Spiritual Place Of Epistemological Tradition In Buddhism

Author(s): Ernst Steinkellner
Publisher: Ernst Steinkellner

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elaboration" (loc.cit., 9) of Dignaga's position. If Dharmakirti, however, de ided to develop a theory of valid cognition taking his stand on Dignaga's Mañgala-ver (22) and if the following tradition considers itself as being determined by this interpretation, we have to take this interpretation of Dharmakirti as the source for an u iderstanding of the answer to the question we are asking; an answer that must badmitted to be with respect to our possibilities of a critical, contextually secured interpretation- enigmatically hidden in this Mañgala-verse for lack of pre-Dharmakirtian sources commenting upon it.
The two paragraphs of Vetter's explanation most important for our coi text are translated in the appendix I to this paper. I would like to repeat his results in accordance with the structural lines given by our problem:
Valid cognitions (pramana, samyagjñāna) are a necessary presuppos tion of meaningful human action.(23) The Buddhist's actions are orientated toward the goal of emancipation. This goal and the path leading towards it have been shown by the Buddha. The Buddha thus offers a goal and guidance for human act vity that cannot be derived from ordinary means of cognition, i.e. perception and i ference. However, that he is an authority for this has to be proven, for faith alone is an insufficient motive to be a Buddhist. The words of the Buddha can be acce ted as an authority only when it has been demonstrated that they are words of somet ody who shows through his conduct that he does not lie, and who because of the development of his experience has something to tell us that cannot be mediated to is in another way. For the last goal of human actions, which also is the only point of orientation for everyday human practice, has to be indicated by such an autho ity, since it is never immediately present or it would not be a "last goal". This is the gist of Vetter's explanation.
The structural scheme of these ideas of Dharmakirti turns out to be a rue circle: The decisive defining characteristic of a means of valid cognition (prami na) is the demand that it must stand the test of meaningful practice (avisamvada ia). and connects it with the Buddha as the one on whose authority one knows v hat meaningful practice is. The reciprocity then is brought about by the need to prove this authority of the Buddha. For the words of the Buddha (agama), as such, I ave neither guarantee for their truth nor for success on following their advice. Their validity has to be accounted for, and it is accounted for by the Buddha himself: "The statement that the Buddha is a means of valid cognition is proven through reference to the means by which he has become one."(24)
This is the program of Dignaga as expounded by Dharmakirti. It offers the answer to our question of the spiritual place of an epistemological tradition
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