Jaina Theory of Knowledge

Author(s): Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Gujarat Vidyapith Ahmedabad

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JAINA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
since two conscious activities cannot occur at the same instant. 41 The opponent may argue that the simultaneous occurrence of the two in the imperfect is not possible, since he is under the influence of the veil of obstructive karma and thus, not completely free from it; but in the case of the perfect who is completely free from obstructive karma, it is not an impossibility. This argument, according to Jinabhadra, is also futile. The faculty of the self is qualitatively the same whether it is partially free or completely free.42
The cognition of the self is of the same sort whether it is imperfect or perfect. The only difference between the two is that perfect cognition comprehends all the objects with all their modes, whereas imperfect knoweldge does not claim to comprehend so. Thus, Jinabhadra supports the alternate occurrence of apprehension and comprehension in the omniscient.
APPREHENSION AND COMPREHENSION AS IDENTICAL :
Now, we come to Siddhassena who does not recognise the apprehension and comprehension of an omniscient being as two separate faculties. According to him, both these faculties are idential as regards the case of the omniscient. He observes : “We can distinguish between apprehension and comprehension up to telepathy (manah-paryuya). In omniscience, however, comprehension and apprehension are identicat’.43 He elaborates this in a systematic and logical