________________
Noesis gives only a partial presentation (or noema) of the object, similar is the case with naya. Now according to Husserl, noesis with regards to an object are infinite in number so also are the cases of naya. Nayas are also infinite in number. In this respect Husserl can also say the same thing like the Jains without embracing any inconsistency viz. anantadharmakam vastu, In strict Husserlian terms, this can be couched as follows : an object as phenomenon has infinitely manifold noematic aspects.
Again, when Husserl says that object, as a system of innumerable noemata corresponding to innumerable noesis, is accessible to the knower through a noematic nucleus, he merely echoes with the view of the Jains in this regard.Objects are givenwith an essential onesidedness because of the perspectivism... This onesidedness is exhibited not only in the totality of evidence of the real and objective world, but also in every particular object in it. Substantial viewpoint or dravyārthika naya in Jainism is thus, parallel to what in Husserlian language is called a noematic nucleus.? This, the Jain call, abhedavrtti. Further when Husserl says that the noematic nucleus contains within itself in the form of horizon, the hints of all the possible noemata, this also seems to be in agreement with the Jains view. A dravya contains within itself the possibility of all the paryāyas. So there is no contradiction in accepting the view that the substantial view point foreshadows the possibility of all the paryāyas that a substance can assume in the form of horizon, as the noematic nucleus, implicitly contains all the paryāyas. Dravyārthic naya contains all the paryāya naya-s as hints.
Mrinal Kanti Bhadra. A Critical Survey of Phenomenology and Existentialism.
p. 83. 2 Samarikanta Samanta. Nayavāda: Phenomenological Interpretation. Quoted
from Tulsi Prajñā. Vol. 135-136, Oct.-Sep., 2007, pp. 43-44. 3 Saptabhangi Tarangini of Vimaldas, op.cit., p. 36. .
106
