Dharmakirtis Criticism Of Jaina Doctrine Of Multiplexity Of Reality Anekantavada

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz

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Piotr Balcerowicz
Sammatitarkaprakarana (ca. 450-50048)49 in Mallavādin's Dvādaśüranayacakra (ca. 550-600)50, in Pūjyapāda Devanandin's Sarvārthasiddhil etc. What Manorathanandin refers to by vastu corresponds to what the Jainas usually call dravya, a substance, and avasthā parallels what the Jainas call paryāya, a mode. They served as a kind of parameters that qualified an angle under which a thing was predicated of. Neither these two viewpoints nor any other kind of parameterisation should not be confused with what Dharmakirti called atiśaya (vide supra § 3.5.) inasmuch they were not a special quality of the thing as such.
Dharmakirti must therefore have known these two viewpoints, or any other parameters for that matter, and their absence in PV was in all probability not dictated by his poor knowledge of Jaina arguments but rather by the fact that he considered a detailed account of Jaina line of reasoning unnecessary.
2.2.1. How accurate and faithful was then his account of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality? To answer this, we should first identify central components of the anekānta theory as it emerges in Dharmakūti's exposition. Indeed, we can distinguish a number of important elements there that appear to underlie the Jaina doctrine at his times: (a) the assertion: is, in a certain sense, y,' i.e. o (xis y), where the symbol o represents the modal operator syär; (b) the assertion: *x is, in a certain sense, not-y,' i.e. a (x is y);
Three remaining permutations of the three principal options (sc, asti, nästi, avaktavyam) are implied by annan vā ("otherwise'); (5) the substance both exists and is inexpressible, (6) the substance both does not exist and is
inexpressible, (7) the substance simultaneously exists, does not exist and is inexpressible. 4* For the dating see Balcerowicz 2003a. +" These are referred to in STP 2.1: jam sāmannaggahanam damsanam eyam visesiyam nānamn /
donho vi nayana eso padekkum anthapajjāo // Insight is the grasp of the general. Cognition is one, characterised by the particular. This modality of the object (viz. its general and particular aspect) is individually [the contents for both viewpoints, li.c. substance
expressive (dravyārthika) and the modal, or mode-expressive paryayarthika). They are also taken for granted in the formulation of STP 3.10:
do una nayā bahavayā davvatthiyapajjavattiya niyaya /
etto ya gunavisese gunatthiyanao vi jujjamio II See also STP 3.57: davvanthiyavallavvam sāmannam pajjavassa ya viseso /
ee samovaniū vibhajjavāyam visesemti // 30 DNC 6,2-7,1: dravyarihaparyāyārthadvitvādyanantāntavikalpopakiptavidhibhedapadārıhaikavākyavidhividhānād
... DNC 876, 1-2: tešām dravyārthaparyāyārthanayau dvau mūlabhedau, tatprabhedah sangrahādayah. - 'Among these viewpoints), there are two main divisions, viz. the viewpoint the object of which is the substance and the
view point the object of which is the mode. Their subdivisions are the collective viewpoint etc. 5 SSi 1.33 (100,8-10): sa dvedhā dravyārthikah paryāyārthikas ceti. dravyam sāmānyam utsargah anuvrtir ity
arthah. Iadvişayo dravyathikah. paryāyo višeşo 'pavādo vyāvrtir ity arthah. tadvişayah pāryāyārihikah. layor bhedā naigumādayah. Compare e.g. the way Mallavādin describes the nature of (1) vastu and (2) dravya: (1) DNC 864,8-9: lathā ca sarvātmakam ekam evästi vasiv ili pratyaksādipramānair upalabhāmale; DNC 869,1-2: adrūpasaktivivariumāram IV elal sarvam bhāvaik val. ato nanisthitam vastu, anārabdhārahdhatvāl sik yakādivat; (2) DNC 866,1-2: ghato mri, mrdah prihivirum, prilivyā druvyarvam druvikärul väl...