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It means the self nature (momentariness) of the objects is the ultimate truth on account of its being a product of the intellectual function of exclusion. So different thinkers have presented the different aspects of truth in their own way. The vedānta philosophy rejected the modes as unreal, while accepting the substance alone as ultimately true. The Buddhist on the other hand, reject the substance as imaginary by accepting the reality of the modes. According to Jain logic, both the substance and the modes are ultimately true. We have experienced that change presupposes the persistence of an underlying permanence. So permanence is to be accounted as an element in a real together with the change. But change means, the cessation of a previous mode or attribute and the coming into being of a new mode. The affirmation of the triple characteristics has therefore, nothing paradoxical about it, like a Cartisean dualism.
• The word ‘anekānta' was not used by Mahāvīra and does not appear in the agamas. Siddhasena Divākara may have been the first Jain ācārya to use this word.' Take, for the instance, in next sections, Mahāvīra's responses to the questions posed by Indrabhūti Gautama, one of the twelve gañadharās and the principal disciples of Mahāvīra, Jayantī, a devotee, inquisitive śrāvikā (lay-women) and sister of king 'atānīka, and Somila, a dedicated and learned śrāvaka (lay-man).
The substance present itself when our thinking is synthetic, losing all its modes and when our approach. is analytical, the modes become prominent at the cost of the substance. In the formative period of anekānta, some principles of logical concomitance were discovered and that constituted an epoch-making achievement of that age. They are as follows:
'Ācārya Mahāprajña. Anekānta: Reflections and Clarifications. Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati Institute, 2001, p. 9.
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