Jaina Theory of Knowledge

Author(s): Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Gujarat Vidyapith Ahmedabad

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JAINA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
works of the Jaina logicians and is generally ascribed to the Jaina system.
INTROSPECTION AND OBSERVATION :
Virasena observes in his commentary Dhavala on the Satkhandagama of Puspadanta that which cognises an external object of the nature of both generic and specific qualities is comprehension, i.e., determinate cognition (jnana), and the introspection of the self of the same nature is apprehension, i.e., indeterminate cognition (darsana). He criticises those philospheres who hold that comprehension cognises only the particular, whereas apprehension knows only the general. Particularity without generality is a figment and generality bereft of particularity is an impossibility. The cognition that knows a particular aspect of an object without a general one is invalid. Similarly, the cognition of the universal bereft of the particular is not valid. In his opinion, therefore, both apprehension and comprehension cognise the object as it is. Since the object is a complex of universality and particularity, each of the two cognises both the particular and the general. The difference between the two lies in the fact that the former apprehends the internal entity, i.e., the self, whereas the latter cognises external objects. In a different language, apprehension is introvert, while comprehension is extravert. As regards the nature of the object itself, the internal entity as well as the external object is a complex of both generality and particularly24. Thus, according to Virasena, the object of both apprehension and comprehension is a complex of generic