Jaina Theory of Knowledge

Author(s): Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Gujarat Vidyapith Ahmedabad

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JAINA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
before and apprehends a feature which was not cognised previously, since his cognition occurs in succession. In a different language, for the omniscient some aspect of an object remains unknown for ever. If such is the case, what is the charm in admitting omniscience ? Moreover, in the scriptures omniscience has been described as having beginning but no end.48 Those who have any regard for the commandments of the scriptures must realize the significance of this fact. If it is held that at the time of perfect apprehension, comprehension is not possible, and at the inoment of perfect comprehension, apprehension is an impossibility, it would mean to admit breaking of continuity of both of them but this is absurd, since it goes against the scriptures which do not prescribe any break.49 If the destruction of apprehension-obscuring karma and comprehension-obscuring karma takes place simultaneously, and the problem arises which of the two, perfect apprehension and perfect comprehension, should spring forth 'first, naturally the priority cannot be given to any one of them. Nor is it proper to maintain the simultaneous occurrence of both of them, for two conscious activities never synchronise. If the removal of the obstruction of both of them takes place at one and the same moment, does the question at all arise as to which of the two arises first ? There is no reason why apprehension should emerge first and comprehension afterwards. Now, if the believer in the successive occurrence persists in maintaining that apprehension arises first and comprehension afterwards, then with the same force of argument, the opponent may hold that comprehension appears first and apprehendion