Jaina Theory of Knowledge

Author(s): Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Gujarat Vidyapith Ahmedabad

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JAINA THEORY OF APPREHENSION
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Ramanuja holds that indeterminate cognition is neither the apprehension of mere existence, as the Sankarite believes, nor the cognition of a qualified object and its qualifications unrelated to each other, as the NyayaVaisesika and the Mimamsaka recognise. On the contrary, it apprehends an object attributed by some qualities 23. It can never apprehend an object devoid of all qualifications. An entirely unqualified object never enters into our cognition, since discrimination is the most fundamental character of consciousness.
JAINA CONCEPT OF INDETERMINATE COGNITION :
With this background in mind we, now, proceed to the Jaina concept of indeterminate cognition. According to the Jaina, indeterminate cognition apprehends merely the existence of an object, and not it's other attributes. This view resembles the concept of the Sankarite to a certain extent. In the language of modern psychology, it is pure sensation of the existence of objects. The Jaina does not deny that in this state of cognition we apprehend the qualifications of an object. He recognises the apprehension of the qualifications in the form of existence, and not in the shape of qualification, since the cognition of a quality as qualifying an object presupposes distinction and determination. Moreover, the Jaina writers are not unanimous with respect to the nature of indeterminate cognition. The aforesaid view is more prevalent in the