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cease to exist at any time, it does not cease to exist at any time and it will not cease to exist at any time. It was, it is and it will be. It is constant, permanent, eternal, imperishable, indestructible, always existing.'
The world is, Jamālī, non-eternal. For it becomes progressive (in time-cycle) after being regressive. And it becomes regressive after becoming progressive.
The soul (i.e. living being) is, Jamāli, eternal. For it did not .cease to exist at any time. The soul is, Jamālī, noneternal. For it becomes animal after being a hellish creature, becomes a man, after becoming an animal and it becomes god after being a man."
Several points may be noted in this connection. First, Jamālī was confused and remained silent in the beginning, for the question had several ambiguities. Mahāvīra stated that not only he could answer it but also most of his ordinary disciples could. (Was it an oblique reference to the 'silence' of the Buddha, when he first tried to avoid answering such question?) The question might have been ambiguous, but were not unanswerable.
Secondly, in the first four avyākhyata questions, the subject was "loka". Since it ambiguously means both 'the world' and 'the person'.Mahāvīra used two separate sets of questions, with two different subjects, 'the world' and 'the soul', thus, perhaps foreshadowing the Jain ontological distinction between the living and the non-living (spirit and matter). Resolution of ambiguities is, as I have already noted, part of the vibhajya method. Third, and this is more important, Mahāvīra, unlike the Buddha, did not reject both of the seemingly contradictory predicates ('infinite' and 'finite'), but rather accepted both of
Bhagavai Viāhapannattī. Ed. Mahāprajña, With Prakrit Text, Sanskrit renderings, Hindi translation and Critical annotations. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute. Vol. I, II, III, 1994, 9.23.233, Pupphabhikkhu, pp. 609-610.
