Spiritual Place Of Epistemological Tradition In Buddhism

Author(s): Ernst Steinkellner
Publisher: Ernst Steinkellner

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definition that something new is cognized by these (PV II 5c) raises perception to the primary source of cognition. The definition that cognitions have to hold good (avisamvādana, PV II 1) puts the truth of every cognition to the test of success in action, and offers the opportunity to designate the Buddha as a ineans of valid cognition, although nothing new is cognized through words as such. The Buddha, however, is not equated with perception and inference. He is considered as a means of valid cognition, because his authority legitimates the authenticity of perception and inference. For the Buddha gives goal and guidance of action, which perception and inference cannot give, and which would be disposed of only by a superficial rationality (flache Aufklärung). That he is an authority on this has yet to be proven. For nobody is a Buddhist simply on trust. This results in a historicalfactual circle, which Dharmakirti has rightly not avoided."
p.31f.: "When inference has been made available, the question of the Budd na as a means of valid cognition can be asked. Not in anyway is the transmitted werd of the Buddha, as such, to be considered as an authority only because somebody who passes for holy uttered it, or because it is considered by many as an authoritative transmitted record (āgama). Not until it is shown that these words originate from somebody who proves through his conduct that he does not lie and who has something to say that is not at everybody's disposal, not until then, can he be accepted as a means of valid cognition. The highest goal of action has to be given by such an authority; for it is not immediately present, or it would not be the highest goal, since as soon as the highest goal has been reached there is no need for any fu ther activity, except if one aims for the highest goal of other beings too.
The Buddha is the subject of which it is predicated that it knows this zoal, and that it acts (= makes known) only for the sake of others. The reason for this is its conduct. Only a conduct that is pervaded by the possession of the hiç hest goal can be of a kind as the Buddha's. But that alone would not be sufficient. The Buddha is also the subject of which it is predicated that it knows the means that lead towards this goal. The reason for this is the process of its development.
The second chapter (pramāṇasiddhi) of the PV mainly deals with this proof of the Buddha's authority. Through his authority, in turn, the authenticity of perception and inference are legitimated. If in this way a Buddhist system expresses in full awareness where it takes its foundations from, it is able, on the other hand, to modify these foundations by a logical procedure, measuring these foundations with the measure of reason."
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