Dharmakirtis Criticism Of Jaina Doctrine Of Multiplexity Of Reality Anekantavada

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz

Page 25

Dharmakini's criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavada)
The implication of Samantabhadra's exposition, which I believe is directly prompted by Dharmakirti, is that any two entities can be considered both as identical and different in accordance with the substance-expressive (dravyärthikanaya) and the mode-expressive (paryāyarthikanaya) viewpoints (see pp. 11, 14, 16), where the two viewpoints serve as parameters.
5. To conclude, we easily see some points in Dharmakīrti's account of the anekāntavāda that significantly diverge from the genuine doctrine as it is represented by Jaina philosophers themselves. Now wonder that the Jainas are keen to demonstrate how greatly Dharmakīti misrepresents it. It is particularly Akalanka who ridicules Dharmakīrti on that basis:
You who are someone who proves the manifold continuum of cognition (which grasps) something impermanent (as represented in falsc appearance (and) who criticises, indeed, the statements (sc. saptabhangi) of cognition of truth,
you are a jester. Vādirājasūri follows the suit: 'Therefore, (when Dharmakinti] has not understood the opinion of the propounder of modal description, and [still] formulates this [objection) against him, [the objection] reveals Dharmakirti's nature of jester: "Someone who has not understood the initial position [of his opponents) and yet criticises is a jester", 19 the last line being a pun (avijñāya DŪŞAKO 'pi VIDŪŞAKAN).
In these acts of derision they reciprocate Dharmakīrti's own tactics, who calls his opponents shameless' (ahrikāh) and their theory 'primitive and confused' (aslīlam ākulam) in PV 3.181. Both approaches seem to be compatible neither with the Jaina and Buddhist principles of ahimsā or kurunā.
The question arises whether the points Dharmakirti 'missed' can be justified historically with his poor acquaintance with the Jaina doctrine? That supposition seems highly unlikely to me, although one cannot exclude the possibility that what Dharmakirti depicts are some early developments of the theory. Rather Dharmak ürti deliberately invents his own example of the camel and the yoghurt in order to graphically emphasise the paradoxes he believed Jaina theory contained, but also in order to draw a caricature of it with his sharp tongue. His approach is reductionist in the sense that
avāc yalaikänie 'py ukrir nāvācyam iti yujyate // 70 // dravyaparyāyor aik vam tayor avyatirekatah/ parināmuviseşác ca sakrimacchaktibhāvatah // 71 // sanjūsurikliyāvisesūc ca svalaksanavišesatah/
prayojunüdibhedäc ca tannānārvam na sarvatha // 72 // SVI 3.26 (412):
mitlivärthabhäsilirajnánacitrasantänasādhakah/
Tallvajñünagiram anga düşakas tvain vidūsakah // See also SVIV 6.37 (437,22-25):
dadhyādau na pravarteta bauddhah tadbhuktaye janah/ adrsyāmi sungain latra tanüm samankamānakah // dadhyüdikeluha bhukie na bhuktam kañcikädikam/
ily asou vellu no veli na bhuktā saugali tanuh // NViV 2.203 (233.26 27): fatah syödvädimatam anavabuddhya tatredam ucyamanam dharmakirler vidulisakatvam ävedayali "purvapakşam uvijñaya düşako 'pi vidūşakal" INVi) ili prasiddheh.