand, since these two have their particular designations and their particular numerical character (SC. substance is one, modes are many), since they have their unique natures and since there is a distinction between them in terms of their purpose etc.. [therefore there is difference between them. However, [the difference is not in the absolute sense. ** NASV 35 8 30, p. 93.26-94.4: na caitad vac yam sarvasyobhayarupafve ladvisesanirakrieh/ codito dadhi khaderi kim ustra nabhidhavari // PV 3.182 11 paryayanayasyapy abhyupagamal, ata eva saplabhangi siddhyati. tatha hi - yada dravyasya pradhanyam Vivaksate lada "syad asti ili katlyule. yatha paryayanam tada "syan nasti" iti. yada yugapad ublayapradhanyapratipadanan vivaks yale talda "avaklavyam." ele sakaladesah. tatsamyoga evapare calvaro bhanga bhavanti. le ca svavayavapeksuya vikaladesah. Tad yuiha-asli ca nasti ca. asti cavaktavya ca. nasti cavaktavyam ca, asti ca nasti cuvaktavyam cu ili naparabhangasambhavah. * Here: avacva-avaklavya, in the sense of the third (or fourth) modal proposition (syad avaklavyam). AMi 70cd is apparently a reply to PVSV (184.22}: na hy avac yam artham buddhayah samihante. The verse of AMi 70 (karya-karana) is a repetition of AMi 13 (abhava-bhava), and it recurs again and again in Samantabhadra's work: 32 (samanya-visesa), 55 (nilya-anitya), 74 (apeksika-anapeksika), 77 (pratyaksa-agama), 82 (antarjnevabahirjneya), 90 (daiva-adaiva), 94 (punya-papa), 97 (ajnana-jnana). In each case ublaya (in ubhayaikamyam) changes its meaning, here supplied by me in brackets. deg AMi 70-72: virodhan nobhayaikatmyam syadvadanyayavidvisam /

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Dharmakini's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) The implication of Samantabhadra's exposition, which I believe is directly prompted by Dharmakirti, is that any two entities can be considered both as identical and different in accordance with the substance-expressive (dravyarthikanaya) and the mode-expressive (paryayarthikanaya) viewpoints (see pp. 11, 14, 16), where the two viewpoints serve as parameters. 5. To conclude, we easily see some points in Dharmakirti's account of the anekantavada that significantly diverge from the genuine doctrine as it is represented by Jaina philosophers themselves. Now wonder that the Jainas are keen to demonstrate how greatly Dharmakiti misrepresents it. It is particularly Akalanka who ridicules Dharmakirti on that basis: You who are someone who proves the manifold continuum of cognition (which grasps) something impermanent (as represented in falsc appearance (and) who criticises, indeed, the statements (sc. saptabhangi) of cognition of truth, you are a jester. Vadirajasuri follows the suit: 'Therefore, (when Dharmakinti] has not understood the opinion of the propounder of modal description, and [still] formulates this [objection) against him, [the objection] reveals Dharmakirti's nature of jester: "Someone who has not understood the initial position [of his opponents) and yet criticises is a jester", 19 the last line being a pun (avijnaya DUSAKO 'pi VIDUSAKAN). In these acts of derision they reciprocate Dharmakirti's own tactics, who calls his opponents shameless' (ahrikah) and their theory 'primitive and confused' (aslilam akulam) in PV 3.181. Both approaches seem to be compatible neither with the Jaina and Buddhist principles of ahimsa or kuruna. The question arises whether the points Dharmakirti 'missed' can be justified historically with his poor acquaintance with the Jaina doctrine? That supposition seems highly unlikely to me, although one cannot exclude the possibility that what Dharmakirti depicts are some early developments of the theory. Rather Dharmak urti deliberately invents his own example of the camel and the yoghurt in order to graphically emphasise the paradoxes he believed Jaina theory contained, but also in order to draw a caricature of it with his sharp tongue. His approach is reductionist in the sense that avac yalaikanie 'py ukrir navacyam iti yujyate // 70 // dravyaparyayor aik vam tayor avyatirekatah/ parinamuvisesac ca sakrimacchaktibhavatah // 71 // sanjusurikliyavisesuc ca svalaksanavisesatah/ prayojunudibhedac ca tannanarvam na sarvatha // 72 // SVI 3.26 (412): mitlivarthabhasilirajnanacitrasantanasadhakah/ Tallvajnunagiram anga dusakas tvain vidusakah // See also SVIV 6.37 (437,22-25): dadhyadau na pravarteta bauddhah tadbhuktaye janah/ adrsyami sungain latra tanum samankamanakah // dadhyudikeluha bhukie na bhuktam kancikadikam/ ily asou vellu no veli na bhukta saugali tanuh // NViV 2.203 (233.26 27): fatah syodvadimatam anavabuddhya tatredam ucyamanam dharmakirler vidulisakatvam avedayali "purvapaksam uvijnaya dusako 'pi vidusakal" INVi) ili prasiddheh.

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Piotr Balcerowicz he redraws and simplifies essential elements of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality for his main objective is not a doxographic report but a successful tactics to win over the opponent. Bibliography AJP Haribhadrasuri: Anekantajayapataka. H. R. Kapadia (ed.): Anekantajayapataka by Haribhadra Suri with his own commentary and Municandra Suri's supercommentary. 2 Vols., Gaekwad Oriental Series 88, 105, Baroda 1940, 1947. AJPSV AMI AnD Ass Ass AVP Haribhadrasuri: Anekantajayapatakasvopajnavyakhya. See AJP. Samantabhadra: Aptamimamsa. (1) Pannalal Jain (ed.): Aptamimamsa of Sam antabhadra Svami, with two commentaries: Astasati of Bhattakalanka and Devagamavrtti of Vasunandi. Sanatana Jaina Granthamala 10(7), Kasi (Benares) 1914. (2) Udayachandra Jain (ed., Hindi tr.): Tattvadipika. A Commentary with Introduction etc. on Aptamimansa of Acharya Samantabhadra. Sri Ganes Varni Digambar Jain Samsthan, Kasi VirSam. 2501 (= 1982 r. n.e.). (3) Nagin Shah (ed., tr.): Samantabhadra's Aptamimamsa. Critique of an Authority (Along with English Translation, Introduction, Notes and Akalanka's Sanskrit Commentary Astasati). SSG 7: 1999. Anuogaddaraim (Anuyogadvarani). Muni Punyavijaya, Dalsukh Malvania. Amritlal Mohanlal Bhojak (ed.): Nandisuttam and Anuogaddaraim. Jaina-Agama-Series 1, Sri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, Bombay 1968. Vidyananda Patrakesarisvam in: Astasahasri. Vamsidhar (ed.): Astasahasri tarkikacakracudamanisyadvadavidyapatina Srividyanandasvamina niraksta. Nirnaya-sagara Press, Bombay 1915. Akalanka: Astasati. See (1) AMij, (3) AMiz and (5) AsS. Haribhadrasuri: Anekantavadapravesa. Edited with Tippanaka. Hemacandracarya Granthavali, Pattan 1919. P. Balcerowicz: 'How Could a Cow be Both Synchronically and Diachronically Homogeneous, or On the Jaina Notions of tiyrak-samanya and urdhva-samanya.' In: N.K. Wagle and Olle Qvarnstrom (eds.): Approaches to Jaina Studies: Philosophy, Logic, Rituals and Symbols. [Proceedings of the International Conference on Approaches to Jaina Studies: Philosophy, Logic, Rituals and Symbols, 31.03-2.04.1995 Toronto). Edited by N.K. Wagle and Olle Qvarnstrom. South Asian Studies Papers 11, University of Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies, Toronto 1999: 211-235. P. Balcerowicz: 'On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana, Indologica Taurinensia (Proceedings of the X7th World Sanskrit Conference (Turin, April, 3d-8". 2000)] 29 (2003) 31-83. P. Balcerowicz: 'Some Remarks on the Naya Method,' in: Piotr Balerowicz (ed.): Essays in Jaina Philosophy and Religion (Proceedings of the International Seminar on Jainism Aspects of Jainism.' Warsaw University 8-9 September, 2000). Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi 2003: 37-67. P. Balcerowicz: "Pramanas and language. A Dispute between Dinnaga, Dharmakirti and Akalanka,' Journal of Indian Philosophy 33 (2005) 343-400. B. Bhatt: The Canonical Niksepa. Studies in Jaina Dialectics. With a foreword by K. Bruhn and H. Haertel. E.J.Brill, Leiden 1978 [reprinted: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Delhi-Varanasi 1991). Balcerowicz 1999 Balcerowicz 2003a Balcerowicz 2003b Balcerowicz 2005 Bhatt 1978

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Dharmakirti's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) BHSD DNC DNCV Pathak 1893 Pathak 1930 Pathak 19301931 Fujinaga 2000 F. Edgerton: Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar, Dictionary, Reader. 3 Vols. New Haven 1953. Mallavadin Ksamasramana: Dvadasaranayacakra. Muni Jam buvijayaji (ed.): Dvadasaram Nayacakram of Acarya Sri Mallavadi ksamasramana. With the commentary Nyayagamanusarini of Acarya Sri Simhasuri Gani Vadi Ksamasramana. Edited with critical notes by .... Pl. I (1-4 Aras), Si-Jaina-Almanamda-sabha, Bhavnagar 1966 (reprinted: Bhavnagar 2000): Pl. II (5-8 Aras): Bhavnagar 1976; Pt. III (9-12 A ras): Bhavnagar 1988. Simhasuri: Nyayagamanusarini Dvadasaranayacakravrti. See: DNC. B.K. Pathak: 'The Position of Kumarila in Digambara Jaina Literature,' in: E.D. Morgan (ed.): The Transactions of the Ninth International Congress of Orientalists, Vol. 1, Printed for the Committee of the Congress, 22 Albemarle St., London 1893: 186-214. B.K. Pathak: "Santaraksita's Reference to Kumarila's Attacks on Samantabhadra and Akalankadeva,' ABORI 11 (1930) 155-164. B.K. Palak: Kumarila's Verses Attacking the Jain and Buddhist Notions of an Omniscient Being,' ABORI 11 (1930-1931) 123-131. S. Fujinaga: Determining which Jaina Philosopher was the Object of Dharmakuri's Criticism, Philosophy East and West 50/3 (2000) 378-385. Mahendrakumar Jain: Jain darsan. Trtiya samskarana, Ganes Prasad Varni Jain Granthamala 2. 7. Sri Ganes Varni Di. Jain Samsthan, Goladhar / Varanasi 1974 (Prahama samskarana: 1955). Jainendra Siddhanta Kosa. Ed. by Jinendra Varni, Parts 1-5. Jnanapitha Murtidevi Jaina Granihamala, 38, 40, 42, 44, 48 [Samskrta Granthanka). Bharatiya Jnanapiha Prakasana, Delhi 1997, 1999, 2000. Yasovijayasuri Upudhyaya: Jainatarkabhasa. (1) Bhargava, Dayanand (ed., transl.): Mahopadhyaya Yasovijaya's Jaina Tarka Bhasa With Translation and Critical Noles. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi-Varanasi --Patna 1973. (2) Sukhlalil Sanghavi, Mahendra Kumar, Dalsukh Malvaniya (ed.): Mahopadhyayasriyasovijayaganiracita Jainatarkabhasa. Sarasvati Pustak Bhandar, Ahmadabad (Ahmedabad) 1993. (first cd.: 1938. H.R. Kapadia: 'Introduction,' see AJP. Jain 1974 JSK JTBh. Kapadia 1940 - 1947 Matilal 1981 NASV NC NKC B.K. Matilal: The Central Philosophy of Jainism (Anekantavada). Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 79, Bharatiya Sanskrit Vidyamandir - L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad 1981. Santisuri: Nyayavatarasutravarilika. Nyayavatarasutravartika of Sri Santi Suri critically edited in Sanskrit with notes. indices etc. in Hindi [with the Vri] by Dalsukh Malvania, published by Singhi Jain Sastra Sikshapitha, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay 1949. Mailla-dhavala-[deval: Nayacakko [Dravyasvabhavaprakasakanayacakra). Kailash Chandra Shastri (cd., transl.): Nayacakko (Nayacakral of Sri Mailladhavala. Jnanapiha Murtidevi Jaina Grantha-mala 12. Bharatiya Jnanapitha Prakasana, Delhi 1999. [first edition.: 1971). Prabhacandrasuri: Nyayakumudacandra. Mahendra Kumar Nyaya Sastri (ed.): Nya vakumuducundra of Srimat Prabhacandracarya. A Commentary on Bhattakalarikadeva's Laghiyastraya. With an introduction (Prastavana) by Kailascandra Sastri. 2 Vols., SGDOS 121, D 1991. 11. ed.: Bombay 1938-1942).. Akalanka Bhatta: Nyayaviniscaya. (1) Nyayacarya Mahendra Pandita Kumar Sastri (ed.): Srimad Bhattakalankadevaviracitam Akulurkagraniharayam (Svopajnavivrtisahitam Laghiyasirayam, Nyayaviniscayah, Pramanasangrahas ca). Sarasvati Pustak Bhandar, Almadabad (Almedabad) 1996 (1 edition: Ahmedabad Calcutta 1939). (2) Mahendra Kumar Jain (ed.): Nyayaviniscayavivarana of Sri Vadiraja Suri, the Sanskrit Commentary on Bhatta Akalankadeva's Nyayaviniscaya. Vol. 1 & 2, Bharatiya Jnanapitha NVi

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28 NViv Pann PRP PRPT PSa PSa PSSa PV Piotr Balcerowicz Prakasana, Varanasi 1949, 1955 [2nd edition: Bharatiya Jnanaprha Prakasana, New Delhi 2000]. Vadirajasuri: Nyayaviniscayavivarana. See: NViz. Pannavanasulta [Prajnapanasutra]. Muni Punyavijaya, Dalsukh Malvania, Amritlal Mohanlal Bhojak (ed.): Pannavanasuttam. 2 parts, Jaina-Agama-Series 9 (Part 1, 2), Sri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, Bombay 1969, 1971. Umasvati: Prasamaratiprakarana. (1) Rajakumara (ed.): [Sriharibhadrasuriviracitatikankita]. prabhavaka Mandala, Srimad Rajacandra Asrama, Agas 2514 (Vira Samvat) [= 1989]. Srimadumasvativiracita Srimad-rajacandra-jaina-sastra-mala, Prasamaratiprakarana Sri-parama-sruta (2) Yajneshwar S. Shastri: Acarya Umasvati Vacaka's Prasamaratiprakarana. Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 107, Bharatiya Sanskrit Vidyamandir - L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad 1989. Haribhadrasuri: Prasamaratitika. See: PRP, and PRP2. Kundakunda: Pavayanasara [Pravacanasara]. A.N. Upadhye (ed.): Sri Kundakundacarya's Pravacanasara (Pavayanasara), a Pro-Canonical Text of the Jainas, the Prakrit Text critically edited with the Sanskrit Commentaries of Amrtacandra and Jayasena. Sri ParamasrutaPrabhavaka-Mandala, Srimad Rajacandra Asrama, Agas (Gujarat) 1984. [first edition: Bombay 1935]. Kundakunda: Pavayanasara [Pravacanasara]. A.N. Upadhye (ed.): Sri Kundakundacarya's Pravacanasara (Pavayanasara), a Pro-Canonical Text of the Jainas, the Prakrit Text critically edited with the Sanskrit Commentaries of Amrtacandra and Jayasena. Parama-Sruta-Prabhavaka Mandal, Shrimad Rajachandra Ashrama, Agas-Gujarat 1984. [First edition: Bombay 1935]. Kundakunda: Pamcatthiyasamgaha [Pancastikayasamayasara]. (1) A. Chakravartinayanar and A.N. Upadhye (ed.): Pancastikayasara. The Building of the Cosmos. Prakrit text, Sanskrit chaya, English commentary etc. Bharatiya Janapitha Prakasana, New Delhi 1975. [1. edition: The Sacred Books of the Jainas 3, Kumar Kendra Prasada - The Central Jaina Publishing House, Arrah 1920]. (2) Manoharlal (ed.): Srimatkundakundasvamiviracitah Pancastikayah TattvapradipikatatparyavrttiBalavabodhakabhaseti tikatrayopetah. Sri Paramasruta-Prabhavaka-Mandala, Srimad Rajacandra Asrama, Agas (Gujarat) 1997. Dharmakirti: Pramanavarttika. (1) Rahula Sankrtyayana (ed.): Pramanavarttikam by Acarya Dharmakirti. Appendix to Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24, Patna 1938: 1-123. (2) Rahula Sankrtyayana (ed.): Pramanavarttikam AcaryaManorathanandikrtaya vritya samvalitam [Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttikam with a commentary by Manorathanandin]. Parts III, Appendix to Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24-26, Patna 1938-1940. (3) See: PVA. (4) Dalasukha Malavaniya (ed.): Acarya Dharmakirti krta Svarthanumanapariccheda. General Edition: V.S. Agarwala, Hindu Vishvavidyalaya Nepal Rajya Sanskrit Series 2, Varanasi [1959]. (5) Raniero Gnoli (ed.): The Pramanavarttikam of Dharmakirti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes. Serie Orientale Roma 23, Ismeo, Roma 1960. (6) See: Mookerjee-Nagasaki (1964). (7) Svami Dvarikadas Sastri (ed.): Dharmakirtti Nibandhawali (1): Pramanavarttika of Acharya Dharmakirti with the Commentary 'Vrtti' of Acharya Manorathanandin. BBS 3, 1968 [reprinted: 1984]. (8) Yusho Miyasaka (ed.): 'Pramanavarttikakarika (Sanskrit and Tibetan).' [Chapter 2 = Pramanasiddhi, Chapter 3 = Pratyaksa, Chapter 4 = Pararthanumana]. Acta Indologica [indokoten-kenkyu] 2 (1971/72) 1-206 [Narita: Naritasan Shinshoji]. (9) Ram Chandra Pandeya (ed.): The Pramanavarttikam of Acarya Dharmakirti with

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Dharmakini's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekantavada) PVA PVSV PVSVT PVV RVar SBT Schubring 1962 Shah 2000 Soni 2003 Subcommentaries: Svopajsavrti of the Author and Pramanavartikavrti of Manorathanandin. MB, 1989. [the chapter numbering follows: PV2). Prajnakarugupia: Pramanavarttikalankara. Tripitakacharya Rahula Sankrtyayana (ed.): Pramunavartikabhasyam or Vartikalankarah of Prajnakaragupta. (Being a commentary on Dharmakirti's Pramanavartikam). Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1953. Dharmakirti: Pramanavarttikasvavrtti. See: (4) PV4. (5) PVs and (9) PV.. Karnakagomin: Pramanavartikasvavrtritika. Rahula Sankrtyayana (ed.): AcaryaDharmakirteh Pramunavartikam (svarthanumanaparicchedah) svopajnavrttya Karnakagomiviracitaya tattikaya ca sahitam. Kitab Mahal, Ilahabad [Allahabad) 1943 (reprinted: Kyoto 1982]. Manorathanandin: Pramanavarttikavrti. See: PV, PV, PV, Akalanka: Tall varthavarlika (Rajavartika). Mahendra Kumar Jain (ed.): Taltvarthavartika [Rajavarttikal of Sri Akalarkadeva. Edited with Hindi Translation, Introduction, Appendices, Variant Readings, Comparative Notes etc. Parts I-II. First edition, JMJG 10, 20 [Sanskrit Graniha), D 1953-1957. [2. ed.: D 1982). Vimaladusa: Saptabhangitarangini. Manoharlal (ed.): Srimadvimaladasaviracila Saptabhangitarangini. Sri Parunasrutu-Prabhavaka-Mandala, Srimad Rajacandra Asrama, A gas (Gujara) 1995 [first edition.: 1913). W. Schubring: The Doctrine of the Jainas. Translated from the German by Wolfgang Beurlen, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi 1962 [reprinted: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi 1978. Reedited with the three indices enlarged and added by Willem Bollee and Jayandra Soni, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi 2000). J.N. Shah (ed.): Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truih. Bhogilal Leharchand Institute of Indology, Delhi 2000. J. Soni: Kundak unda and Umasvati on Anekanta-vada." In: Piotr Balcerowicz (ed.): Essays in Jaina Philosophy and Religion. Warsaw Indological Studies 2, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi 2003 25-35. Akalanka: Svarupasambodhana. Kallapa Bharamappa Nitve (hrsg.): Laghiyasirayadisangrahah. 1. bhuttakalarkadevakriam Laghiyastrayam, Anantakirtiracitatat paryavrttisahitam, 2. bhattakalankudevakram Svarupasambodhanam, 3-4. Anantakirtikrtalaghubrhatsarvajnasiddhi ca. Manikacandra-Digambara-Jaina-Grantha-mala 1, Bombay 1975: 7-4-106. Pujyupada Devanandin: Sarvarthasiddhi. (1) Phoolchandra Shastri (ed.): Acarya Pujyapada's Sarvarthasiddhi The commentary on Acarya Griddhapiccha's Tanvarthasutral. Edited and translated into Hindi). Varanasi 1934 [reprinted: Jnanapitha Murtidevi Jaina Grantha-mala, Bharatiya Jnanapitha Prakasana 13, Delhi 2000). Siddhusena Divakara: Sammatitarkaprakarana. (1) Sukhlal Sanghavi; Becurdas Dosi (ed.): Sarmalitarkaprakaranam by Siddhasena Divakara with Abhayadevasuri's Tativabodhavidhayini. Gujaratpuratattvamundirgranthavali 10, 16, 18, 19, 21, Gujaral-puru-tattva-mandir, Amdavad 1924-1931 (reprinted: 2 Vols., Rinsen Buddhist Text Series VI-1, 2; Kyoto 1984). Akalanka Bhatta: Siddhiviniscaya. Mahendrakumar Jain (ed.): Siddhiviniscaya of Akalarka edited with the commentary Siddhiviniscayarika of Anantavirya. 2 Vols. BhJP, V 1959. Ananiavirya: Siddhiviniscayatika. See: SVI. Akalanka Bhatta: Siddhiviniscayavivrti. See: SVI. Mallisenasuri: Svadvadamanjari. (1) See: AYVD. (2) Jagadisacandra Jain (ed.): Srimallisenasuripranila Syudvadamanjari. Sri Param asruta-Prabhavaka-Mandala, Srimad Rajacandra Asrama, A gus (Gujarat) 1992. Vadidevasuri: Syadvadaratnakara. Motilal Lalaji (ed.): Srimadvadidevasuriviracitah Pramananavalallvalokalarikarah tadvyakhya ca Syadvadaratnakarah. 5 Vols., Poona 1926-1930 /reprinted: 2 Vols., Bharuliya Buk Karporesan, Dilli (Delhi) 1988). Samantabhadra: Svayambhustotra. (1) Jugal Kisor Mukhtar 'Yugavira' (ed., introd.): Srimatsvami SSam SSI STP SVi SVIT SViV SVM SVR SvSt

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30 Piotr Balcerowicz TBh TBV TS samangabhadracaryaviracita caturvimsatijinastavanatmaka Svayambhustotra (stutiparaka jainagama). Virasevamandiragranthamala 7, Vira-seva Mandira, Sarasava Jila Saharanapura 1951. (2) Devendra K. Goyal (ed., tr.): The Path to Enlightenment. Svayambhu Stotra by Acharya Samantabhdra Svami. English Translation with introduction. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi 2000. Umasvati: Tattvarthadhigamablasya. See: TS, TS2. Abhayadevasuri: Tattvabodhavidltayini. See: STP. Umasvamin: Tattvarthasutra. (1) M.K. Mody (ed.): Tattvarthadhigama by Umasvati being in the Original Sanskrit with the Bhasya by the author himself. Bibliotheca Indica Nos. 1044, 1079, 1118, Calcutta 1903, 1904, 1905. [= Svetambara Recension). (2) See: TT. [= Svetambara Recension) (3) See: SSi. [= Digambara Recension). (4) See: RVar. [= Digambara Recension). Siddhasena-ganin: Tattvarthadhigamatika. Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia (ed.): Tattvarthadhigamasutra (A Treatise on the Fundamental Principles of Jainism) by His Holiness Sri Umasvati Vachaka, together with His connective verses commented upon by Sri Devaguptasuri & Sri Siddhasenagani and His own gloss elucidated by Sri Siddlasenagani, edited with Introduction in English and Sanskrit. 2 Vols., Sheth Devchand Lalbhai Jain Pustakoddhar Fund Series Nos. 67 and 76, Jivanachand Sakerchand Javeri, Bombay 1926 (Part I: Chapters l-V), 1930 (Part II: Chapters VI-X). A.N. Upadhye: "Introduction,' See: PSa, pp. 1-120. Jinabhadra-ganin: Visesavasyakabhasya. Haragovinda Das (ed.): Visesavasyakabhasyam. Muladharisrihemacandrasuriviracitaya sisyahitanamnaya brhadvrtlya vibhusitam. . $17-Yasovijayajaina-grantha-mala 25, 27, 28, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, Shah Harakhchand Bhurabhai, Varanasi 1915. Hemacandra Maladharin Gandhavimukta: Visesavasyakavrii (Brhadvrti). See: VABh. Viyahapannalli / Viyahapannatti | Bhagavaiviyalapannatti [Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti / Bhagavatisutra). Bechardas J. Doshi; Amritlal Mohanlal Bhojak (ed.): Viyahapannattisultain. 3 parts, Jaina-Agama-Series 4 (Part 1, 2, 3), Sri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, Bombay 1974, 1978, 1982. Upadhye 1935 VABh VAV! Viy