Book Title: Applied Philosophy of Anekanta
Author(s): Shashiprajna Samni
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute

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Page 77
________________ sensuous knowledge whereas the omniscient knows it through the direct knowledge. The theory of anekānta is of universal application. Substance cannot exist without mode; therefore it applies to substance; mode cannot exist without substance; therefore it applies to mode. The transcendental existence and empirical existence are not absolutely separate in the Jain philosophy. The mode is empirical existence and the substance is transcendental existence; but they are inseparably joined together. Both of them are two aspects of the same existence and therefore, they cannot be conceived of as absolutely independent. If existence is to be propounded even by an omniscient, he will have to use syādvāda and saptabhangi as similar is the case with an ordinary man. When substance in itself is permanent and temporary, how can the omniscient express it in absolute terms? He will haye to use the language of syādvāda. For example, substance is relatively (i.e. with respect to a particular point of view) permanent and relatively temporary. So the acceptance of truth having multiple facets, partial perception of truth due to limitations of the observer, incomplete description of truth due to limitations of expression, and recognizing the equal possibility of different view points to be true is in brief, is the theory of anekāntavāda. This theory spontaneously drive a Jaina, away from extremism, radicalism, and fanaticism.It is discussed in the present chapter, how anekāntavāda (the theory of non-absolutism), manifests itself as the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy. It would be contextually relevant to briefly touch upon the meaning of anekānta ,the need of anekānta and the interrelation of anekāntavāda, nayavāda and syādvāda, which together reveal the functional dynamics of anekātvāda.. Pancāstikāyasāra of Kundakunda, op.cit., verse-13.. 54

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