Nyayavatara and Nayakarnika

Author(s): Siddhasena Divakar, Vinayvijay, A N Upadhye
Publisher: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal

Page 309

198
Naya-karņikā
qualities, ws must, with Bergson, arrive at the conclusion that it is free; but if we look at it as regards its manifested appearance, that is to say, from the point of view of evolution, it is certainly subject to predeterminism of karmas (actions). It is thus clear that both the parties to the controversy have only got hold of partial truth, and are trying to pass it off for absolute wisdom. The truth is neither in the view of the one nor in that of the other, but in a perfect synthesis of both, since will is free by nature, but liable to predeterminism of karmas as an incarnating ego.
It is thus evident that the greatest care must be taken in accepting all one-sided statements of facts, whether they come from gods or men. It must be remembered that our language makes it impossible for us to describe things in all their aspects at one and the same time; and, for that reason, is liable to lead us into error to a considerable extent. He who would avoid falling into the pitfalls of error must, therefore, first of all, try to understand and master the philosophy of Nayas.
Jainism aims, from the very commencement, at a systematic classification of the subject matter of knowledge, and divides the philosophical standpoint into two main heads, the Niscaya and the Vyavahāra. Of these, the former deals with the permanent qualities, hence, the essential nature of things about which there can be no possibility of doubt, and which remains true under all circumstances, conditions and states. For this reason, it is called the Niścaya, i.e., the natural or certain. The latter, however, only deals with things not with reference to their real or essential nature, but with respect to their utility, or non-natural states