Note On Mahabhasya II 366 26 Gunasamdravo Dravyam

Author(s): A Wezler
Publisher: A Wezler

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A. WEZLER
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penetration of language theory into the Indian philosophical systems and the other to language theory and philosophy in Patanjali's Mahābhäşya. Especially the latter article has provoked vehement protest from Western Paniniyas', both as regards Frauwallner's understanding of Patanjali's discussion as also his very approach. As indicated by me on an earlier occasion, I, too, should like to dissociate myself from the conclusions arrived at by Frauwallner. In particular I completely fail to understand why such investigations should be inhibited by prejudices about Patanjali's alleged lack of interest in philosophical questions, etc. Instead of being carried away by what looks like an obsession to evaluate, one should rather, perhaps even with sincere gratitude for the information given by him, concentrate on an unbiased and thorough analysis, of the various cases where Patanjali mentions philosophical views or actually takes recourse to them.
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Yet, one observation of Frauwallner's, though meant as a reproach, is indisputably of no little importance, viz. that Patañjali usually remains silent about the sources drawn upon by him; for, this procedure of Patañjali considerably adds to the difficulties one is faced with when dealing with philosophical tenets in the Mahabhäşya. These difficulties are first of all posed by the scarcity of source material at our disposal which would allow us to gain a clear picture of the stage of development of philosophy in Patanjali's own age. Hampered as we are by this lack of information we would, of course, like Patanjali to have given in each and every case at least a precise and detailed account of his source(s), the title(s) of the work(s), the name(s) of the author(s), etc. That he does not meet these expectations, and, I think, quite understandably not, is no justification for censuring him. Yet, there are even more elementary difficulties one has to grapple with: Often it is by no means easy to recognize a reference to a philosophical view as such, and in this regard the commentators do not always render assistance, or cannot at any rate be relied upon without hesitation. Hence any additional information is highly welcome, especially if it consists in a statement to the effect that a particular passage in the Mahābhāṣya is "taken over" from a certain system of philosophy. It is evident that any such contention is of enormous heu
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