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of seșavat altogether by making it identical with the sthālipuläkanyaya as it were."
It was at this stage of the controversy that Bhatta Akalamka (750 A.D.) the first Jaina logician to deal with this problem, entered into arena. He sided with the non-Buddhist logicians by accepting that effect can be inferred from the cause just as in the inference of the shade from the tree. By giving this example Akalamka contributed in the following three ways: (i) He could give an example of a valid inference of the effect from the cause. (ii) He could introduce the idea that there could be a case where the cause and effect could be simultaneous and not in succession. Therefore, he calls these varieties of hetu not merely effect and cause but as simultaneous effect and simultaneous cause. In fact, Akalaska appears to have been influenced by the examples given by Anuyoga-dvāra where the example of inference of blossoming of lotus from the rising of sun has been quoted as an example of inference of effect from the cause.3 (iii) In this example he could show that the effect could be actually inferred from the cause and we need not go into the hair splitting method of Uddyotakara, viz., that it is the potential effect not the effect itself which can be inferred from the cause. In fact, the example that was given by him could also safely meet the objection of Uddyotakara that a non-existent object is not to be inferred because here the effect also actually exists at the time of inference.
Though the Jainas did not appear to have entered into the controversy raised by Uddyotakara as to whether the past or the future objects can be inferred or not, it was Jayamangalā commentary of the Sāmkhyakärikä (9th Cent. A.D.) which asserted in unmistakable terms that preceding cause can lead to the inference of succeeding effect and vice versa. In fact, the Jaymang!ā interpreted pūrvavat and seşavat as inferences regarding future objects and past objects respectively. It appears to be a very bold step on the part of this commentary in view of the fact that Uddyotakara has definitely rejected the idea of any inference of a succeeding effect from a preceding cause and the Buddhist logicians have altogether denied the possibility of such an inference. It also goes to the credit of this
1. शेषवद्यथा-समुद्रादेकं जलपलं लवण मासाद्य शेषस्यास्याप्यस्ति लवणभाव इति । 2. Pramāṇasangraha, 29-30. 3. Anuyogadvāra Sūtra, 147. 5. HallucefaTTatu gacTHIH..... tatarefateatu tai
- Jayamangalā on Saṁkhyakärikā, 5.
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