Dharmakirtis Criticism Of Jaina Doctrine Of Multiplexity Of Reality Anekantavada

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz

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Piotr Balcerowicz
are primary at the same time, then [one asserts]: "x is, in a certain sense, inexpressible." These [three) are the cases of the complete (sc. basic) account. The combinations of precisely these [three] yield another four angles. And these [remaining four] are the cases of the incomplete account insofar as they are based on the arrangement of the elements of these three). [The permutations] are as follows: ".xis, fin a certain sense,] [P] and is not-Pl": "x is, sin a certain sense. [P] and is inexpressible"; "x is, [in a certain sense,] [P] and is not-[P], and is inexpressible." Thus, no other angle is possible. 88
What is important, the parameterisation of the modal propositions within the framework of the seven-fold modal description had already become a standard procedure among the Jainas before Dharmakīrti, for examples see $$ 3.1.3., 3.5., 3.6, so Dharmakirti must, at least should, have been aquatinted with it.
4.2.6. We come across similar criticism against a charge of the identity of two unrelated things x = y (vide supra $ 2.2.1.f. and 4.2.3.), expressed by Samantabhadra. He explains that any two things can be regarded as equal and unequal the way a substance and its modes can be interpreted as identical and different:
[70] Because of the contradiction, there cannot be selfsameness of nature of both phenomena that are opposed in nature, which is incriminated) by the enemies of the method of the seven-fold modal description. Also when la charge is expressly formulated by the opponents that if sa thing is indescribable it is findescribable in the absolute sense, then (such a charge] is not logically tenable because, [that being the case, it is seen to be expressible. 171] The substance and the mode are one, insofar as there is no disassociation of these two (sc. they are invariably related) and insofar as these two always undergo [their respectivel particular kind of transformation due to the relationship that holds between these two of the potentiality bearer (sc. substance) and the potentialities (sc. modes). 172] On the other hand, since these two have their particular designations and their particular numerical character (SC. substance is one, modes are many), since they have their unique natures and since there is a distinction between them in terms of their purpose etc.. [therefore there is difference between them. However, [the difference is not in the absolute sense.
** NASV 35 8 30, p. 93.26-94.4: na caitad vāc yam
sarvasyobhayarūpafve ladviseșaniräkrieh/
codito dadhi khăderi kim ustra näbhidhāvari // PV 3.182 11 paryāyanayasyāpy abhyupagamäl, ata eva saplabhangi siddhyati. tatha hi - yada dravyasya prādhanyam Vivaksate lada "syād asti ili katlyule. yathä paryāyāņām tadā "syān năsti" iti. yada yugapad ublayapradhanyapratipādanan vivaks yale taldā "avaklavyam." ele sakalādeśāh. tatsamyoga eväpare calvaro bhanga bhavanti. le ca svāvayavāpekşuyä vikalādesah. Tad yuiha-asli ca nāsti ca. asti cāvaktavya ca. nästi cävaktavyam ca, asti ca năsti
cüvaktavyam cu ili näparabhangasambhavah. * Here: avācva-avaklavya, in the sense of the third (or fourth) modal proposition (syäd avaklavyam).
AMi 70cd is apparently a reply to PVSV (184.22}: na hy avāc yam artham buddhayah samihante. The verse of AMi 70 (kārya-kärana) is a repetition of ĀMi 13 (abhāva-bhāva), and it recurs again and again in Samantabhadra's work: 32 (sāmānya-viseșa), 55 (nilya-anitya), 74 (apeksika-anapekṣika), 77 (pratyakşa-agama), 82 (antarjñevabahirjñeya), 90 (daiva-adaiva), 94 (punya-pāpa), 97 (ajñāna-jñāna). In each case ublaya (in ubhayaikāmyam)
changes its meaning, here supplied by me in brackets. ° AMi 70-72:
virodhän nobhayaikātmyam syädvädanyayavidvisām /