Spiritual Place Of Epistemological Tradition In Buddhism

Author(s): Ernst Steinkellner
Publisher: Ernst Steinkellner
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269711/1

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THE SPIRITUAL PLACE OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION
IN BUDDHISM
By E.Steinkellner, Vienna
It is now just about a hundred years since the Buddhist tradition of epistemology and logic (pramayavada) entered, as such, the view of the scholarly work. After the serious research-efforts of roughly speaking three generations of scholars, we are slowly entering into a new phase of research, which I wishfully think of as the phase when the great remaining philological tasks will be taken up, and when the individual theoretical achievements of the tradition's masters will finally be understood and judged in their value as contributions to the finding and solving of the relevant philosophical problems in detail. This, then, is a suitable moment, not only to survey and put in good order work done so far and organize and prepare for future enterprises, but also to reflect in a more general sense on the validity and correctness of the hitherto gained concepts regarding this particular tradition's meaning within the context of Buddhist and Asian culture.
My following remarks are an example of such a reflection. The question I shall use as a leitmotiv - the question for the "spiritual place” — has already been answered, I think; but the scholarly development of this answer (the difficulties in seeing what was always there, the sometimes forcible misinterpretations etc.), it "prehistory" is a dramatic diagram showing the course of the reaction of the so-called "Western", or as I prefer to say "modern", scholar to a specific Buddhist cultura phenomenon.
Within its relatively smaller cultural significance for the history of modern scholarly emancipation, this case-history is certainly comparable to the only othe one that has been studied so far, i.e. the history of understanding the concept(s) of nirvana in Western scholarship(2)
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That I present this case to a learned Japanese audience has good reasons. The significant progress of our knowledge of the epistemological tradition during the list two or three decades is largely due to the effort of a few outstanding Japanese scho ars. Without their work we could not hope today for any substantial further pron otion of knowledge in the field. Some major studies have been written in this country in the last twenty years, and — what is equally important — an academic tradi ion has grown: a considerable number of young Japanese scholars seems to be devo ed to the study of the epistemological tradition.
I am honoured and moved to have been given the chance to work with these colleagues and discuss my problems among them. And I would like to express my deep gratitude to the Japanese authorities and the University of Kyoto who nade this visit possible, and to my colleagues and friends, above all to Prof. Kajiy ima Y., Prof. Mimaki K., and Dr. Yuyama A., who took upon themselves all the ti ubles that accompany such an invitation.
A final preparatory remark seems appropriate: As to the main points, you will rot find many new facts or aspects in my lecture. Most of the facts and interpreta ional ideas will be known to the specialists. It's the reconsideration, the attempi to state clearly how far our understanding of this tradition's cultural meaning has cc me, that will hopefully receive the honour of your kind interest.
One of the causes for difficulty in understanding the features of particular cultural phenomena seems to be the situation that a scholar finds in his object of research something which he does not like to find. The evaluation of the long and fully developed tradition of Buddhist epistemology and logic has been marred by cons lerable interpretational injustice done by indological research, for the very reason that the appearance of the object and its context was not to the liking of the concerned scholars.
Nearly all Indian philosophical traditions after about the second century A.D. show a more or less distinct interest in epistemological problems. In the second phase of the great theoretical period of Brahmanical, Jinist, and Buddhist philosophy from about the fifth to the twelfth century A.D. these problems and their solutions provided the main directions and tasks of philosophical work.
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Within Buddhism it is Dignaga who, in the first half of the 6th century, founde l a distinct tradition of epistemology. Henceforth this tradition acted an import: nt part in the development of Indian philosophical thought by being partner soi etimes, often model, and mostly opponent to similar Brahmanical and Jinist traditions throughout the second half of the millenium, and it became extinct in In lia only with the disappearance of Buddhism. While there is no real continuation of the tradition in Chinese Buddhism, the Tibetans have become its heirs and keepers. For the main stream of Tibetan Buddhism the categories and theories of the tradition are still valid today.
The presence of such a tradition with its primary interest in analysis of cognition and its tendency to apply the epistemological results to the ontolog cal level of the systems has puzzled its modern interpreters. This is mainly beca ise of the apparent contradiction that was assumed to exist between this analytical approach and the clearly practical goal of all Indian speculation, particularly of Buddhist philosophy, which systematically and historically understands philoso; hical theory as a rational complement to the progress towards liberation.(3)
It seemed to be incompatible that the Buddhist philosop er with his basically practical and religious goal would waste his efforts on investigations of seemingly purely theoretical, non-religious problems, such as the possibility and nature of perception, truth and falsity of cognition, logic, the meaning of words.
This seeming contradiction resulted in the peculiar fact that the question of whether this tradition assumed a spiritual status within Buddhism - if asked at all by scholars concerned has usually been answered quite negativ ly. And the common denominator of these various negative attitudes is the opinion that the problems, intentions, work, and accomplishments of the tradition are essentially unbuddhistic, heterogeneous to the teachings of the Buddha, ind. that, with the development of such a tradition, "worldly" interest had gai ed a footing within a religion that aims for liberation and is of meditational practice. In terms of the motive mentioned for a misinterpretation we can roughly distinguish two kinds of wrong, or at least heavily one-sided, evaluations of his Buddhist tradition's nature, both of which finally result in a misunderstanding of the tradition historically within its context and with regard to its spiritual function within the larger frame of Buddhist and then also of Asian culture in general. Both kinds of interpretations have been propounded by most eminent scholars in publications widely read and relied upon which is a further reason why we should deal with this topic.
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(2014).
For a scholar such as Edward Conze, who understands and explains Buddhism with an emphasis on its practical, religious ideas,“) the phenomenon of a Buddhist tradition of epistemology and logic has the distinct meaning of being a sign of a deplorable distortion and corruption of the basic ideas and values of Buddhism during the last phase of Buddhism in India. It seems that he would rather not deal with this product of Buddhist culture at all; but, he says as he introduces the chapter “The later logicians" of his influential book Buddhist Thought in India, London 1962: “Both because of their theoretical importance, and the current interest in logic, we must briefly allude to the principles of Buddhist logic as developed by the school of Dignāga, Dharmarkirti and Dharmottara ..." (264).
Conze's deprecating approach towards the tradition is conspicuously revealed by his later statements, e.g.: “At variance with the spirit of Buddhism, it can indeed be tolerated only as a manifestation of 'skill in means'. Logic was studied 'in order to vanquish one's adversaries in controversy', and thereby to incre use the monetary resources of the order." (265), and later: "The importance, validity and usefulness of Buddhist logic is circumscribed by its social purpose, and the works of the logicians can therefore exhibit the holy doctrine only in a distinctly truncated form.” (267).
This is the judgement of a scholar troubled by the historical fact of an pistemological tradition, because it does not fit into his picture of Buddhism. 2. We also have, however, the other, positive approach of Indological re
search to this tradition, but on the basis of the same estimation of the tradition as being unbuddhistic. This approach even culminates in celebrating the tradition as the philosophical achievement of India, but remains more or less uneasy about the fact that these philosophers did not try to shed their religious "adornment", tha: they were Buddhists after all.
It all started with Theodor Stcherbatsky. Stcherbatsky gave the first general philosophical interpretation of the tradition - in details obsolete, but as such still unsurpassed – in the four times(5) reprinted first volume of his Buddhist Logic, Leningrad 1932. The gist of his interpretation springs clearly fro n statements like: “The Buddhists themselves call this their science a doctrine of logical reasons (hetuvidyā) or a doctrine of the sources of right knowledge (prumānavidyā) or, simply, an investigation of right knowledge (samyagjñanavyutpādanam). It is a doctrine of truth and error. In the intention of its promotors the system had apparantly no special connection with Buddhism as a religion, i.e., as the teaching of a path towards Salvation. It claims to be the natural and
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general logic of the human understanding.” (2), and: “As a religion Buddh sm remained in this period much the same as it has been in the preceding one. So ne changes were introduced in the theory of Nirvāṇa, of the Buddha, and of he Absolute in order to bring it in line with the idealistic principles of the system. The greatest men of this period seem to have been free thinkers.” (13f.)
With Stcherbatsky the principal achievement of the tradition consis ed in the development of a kind of liberal theory, emancipated from the religious background, although historically connected with it, and the basic ideas ei en of Buddhism in general seemed to him to be very near to modern world-views on scientific bases.
Stcherbatsky's attitude is representative of a period, when - until abc ut 1928(6) --- leading Buddhist circles in the Soviet Union were still convinced of among the religions of this world. Thus Stcherbatsky's emphasis on the dial •cwas considered as a sufficient reason to grant to Buddhism an exceptional position among the religions of this world. Thus Stcherbatsky's emphasis on the dial. ctical and logical, and — in his opinion — "positive" tradition of Buddhism was therefore a timely one.
A similar attitude is extant in more recent interpretations with a background in contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophies which have taken the perspective of not accepting as “philosophy" anything that is not analytical and critic al philosophy. Such interpreters are not particularly troubled by the “religiou." component of our tradition for the simple reason that within the limits of te self-adjusted focus on their research-object they do not deal with this aspect at all
.. A. clear-cut proponent of this attitude is A.K. Warder in his Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Delhi 1971.)) Lovers of our tradition should rejoice over such an attitude's advantageous effects on the interest and literary space reserved for it - de Jong in his review(8) weighs nine lines for Sankara against sixteen pag 's for Dignāga in Warder's book —; but this emphasis is for the wrong reasons, s I shall show. It therefore produces an unbalanced historical picture, and is thus in the long run rather an impediment to propagating a true understanding of the tradition's aims.
This positive approach is of course not limited to “Western" scholar; we find it with "Indian" scholars too. A good example is Sukumar Dutt wh ) shares Stcherbatsky's opinion of the epistemological tradition in his book Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India, London 1962, showing, however, a differert motivation for his interpretation which I am tempted to term “nationalistic".
Dutt takes the epistemological tradition totally at facevalue, i.e. as th:
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th oretical basis of Buddhist success in learned and polemical disputations. Beyond that he considers epistemology and logic to be one of the main characteristics of the period of the decline of Buddhism. The essential change of Buddhist monastic culture during the second half of the first millenium A.D. was a progress "f om 'Study for Faith' to 'Study for Knowledge' ” (319). “A phenomenon, increasingly evident in the decline of Buddhism, is the gradual modification of the purely conventual character of the monasteries. From being seats of monklife and monk-culture, they grew into centres of general learning and liberal scholars iip." (319). The centres of this development are those big monasteries (mahāvih ira) that are usually called "universities". Dutt understands these establishments mainly as places for general education: "This traditional learning of the monasteries had been at its beginning a cloistered pursuit - learning in canonical lor for the benefit and use of monkhood. But it was progressively liberalized - extended and enlarged in its scope and contents and made available not to monks alo: e, but to all seekers after knowledge."(319), "The monasteries, having grown up is seats of liberal learning, ........ They seem to have partaken of the character of studia generalia." (325), and "Some of the monasteries which had grown into seminaries of learning ... developed an organization entitling them to be clas ed as 'universities'." (327).
In short: Dutt tries to transform these Buddhist monasteries into old Ind an universities (9) But although the development of a university character is cuite distinct - e.g. participation of laymen in the general education Duti's emphasis on phenomena of secularization in general and on the purely secular utility of our tradition's achievements in particular is biased in accordanct with his aims (10)
All these “secularistic” interpretations take the superficial appearance and practical function of the Buddhist epistemological tradition as the sole basis for in interpretation of its cultural meaning. They praise it highly for the very reas in that it is assumed to present a development of rational secularization witł in Buddhist monastic culture, or — to put it in an exaggerated way for clar ty's sake – for the reason that it presents dawning of "modern, Western” progress within the “dark ages" of traditional religious India. On the other hand, scholars with inclinations towards the religious, practical, and mystical components of Buddhism tend to scorn this same tradition for the very same reasons.
The assumption common to all these approaches is that the epistemological tradition presents an essential deviation from the spirit of Buddhism. And the methodical fault common to all these approaches is that none of them
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raises the question of the tradition's self-understanding.
But precisely this self-understanding, the tradition's awareness of its own character, aims, and motivations, is clearly formulated from the very "beginning" of the tradition, i.e. the composition of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, and it has not only never been lost by Dignāga's followers, but has rather been develoj ed and deepened. A historical and critical answer to the question of the spirit ial place and cultural function of the epistemological tradition within Buddhism, therefore, has to take its cue from the specific answer given by the tradition itsel.
This answer can be found in the Mangala-verse of Dignāga's Pramāṇasan iuccaya. It was conceived with a stroke of genius around 530 A.D., and can be considered the cornerstone that marks the historical border between the dialectical and the truly epistemological period of our tradition. Its importance is not only underlined by the literary masses written as a commentary to it, but also by the attiiude toward it in later Buddhist history:11) The verse, together with Dignāga's own ex planation, is well known thanks to Prof. Hattori's brilliant philological work, the edition, translation and explanation of the whole first chapter.(12) With gratitude I ake advantage of his work and would like to refer to the Appendix II which shows the logical structure of the first half of the verse in accordance with Prof. Hattri's scheme(13) of p. 74 and his translation.
Let me first quote the translation of the verse, which deviates only slig itly from Prof. Hattori's, since I prefer to translate the term pramāṇabhūta in its technical meaning(14):
"Saluting Him, who has become a means of valid cognition, who seeks the benefit of all living beings, who is the teacher, the sugata, the protetor, I shall, for the purpose of establishing the means of valid cognition, compose the (Pramāņa-)samuccaya, uniting here under one head my theories scattered (in many treatises).”

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Dignāga explains the meaning of the Buddha's attributes in the verse's firsi part as follows: The fact that the Buddha has become a means of valid cognition is the result of the development of certain qualities to perfection. These qualities are further differentiated as perfections in cause (hetu) and perfections in effect (phila), where the two terms "cause" and "effect" bear the meaning they have as categories of describing the career of a Bodhisattva. There is a causal relation between these qualities and the status of having become a means of valid cognition (hel iphalasampattyā pramāṇabhūtatva-). The first two perfections, his perfection in intention (āśayasampad) and his perfection in practice (prayogasampad), guarantee that the Buddha does not teach anything that is deceitful and wrong; that means, he does not lie, and what he has seen himself he transmits to other beings without distortions. The second two perfections, his perfect attainment of his own objectives as v ell as of those of other beings (svaparārt hasampad), guarantee that what he has seen is of value for others; for he has not only gone the whole path, but he also knows exactly the needs of all other living beings. These qualities together constitute the fact that the Buddha's words are not only valid, but also valuable.
Due to the lack of pre-Dharmakirtian commentaries on the Pramāṇasamuccaya we have, I think, no way of knowing for sure whether Dharmakirti's interpretation of the ca u s a l relation between the qualities of perfection in cause and effect on the one side, and the Buddha's having become a means of valid cognition on the other side, as a logical relation is in accordance with Dignāga's original intentions Or, in other words, whether it is true that Dignāga's intention was to conceal a ve itable inference or proof in the garb of a series of five successive attributes in the dative. A reader unbiased by the later understanding would take the meaning to b: that Dignāga emphasizes pramāṇabhūta as a new attribute, adding to it the causes for this quality summarized in the four other attributes. He then would say Dignāga's purpose in writing the book is to establish the means of valid cognition, to explain what a means of valid cognition is, how many there are, and so on. On the other hand, this problem is minor, since we must take the understanding of the liter tradition as the decisive one; and that understanding has been shaped by Dhar nakirti.
This first part of the verse, then, has been interpreted as a proof in the commentarial tradition shaped and determined by Dharmakirti.(15) The Buddha, subject of the proof, is said to be an authority, a means of valid cognition (pramāna). The ogical reason is twofold, consisting on the one side of his self-acquired knowledge of the final goal and of the path towards it, and on the other side of a certainty - itself due to his perfect compassion — that he does not deceive other beings
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in mediating this knowledge of the goal and the path to them. The first elaborate explanation of the verse as such a proof(16) is to be found in the chapter of the Pramāņavārttika which is entitled "establishment of the means of valid cognition", (pramānasiddhi).
The import of this proof of the Buddha's being a means of valid cognition, or, in other words, of the authority of the Buddha's words, for a Buddhist tl eory of valid cognition seems evident. But the relation between the theory of valid cognition as such and the words of the Buddha hidden in this verse and its commen aries has to be determined as precisely as possible if we suspect some general cultural significance in it.
In a recent article(17) Prof. Nagatomi quotes the introductory general statement of Prof. Hattori in the latter's notes on this verse (18) According to Prof. Hattori Dignāga shows himself to be a true heir of the “critical attitude" of the Buddha: “Unlike his predecessors, Dignāga does not accept the unconditional authority of Scripture. According to him, the words of the Buddha must be subjected to critical test before they are accepted as valid.” (my spacing). While this statement is certainly correct with regard to Dignāga in its general terms, it cannot be taken — and was not intended to be taken, I think — as a statement refering to the relation between the validity of the means of valid cognition and the words of the Buddha.
If it is taken as an interpretation of this relation, wrong conclusions will be drawn. The possible source of such misinterpretation is the expression "critical test". For “critical test" in this context can have two meanings: It can be understood as a critical test of the assumption that the Buddha's words are valid, i.e. as an investigation and finally an argumentative establishment of their valicity, a "pramāṇasiddhi”; or it can be understood as a critical test of the validity of the Buddha's words, i.e. a process to judge whether these words are true or false.
Prof. Nagatomi took it in this latter meaning, and develops the following scheme: “The testing of the validity of the Buddha's words requires a tool which was for Dignāga and Dharmakirti the pramāna, the valid means of cognition. Such a tool, at least in principle, may be expected to be one which is universally acceptable to all and free from dogmatic premises and presuppositions ........ We must note, however, that the final authority by which they claimed the validity of their pramāņa system was none other than the Buddha's words which they accepted as authentic by faith. Thus the Buddhist pramāna system and the authenticity of the Buddha's words stood, in reality, in a reciprocal relation: the structuring of the former was done within the limits of the latter, and the latter
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wa: meant to be supported by the former."(19) (my spacing)
Nagatomi rightly concludes that the epistemological methodology of Dignāga was intended “to articulate the nature of the Buddhist ways of knowing by translati ig their prototypes drawn from the Buddha's words into the vocabulary of epistemology, logic and semantics.''(20) He also has the right feeling about a reciprocity of he relation in question, but his interpretation of this reciprocity remains on the surface, and his statement that they, Dignāga and Dharmakirti, accepted the Buddha's words as authentic by faith comes as a considerable shock to the reacer who has just been informed by Hattori's words and Nagatomi's paraphrase that these philosophers did not accept an unconditional authority of the scriptures. Thus according to Nagatomi's explanation there is in fact no real reciprocity in the relation between "the Buddhist pramāņa system and the authenticity of the Bud Iha's words”. For his scheme means that a tool, the pramāna, is used to test the ralidity of the Buddha's words. But this testing is not taken seriously: Since the 'alidity of the tool is derived from the Buddha's words, Prof. Nagatomi thinks that these are only "meant to be supported by the former" (ibid.), their real authority being accepted by faith.
In short, this conception of the relation between the theory of valid cognitions and Buddhist revelation is insufficient. Is there a better one? Yes. Even though anot ier scholar, L.W.J. van der Kuijp, regrets in the beginning of another recent articie(21) that “the Pramāņavārttika and its position within the continuum of Buddhist philosophy which, despite the efforts of a handful of scholars, have not been adeq lately treated up to the present day" (6) and that “the position of logic within Budc hist philosophy and the answer to the question whether it should play a role in Buddhism at all has been ignored by Western scholars ..." (6; my spacing), his is not true at all.
Not only have there been clear answers as I tried to show in the beginning - vithout, for various reasons, - also asking the question --- but a fully acceptable xplanation of our problem has been elaborately presented by Tilmann Vetter in his book of 1964, Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakirti.
Vetter's explanation, of course, is one of Dharmakirti's "profound re
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elaboration" (loc.cit., 9) of Dignaga's position. If Dharmakirti, however, de ided to develop a theory of valid cognition taking his stand on Dignaga's Mañgala-ver (22) and if the following tradition considers itself as being determined by this interpretation, we have to take this interpretation of Dharmakirti as the source for an u iderstanding of the answer to the question we are asking; an answer that must badmitted to be with respect to our possibilities of a critical, contextually secured interpretation- enigmatically hidden in this Mañgala-verse for lack of pre-Dharmakirtian sources commenting upon it.
The two paragraphs of Vetter's explanation most important for our coi text are translated in the appendix I to this paper. I would like to repeat his results in accordance with the structural lines given by our problem:
Valid cognitions (pramana, samyagjñāna) are a necessary presuppos tion of meaningful human action.(23) The Buddhist's actions are orientated toward the goal of emancipation. This goal and the path leading towards it have been shown by the Buddha. The Buddha thus offers a goal and guidance for human act vity that cannot be derived from ordinary means of cognition, i.e. perception and i ference. However, that he is an authority for this has to be proven, for faith alone is an insufficient motive to be a Buddhist. The words of the Buddha can be acce ted as an authority only when it has been demonstrated that they are words of somet ody who shows through his conduct that he does not lie, and who because of the development of his experience has something to tell us that cannot be mediated to is in another way. For the last goal of human actions, which also is the only point of orientation for everyday human practice, has to be indicated by such an autho ity, since it is never immediately present or it would not be a "last goal". This is the gist of Vetter's explanation.
The structural scheme of these ideas of Dharmakirti turns out to be a rue circle: The decisive defining characteristic of a means of valid cognition (prami na) is the demand that it must stand the test of meaningful practice (avisamvada ia). and connects it with the Buddha as the one on whose authority one knows v hat meaningful practice is. The reciprocity then is brought about by the need to prove this authority of the Buddha. For the words of the Buddha (agama), as such, I ave neither guarantee for their truth nor for success on following their advice. Their validity has to be accounted for, and it is accounted for by the Buddha himself: "The statement that the Buddha is a means of valid cognition is proven through reference to the means by which he has become one."(24)
This is the program of Dignaga as expounded by Dharmakirti. It offers the answer to our question of the spiritual place of an epistemological tradition
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within Buddhism. Dignāga's program contains the idea of a philosophical foundation of Buddhism, understood as human practice orientated by the words of the Buddha. Historically this means nothing else but that Buddhism, too, takes its part in that general philosophical development in India, from about the 3rd and 4th century A.D. onwards, that is characterized by an ever increasing interest in problems of dialectics, logic, and general epistemology.
The motive for such interest essential to our context can be found for the first time in the epistemology of the Sāmkhya-teacher Vrsagana(25) from the beginning of the 4th century A.D., according to Frauwallner. Vrşagaņa seems to have been the first in India not only to consider epistemology as a prerequisite for the elaboration of his systematic philosophy, but also to establish his system mei hodically on, and by means of, this epistemology by creating a theory of inference which was such that the actual inferences used as a philosophical tool permitted the argumentative derivation of the system's metaphysical principles.
Already this case of Vrsagana shows what is valid for all other epistemological traditions, too: that the respective epistemology is developed, being linked up with the philosophical system. That — in other words — there is in India no emancipation of epistemology from the respective systematic ideas, and that epistemology nowhere becomes a positive science" in the sense of Th. Stcherbatsky.
The Buddhist tradition of epistemology and logic thus presents another clear example of the relativity of epistemological thought. Buddhist epistemology turns out to be related to a certain order of the values and goals that govern human practice; it therefore cannot be investigated and evaluated without reference to this order, as if it were separated from it. The epistemological achievements of this Bud lhist tradition thus not only have their truly deserved position in the general history of Indian philosophy, and so of the history of the human mind, but also in the l istory of Buddhism as a religion.
APPENDIX. I : A translation of T. Vetter, Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharma
kirti. Wien 1964.
p.27
"The means of valid cognition have to procure cognition for action. The

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definition that something new is cognized by these (PV II 5c) raises perception to the primary source of cognition. The definition that cognitions have to hold good (avisamvādana, PV II 1) puts the truth of every cognition to the test of success in action, and offers the opportunity to designate the Buddha as a ineans of valid cognition, although nothing new is cognized through words as such. The Buddha, however, is not equated with perception and inference. He is considered as a means of valid cognition, because his authority legitimates the authenticity of perception and inference. For the Buddha gives goal and guidance of action, which perception and inference cannot give, and which would be disposed of only by a superficial rationality (flache Aufklärung). That he is an authority on this has yet to be proven. For nobody is a Buddhist simply on trust. This results in a historicalfactual circle, which Dharmakirti has rightly not avoided."
p.31f.: "When inference has been made available, the question of the Budd na as a means of valid cognition can be asked. Not in anyway is the transmitted werd of the Buddha, as such, to be considered as an authority only because somebody who passes for holy uttered it, or because it is considered by many as an authoritative transmitted record (āgama). Not until it is shown that these words originate from somebody who proves through his conduct that he does not lie and who has something to say that is not at everybody's disposal, not until then, can he be accepted as a means of valid cognition. The highest goal of action has to be given by such an authority; for it is not immediately present, or it would not be the highest goal, since as soon as the highest goal has been reached there is no need for any fu ther activity, except if one aims for the highest goal of other beings too.
The Buddha is the subject of which it is predicated that it knows this zoal, and that it acts (= makes known) only for the sake of others. The reason for this is its conduct. Only a conduct that is pervaded by the possession of the hiç hest goal can be of a kind as the Buddha's. But that alone would not be sufficient. The Buddha is also the subject of which it is predicated that it knows the means that lead towards this goal. The reason for this is the process of its development.
The second chapter (pramāṇasiddhi) of the PV mainly deals with this proof of the Buddha's authority. Through his authority, in turn, the authenticity of perception and inference are legitimated. If in this way a Buddhist system expresses in full awareness where it takes its foundations from, it is able, on the other hand, to modify these foundations by a logical procedure, measuring these foundations with the measure of reason."
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APPENDIX. I: Causal/logical scheme of PS I, lab
resu it/thesis:
bhagavat = pramānabhūta
(the Ven. has become a means of valid cognition) caus s/reasons:
hetusampad (perfection in cause) phalasampad (perfection in effect) āśay isampad prayogasampad svārthasampad
parārthasampad (per. in intention) (perf. in practice) (perfect attainment of (perf. attainment of
his own objectives) the objectives of others)
jaga Idhitaisita
Šāstrtva (tak ng as his purpose (being the true teacher) the enefit of all livin; beings)
tāyitva (being a protector)
sugatatva (being "sugata" in three ways: 1. being praise worthy
(praśastatva 2. being beyond return
(apunarāvrttyartha) 3. being complete
(niņśeşārtha)
NOTES (1) This lecture has been delivered during the Spring-semester 1982 at the University of Tokyo,
of Kyoto, of Kyūshū, and at Waseda University. (2) f. G.R.Welbon, The Buddhist Nirvana and Its Western Interpreters. Chicago 1968, and
.W.de Jong's review in JIPh 1, 1972, 396-403. (3) Cf. L. Schmithausen, Spirituelle Praxis und philosophische Theorie im Buddhismus. Zeit
chrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft 3, 1973, 161-186.
f. e.g. Buddhist Philosophy and its European Parallels, PhEW 13, 1, 1963, 9-23 (reprint in Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, Oxford 1968, 213). The Hague 1958, New York 1962, Osnabrüch 1970, Tōkyō 1977.
f. Heinz Bechert, Der Buddhismus in der heutigen weltpolitischen Situation. Marxismusstulien 6, 1968, 46f. Cf. his "preliminary definitions" p.1f.; J.W.de Jong in his review (IIJ 16, 1975, 147-149) ightly stresses the incongruity of Warder's approach.
2c.cit. 148. (9) Foncerning the motives of these monasteries' promotion through the Gupta kings he says:
To build monasteries and provide for their upkeep was regarded more as a service render
d to the cause of learning and culture than to the cause of Buddhism."(331) (10) for the purpose of explaining the educational position of the "science of logic (hetuvidyā)",
.g., he makes use only of sources that present it as one of the traditionally secular sciences 323f.): the two Chinese records, and Bu-ston who follows the secularistic interpretation of he early Sa-skya-pa. He then explains what I-tsing describes as the first, general level of he dialetical and logical education (transl. Takakusu, 176f), but does not deal with the higher level" of these studies at all (cf. ibid., 186), unaware, however — or leaving us ninformed — of any such differentiation.
(7)
(8)
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Page #15

(11) cf. the legendary report of its composition in Bu-ston's history (transl. Obermiller, 150). (12) Dignaga, On Perception, being the Pratyaksapariccheda of Dignaga's Pramanasamuccaya rom
the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions, translated and annotated by Masaaki Hattori, Cambridge, Mass., 1968.
(13) First drawn by M. Nagatomi (cf. note 22), 266.
(14) In accordance with Hattori's note 1.3.
(15) cf. T.Vetter, Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakirti. Wien 1964, 32f. (translated in the af pendix).
(16) However, I have not seen so far a real formulation (prayoga) of this proof, or a series of such formulations comparable, e.g. with the formulations in dGe-lugs-pa-exegeses of the pran āṇasiddhi-chapter (cf. my paper: Tshad ma'i skyes bu. Meaning and Historical Significance of the Term, Proceedings of the Csoma de Körös Symposium Velm-Wien, Wien 1983, n.19) -earlier than the "commentarial" text from the appendix to the Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti, 521, 5-13 (cf. T.Kimura, Pramanavarttika, Pramanasiddhi-shō ni tsuite. Tohoku Indogaku Shūkyōgakkai, Ronshu 2, 1970, 64ff.
(17) M.Nagatomi, Manasa-Pratyakṣa: A Conundrum in the Buddhist Pramāņa System, San krit and Indian Studies, ed. M. Nagatomi et al., Boston 1979, 243-260.
(18) loc.cit. 246; the quotation is from Hattori, loc. cit., 73.
(19) loc.cit., 246
(20) ibid.; cf. Vetter, loc. cit., 33, where he refers to Dharmakirti's derivation of the truth al out the means of valid cognition from the words of the Buddha in the four concluding verses of the pramana-siddhi-chapter (PV II 282-285).
(21) Introductory notes on the Pramāṇavārttika Based on Tibetan Sources, The Tibet Journal 4.2, 1979, 6-28.
(22) The whole pramanasiddhi-chapter of his Pramāṇavārttika presents itself as a commentary on this verse. Cf. E. Frauwallner, Die Reihenfolge und Entwicklung der Werke Dhar nakirti's, Asiatica. Festschrift Friedrich Weller, Leipzig 1954, 143f.; M. Nagatomi, The Framework of the Pramāṇavārttika Book I, JAOS 79, 1959, 263-266; T.Kimura, Pramāṇavārtt ka, Pramāṇasiddhi-shō ni tsuite. Tohoku Indogaku Shūkyōgakkai, Ronshu 2, 1970, 54-68. (23) Cf. the introductory sentences in Pramāṇavārttika(sva)vṛtti (ed. Gnoli) 1,8f., and Pram naviniscaya I (ed. Vetter) 30, 12f.
(24) Vetter, loc. cit., 32.
(25) Cf. E. Frauwallner, Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Samkhya-systems, WZKS 2, 1958, 84-139.
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Page #16

「佛教認識論の系譜の精神的地位」
—解説一 清水公庫
シュタインケルナー博士は佛教認識論,とりわけ7 世紀に活躍し、以後佛教内外に多大な影響を及ぼし たダルマキールティの専門家として知られている。佛 教認議論なる研究分野は、近代にはいり西欧人たちに より近代的な研究,特に言語的文献的なところに手が 加えられ、サンスクリット(梵語) ・パーリー語・チ ベット語などそれまで全くといっていい程手がつけら れていなかった文献が研究されるようになり、中国・ 日本に伝わらなかった6世紀以降の認識論・論理学 を中心とする佛教が知られるようになって開拓された 分野でうる。新しい学問分野ではあるが、今や百年二 世代の替を経て除々に新しい段階へと移行しつつあ る。博にはこの段階を将来に向っての計画をたてると いうだいではなく、従来なされてきた研究を再検討す るのにした時期と見做され,佛教認識論を佛教にお ける位付けという点から検討しようとされたのがこ の講演の目的である。
佛教の基本的姿勢や価値を歪曲し腐敗をもたらしたも のとする。逆に著名な『佛教論理学』を著わしたT. スチェルバッキーは、マルクスレーニン主義の風潮 の中でこの系譜を宗教的なものとは別な科学的基盤に たつ現代的な世界観に近いものと見做し,S.ダット も彼のインド文化論の立場から、伝統的宗教的なイン ドに西欧的現代的な意味で知の解放をもたらしたもの として賞讃する。併し、このような見解は全て佛教認 議論の系譜が佛教の伝統から遊離したものと見做し、 それぞれの立場からこの系譜を自分の見解に都合のよ い様に批難或は評価しているのであって、そのどれも がこの系譜に対する誤解をひきおこしてきたと博士は 評されている。
ではこの問題を解く糸口は何かということについて 博士は,彼らが問題にしていなかったこと、つまりこ の系譜の学匠達が自らの性格や目的・動機といったこ とをどう意識していたかといったことを検討すること によって得られる、これは佛教認識論の基礎を築いた ディグナーガにより意識され、その後の学匠達に承け 継がれ発展せしめられてきたことだから、とされ、デ イグナーガの著「プラマーナ・サムッチャヤ(集最論)」 の福故a(佛への敬礼という形でその意趣を述べる) を検討されている。
のうりょうろん
“プラマーナ C正しい認識手段」となっておられ、 全有情の利益を追求され、師であり善逝であり、(諸 悪からの)擁護者たる彼(の佛陀)に敬礼し、私(デ イグナーガ)は正しい認識手段を確立せんとして, (多くの著作中に)散在している私の理論をここで一 つの思索のもとに統合することによりこの「プラマー ナ・ムッチャヤ」を編んだのである。”
紀元和二世紀頃よりインド哲学全般に認識論の訪芽 が見られるが、五世紀頃には高度に論理化した段階に はいり、その後の思想発展の方向がこれにより決定付 けられた、佛教に於いては六世紀前半にディグナーガ (陳那)が現われ、それまでの弁証論<古因明>の時代 と真に認識論的<新因明>な時代とに一線を画した。 この後,この系譜は十二世紀のイスラム侵攻によりイ ンドにおいて佛教が滅亡するまで,他学派に対し規範 となりつつも論敵として続いていった。この系譜は真 の意味では中国に引き継がれなかったが、チベット佛 教においては今でもその整合性を保って引き継がれて いる。
さて, 宗教である筈の佛教に、純理論的であり宗教 とは別なところにしか存在しえぬような認識論の系譜 が存在したということに我々は少なからず異和感を覚 えるのだと、こういったところに佛教認識論は佛教内 部に於いこどう位置付けられるのか、という疑問がで てくる。これについて博士は二つのとらえ方があった ことを指されている。
つまり, E.コンゼのような学者は,解脱という実 践的宗教な性格を強調するあまり、認識論の系譜を、
ここで問題にされるのは,佛陀の五つの特質として あげられている中の一つ、「プラマーナとなっておら れる」ということである。ディグナーガはこれを止し て、佛陀は誤っていたり疑わしいことを一切言わぬと いうことを保障する因位における決意と実践の成就, 又佛陀のとらえたことは他の有情にとって価値あるも のであることを保障する果位における自利と利他の成 就を発展させることにより「プラマーナとなっておら れる」のだとしている。これら因位 果位の成就という資質は菩薩の修行段階を述べている のだが,これらの資質とプラマーナであるという特質 との間には因果関係が存在する。
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Page #17

「仏教認識論の系譜の精神的地位」 (清水)
ディグナーガの理解にみがきをかけたダルマキール ティ及びその後の伝統ではこれを証明としてとらえ, 佛陀は 「プラマーナとなっておられる」 という命題は 二つの論証理由究極的な目標とそれに至る道を知 り得たという自証の知の側面と,その目標や道程を求 める他の有情を欺かないという完全なる慈悲に根ざし た確実さに依って証明されるとする。 ダルマキー ルティが, 証明という関係でとらえようとしたことに ついてシュタインケルナー博士は, 「佛陀が正しい認 識根拠であるということ, 換言すれば佛陀の言葉の権 威というものを証明することが, 佛教の正しい認識の 理論にとって重要であることは明らかであると思え る」とされながらも, 更に服部 永富博士の見解を引 かれて追求されている。
服部博士は, ディグナーガは自らを佛陀の批判的精 神の真の継承者であるとし, 彼によれば経典は無条件 に確実なものとは認めえず, (他学派ではこれを 「聖 教量」 として無条件にみとめるが, 佛教認識論ではこ れを排除し, 「現量<知覚>」 「比量<推理>」 しか 認めていない), 佛陀の言葉の正当性を認めるには‘批 判的検証が必要である, と言われている。 シュタイ ンゲルナー博士は,この言明は一般的なものとしては 正しいが、佛陀の言葉と正しい認識手段の正当性との 関係としてとらえることは出来ず, もしそう考えれば 誤った結論を導き出してしまう。 それは‘批判的検証” という表現であり,これが二つの意味佛陀の言葉 というものが正当であるという命題を考察し議論を通 して確立すること, 彼はそれらの言葉が真であるのか 偽であるのかを判断する手続きに解しうるから だとされている。 服部博士の言を受け後者の意味を 採られた永富博士は、 佛陀の言葉を検証するにはブラ マーナという手段が必要であったが,これは独断を離 れ万人に普遍的に認められるようなものでなければな らない。しかし一方でそのブラマーナの体系の正当性 を主張するとき基づいた最終的な権威は ‘信仰により 権威が認められた' 佛陀の言葉に他ならず, 「したが ってプラマーナの体系と佛陀の言葉の権威の間には, 前者は後者の範囲の中でなされ, 後者は前者によって 支えられるべくあるというような“互恵的な関係' があ る」とされ, 「ディグナーガの認識論的方法論は, “知恵の探究” ということを, 佛陀の言葉から引き出さ れたその原型を認識論や論理学 意味論の語彙に翻訳 することにより明瞭に表現しようとしたものである」 と結論されている。
17
永富博士が‘互恵性”を感じられたのも或いに当然か も知れぬが,その説明は表面的でしかない。 社士が, ‘信仰により’佛陀の言葉が権威あるものとされたと言 われたことと, ディグナーガやダルマキールフィは佛 陀の言葉を無条件では認めなかったと博士や)部博士 が言われたこととには明確な食い違いがある。 博士の 論旨は、ディグナーガ達はプラマーナを使っ佛陀の 言葉の真偽判断をしようとしたということであり,た だその手段としてのプラマーナについてその当性が 佛陀の言葉から抽出され, これについては信仰によっ て認められていたということである。 そして結局博士 は, 佛陀の権威はプラマーナの体系によってえられ ていたと考えておられるのである。 故に 「正しい認識 の理論と佛教の解脱ということとの関係についての理 解は不充分である」 とシュタインケルナー博は評さ れる。 しかし実はこれ以前にダルマキールテの註釈 に従ったT. フェッターが十全なる説明をし ていたの である。
シュタインケルナー博士はT. フェッター解説を 引用し , 概ね次のように説明されて いる。
佛教徒の活動は解脱という目標に向けられている が、この目標に至るには確実で正しい認識というもの が必要とされる。 佛教認識論にとって 「正しい認識手 段プラマーナ>の特質を明確にしようとすば,そ れが有意義な活動 (avisamvadana) であるかどうか という検証に耐えねばならない。」 勿論解脱という 目標もそれに至る道も佛陀によって提示されたもので あり, 又知覚や推理という普通の認識手段によって導 き出せるものでもない。 しかし陀の言葉というだけ では, それが真実であるとは限らぬし, そういうこと だけで佛陀の言葉に従ったところで成功は保障されな い つまり有意義であるとは限らない。 したがって有 意義な活動であるのかどうかということは — その人の権威により人は何が有意義な活動であるのか を知りうる, そういう人 と関係づけられねばなら ない。」 つまり佛陀自身によって証明されねになら ないのであり,そして事実なされていたのである。 即 ち, ダルマキールティは佛陀の権威を 「佛陀はプラマ ーナとなっておられる」という命題の証明として追求 したのであるが, 実はこの証明は佛陀が佛陀なら れたその過程─二つの論証理由として示されたも の, ディグナーガでは因位果位の成就 に言及する

Page #18
「仏教認識論の系譜の精神的地位」(清水) ことしよりなされていたのである。そして“互恵性は こういったところにもたらされるのである。 以の考察を通してシュタインケルナー博士は当初 の問いに次のような解答を与えられている。ディグナ ー ガス・プラマーナの体系を構築しようとしたとき「そ の構には,佛陀の言葉によって指示された人間活動 と解をされる佛教,そういうものの哲学的な基盤への 思索社含まれている。歴史的にはこのことは弁証論・ 論理:・一般認識論に対する興味が増すことによって 発展してきた3~4世紀以降の一般哲学に佛教も参与 した,ということでしかない。」しかし「認識論は体 系的は、哲学を細密に説明するための必須条件」であっ た。この体系化を最初に行ったのはサーンキャ(数 論)学派のヴルシャガナ(4世紀初)と目されるが, その哲学体系からインド諸哲学派の認識論が発展した とされている。そしてこれらの認識論は全て各々の体 系的思索から遊離することはなかった。そして先述の 如く「佛教認識論も人間活動を決定付ける価値や目標 についての特定の秩序と関係している」のであり,ス チェルバッキーの言うような非宗教的で価値観を排除 した“実証科学となることはなかった。したがってく このような佛教認識論の性格を無視して研究・評価さ れてはならない。 そして最後にシュタインケルナー博士は,「佛教認 識論はインド哲学史や人間の心の歴史においてだけで なく,宗教としての佛教の歴史においても真に相応し い地位を得ている。」としめくくられている。 (しみず・こうよう 南都佛教編集委員) -18