Nyayavatara

Author(s): Satish Chandra Vidyabhushan
Publisher: ZZZ Unknown
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/008447/1

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THER NYAYAVATARA (THE EARLIEST JAINA WORK ON PURE LOGIC.) . OXO SYBLIOTHECA JAIN SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA.

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JUST PUBLISHED! JUST PUBLISHED !! A UNIQUE PUBLICATION THE KEY OF KNOWLEDGE By CHAMPAT RAI JAIN, Bar-at-Law. all Times !! Good for all men ! all ages !!! An unbiassed philosophical treatise, giving an esoteric explanation of the principles underlying all principal religions, and valuable hints for the attainment of self-realization. No Library should be without a copy. Price Rs. 10 or 16s. BY THE SAME AUTHOR In the Press THE PRACTICAL YOGAS OF JAINISM. THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS. 1. Dravya-Samgraha, of Nemnichandra Siddhanta Chakravarti.. Translated into English with 13 plates by the Genl. Editor, Mr. S. C. Ghoshal, M.A., B.L., Saraswati, Kavyatirtha, Vidyabhusana, Bharati. English Edition, Rs. 4 or 6s. 2. Also translated into Chinese by Mr. Wan Hui, a Buddhist Scholar from China. 3. Munisuvrita Kavya, of Sri Arahedas Kavi.--Edited by the General Editor, Mr. Ghoshal. 4. Vipak-Sutra. --Also Edited by the General Editor. 5. Pravachanasara, of Sri Kundkundacharya. Edited by Dr. T. K. Laddu, Ph.D., Professor of Sanskrit and Epigraphy, Queen's College. Benares. 6. Tattvarthadhigama Sutra, of Sri Umasvami. Translated into English with valuable notes by J. L. Jaini, M.A., Bar-at-Law, and Judge, High Court, Indore. 7. Panchastikaya Samayasara, of Sri Kundakundacharya. --Edited by Justice J. L. Jaini, M.A., 8. The Jaina Gem Dictionary. Compiled and Edited by Justice J. L. Jaini, M.A. 9. Purusharth-Siddyupaya, of Sri Amrit Chandra Acharya. Translated into English with explanatory notes by Ajit Prasada, M.A., LLB. THE CENTRAL JAINA PUBLISHING HOUSE--ARRAH.

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The Library of Jaina Literature--Vol. II. NYAYAVATARA: THE EARLIEST JAINA WORK ON PURE LOGIC BY SIDDHA SENA DIVAKARA (The Celebrated Ksupinaka of Vikramaditya's Court) WITH SANSKRIT TEXT AND COMMENTARY EDITED FOR THE FIRST TIME WITH NOTES AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA DR. SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA, SIDDHANTA MAHODADHI, M.A., Ph.D., F.I.R.S., PRINCIPAL, SANSKRIT COLI.EGE, CALCUTTA, Author of the History of the Medieval School of Indian Lagic, etc. PUBLISHER KUMAR DEVENDRA PRASADA THE CENTRAL JAINA PUBLISHING HOUSE ARRAH, (INDIA) 1915.

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CONTENTS. PACE . . . i Preface . . . . . Introduction . . * * * * ation . . . . . . Text with Translation and Notes . . Commentary called Nyayavatara-vivrti. . * . . . * . . . . 5. . 7 . 31

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PREFACE. (SECOND EDITION.) The second edition of this treatise on Jaina Logic is intended to be included as a volume of " the Library of Jaina Literature" in the publication of the Sacred Books of the Jaina Society, ARRAH. I take this opportunity of expressing my sincere thanks to my friend Kumar Devendra Prasad, Managing Director of the said Society, at whose suggestion this edition was undertaken. I hope the work, which as a treatise on Jaina Logic is unique in its character will in this way obtain a wider circulation. SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA. SANSKRIT COLLEGE, CALCUTTA : December, 1915.

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PREFACE. (FIRST EDITION.) Professor Peterson, in his Fifth Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Circle, mentions a Jaina Sanskrit work called Nyayavatara by Siddha Sena Divakara. A manuscript of this work, together with a commentary on it called Nyayavatara-vivrti, was kindly procured for me from a private library in Bhavanagara, Bombay, by the well-known Svetambara Sadhus, Sastravisarada Jainacharyya Vijaya Dharma Suri and Upadhyaya Indravijaya. Seeing that the Nyayavatara is a very important work, being the earliest known Jaina treatise on Pure Logic, I have, in the present volume, attached the text of it with extracts from its verbose commentary. I have also included in the volume an English translation which I prepared for the "Journal" of the Indian Research Society of Calcutta. The notes which I have added to elucidate the translation are based on the commentary already referred to. I acknowledge with thanks that Mr. C. Russell, M.A., Principal, Patna College, has kindly helped me with a number of suggestions while the translation was passing through the press.

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iv PREFACE. My thanks are also due to Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., at whose instance I undertook this work, and who, at the suggestion of the Government of Bengal, forwarded its advance proof to the International Congress of Orientalists held at Copenhagen in August 1908. It was kindly accepted by that learned body as a contribution on the Jaina philosophical literature. SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA. PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, CALCUTTA : February, 1909.

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INTRODUCTION. thor of Nyayavatara. Logic was mixed up with metaphysics and reliSiddha Sena Ni- gion in the ancient writing of the vakara, the au- Jainas as in those of other sects in India. The first Jaina writer on Pure Logic appears to have been Siddha Sena Divakara. It was he who, for the first time among the Jainas, distinguished logic from the cognate branches of learning by composing a metrical work called Nyai, ya vatara' on Logic in thirty-two stanzas, Siddha Sena Diva kara is the famous author of the Sammati-tarka---sutra, which is a Prakrta work on philosopliy, containing an elaborate discussion on the principles of logic. This author, who belonged to the Svetanibara (the white-robed) sect, has been A manuscript of the Nyaya yatara by Siddha Sena Divakara, ether with its commentary called Nyayavatara-vivrti, was kindly procured for me from Bhavanagara, Bombay, by Venerable Dharmavijaya and his pupil, Indravijaya. For further information about this work, see a notice of it in Peterson's Fifth Report on Sanskrit MSS., p. 289. The notes, incorporated in this paper for the elucidation of the translation, are all based on the Nyayavata ra-vivrti.

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2 lng INTRODUCTION. mentioned by Pradyumna Suri (1000 A. D.) in his Vicara-sara-prakarana.1 This famous logician, who was a pupil of Vrddhavadi Suri, received the name of Kumuda-candra2 at the time of his ordination. He is said to have split, by the efficacy of his prayers, the Linga (Brahmanical symbol) of Rudra in the temple of Mahakala at Ujjaini, and to have called forth an image of Parsvanatha by reciting his Kalyana-mandira-stava. He is believed to have converted king Vikramaditya to Jainism, 470 years after the Nirvana of Mahavira.3 The Jainas believe that he was the spiritual tutor of that famous king, as is evident from the Kumarapala-caritra and other works. It may be noted here that Vikramaditya of Ujjaini has been considered by scholars to be identical with Yasodharma Deva, king of Malwa, who, according to Alberuni, defeated the Huns at Korur, in 533 A. D. The Chinese pilgrim, Hwen-tshang, who came to India in 629 A. D., says that a very powerful king (presumably Vikramaditya] reigned 60 1 paMcaiva ya vArisasae siddhaseNa divAyarI ya jayapayar3o / chalae vIsahie sakkathuU ajjarakkhi pahU // 26 // (Vicara-sara-prakarana, noticed by Peterson Report, p. 272.) in his Third Cf. Prabhavakacaritra VIII, V. 57. * See Klatt's Pattavali of the Kharatara Gaccha in the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p. 247.

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INTRODUCTION. years before his arrival there. From these it appears that Siddha Sena Divakara, who was a contemporary of Vikramaditya, must have lived at Ujjaini about 550 A. D. Legends and historical accounts show that Siddha Sena was the well-known Ksapanaka2 (the Jaina sage), who adorned the court of Vikramaditya and was one of the Nine Geras (Nava Ratna). Varahamihira, the famous astronomer, who was another of the Nine Gems of the court of Vikramaditya, lived between A D. 5053 and A.D. 587. We are told that Ksapanaka, alias Siddha Sena, was a contemporary of Varahamihira; so he must have flourished about the middle of the 6th century. 1 Vide Beal's Buddhistic Records of the Western World, Vol. 11, p. 26. dhanvantariH capaNako'marasiMhazaGkarve tAla bhaTTaghaTakharpara kAlidAsAH / khyAtA varAhamihiro nRpateH sabhAyAM ratnAni vai vararucirnava vikramasya // 2 (Jyotirvidabharana). * Vide Dr. Thibaut's Introduction to Pancasiddhantika, p. XXX. Varahamihira chose Saka 427 or A. D. 505 as the abdapizda of his astronomical calculation, showing thereby that he lived about that time. So saptAzviveda-saMkhyaM zakakAlamapAsya caitrazuklAdau / agiafia mai vaage aru feaura^ ( = 11 (Pancasiddhantika, Chap. 1, edited by Dr. G. Thibaut and Sudhakara Dvivedi.)

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INTRODUCTION. There is an excellent commentary on the NyayaCandra-prabha vata ra, called the Nyayavatara-vivrti Suri, author of Nyayayatara- by Candra-prabha Suri, who also vivsti (2) belonged to the Svetarnbara sect and founded the Purnima Gaccha3 in San vat 1159 or A.D. 1102. He was a pupil of Jayasimha Suri, and preceptor of Dharamaghoaa. He wrote another logical treatise, called Prameya-ratna-kosa, and a philosophical treatise called Darsana-suddhi, otherwise called Samyaktva-prakarana. He was a great logician, and in controversy appeared as a lion before opponents, who resembled elephants. In the introduction to his Nyaya vatara-vivrti he has quoted the Buddhist logicians, Dharmottara and Arcata, and in the concluding lines has craved the mercy of Jina. * See Peterson's Fourth Report, p. xxvii, and Peterson ?, xvi. In the Nya yavata ra-vivrti itself there is no mention of Candra-prabha Suri. I found somewhere that he was the author of it. The authorship of the Nyayavatara-vivsti must, however, for the present remain an open question. * Sec Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report, 1883-84, p. 147. Vide Jain a gama List, Bombay, p. 77, and Peterson's Third Report on Sanskrit NISS., Appendix, p. 9. 'tIrthe vIravibhoH sudharmagaNabhat santAnalabdhonnatizvAstriojjvalacandragacchajaladhiprollAsazItayutiH / sAhityAgamatarkalakSaNa mahAvidyApagA sAgaraH zrIcandraprabha sUriradbhutamatirvAdIma siMho'bhavat // 1 // (Dasavalkalika-tika by Tilakacarya, noticed in Peterson's Fifth Report, p. 65.)

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AN OBSERVATION. [Mahamahopadhyaya Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana maintains here that Siddha Sena Divakara was identical with the well-known Ksapanaka. This view perfectly commends itself to me.--There is proof enough that Siddha Sena was a Jaina sage and lived in the court of Vikramaditya. That Ksapanaka was one of the Nine Gems of the court of Vikarmaditya is also very widely known, and it remains only to prove that he was a Jaina sage. We have instances enough in the Pancatantra where the Jaina ascetics are nicknanied as Ksapanaka. The following instances from the Avadanakalpalata will show that the Buddhists also designated the Jaina ascetics as Ksapanaka : bhagavadbhASitaM tattu subhadreNa niveditam / zrutvA kSapaNakaH kSipramabhUd dvessvissaakulH||9|| tasya sarva zatAM vetti subhadro yadi mgiraa| tadeSa kSapaNazraddhAM tyakSyati zramaNAdarAt // 12 / / mUrkha kSapaNabhaktena tagirA hatayoSitA / tvayA tyaktasvaputreNa kiM nAma sukRtA kRtam // 40 // (Jyotiskavadana). SARAT CH. DAS.]

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nyAyAvatAra NYAYAVATARA. TEXT AND TRANSLATION, WITH NOTES. pramANaM svaparAbhAsi jJAnaM bAdhavivarjitam / pratyakSa ca parokSaca dvidhA meyavinizcayAt // 1 // 1. Pramana (valid knowledge) is the knowledge which illumines itself and other things without any obstruction : it is divided as pratyaksa (direct knowledge or perception) and parolsa (indirect knowledge) as knowables are ascertained in two ways. This definition sets aside the view of those Buddhists (Yogacarasl who maintain that knowledge illumines itself alone, inasmuch as there is, according to them, no external object beyond it. The same definition is also in direct opposition to the doctrine of the Naiyayika, Miuo amsaka and others, who hold that knowledge illumines the external object alone, as it cannot illumine itself. The Jainas maintain that it is only when knowledge illumines itself that it can take cognizance of the external object. So according to them knowledge, like a lamp, illumines itself as well as the object lying outside it. Those whose sight has been obscured by darkness often seo many false images, such as two moons, etc. ; men bewildered by sophism are found to believe that every thing is momentary, or the like. With a view to differentiate such kinds of false

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NYAYAVATARA. knowledge from prama?a (valid knowledge), the phrase "without obstruction" has been used, Pramana (valid knowledge) is divided here into pratyaksa (direct knowledge) and paroksa (indirect knowledge), including in the latter anumana (inference and sabda (the verbal testimony). This division contravenes the conclusion of Carvaka that there is only one pramina, viz., prutyuksa (perception or direct knowledge), for, pratyaksa cannot be established as a prama ra, except through the medium of the paroksa (indirect knowledge). It also sets aside the view of the Saugatas (Buddhists) who divide pramcra into pratyaksa (direct knowledge or perception) and anumana (inference), without any notice of subda (the verbal testimony). prasiddhAni pramANAni vyavahArazca ttkRtH| pramANalakSaNasyoktau jJAyate na prayojanam // 2 // 2. Pramanas and the practical use made of them are well known : there appears no necessity for giving any definition of the pramanas. There was never a time when the acts of seeing, inferring, etc., were not performed. The use of these acts is also well known, for it is through them that we can choose one thing and reject another thing. So it appears superfluous to explain the nature of pramana (valid knowledge). prasiddhAnAM pramANAnAM lakSaNAktau prayojanam / tadvyAmohanivRttiH syAd vyAmUr3hamanasAmiha // 3 // 3. The necessity here for giving the definition of the well-known pramanas is to remove the stupidity froin the mind of stupid people. Pramara (valid knowledge), though well-known, is explained here to warn the foolish people from taking false knowledge as true.

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NYAYAVATARA. aparokSatayArthasya grAhakaM zAnamIdRzam / pratyakSamitarada zeyaM parokSagrahaNekSayA // 4 // 4. Such knowledge that takes cognizance of objects, not beyond the range of the senses, is pratyaksa (direct knowledge or perception); the other is known as parokza (indirect knowledge), in reference to the manner of taking the cognizance. The words prattikikset. (direct knowledge) and paroksa (indirect knowledge) have been used here in their ordinary acceptations, namely, the first for sense-perceptions, and the second for inference and verbal testimony. In the ancient Jaina scriptures, however, prutyaksit (diroct knowledge) signified perfect knowledge acquired by the soul direct through meditation and not through the channels of tho senses, while pa' oksa (indirect knowledge) signified knowledge derived through the medium of the senses or signs comprising perception, inference and the verbal testimony. sAdhyAvinAbhuno liGgAt sAdhyanizcAyakaM smRtam / anumAnaM tadabhrAntaM pramANatvAt samakSavat // 5 // 5. The knowledge determinant of that which is to be proved (i.e., the major term, called in Sanskrit sadhya), derived through the mark ii.e., the middle term called in Sanskrit linga) which is inseparably connected with the same, is known as anumana (inference): being a pramana it is free from invalidity like perception (pratyahsa). Inference is of two kinds : (1) svarthanumana, inference for one's own self, and (2) parirthinuiceut, intorence for the sake of others. The first kind is the inferonce drawn in one's own mind after having made repeated observations. Suppose that

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10 NYAYAVATARA. having repeatedly seen in the kitchen and other places, that where there is smoke there is fire, and having realised in his mind that there is a universal antecedence of fire in respect of smoke, a man afterwards goes to a hill and entertains a doubt as to whether or not there is fire in it. Instantly, when he observes smoke on it, he recollects the inseparablo connection between fire and smoke, and concludes in his mind that the hill has fire in it, as it bas smokeon it. This is an inference for one's own self. The inference for tho sake of others will be defined later on. This definition of inforence, says the commentator, sets aside the view of certain writers (such as Dharmakirti, the Buddhist] who maintain that non-perception (anipulahdhi), identity (sverbhava) and causality (karua) are tho marks or grounds of inference, or of certain other writers who hold the effect (kcirya), cause (kiiru?a), conjunction (sainyoga), coexistence (samavaya), and opposition (virodha) to be such marks or grounds. The division of inference as (1) a priori (purvavat, from cause to effect), (2) a posteriori (sesavat, from effect to cause) and (3) from analogy (saminya to-drsta, perception of homogeneousness, that is, the recognition of the subject as being referrable to some class, and as being thence liable to have predicated of it whatever may be predicable of the class) fas given in the Nyaya-sutra of Aksapada Gautama) is also hereby set aside. na pratyakSamapi bhrAntaM pramANatvavinizcayAt / bhrAntaM pramANamityetad viruddhavacanaM ytH||6|| 6. Since it is a prameno, pratyaksa (perception), too, is not invalid, for, "a pramana, is invalid " is an absurd expression. Some Buddhists) who maintain that the world is true only from the practical or illusory point of view (lokasumurti), but false from the transcendental or absolute standpoint

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11 (para marthika), consider perception (pratyaksa) to be merely illusory, and consequently invalid from the absolute standard of truth. But this view is opposed by the Jainas, who maintain that the world is real from all standpoints, and consequently perception is not invalid. NYAYAVATARA. sakalapratibhAsasya bhrAntatvAsiddhitaH sphuTam / pramANaM svAnyanizcAyi dvayasiddhau prasiddhyati // 7 // 7. Owing to the impossibility of all phenomena (external objects) being invalid, prumana is evidently a determinant of self and other things, and serves to establish both. The world is not an illusion: knowledge and its objects are all real. dRSTeSTAvyAhatatvAdvAkyAt paramArthAbhidhAyinaH / tattvagrAhitayAtpannamAnaM zAbdaM prakIrttitam // 8 // 8. Knowledge arising from words, which taken in their proper acceptance express real objects not inconsistent with what are established by perception, is known as subda (the verbal testimony). Sabda (the word or verbal testimony) is of two kinds, viz., (1) laukika (the knowledge derived from a reliable person), and (2) sastraja (the knowledge derived from scripture). AptopajJamanullaDuramadRSTeSTavirodhakam / tattvopadezakRt sArvaM zAstraM kApathaghaTTanam // 9 // 9. The scripture (sastra) is that which was invented (or first known) by a competent person, which is not such as to be passed over by others, which is not incompatible with the truths derived

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12 from perception, which imparts true instructions and which is profitable to all men and is preventive of the evil path. NYAYAVATARA. This definition sets aside the view of those [Mimamsakas] who maintain that the scripture [such as the Veda] is eternal and was not composed by any human being. The scripture could not have been called a verbal testimony (sabda or word), unless it embodied the words of any particular person or persons. svanizcayavadanyeSAM nizcayeAtpAdanaM budhaiH / parArthaM mAnamAkhyAtaM vAkyaM tadupacArataH // 10 // 10. Like the decision for oneself, the production of a decision in others is called by the learned 'knowledge for the sake of others' (pararthamana): specch is designated as such by metaphor. or Knowledge is of two kinds : (1) knowledge for one's own self (svarthu mana), and (2) knowledge for the sake of others (parartha mana). The second is defined as that which produces decision or belief (niscaya) in others, i.e., which enables others to ascertain the nature of things. The "word " speech" (sabda or vakya) comes under this class, that is, it is knowledge for the sake of others, for it produces decision in others. It is true the "word itself is not knowledge, but being the medium through which knowledge is conveyed to others, it is figuratively identified with knowledge. 46 pratyakSeNAnumAnena prasiddhArthaprakAzanAt / parasya tadupAyatvAt parArthatvaM dvayorapi // 11 // 11. Perception and inference having disclosed objects with which we are familiar, and they being the means of communication to other people, both of them are knowledge for the sake of others.

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NYAYAVATARA. 13 Perception and inference are as much knowledge for one's own self (svartha mtina) as for the sake of others (parartha mana). They aro called " knowledge for the sake of others," because the results of perception and inference arrived at by one's own self can be communicated to others through words. pratyakSapratipannArthapratipAdi ca yadvacaH / pratyakSa pratibhAsasya nimittatvAttaducyate // 12 // 12. A statement expressive of the object ascertained by perception is also called perception : it is so called being the cause of the object's manifestation, As the result of perception can be communicated to others through the word, the word itself is figuratively called perception. For instance, the deposition of a witness is taken by the judge as equivalent to perception, though in truth the judge has not perceived the fact deposed to. sAdhyAvinAbhuvo hetArvaco yat pratipAdakam / parArthamanumAnaM tat pakSAdivacanAtmakam // 13 // 13. A statement expressive of the reason (2.e., mark or the middle term, called hetu) which is inseparably connected with that which is to be proved (i.c., the major term, called sudhya) having been composed of the minor term (called paksa, signifying a side or place), etc., is called an inference for the sake of others (pararthanumana). In an "inference for the sake of others" the minor term (paksa), etc., must be explicitly set forth. The major term or * proven" (sadlya) is that which is to be proved. The middle term or reason (hetu, linga or sadhana) is that which cannot

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14 NYAYAVATARA. exist, except in connection with the major term or " proven" (sadhya or lingi). The minor term or abode (paks) is that with which the reason or middle term (lietu) is connected, and whose connection with the major terin (seidhya) is to be proved. In a proposition, the subject is the minor term (paksci), and the predicate the major term (sidhya). The following is an " inference for the sake of others": (1) This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term)-- proposition (pratini); (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term); (3) whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, just as the kitchen (example, dratanta); (4) 30 is this hill full of smoke (application, upanaya) : (5) therefore, this hill is full of fire (conclusion, nigamana), The above is a mediocre (madhyama) form of an + inferenco for the sake of others." Here the minor term (paksa), the major term (scidhya), the middle term (hetu) and example (drstanta) have been used. The worst (jaghanya) form of an * inferenco for the sake of others " consists in a mere statement of the reason or middle term (hetu), besides the major term (s:idhya) and the minor tern (paksa), thus : (1) This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term); (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term). The best (uttama) form of an inference for the sake of others consists in the statement of the following ten parts or members (dasavayjava): (1) proposition (pratiju); (2) correction of the proposition (pratijna-suddhi); (3) reason or middle term (hetu); (4) correction of the reason or middle term (hetusuddhi) ; (5) example (drstanta) ; (6) correction of the example (drstunta-suddhi) ; (7) application (upanaya) ; (8) correction of the application (upanaya-suddhi) ; (9) conclusion (nigamana), and (10) correction of the conclusion (nigamana-suddhi). Any form containing less than ten members, down to five, is called mediocre (madhyama).

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NYAYAVATARA. 15 sAdhyAbhyupagamaH pakSaH pratyakSAdyanirAkRtaH / tatprayogo'tra kartavyo hetArgocaradIpakaH // 24 // 14. Paksa (the minor term) is that which is asserted to be connected with the (major term or) sadhya, and is not excluded by perception, etc. ; it is to be used here (in an inference for the sake of others) as exhibiting an abode of the reason (i.e., the middle term, called hetu). Some philosophers hold that the minor term (paksa) is not an essential part of an inference. But this view, according to the Jainas, is untonable, it being absolutely necessary to state the minor term (palesa) in an inference. anyathA vAdyabhipretahetugocaramohitaH / pratyAyasya bhaveddhatuviruddhArekitA yathA // 15 // 15. Otherwise, owing to a misconception as to the abode of the reason (i.e., paksa or minor term) as intended by the disputant, his reason (hetu or middle terin) may appear to his opponent as absurd. If any disputant does not explicitly state the minor term (paksa), his reason might be misunderstood by his opponent, e.g. :-- (1) This hill (minor torm) is full of fire (major term); (2) because it is full of sinoke (middle term). The above inference, if the minor term is omitted, will assume the following form: (1) Full of fire (major term); (2) becauso full of smoke (middle term). Here the opponent might not at once recollect any abode or place (minor term, paksu) in which the fire and smoke abide in

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16 NYAYAVATARA. union, and might mistake a lake for such an abode. In such a case, the whole argument will be misunderstood. dhAnuSkaguNasaMprekSi janasya parividhyataH / dhAnuSkasya vinA lakSyanirdezena guNetarI // 16 // 16. A man who has come to behold the excellence of an archer will have to beliold the opposite of it, if the archer hits without fixing an aim. Just as a clever archer, with a view to preventing his arrow from going to a wrong direction, fixes his aim before hitting, so a skilful disputant, in order to avoid being misunderstood, should, in stating an inference, mention the minor teru (paksa) with which the major term (slidhya) and the iniddle term (hetui) are both connected. hetostathopapattA vA syAt prayogo'nyathApi vA / dvidhAnyatareNApi sAdhyasiddhirbhavediti // 17 // 17. The reason (or the middle term, i.e., hetu! may be used to show connection or the opposite of it; in either of these two ways, the sadhya (that which is to be proved) can be proved. The reason or middle term (hetu) can be used in two ways as follows: (1) the reason or middle term (hetu) may exist only if the major term (sadhya) existed, such as in the proposition "here there is fire, because there is smoke," the smoke (middle term) may exist only if there is fire (major term); and (2) the reason or middle term (hetre) cannot exist if the major term (sadhya) does not exist, such as in the proposition "here there is fire, because otherwise there could not be any smoke," the smoke (middle term) could not have existed if there had been no fire (major term).

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NYAYAVATARA. 17 sAdhyasAdhanayoAptiryatra nizcIyatetarAm / sAdhamryeNa sa dRSTAntaH smbndhsmrnnaanmtH||18|| 18. Where the inseparable connection of the major term (sadhya) and the middle term (sadhana or hetu) is shown by homogeneousness (sadharmya), the example is called a homogeneous one, on account of the connection between those terms) being recollected. An example (drstcinta) is a familiar case which reassures the inseparable connection (vyapti) between the major term (sadhya) and the middle term (letu). It is of two kinds: (1) homogeneous (sadharmya), and (2) heterogeneous (vaidharmya). The homogeneous exaraple is that which reassures the connection (vycpti) hy honogeneousness (saidharnya), thus: (1) This hill is full of fire (major torm); (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term); (3) just as the kitchen (homogeneous example). Here the fire and smoke abide homogeneously in the kitchen. sAdhye nivartamAne tu sAdhanasyApyasambhavaH / khyApyate yatra dRSTAnte vaidhammyeNeti sa smRtH||19|| 19. The heterogeneous example is that which shows that the absence of the major term (sadhya) is followed by the absence of the middle term. The heterogeneous example reassures the connection (vycapti) by contrariety, that is, by showing that the absence of the major term (sadhya) is attended by the absence of the middle term (hetu), thus : (1) This hill has no smoke (major term); (2) because it has no fire (middle term); (3) just as a lake (heterogeneous example).

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18 NYAYAVATARA. antAtairava sAdhyasya siddhrbhirudaahRtiH| vyarthA syAttadasadbhAve'pyevaM nyAyavido viduH||20|| 20. Logicians maintain that to cite an example from outside is useless, as that which is to be proved (sadhya) can be proved through internal inseparable connection Santar-vyapti), even without such example. Internal inseparable connection (antar-tyopti) occurs when the minor term (paksa) itself as the common link of the middle term (hetre) and the major term (sadhya) shows the inseparable connection between them, thus:-- (1) This hill (minor term) is full of fire (major term); (2) because it is full of smoke (middl Here the inseparable connection between the fire and smoke is shown by the hill (minor term), which is their common ground. External inseparable connection (hahir-vycipti) occurs when an example (drstanta) from outside is introduced as the common link of the middle terma (het) and the major term (sadhya) to reassure the inseparable connection between tbem, thus : (1) This hill is full of fire (major term); (2) because it is full of smoke (middle term) ; (3) just as a kitchen (example). Here the kitchen, which forms no essential part of the inference, is introduced from outside as the common link of the fire and smoke, to reassure the inseparable connection between them (the fire and smoke). Some logicians (such as Vasubandhu) hold that that which is to be proved, that is, the "proven " or the major term (sadhya), can be established by the internal inseparable connection (antar-vyapti) alono, so the pointing out of the external inseparable connection (bahir-vypti) is superfluous. It is useless even when there is no internal inseparable

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NYAYAVATARA 19 connection. In the case of the internal inseparable connection being existent external inseparable connection is superfluous, and in the case of the forrer being non-existent the latter is useless. pratipAdyasya yaH siddhaH pakSAbhAso'sti linggtH| lokasvavacanAbhyAM ca bAdhito'nekadhA mataH // 21 // 21.' If that of wliich the major term or preclicate (sadhya) is aflirmed is opposed by evidence (linga!, the public understanding, one's own statement, etc., we have that which is known as the fallacy of the minor term or thesis (Paksa-bhasa), of which there are many varieties. The semblance or fallacy of the minor term or thesis (palsabhiisa) arises when one predicates of the minor term (paksa) that which is yet to be proved to the opponent, or which is incapable of being proved, or when it is opposed to perception and inference, or inconsistent with the public understanding or incongruous with one's own statement, thus : (1) " The jar is corporcal (paudgalika)" this is a conclusion which is yet to be proved to the opponent. (2) "Every thing is momentary " this is a Saugata (Buddhist) doctrine which, according to the Jainas, is incapable of being proved. (3) " The general (sananya) and particular (visesa) things are without parts, are distinct from each other and are like themselves alone "--this is opposed to perception. (4) "There is no omniscient being"-this is, according to the Jainas, opposed to inference. (5) << The sister is to be taken as wife "--this is inconsistent with the public understanding. (6) "All things are non-existent"--this is incongruous with one's own statement.

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20 NYAYAVATARA. anyathAnupapannatvaM hetorlakSaNamIritam / tadapratItisandehaviparyAsaistadAbhatA // 22 // 22. The reason (i.e., the middle term called hetu) has been defined as that which cannot exist except in connection with the major term (sadhya) ; the fallacy of the reason (hetvabhasa) arises from non-conception, doubt or misconception about it (the middle term). (1) This hill is full of fire (major term); (2) because it is full of smoke (middle torm). In this example " saioke" is the middle term or reason (hetu) which cannot exist, except in an inseparable connection (union) with "firo," which is the major term (sadhya). asiddhastvapratIto yo yo'nyathaivopapadyate / viruddho yo'nyathApyatra yukto'naikAntikaH sa tu // 23 // 23. That which has not yet been established is called "the unproved " (asiddha); that which is possible only in the opposite way is called "the inconsistent" (viruddha); that which can be explained in one way as well as in the opposite way is called "the uncertain" (anaikantika). Semblance of the reason or fallacy of the middle torm (hetvabhiisa) is of threo kinds, as follows: (1) The unproved (asiddha) such as: "the sky-lotus is fragrant, becauso it has the generic property of lotuses." Here the reason, viz., the sky-lotus (which is unreal] has the generic property of lotuses, is unproyed. (2) The inconsistent (viruddha) such as: * this is fiery, because it is a body of water." Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established.

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NYAYAVATARA. 21 (3) The uncertain (anailcantila) such as: "all things are momentary, because they aro existent." Here the reason alleged is uncertain, because 'existenco' may or may not be a proof of momentariness, for, an opponent might equally argue : "all things are eternal, because they are existent." sAdhammyaNAtra dRSTAntadoSA nyAyavidIritAH / apalakSaNahetUtthAH sAdhyAdivikalAdayaH // 24 // 24. Logicians have declared that fallacies of the example (drstantabhasa) in the homogeneous form, arise here from an imperfect middle term or from a defect in the major term, etc. Fallacies of the homogeneous example (sadharmya drstantabhasct) arise from a dofect in the major term (skidhyu) or middle term (hetu) or both, or from doubt abont them, thus : (1) Inferenco is invalid (major term), because it is a source of knowledge (midale term), like perception (homogeneous examplo), Here the example involves a defect in the major term (sadhya), for perception is not invalid. (2) Perception is invalid (major term), because it is a source of truc lenowledge (middle term), like a dream (homogeneous example). Here the example involves 3 defect in the middle term (betu), for a dream is not a source of true knowledge. (3) The omniscient being is not existent (major term), because he is not apprehended by the senses (middle term), like a jar (homogeneous example). Here the example involves a defect in both the major and middle terms (sidhya and lietu), for the jar is both existent and apprehended by the senses. (4) This person is devoid of passions (major term), because he is mortal (middle term), like the man in the street (homogencois example), Ilere the example involves doubt as to the validity of the

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22 NYAYAVATARA. major term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions. (5) This person is mortal (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term), like the man in the street (homogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions. (6) This person is not omniscient (major term), because he is full of passions (middle torm), like the man in the street (homogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is full of passions and not omniscient. Some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the homogoneous example (sadharmya-drstantaibhasa), viz. : (1) Unconnected (anahvYC), such as : This porson is full of passions (major term), because he is a speaker (uniddle torm), like a certain man in Mugadla (examplo). Here, though a certain man in Magadha is both a speaker and full of passions, yet there is no inseparable connection between "being a speaker" and "being full of passions." (2) Of connection unshown (upradarsitanvaija), such as : Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is udventitious (middle term), as a jar (example). Hero, though there is an inseparable connection between "adventitious" and " non-eternal," yet it has not been shown in the proper form, as : " Whatever is adventitious, is non-eternal, as a jar." [Dignaga, the Buddhist, urged the necessity of converting the example into a universal proposition, with a view to show the connection between the middle terin and major term in the proper form.] (3) Of contrary connection (viparitanvaya), such as :--- Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is adventitious (middle term).

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NYAYAVATARA, 23 Here, if the inseparable connection (ylipti) is shown, thus " Whatever is non-eternal, is adventitious as a jar," instead of thus " Whatever is adventitious, is non-etornal as a jar," the example would involyo the fallacy of contrary connection. vaidhayeNAtra dRSTAntadoSA nyAyavidIritAH / sAdhyasAdhanayugmAnAmanivRtezca saMzayAt // 25 // 25. Logicians have declared that fallacies of the example in the heterogeneous form arise when the absence of the major term (sadhya) or the middle term (sadhana or hetui or both, is not shown, or when there is a doubt about tliem. The fallacy of the heterogeneous example (vaidharmyadrslontabhasa) is of six kinds, thus : (1) Inference is invalid (major term), because it is a source of true knowledge (iniddlo term); whatover is not invalid is not a source of true knowledge, as a dream (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the major term (sadhya), for a dream is really invalid, though it has been cited as not invalid. (2) Perception is non-reflective or nirvilalpaka (major term), because it is a source of true knowledge (middle term); whatever is reflective or savikal puka, is not a source of true knowledge, as inference (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the middle term (sadhana), for inference is really a source of true knowledge, though it has been cited as not-such. (3) Sound is eternal and non-eternal (major term), because it is an existence (middle term); whatever is not eternal and non-eternal is not an existence, as a jar (heterogeneous example).

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24 NYAYAVATARA Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in both the major and middle terms (sadhya and sadha nat), for the jar is both "eternal and non-eternal," and "an existence." (4) Kapila is non-omniscient (major term), because he is a non-propounder of the four noble truths (middle term); whoever is not non-omniscient is not non-propounder of the four noble truths, as Buddha (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves in the negative form a doubt as to the validity of the major term (sadhya), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was omniscient. (5) This person is untrustworthy (major term), because he is full of passions (middle term); whoever is not un-trustworthy is not full of passions, as Buddha (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term (hetu), for it is doubtful whether Buddha is not full of passions. (6) Kapila is not devoid of passions (major term), because he did not give his own flesh to the hungry (middle term); whoever is devoid of passions gives his own flesh to the hungry, as Buddha (heterogeneous example). Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms (sadhya and sadhana), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was devoid of passions and gave his own flesh to the hungry. Some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the heterogeneous example (vu idharmya-drstantibhisa), viz. : (1) Unseparated (uvyatireki): This person is not devoid of passions (major term), because he is a spealer (middle term); whoever is devoid of passions is not a speaker, as a piece of stone (heterogeneous example). Here, though a piece of stone is both "devoid of passions" and "not a speaker," yet there is no unavoidable separation (vyatirelca vyapti) between "devoid of passions" and "a speaker."

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NYAYAVATARA. 25 (2) Of separation unshown (apradarsita-vyatireka) : Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is adventitious (middle term); just as ether (example). Here, though there is an unavoidable separation between "adventitions" and "eternal," yet it has not been shown in the proper form such as: "Whatever is not adventitious, is eternal, just as ether." [Dignaga, the Buddhist, urged the necessity of converting the heterogeneous example into a universal negative proposition, with a view to point out the connection of the middle term and major term.] (3) Of contrary separation (viparita-vyatireka) : Sound is not eternal (major term), because it is adventitious (middle term); whatever is eternal, is not adventitious, just as ether (example). Here the example has been put in a contrary way, for the proper form should have been: "Whatever is not adventitious is eternal, just as ether. vAdyate sAdhane proktadoSANAmudabhAvanam / dUSaNaM niravadye tu dUSaNAbhAsanAmakam // 26 // 26. Refutation (dusana) is the pointing out of the aforesaid fallacies in the reasoning of an opponent; but it is called a semblance of a refutation (dusanahusa), when the reasoning is really devoid of defects. A disputant is said really to refute his opponent, if the former can detect in the reasoning of the latter any of the fallacies aforementioned. But it will be a mere semblance of refutation, if he ascribes to his opponent fallacies which he has not really committed. sakalAvaraNamuktAtmakevalaM yat prakAzate / pratyakSa sakalArthAtmasatatapratibhAsanam // 27 // 27. That which is characterised as free from

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26 all obstructions and shines as the absolute is called (supreme or transcendental) perception; it uninterruptedly illumines the nature of all objects. Perception (pratyaksa) is used in two senses: (1) supreme or transcendental (paramarthika) and (2) practical (vyavaharika). The practical perception consists of the knowledge acquired by the soul through the channels of the senses, such as the visual knowledge, auditory knowledge, etc. Transcendental perception is the knowledge acquired by the soul direct, through meditation, without the intervention of the senses or signs. NYAYAVATARA. pramANasya phalaM sAkSAdazAnavinivarttanam / kevalasya sukhApekSa zeSasyAdAnahAnadhIH // 28 // 28. The immediate effect of pramana (valid knowledge) is the removal of ignorance; the mediate effect of the absolute knowledge is bliss and equanimity, while that of the ordinary practical knowledge is the facility to select or reject. Prumana (valid knowledge) is of two kinds : (1) kevala, absolute and (2) ordinary. The immediate effect of both is the cessation of ignorance. The mediate effect of the absolute knowledge is happiness and equanimity, while that of the ordinary knowledge is the facility which it affords us to choose the desirable and reject the undesirable. anekAntAtmakaM vastu gocaraH sarvasaMvidAm / ekadezaviziSTo'rtho nayasya viSayA mataH // 29 // 29. Since things have many characters (that is, may be conceived from many points of view), they are the objects of all-sided knowledge (omniscience); but a thing conceived from one particular point

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NYAYAVATARA. 27 of view is the object of naya (or one-sided knowledge). Objects, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, possess many different characteristics, and may be taken from different standpoints. They are understood in their entire character by omniscience alone, while to take them from a certain standpoint is the scope of raya (the one-sided method of comprehension). Nuya (the one-sided method of comprehension) is of seven kinds, mentioned below: (1) Vaigama (the non-distinguishod) is the method by which an object is taken in its generic and specific capacities not distinguished from each other. For instance, by the term "bamboo" one may understand a number of properties, some of which are peculiar to its own species, while the remaining ones are possessed by it in cominon with other trees, such as a mango, jack, banyan, etc., without any distinction being made between these two glasses of properties. The Nyaya and Vaisesika schools of philosophy follow the Naigama nuyu. (2) Saingraha (the generic) is the method by which the generic properties alone are taken into consideration without apy cognizance of the particular properties which, independent of the former, are non-entities, like-sky flowers. Thus, when we speak of a mango, jack or bamboo, we mean that it is a tree. The Advaita and Samkhya systems of philosophy follow the saingraha naya. (3) V'yavah ira (the practical) is the method by which the practical or particular alone, is considered, for the general without the particular is a non-entity, like the horn of a hare. On being asked to bring a tree, can anybody bring the tree in general ? No, he can bring only a particular tree, such as a mango, jack or bamboo. The Carvaka philosophy follows the Vyavahara naya. (4) Rj-sutra (the straight expression) is the method by which a thing, as it exists at present, is considered, without any

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28 NYAYAVATARA. reference to the past or future. It is useless to ponder over things as they were in the past or will become in the future. All practical purposes are served by the thing itself, as it exists at the present moment. For instance, a man, who was formerly (in a previous birth) my son, is now born as a prince somowhero else ; he is of no practical ase to me now. So the Rja-sutra recognises only the entity itself (ohtiva), and does not consider the name (namu), image (sthapana), or the constituent cause (drivya). For instance, a poor cowherd, if he bears the name of indra, does not thereby become the lord of heavens. An image of a king cannot accomplish the function of the king himself. The causes in me which will lead to my accepting a different kind of body in a futuro birth, cannot enable inne to enjoy that body now. Some hold that the atoms alone are true, while practically it is the aggregates or lumps alone that are true. This is Rju-sutra, which is followed by the Buddhists. (5) Sabda (the verbal) consists in using a word in a conventional sense, and not according to its etymological derivation. Thus the word satrit usually, or in its conventional sense, means " enemy," while etymologically " a destroyer". The grainmarians are tho followers of this method. (6) Samabhirudha (the subtle) consists in making nice distinctions among the synonyms, applying cach name appropriately according to their etymological derivation. The grammarians are the followers of this method. (7) Evambhuta (the such-like) consists in naming a thing only when it possesses its practical efficiency. Thus a man should be named salera, if he actually possesses strength (sakti), implied by the name. The grammarians are the followers of this method. nayAnAmekaniSThAnAM pravRtteH zrutavama'ni / sampUrNArthavinizcAyi syAdvAdazratamucyate // 30 // 30. The knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment, in

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NYAYAVATARA. 29 the scriptural method, of one-sided nayas, is called Syadvadu-sruta. The sruta or scriptural knowledge is of three kinds, viz. : (1) false hearing or knowledge (mithya-sruta), such as that derived from the scripture of the bad Tirthikas; (2) hearing of the one-sided method (naya-sruta), that is, the knowledge derived from that part of the Jaina scripture which teaches us to comprehend things from any particular standpoint; and (3) hearing of the all-sided method (syad-vada-srutu), that is, the knowledge derived from that part of the Jaina scripture which teaches us to comprehend things from all-sided standpoints. The naya-sruta (knowledge of the one-sided method) has been described in the previous verse. The syad-vada (knowledge of the all-sided method) is described below: Syad-vada, which literally signifies assertion of possibilities, seeks to ascertain the meaning of things from all possible standpoints. Things are neither existent nor non-existent absolutely. A thing may be said to exist in a certain way and to be non-existent in another way, and so forth. Syad-vada examines things from seven points of view, hence the doctrine is also called supta-bhangi-naya (seven-fold paralogism). It is stated as follows: (1) May be, it is (syadusti); (2) may be, it is, not (syad-nasti); (3) may be, it is, and it is not (syad-asti-nasti); (4) may be, it is indescribable (syid-avyaktavyam); (5) may be, it is and yet indescribable (syad-asti ca avaktavyanca); (6) may be, it is not, and also indescribable (syad nasti ca avaktavyanca); (7) may be, it is, and it is not, and also indescribable (syad asti ca asti ca avaktavyancu). When a thing is to be established, we say "it is," when it is to be denied, we say "it is not.' When a thing is to be established and denied in turn, we say "it is and it is not." When a thing is to be established and denied simultaneously, we say, "it is indescribable." When a thing is to be established and yet described as indescribable, we say "it is, and yet indescribable." When a thing is to be denied and also

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30 NYAYAVATARA. declared as indescribable, we say " it is not, and also indescribable." When a thing is to be established and denied as well as declared indescribable at the same time, we say 5s it is and it is not, and also indescribable." Sycid, which signifies "may be," denotes all these seven possibilities, that is, a thing may be looked at from one of the above seven points of view, there being no eighth alternative. pramAtA svAnyanirbhAsI karttA bhoktA vivRttimAn / svasaMvedanasaMsiddho jIvaH kSityAdyanAtmakaH // 31 // 31. The spirit (soul or jiva) is the knower, doer and enjoyer, illumines self and others, undergoes changes of condition, is realised only in self-consciousness, and is different from the earth, etc. . The soul (atman or jiva) has knowledge, and so is different from knowledge itself. As an enjoyer and doer, the soul in the Jaina philosophy is different from that of the Samkhya philosophy. The soul by the Jainas is described as undergoing changes of condition. In this respect, it is different from that of the Nyaya and Vaiaesika philosophy. prmaannaadivyvstheymnaadinidhnaatmikaa| sarvasaMvyavahaTTaNAM prasiddhApi prakIrtitA // 32 // kRtiriyaM zrIsitapaTTasiddhasenadivAkarasya / / 32. This system of pranina, etc., is beginningless and endless; though familiar to all persons in every day practice, it is yet explained here. This shows that the world, as conceived by the Jainas, is eternal.

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. nyAyAvatAravivRtIH / aviyutasAmAnyavizeSadezinaM varddhamAnamAnamya / nyAyAvatAravivRtiH smRtibIjavivRddhaye kriyte|| 'pramANetyAdi' anena ca tAdAtmya-tadutpattilakSaNasaMbandhavikalatayA dhvanerbahirartha prati prAmANyAyogAt abhidheyAdisUcanadvArotpannArthasaMzayamukhena zrotAraH zravaNaM prati protsAhyante iti dhammottaro manyate / ...accaMTastu Aha / na zrAvakotsAhakametat prAmANyAbhAvAt teSAM caaprmaannaadprvRtteH| sva AtmA svarUpaM, paro'rthaH / to AbhAsayituM prakAzayituM zIlaM yasya tat / tathA jJAyate nirNoyate tattvaM yena tat zAnam / bAdhyate aneneti bAdhaH, viparItArthopasthApakapramANapravRttiriti yAvat / sena vizeSeNa varjitaM rahitaM yat jJAnaM tat pramANamiti saMTaMkaH / svaparAbhAsItyanena ye svAbhAsyeva jJAnaM manyante te zAnavAdino bauddha vizeSAH; ye ca parAbhAsyeva mImAMsakanaiyAyikAdayaH; te nirastAste hi bahirarthAbhAvAt jJAnaM svAMzaparyavasitasattAkam ityAcakSIran / tadayuktam / jhayArthAbhAve jhAnAbhAvaprasaGgAt / .........parAbhAsyapi svaprakAzAbhAvAt abhidadhIran tadapyasambaddham / svaprakAzAbhAve paraprakAzAyogAtna hi pradIpaH svarUpamanudyotayan ghaTAdyudyotane vyaapriyte| tatra siddhAntaprasiddhapAramArthikapratyakSApekSayA'kSazabdo jIvapayAyatayA prsiddhH| iha tu vyAvahArikapratyakSaprastAvAt

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32 NYAYAVATARA. akSadhvanirindriyavacano gRhyate tatazca akSa prati gataM pratyakSa* yadindriyamAzritya ujjihIte arthasAkSAtkAri jJAnaM tat pratyakSamityarthaH / tatazca sarvajJAnAnAM yat svarUpasaMvedanaM tadapi pratyakSamityuktaM bhavati / tatrApi svarUpasya grAhyasya sAkSAtkaraNasadbhAvAditi / akSobhyaH parato varttate iti parokSamakSavyApAranirapekSa manovyApAreNa sAkSAdaparicchedakaM yat jJAnaM dvidhaiva... dvAbhyAmeva prakArAbhyAM tatparokSamiti bhAvaH / meyasya grAhyArthasya vinizcayAt svarUpanirNayAt // 1 // prasiddhAni prarUDhAni, nAdhunA sAdhyAnItyarthaH / pramANAni pratyakSAnumAnazabdAni / ... ... yadarthaM pramANaparIkSaNaM asAvapi jalapAnazItatrANadirvyavahAro'nAdiprarUDhaH / tannirarthakaM pramAgAlakSaNAbhidhAnamiti // 2 // yadyapi pratiprANiprasiddhAni pramANAni / anyathA tatkRtanikhilavyavahArocchedaprasaMgAttaducchede ca dRSTahAnyAdyApatteH / ... vyAmUDhaM viparItagrastaM vicitratAM gataM mano'ntaHkaraNaM yeSAM te tathA teSAm, iheti loke / ...... yadyanAdiprasiddhaM pramANalakSaNaM prati na kecit api vyAmuhyeyustadA yad bhavadbhiH prAgudagrAhi nirarthakaM pramANalakSaNamiti tad yuktameva syAt / na caitadevam, tatra vyAmUDhAnAM darzanAt // 3 // parokSo'kSagocarAtItastateo'nyo'parokSastadbhAvastattA tayA sAkSAtkRtatayeti yAvat / tasya [ arthasya ] grAhakaM vyavasAyAtmakatayA sAkSAt paricchedakaM yat jJAnaM tadIdRzamiti IdRgeva pratyakSamiti saMTaMkaH / arthasya grAhakamityasya grahaNekSayeti vakSyamANapadasApekSatvAdamunA bahirapi ye'rthakAlAkalanavikalaM ...

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NYAYAVITANA. 33 sakalamapi zAnaM pralapanti tAnirasthati / ... ... grAhakamiti ca nirNAyakaM draSTavyaM nirNayAbhAve'rthagrahaNAyogAt / tena yat tathAgataiH pratyapAdi pratyakSa kalpanApaDhimabhrAntamiti tadapAstaM bhavati / tasya yuktiriktatvAt / tathAhi, te nirvikalpakatve'dhyakSasya yuktAH kheTayanti kiledamarthasAmarthyanAdIyate sannihitArthakriyA samarthArthagrAhakatvAt / ... tasmAt [pratyakSAt ] itarat asAkSAdarthagrAhakaM jJAnaM parokSamiti jhayamavagantavyametadapi svasaMvedanApekSayA pratyakSameva / bahirarthApekSayA tu parokSa-vyapadezamaznute iti darzayannAha grahaNekSayeti / iha grahaNaM prakramAd bahiHpravartanamucyate / anyathA vizeSaNavaiyarthyAt tasyekSApekSatayA bahiHpravRttipAlocanayeti yAvat / tadayamartho yadyapi svayaM pratyakSa tathApi liMgazabdAdidvAreNa bahirviSayagrahaNe'sAkSAtkAritayA vyApriyate iti parokSamityucyate / ... tadyathA anumAnaM zAbdaM ceti // 4 // sAdhyAvinAbhuna ityanena parapraNItaliMgalakSaNavyudAsamAcaSTe / tatazca yat pare procuH / pakSadharmAnvayavyatirekalakSaNarUpatrayopalakSitAni trINi eva liMgAni anupalabdhiH svabhAvaH kAryateti / taduktaM "anumeye'tha tattulye sadbhAvo nAstitA'sati / nizcitAnupalambhAtmakAyAkhyA hetavastrayaH" // iti // tathA'nye'syedaM kArya kAraNaM saMyogi samavAyi virodhi ceti liNgikmiti| tathA pUrvavat zeSavat saamaanytaadRssttmityaadi| tabAlapralapitaprAyamityavagantavyam / pakSadharmatvavirahe'pi anumimImahe kAlAdikasUtradharmI samastyeva tatra pakSadharmatA liMgasya gRhyate iti cet na, atiprasaGgAt / evaMhi zabdasya

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34 NYAYAVATARA. anityatve sAdhye kAkakAryAderapi gamakatvaprasaktaH / tatrApi lokAdedharmiNaH kalpayitu zakyatvAt / ... adhunA yat zauddhodanaziSyakainyaMgAdi yadutabhrAntamanumAnaM sAmAnyapratibhAsitvAt tasya ca bahiH svalakSaNe vyatirekAvyatirekavikalpAbhyAmapAkriyamANatayA yogAttadrUpatayA vata na tasyAdhyavasAyAdetasmin tadgrahasya ca bhrAntilakSaNatvAt ... taduktam "atasmin tadgraho bhrAntirapi saMbandhataHpramA" iti tadapAkatumAha tadabhrAntamityAdi // 5 // na kevalamanumAnaM bhrAntaM kiM tarhi yadbhavadbhiH dRSTAntatayA upAttaM pratyakSa tadapi bhrAntameva "sarvamAlambane bhrAntam" iti vacanAt / ... lokasaMvRttiM ghaTayanso vayaM dRr3hataravAsanAprabodhasaMpAditasattAkayAHpratyakSAnumAnayoHpramANatAmAcakSmahe // 6 // ___ sakalapratibhAsasya samastasaMvedanasya bhrAntatvAsiddhito viparyastatvAniSpatteH yat sphuTaM svAnyanizcAyi sunizcitatayA svaparaprakAzakaM tat pramANamiti smbndhH| tacca dvayasiddhau svarUpArthalakSaNayugmaniSpattau prasidhyati niSpadyate nAnyathA prameyAbhAve pramANAbhAvAt // 7 // dRSTana pramANAvalokitena iSTaH pratipipAdayiSitA'vyAhato' nirAkRtaH sAmarthyAdoM yasmin vAkye tat tathA pramANanizcitArthAbAdhitamiti yAvat / tasmAt parameo'kRtrimaH puruSopayogI zakyAnuSThAno vA'rthI vAcyastamabhidhAtuM zIla yasya tat paramArthAbhidhAyi vishissttaarthdrshkmityrthH| tatastatvagrAhitayA utpannaM prakRtavAkyapratipAdyArthAdAnazIlatayA labdhAtmasattAka yanmAnaM tat zAbdamiti prakIrtitam / ... tadaprAmANye

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NYAYAVATARA. 35 parArthAnumAnapralayaprasaMgAt tasya vacanarUpatvAt / ... zAbda ca dvidhA bhavati / laukikaM zAstrajaM c| ... yAdRzaH zAstrAt tajAtaM pramANatAmanubhavati tadarzayati // 8 // prAptaH prakSINAzeSarAgAdidoSagaNAstenopakSam AdI upalabdham anena apauruSeyApohamAha; tasya pramANabAdhitatvAt puruSavyApArAbhAve vacanAnupalabdherupalambhe'pi tadarthAnavagamAt tadarthanizcayArtha puruSAzrayaNe gajasnAnanyAyaprasaMgAt / ... ullaGghanate prAbalyena gamyate abhibhUyate anyairityullacaMya tato'nyadanullaGghana sarvavacanAtizAyIti yAvat / ... dRSTena pramANanirNItena iSTasya tadvAcyasya virodho yasmin tat tathA tadeva / yadi cAdRSTaH pramANena iSTo vacanAntareNa tayAvirodhaka tadviruddhArthAbhidhAnAt / tato'nyat adRSTeSTavirodhakam abAdhArthAbhidhAyItyarthaH / ... tattvaM jIvAdayaH padArthAH pramANapratiSThitatvAt teSAm upadezaH svarUpaprakAzanaM tadrakSaNAdividhAnaM vA taM karotIti tattvopadezakRt ataeva sAvaM sarvasmai hitaM ... / kutsitAH panthAnaH kApathAstIrthAntarANi teSAM ghaTTanaM vicAlakaM nirAkArakaM sarvajanApakArikumatavidhvaMsakamityarthaH // 9 // sva AtmA tasya nizcayaH prameyAdhigamaH tadvadanyaiSAM pratipAdyAnAM nizcayotpAdanaM prameyaparicchedakajJAnaprAdurbhAvanaM yathA''tmano'rthanirNayastathA pareSAM nirNayajananamityarthaH / budhairvidvadbhiH parasmai arthaH prayojanaM yena tat parArthaM mIyate'neneti mAnam / nanu ca yadi nizcayotpAdanaM parArthamAnaM tadA jJAnamapi parapratyAyanAya vyApriyamANaM parArthaM prApnotItyAha / vAkyaM

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36 NYAYAVATARA. parArtha na jJAnaM tasyaiva AnantaryeNa vyApArAt paraprayojanamAtratvAcca itarasya tu vyavahitatvAt svaparopakAritvAt ca / kathaM vacanamajJAnarUpaM pramANamityAha / tadupacAratastasya jJAnasya upacAro'tadrUpasyApi tadaGgatayA tadrUpatvena grahaNam tataH idam uktaM bhavati pratipAdyagatamutpatsyamAnaM yat jJAnaM tadavyavahitakAraNatvAt vacanamapi upacAreNa prmaannmityucyte||10|| pratyakSeNApi anumAneneva prasiddhArthaprakAzanAt svapratItaprameyapratyAyanAt parArthatvaM pratipAdyaprayojanatvaMdvayorapi pratyakSAnumAnayostulyakAraNatvAnnAnumAnasyaivaikasyetyabhiprAyaH / ... tadyathA'numAnapratIto'rthaH parasmai pratipAdyamAno vacanarUpApanna: parArthamanumAnam tathA pratyakSapratIto'pi parArthaM pratyakSa parapratyAyanasya tulyatvAt vacanavyApArasyaiva bhedAt / tathAhyanumAnapratItaM pratyAyannavaM vacanayati / agniratra dhUmAt / yatra yatra dhUmastatra tatrAgniH / yathA mahAnasAdau / vaidhayeNa vA agnapabhAve na kvacid dhUmo yathA jalAzayAdA / tathA ca dhUmo'yaM tasmAt dhUmAdagniratreti / ... pratyakSapratItaM punardarzayan etAvadvakti / pazya rAjA gacchati / tatazca vacanAt vividhAdapi samagrasAmagrIkasya pratipAdyasya anumeyapratyakSArthaviSayA yataH pratItirullasatyatA dvayorapi parArthatA ityAha ca / parasya tadupAyatvAt pratipAdyasya pratIti pratipAdakasya prtykssaanumaannirnniitaarthprkaashnkaarnntvaadityrthH| etena pUrvakArikoktopacArakAraNaM ca lakSayati // 11 // yadvacaH pratyakSapratipannArthapratipAdi sAkSAtkArijhAnagocarakathanacaturaM tat prtykssmucyte|... vacanaM kutaH pratyakSamityAha /

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NYAYAVATARA. 37 pratibhAsasya nimittatvAt pratipAdyapratyakSaprakAzahetutvAd upacAreNa ucyate // 12 // pakSo vakSyamANalakSaNaH sa prAdiryeSAM hetudRSTAntopanayanigamAdInAM tAni tathA teSAM vacanAni pratipAdakA dhvanayaH tAnyaivAtmasvarUpaM yasya tatpakSAdivacanAtmakaM na tu ca hetupratipAdakaM vacaH parArthamanumAnamityabhidhAyatatpakSAdivacanAtmakamiti vadataH pUrvAparavyAhatA vAco yuktiH / naitadasti / evaM manyate / naikaH prakAraH parArthAnumAnasya kiM tarhi yathA parasya sukhena prameyapratItirbhavati tathA yatra saH pratyAyanIyaH tatra dazAvayavasAdhanaM pratipAdanopAyaH tadyathA pakSAdayaH paJca tacchuddhayazca // 13 // sAdhyasya anumeyasya abhyupagamo'GgIkaraNaM prAznikAdInAM purataH pratijJAsvIkAra ityarthaH |...prtykssaadyniraakRt iti pratyakSa sAkSAtkArisaMvedanamAdizabdAdanumAnasvavacanalokA gRhyante taiH anirAkRtaH abAdhitaH / ...tadyathA sarvamanekAntAtmakam asti sarvajJa ityAdi / tasya pakSasya prayogo'bhidhAnamatra parArthAnumAnaprastAve kartavyo vidheyaH / hetorgocaradIpaka iti nirdezasya viSayasaMdarzakatvAt ityarthaH // 14 // ____ anyathetyuktaviparItAzrayaNe pakSaprayogAkaraNe ityarthaH / vAdino hetUpanyAsakarturabhipreto'bhimataH sa cAsau hetugocarazca vAdyabhipretahetugocarastatra muhyati dolAyate tacchIlazca yastasya pratyAyasya prativAdinA hetuviruddhArekito bhavet virodhazaGkAkalaGkitaH syAdityarthaH / tatazca samyag hetAvapi vipakSa evAyaM vartate iti vyAmohAt viruddhadUSaNa

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38 NYAYAVATARA. mabhidadhIta / pakSopanyAsAtu nirNItahetugocarasya naiSa doSaH syAdityabhiprAyaH / amumevArtha spaSTaM dRSTAnnAha // 15 // yathA lakSyanirdezaM vinA dhAnuSkasya iSu prakSipato yau guNadoSI taiA taddarzijanasya viparyastAvapi pratibhAtaH / guNA'pi doSatayA doSo'pi vA guNatayA tathA pakSanirdezaM vinA hetumupanyasyato vAdino yo svAbhipretasAdhyasAdhanasamarthatvAsamarthatvalakSaNa guNadoSau tau prAzikaprativAdyAdInAM viparItAvapi pratibhAta iti bhAvArthaH // 16 // svArthAnumAnaprastAve hi parapraNItalakSaNAntaravyapAhena sAdhyavyatirekAt sAmastyena hetALavRttirevaikaM lakSaNamiti nirNItaM parArthAnumAnenApi tadeva prakAzanIyaM vacanaracanA tu kacit pravartate ityabhiprAyavAMstavaividhyamAha / hetAIividhaH prayogaH syAditi sambandhaH / kathamityAha / tathaiva sAdhyasadbhAve eva upapattirvidyamAnatA tayA tathopapatyA yathA agniratra dhUmasya tathaiva upapatteriti / anyathApi vA ityanenAvayave samudAyopacArAt anyathAnupapatti lakSayati anyathA sAdhyavyatireke anupapattiH avidyamAnatA eva tayA vA anyathAnupapatyA hetoH prayogaH syAt / yathA agniratra dhUmasya anyathAnupapattiriti ete ca dve api ekasmin sAdhye prayoktavye iti manyeta |...tthiippttipryogenn anyathA'nupapattyaprayogeNa vA sAdhyasya pratipipAdayiSitArthasya siddhiniSpattiH...bhavet // 17 // sAdhyaM jijJAsitArthAtmakaM sAdhanaM tadgamakA hetuH tayAH sAdhyasAdhanayoH vyAptiH idamanena vinA na bhavatItyevaMrUpA yatra kvacinizcIyatetarAm atizayena nirNIyate sa sAdhayedRSTAntaH /

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NYAYAVATARA. 3) yathA agniratra dhUmasya tathaiva upapattaH mahAnasAdivat / ityayaM ca avismRtapratibandhe prativAdini na prayoktavya ityAha // 18 // sAdhye gamye nivartamAne asaMbhavati tu zabdo'vadhAraNArtho bhinnakramaH sa ca sAdhanasya asaMbhava eva ityatra draSTavyaH / khyApyate pratipAdyate yatra kvacit dRSTAnte sa vaidhaya'Na bhavati iti zabdena sambandhasmaraNAt iti idamatrApi saMbadhnAti asyApi smaryamANe saMbandhe aprayogAt iti kimarthaM vismRtasaMbandhe pava prativAdini dRSTAntaH prayujyate nAnyadeti pravacanAvakAzamAzaGkayAha // 19 // anyandA hi smayamANe vA saMbandhe aprayujyetAgRhIte vA... tatazca antaH pakSamadhye vyAptiH sAdhanasya sAdhyAkrAntatvam antarvyAptistasyaiva sAdhyasaMgamyasaMsiddhaH pratIteH bahirvivakSitadharmiNA'nyatra dRSTAntadharmiNi udAhRtiH vyAptidarzanarUpA vyarthA niSprayojanA / tadasadbhAve'pyeva saMbandhAd grahaNAd antarvyAtptyabhAve'pyevamiti vyathaiva bahirudAhRtiH / nahi sahadazanAt / kvacit sarvatra tadrapatA sidhyati vyabhicAradarzanAt / tasmAd agRhItasambandhe pratipAdye pramANe na pratibandhaH / sAdhyastasiddhau tata eva sAdhyasiddharakiJcitkarI dRSTAntAdAhRtiriti nyAyavidvAMso viduravabudhyante iti / iha ca prakaraNe zeSAvayavAnAM upanayanigamanazuddhipaJcakalakSaNAnAM saMkSiptarucisattvAnugrahaparatvAt asya yadyapi sAkSAllakSaNaM noktaM tathApyata eva pratipAditAvayavatrayaM buddhimadbhirunneyam / yato'vayavApekSayA jaghanyamadhyamotkRSTAH tisraH kathA bhavanti iti / tatra hetupratipAdanamAtraM jaghanyA, yAdyavayavanivedanaM madhyamA,

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40 NYATAVATARA. saMpUrNadazAvayavakathanamutkRSTA / tatra iha madhyamAyAH sAkSAt kathanena jaghanyotkRSTe arthataH sUcayati; tat sadbhAvasya pramANasiddhatvAt iti // 20 // pratipAdyasya prativAdinaH yaH kazcit siddhaH pratItAvArUDha eva sa pakSAbhAsaH / sAdhyasyaiva pakSatvAt siddhasya sAdhanAnahatvAd atiprasaktastathA'kSaliMgato'dhyakSahetubhyAM lokasvavacanAbhyAM ca bAdhitastiraskRto yaH sa pakSAbhAsastatra pratipAdyasiddho yathA paudgaliko ghaTaH / saugataM vA prati sarva kSaNikamityAdi / pratyakSabAdhito yathA niraMzAni svalakSaNAni parasparaviviktau vA sAmAnyavizeSAviti / anumAnabAdhito yathA nAsti sarvajJa iti / lokabAdhito yathA gamyA mAtA iti / svavacanabAdhito yathA na santi sarve bhAvA iti // 21 // _ hetAlakSaNam asAdhAraNadharmarUpaM yadIritaM gamitam anekArthatvAddA dhAtoH pratipAditaM svaarthaanumaanprstaave| yadutAnyathAnupapannatvamiti / tasya apratItiranadhyavasAyaH, saMdeho dolAyamAnatA, viparyAso vaiparItyanirNayA'pratItizca saMdedehazca viparyAsazceti dvandvaH / tadAbhatA hetvAbhAsatA // 22 // yaH kazcidapratItaH pratItyA'gocarIkRto'nizcitaH so'siddhanAmA hetvAbhAsaH |...ystu anyathaiva sAdhyaM vinaiva vipakSa eveti yAvat upapadyate sambhavati sa viruddhAbhidhAnaH / yaH punaH anyathApi sAdhyaviparyayeNApi yukto ghaTamAnako'pi zabdAt sAdhyenApi so'tra vyatikare'naikAntikasaMjJo jJAtavya iti / tatra pratiprANiprasiddhapramANapratiSThitAnekAntaviruddhabuddhibhiH kaNabhakSAkSapAdabuddhAdiziSyakairupanyasyamAnAH sarva eva hetvH|

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NYAYAVATARA. 41 tadyathA ekAntena nityaH zabdo'nityo vA / sattvAt utpattimattvAt kRtakatvAt pratyabhijJAyamAnatvAt ityAha |...klpnaarcitsttaakaanaaN ca sarvazaktiviraharUpatayA niHsvabhAvatvAt / tathApi teSAM sAdhanatve sAdhyamapi niHsvabhAvamiti / kharaviSANaM zazaviSANasya sAdhanamApadyate iti zobhanaH sAdhyasAdha. navyavahAraH |...evN hi nabhaHpuNDarIkaM tatra nAstIti sattAdikamapi kalpayituM na zakyamiti prasajyeta |...anityvaadii nityavAdinaM prati pramANayati / sarva kSaNika sattvAt...... nityavAdI punaH evaM pramANayati / sarva nityaM sattvAt / tasmAd amI sarva eva hetavaH santo'nekAntamantareNa nopapadyante iti tameva pratipAdayitum Izate vimUDhabuddhibhiH punaH vipakSasAdhanArtham upanyasyamAnA vivakSayA prasiddha viruddhAnakAntikatAmAbibhratIti sthitam // 23 // dRSTAntadoSA dRSTAntAbhAsA ityarthaH |...saadhyN gamyam AdizabdAt saadhnobhyprigrhH| tadvikalAstacchranyA AdizabdAt sandigdhasAdhyasAdhanobhayadhamA gRhyante / kiMbhUtA pate ityAha / apagataM lakSaNaM yebhyaste tathA ca te hetavazca tebhya utthA utthAna yeSAM teaplkssnnhetuutthaaH| idaM ca prAyakaM vizeSaNaM, samyaga hetAvapi vaktadoSavazAt dRSTAntAbhAsatopapatteH yathA nityAnityaH zabdaH zrAvaNatvAt ghaTavaditi / tatra sAdhyavikalo yathA, bhrAntam anumAnaM pramANatvAt pratyakSavat pratyakSasya bhrAntatAvikalatvAt...... / sAdhanavikalo yathA, jAgratsaMvedanaMbhrAntaM pramANatvAt svapnasaMvedanavat svapnasaMvedanasya pramANatAvaikalyAt... / ubhayavikalo yathA, nAsti sarvazaH pratyakSAdyanupa

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42 NYAYAYATAA. labdhatvAt ghaTavat ghaTasya saracAt pratyakSAdibhirupalabdhatvAcca / sandigdhasAdhyadharo yathA, vItarAgo'yaM maraNadharmatvAt rathyApuruSavat rathyApuruSe vItarAgatvasya sndigdhtvaat...| sandigdhasAdhanadhammo yathA, maraNadhamA'yaM puruSo rAgAdimattvAt rathyApuruSavat draSTavyaH puruSe rAgAdimatvasya sandigdhatvAt vItarAgasyApi tathA sambhavAditi / sandigdhobhayadharmo yathA, asarvajJo'yaM rAgAdimattvAt rathyApuruSavat iti rathyApuruSe pradarzitanyAyena ubhayasyApi sandigdhatvAditi / nanu ca parairanyadapi dRSTAntAbhAsatrayamuktaM tadyathA ananvayA'pradarzitAnvayo viparItAnvayazceti / tatra ananvayo yathA, rAgAdimAn vivakSitaH puruSo vaktatvAd iSTapuruSavaditi yadyapi kileTapuruSe rAgAdimattvaM vaktatvaM ca sAdhyasAdhanadhammaiau dRSTau tathApi yo yo vaktA sa sa rAgAdimAniti vyAptapasiddharananvayo'yaM dRSTAntaH / tathA apradarzitAnvayo yathA, anityaH zabdaH kRtakatvAt ghaTavaditi / atra yadyapi vAstavo'nvayo'sti tathApi vAdinA vacanena na prakAzita iti apradarzitAnvayo dRSTAntaH / viparItAnvayA yathA, anityaH zabdaH kRtakatvAt iti / hetumabhidhAya yadanityaM tat kRtakaM ghaTavaditi viparItavyAptidarzanAt viparItAnvayaH // 24 // sAdhyAbhAvaH sAdhanAbhAvavyAptau dayitumabhipreyate yasmin tad vaidhaya'm / tenAtra dRSTAntadoSA nyAyavidIritA iti dattArtha sAdhyasAdhanayugmAnAMgamyagamakobhayAnAm anivRttaH avivarttanAt ca zabdasya vyavahitaprayogatvAt saMzayAJca nivRttisaMdehAccetyarthaH / tadanena Sar3a dRSTAntAbhAsAH sUcitAH / tadyathA sAdhyAvyatirekI (1), sAdhanAvyatirekI (2), sAdhyasAdhanAvyatirekI

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NYAYAVATARA. 43 (3), tathA sandigdhasAdhyavyatirekaH (4), sandigdhasAdhanavyatirekaH (5), sandigdhasAdhyasAdhanavyatirekazceti (6) / tatra sAdhyAvyatirekI yathA, bhrAntamanumAnaM pramANatvAt ityatra vaidhaHdRSTAntA yat punarbhrAntaM na bhavati na tat pramANaM tadyathA svapnajJAnamiti svapnajJAnAd bhrAntatAnivRtteH sAdhyAvyatirekitvamiti / sAdhanAvyatirekI yathA, pratyakSa nirvikalpakaM pramANatvAditi / atra vaidhaya'dRSTAnto yat punaH savikalpakaM na tat pramANaM tadyathA'numAnamanupramANatA'nivRttaH sAdhanAvyatirekitvam / ubhayAvyatirekI yathA, nityAnityaH zabdaH sattvAt ityatra vaidhaya'dRSTAnto yaH punarna nityAnityaH sa na san tadyathA ghaTaH ghaTAdubhayasyApi avyAvRtterubhayAvyatirekitvamiti / tathA sandigdhasAdhyavyatirekaH, asarvajJA anAtA vA kapilAdayaH AryasatyacatuSTayApratipAdakatvAditi / atra vaidhaya'dRSTAntaH yaH punaH sarvajJa prApto vA asau AryasatyacatuSTayaM pratyapIpadat tadyathA zauddhodaniriti / ayaM ca sAdhyavyatirekI vA AryasatyacatuSTayasya duHkhasamudayamArganirodhalakSaNasya pramANabAdhitatvena tadbhASakasya asarvajJatAnAptatopapatteH ... ... tasmAt zauddhodaneH sakAzAd asarvajJatAnAptatAlakSaNasya sAdhyasya vyAvRttiH sandigdheti sandigdhasAdhyavyatirekitvamiti / sandigdhasAdhanavyatireko yathA, anAdeyavAkyaHkazcidavikSitaH puruSo rAgAdimattvAdityatra vaidhaya'dRSTAnto yaH punaH AdeyavAkyo na sa rAgAdimAn tadyathA sugata iti... sugatAt rAgAdimatvavyAvRttisaMzayAt sandigdhasAdhanavyatirekitvamiti / sandigdhasAdhyasAdhanavyatireko yathA, vItarAgAH kapilAdayaH karuNAspadeSu

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44 NYAYAVATARA. api akaruNAparItacittatayA dattanijakamAMsazakalatvAditi / atra vaidharmyadRSTAnto ye punarvItarAgAste karuNAparItacittatayA dattanijamAMsazakalAH tadyathA bodhisattvA ityatra sAdhanasAdhyadharmayeArbodhisatvebhyA vyAvRttiH sandigdhA tataH pratipAditapramAgAvaikalyAt na jJAyate ki te rAgAdimantaH uta vItarAgAstathA' nukampyeSu kiM svapizitakhaNDAni dattavanto neti vA ataH sandigdhasAdhyasAdhanavyatirekitvamiti / paraiH pare'pi dRSTAntAbhAsAstrayA vimRzyabhASitayA darzitAstadyathA'vyatireko'pradarzitavyatireko'viparItavyatirekazceti / te asmAbhiH prayuktatvAttu darzayitavyAH / tathAhi avyatirekastairdarzitA yathA, avItarAgaH kazcid vivakSitaH puruSo vaktatvAdityatra vaidharmyadRSTAnto yaH punaH vItarAgo na sa vaktA yatheopalakhaNDa iti yadyapi kilopalakhaNDAd ubhayaM vyAvRttaM tathApi vyAptayA vyatirekAsiddheH avyatirekitvamiti / tathAhi apradarzitavyatirekastairukto yathA, anityaH zabdaH kRtakatvAt AkAzavadityatra vidyamAno'pi vyatireko vAdinA vacanena udbhAvita iti duSTatA / viparItavyatirekaH punarabhihitA yathA, anityaH zabdaH kRtakatvAd ityatra vaidharmyadRSTAntA yadakRtakaM tannityaM bhavati yathA''kAzamiti ityatra viparyastavyatireka pradarzanAt viparItavyatirekitvam // 25 // sAdhyate pratipAdyapratItA ArohAte tu meyaM yena tat sAdhanaM taca anekarUpaM prAka pratyapAdi / tadyathA / kacit heturevaikaH, kacit pakSahetU, kvacit pakSahetudRSTAntAH kvacit te eva sopanayAH, kvacit sanigamanAH, kvacit ekaikatacchuddhivRddhyeti / ... tatreha samyaksAdhanasya dUSayitumazakyatvAt sAdhanAbhAsa eva ... 3

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NYAYAVATARA. 45 tatsAmopapatteH ... / tatra proktadoSANAM pratyakSAdinirAkRtapakSAsiddhAdihetusAdhyAdivikaladRSTAntAdyupanyAsalakSaNAnAmudbhAvana prAnikAnAM purataH prakAzanaM yat tad dRSyate svAbhipretasAdhyapratyAyanavaikalyalakSaNaM vikRti nIyate sAdhanamaneneti dUSaNamiti jJa yam // 26 // sakalaM samastam AvRNoti Aviyate vAanenetyAvaraNam / tat svarUpapracchAdanaM karmetyarthaH / sakalaM ca tadAvaraNAM ca sakalAvaraNaM tena mukto rahitaH AtmA svarUpaM yasya tat tathA / ataeva kevalam asahAyam AvaraNakSayopazamavicitratayaiva bodhasya nAnAkArasya pravRtteH / sAmastyena punaH AvaraNanirdalane vibandhakAraNavaikalyAd ekAkAratayaiva tasya vivartanAd ato zAnAntaranirapekSaM yat prakAzate prathate nirupAdhikaM dyotate ityrthH| tat paramArthataH pratyakSaM tadidaM sakalAvaraNamuktAtmeti hetudvAreNa tathA kevalaM tat prakAzate iti svarUpatA nirUpya adhunA kAryadvAreNa nirUpayannAha / sakalArthAtmanAM samastavastusvarUpANAM satatapratibhAsanam anavarataprakAzanaM sakalArthAtmasatatapratibhAsanamiti pratibhAsyate'neneti pratibhAsanam Atmano dharmarUpatayA bhedavadvivakSitaM zAnamiti yAvat / asya ca pAramArthikatvaM nirupacaritazabdArthopapatteH / tathAhi / akSazabdo jIvapAyastatazcAkSaM prati vartate iti pratyakSaM yatrAtmanaH sAkSAdvarApAraH / vyAvahArikaM punarindriyavyavahitAtmavyApArasampAdyatvAt paramArthataH parokSameva dhUmAdagnizAnavattirodhAnAvizeSAt // 27 // dvividhaM hi pramANasya phalaM sAkSAd asAkSAca anantaraM vyavahitaM cetyarthaH / tatra sAkSAd ajJAnam anadhyavasAyaH

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46 NYAYAVATARA, prameyAparicchittistasya vinivartanaM vizeSeNa pralayApAdana pramANasya phalam ajJAnoddalanadvAreNa tasya pravRtteH tasya sarvAnarthamUlatayA pramAtrapakAritvAt tannivartanasya prayAjanatA yuktava / etaccAnantaraprayojanaM sarvajJAnAmekarUpatvAt sAmAnyenoktam / vyavahitaprayojanaM punaH vibhAgenAha / kevalasya sarvazazAnasya sukha vaiSayikaM sukhAtotaparamAlAdAnubhava upekSA sAkSAt samastAnubhave'pi hAnopAdAnopAdAnecchAbhAvAnmadhyasthavRttitA te sukhopekSe phalamityarthaH / zeSasya tadvaratiriktaprAkRtalokapramANasya AdAnaM grahaNaM hAnaM parityAgastayorAdAnahAnayA?H buddhirAdAnahAnadhIH, sA phalamiti yAvat / tatazca prAdeyAnAM samyagadarzananakacandanAdInAM yA AditsA tathA, heyAnAM mithyAdarzanAdiviSakaNTakAnAM yA jihAsA pramANasAdhyA pramANAttasiddheH // 28 // aneke bahavo'ntA aMzA dharmA vA AtmanaH svarUpANi yasya tad anekAtmakaM ki tadvastu bahirantazca gocaraH viSayaH sarvasaMvidAM samastasaMvittInAmanena anekAntamantareNa saMvedanaprasaravyavacche daM darzayati ... / eka ityAdi anantadharmAdhyAsitaM vastu sAbhipretaikadharmaviziSTaM nayati prApayati saMvedanamArohayatIti nayaH pramANapravRtteruttarakAlabhAvI parAmarza ityarthastasya viSayaH pramANasya gocaro mato'bhipreta ekadezena anityatvAdidharmalakSaNena viziSTaH pararUpebhyo vyvcchinnetyrthH| ... sarvasaMgrAhisattAbhiprAyaparikalpanAdvAreNa sapta nayAH pratipAditAH, tadyathA / naigama-saMgraha-vyavahAra-RjusUtra-zabda-samabhirUr3ha evaMbhUtA nayA ityato'smAbhirapi se eva varNyante kathamete sarvAbhi

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NYAYAVATARA. 47 prAyasaMgrAhakAH iti cet / ucyate / iti prAyastAvad arthadvAreNa zabdadvAreNa vA pravartata gatyantarAbhAvAt / arthazca sAmAnyarUpo vizeSarUpo vA zabdo'pi rUDhito vyutpattitazca vyutpattirapi sAmAnyanimittaprayuktA tatkAlabhAvinimitta prayuktA vA syAt / ... ye'pi parasparavizakalitau sAmAnyavizeSarai icchanti tat samudAyarUpA naigamaH / ye punaH kevalaM sAmAnyaM vAJchanti tat samUhasaMpAdyaH sNgrhH| ye punaranapekSitazAstrIyasAmAnyavizeSaM lokavyavahAramavatarantaM ghaTAdikaM padArtham abhiprayanti tannicayajAtyA vyavahAraH / ye tu kSaNakSayiNaH paramANulakSaNA vizeSAH satyA iti manyante tatsaMghAtaghaTita RjusUtra iti / tathA ye rUDhitaH zabdAnAM pravRttiM vAJchanti tannivahasAdhyaH zabda iti / ye tu vyutpattito dhvanInAM pravRttiM vAJchanti nAnyathA tavArajanyaM samabhiruDha iti / ye tu vartamAnakAlabhAvivyutpattinimittamadhikRtya zabdAH pravartante nAnyatheti manyante tatsaMghaTitaH khalvevaMbhUta iti / tadevaM na kazcana vikalpo'sti vastugocaro yo'tra nayasaptake nAntaryAtIti sarvAbhiprAyasaMgrAhakA ete iti sthitam / ... tathAhi naigamanayadarzanAnusAriNau naiyAyikavaizeSiko, saMgrahAbhiprAyapravRttAH sarve'pi advaitavAdAH sAMkhyadarzanaM ca, vyavahAranayAnupAtiprAyazcArvAkadarzanam , RjusUtrAkUtapravRttabuddhayastAthAgatAH, zabdAdinayamatAvalambino vaiyAkaraNAdayaH // ... tathAhi nayati kenacid aMzena viziSTamartha prApayati yo'bhiprAyaH sa nayaH // 29 // iha trividhaM zrutam / tadyathA / mithyAzrutaM, nayazrutaM, syAdvAdazrutam / tatra zrUyate iti shrutmaagmH| mithyA'lIkaM zrutaM

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48 NYAYAVATARA. mithyAzrutam / tazca durnayAbhiprAyapravRttaM tIrthikasambandhi nirgocaratvAt / tathA nayaiH hetubhUtaiH zrutaM nayazrutam / etavya arhadAgamAntargatameva ekanayAbhiprAyapratibaddham / ... tathA nirdizyamAnadharmavyatiriktAzeSadharmAntarasaMsUcakena syAt yukto vAdo'bhipretadharmavacanaM syAdvAdaH / tadAtmakaM zrutaM tat kiM bhUtamucyate ityatrAha / saMpUrNa vikalaH sa cAsAvarthazca tadvinizcAyi tannirNayahetutvAd evamabhidhIyate / nayAnAM naigamAdInAm ekaniSThAnAM ekadharmagrahaNapayryavasitAnAM zrutavartmani AgamamArge pravRtteH tadekaikAbhiprAyapratibaddha saMpUrNArthavinizcAyi pravarttanAnna tatsamudAyasyaiva saMpUrNArthavinizcAyakatvAd ityAkUtam // 30 // ... svAnyau AtmaparI nirbhAsayitum udyotayituM zIlamasyeti svAnyanirbhAsI svasvarUpArthayeAH prakAzaka iti yAvat / vivarttanam aparAparaparyyAyeSu gamanaM vivRttiH pariNAmaH sA vidyate yasyeti vivRttimAn / sva AtmA saMvedyate aneneti svasaMvedanaM sena samyak siddhaH pratiSThitaH pratIto vA svasaMvedanasaMsiddhaH / kSitiH pRthivI AdiryeSAM tAni kSityAdIni / AdizabdAd ambu tejovAyvAkAzAni gRhayante / na vidyate AtmA svarUpamasyeti anAtmakaH kSityAdisvarUpo na bhavati ityarthaH / ... svAnyanirbhAsItyanena prAguktasvaparAbhAsipramANavizeSavan mImAMsakAn parokSabuddhivAdino yogAcArAMzca jJAnamAtravAdinaH pratikSipati / kathaM jJAnajJAninoH kathaMcidabhedena taduktanyAyAvizeSAditi karttA bhokteti vizeSaNadvayena sAMkhyamataM vikuTTayati / vivRttimAnityamunA tu ekAntanityaM apari ...

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NYAYAVATARA. 49 grAminaM naiyAyikavaizeSikAdiprakalpitaM pramAtAraM nirasyati sarvathA'vicalitarUpasya arthagrahaNapariNAmAnupapatteH // 31 // pramANAni pratyakSAdIni AdizabdAnnayaparigrahaH / teSAM vyavasthA pratiniyatalakSaNAdirUpA mayyAdA sA iyamanantaroktasthityA prakIrttiteti / ... sarvasaMvyavaharttRNAM laukikatIrthikabhedabhinnasamastavyavahAravatAM prasiddhA'pi rUDhA'pi tadaprasiddhau nikhilavyavahArocchedaprasaMgAt / prakIrttitA saMzabditA avyutpannavipratipannavyAmohApohAyeti gamyate // 32 // ... syAdvAdakesarisubhISaNanAdabhIteruttastalolanayanAn prapalAyyamAnAn / he durnayAzritakutIrthimRgAnananyatrANAn vihAya jinametya tamAzrayadhvam // bhaktirmayA bhagavati prakaTIkRteyaM tacchAsanAMzakathanAnna matiH svakIyA / mohAdato yadiha kiMcidabhUdasAdhu tat sAdhavaH kRtakRpA mayi zodhayantu // nyAyAvatAravivRti vidhinA vidhitsAH siddhaH punartha iha puNyacayastato me / nityaH parArthakaraNeodyatamAbhavAntAt bhUyAjjinendra matalaMpaTameva cetaH // iti nyAyAvatAravivRtiH samAptA / kRtiriyaM sitapaTTa zrIsiddhasenadivAkaravyAkhyAnakasya tarkaprakaraNavRtteriti // Printed by Apurva Krishna Bose, at the Indian Press, Allahabad,

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THE LIBRARY OF JAINA LITERATURE Vol. 1.- The Paramatma Prakash of Sri Yogindra Acharya, by Rickhab Das Jain, B.A. Price Rs. 2 or 3s. Vol. II. The Nyayavatara. --The Earliest Jaina work on Pure Logic of Siddha Sena Divakara. Edited by Mahamahopadhyaya D. Jatis Chandra Vidyabhusana MA., Ph. D. Siddhanta - Mahodadhi. Pre Re. Torts. 60. 70; Vol. III. --The Naya Karnika. A Primer on Jaina Logic by Mr. Mohan Lal D. Desai, B.A, LL.B., Editor, Jaina Swetambara Conferenco Herald, Bombay. Price Re. I or Is. 6d. Vol. IV. The Jaina Law of Inheritance or Bhadrabahu Samhita. Edited by Justice J. L. Jaini, M.A. Price Re. 1-4 or 2s. Vol. V. Husn-i-Avval. (In Urdu.) An original work on Jainism, by Mr. Jineshwar Dass Jain, late Editor, Zubano, Delhi. Price Rs. 1-8 or 3s.. Vol. VI. -Atam-Khyati Samayasaro, of Sri Kundkundacharya.-. Translated from Sanskrit into easy and lucid Hindi by Jaina Dharma Bhusana Brahmchari Sri Sital Prasad Ji, Hony. Principal, Syadvada Jaina Mahavidyalaya, Benares, and Editor, Jaina Mitra.' Bombay. Vol. VII. Trishasti-Shalaka-Purusha Charitra, of Sri Hemchandracharya. By Prof. Amulya Charan Vidyabhusana. Vol. VIII.- Atmanushashana, of Sri Guna-Bhadra Acharya. Translated into English by J. L. Jaini, M.A., Bar-at-Law. and Judge, High Court, Indore. Vol. IX. Life and Works of Sri Nemichandra Siddhanta Chakravarti and Chamundaraya, in Hindi, with 12 Plates by Kumar Devendra Prasad of Arrah. Vol. X. -Thiru-Nuttaradhati..By Mr. C. S. Mallinath, Manan. gudi. Price 8 Ans. or Is. THE JAINA SCRIPTURE GIFT SERIES. (1) Jainism is not Atheism, and the six Dravyas of Jaina Philosophy by Mr. H. Warren, Honorary Secretary, Jaina Literature Society, London. Price 2 Ans. or 2d. (2) Pure Thoughts or Samayak Path.By Ajit Prasada, M.A., LL.B. Price 2 As. 2 d.

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