Jaina Theory of Knowledge

Author(s): Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Gujarat Vidyapith Ahmedabad

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JAINA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
must be fire'. In short, our reasoning derives the conclusion that whatever is a case of smoke is invariably the product exclusively of fire. Take another example. A burnt child dreads fire. His fear is based on reasoning, ‘Fire once burnt me; what I see before me is fire; therefore, it will burn me again if I put my hand into it'. This is a simple instance to show how the process of reasoning begins and arrives at a definite conclusion. Thus, reasoning is a synthesis of different judgments in the form of premises and a conclusion in the shape of inferential judgments. The former, i.e., the form of premises is called inductive reasoning and the latter, i.e., the form of inferential conclusions is called deductive reasoning. Thus, reasoning takes two main forms : induction and deduction. Induction is that form of reasoning in which we draw a general conclusion from particular cases. In deduction, on the contrary, we draw a particular conclusion from general premises.
We have discussed the first variety of sensory and mental comprehension, viz., non-verbal comprehension (mati-jnana). Now, we come to the problem of verbal or scriptural comprehension (sruta-jnana) which comes next in order. The mind and the auditory sense are the chief organs that give rise to verbal comprehension.
VERBAL COMPREHENSION :
As non-verbal comprehension is essentially conditioned by the destruction-cum-subsidence of mati-jnanavarana karma, so also verbal or scriptural comprehension is