Jaina Theory of Knowledge

Author(s): Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Gujarat Vidyapith Ahmedabad

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JAINA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
specific, since it cannot distinguish it from other objects, nor can it cognise its object as generic, for it cannot assimilate it to other objects. It apprehends an object as pure and simple, and not as qualified by its general or particular character. 20
Prabhakara, the founder of the Prabhakara system of Mimamsa, holds that in indeterminate cognition, we apprehend not the mere individual object which is the substratum of its general and particular qualities, but also cognise the generic and specific attributes of the object without apprehending their distinction. He remarks that the Buddhist is not justified in maintaining that indeterminate cognition apprehends merely the unique momentary thingin-itself, since we are clearly conscious of the generality. Indeterminate cognition apprehends both the generality and particularity but not their distinction from each other. 21
As regards the Sankarite, indeterminate cognition is not capable of cognising any qualifications what so ever. According to him, it cannot apprehend even an object and its general character unrelated to each other, as the Mimamsaka, the Vaisesika, etc., hold, since the cognition of these various aspects presupposes the comprehension of their difference which falls outside the province of indeterminate cognition. Hence, he concludes that indeterminate cognition apprehends merely the unqualified being' (satta). It is absolutely undefined, devoid of all determinations. It knows neither a particular object not its characters. It is strictly confined to mere existence.22