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318 : Scientific Contents in Prākļta Canons
The Prākrta canonists and Jaina logicians have thought over the working of physical perceptional senses. In contrast with the Nyāya-Vaiseșika, Sānkhya and Mimāmsaka theory of sense-matter contact, they postulate that the sense of sight is an exception to this theory (for the Buddhists, the sense of hearing too ). They have validated this concept on the basis of (i) canons and (ii) logistics with two different renderings. The canons have a traditional gāthā saying that the eye sees the shape and colour of the object without contact with it. Logically, they hold the view that any or all physical factors are inanimate and hence they cannot be immediate cause, but secondary ones, the primary one being the knower soul. This concept of primary and secondary factors for the process of seeing and knowing gives an impression of a bit deeper (and of course, supernatural ) insight of Jaina logicians67. Their logic has developed over the canonical concept of non-contactility of the eye. It has led to another concept that other senses could also be non-contactile alongwith their prominent contactility 68.
The logic has been developed by eminent scholars like Pūjyapāda, Akalanka, Prabhacandra, Hemcandra, Vadideva Sūri and others in their religious and logical treatises during one thousand years from fifth to sixteenth century. Pūjyapāda seems to have initiated the logical treatment, Akalanka developed it and Prabhacandra of 11th century completed it by initiating the natural capacity concept. His logistics has been followed by later scholars without much addition. A summary of points supporting the non-contactility concept is given below :
The eye sees the objects without contact with them
as 69
(i) Neither the eye, nor the objects go to each other. They stand at different locations in their own positions. The eye-ball also stays put in place. How, otherwise, its defects could be cured ?
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