Jaina Philosophy of Language

Author(s): Sagarmal Jain
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith

Page 81

Jaina Philosophy of Word : (55) particular. Synthesising these two views Naiyāyikas and Jainas have accepted that the universal qualified by an individual or universal qualified by particular is the denotation of word2. If we accept word as universal then the day to day behaviour will not be possible, because universal is intangible. In fact, from word, we comprehend universal as well as individual also. The Jaina philosophers hold that the word is neither absolute universal nor absolute particular (individual), but it denotes the universalised particular. They accept that in fact, the question that whether the word denotes universal or particular is wrong in it self. This question may be possible only if universal and particular are considered as totally
eparate having their independent existence. But it is not so. Both can be separated in thought only; empirically they cannot be separated. No particular is existent without universal and no universal is existent without particular. The manușyatva (the aggregate of human qualities) or the (characteristics of man) can not be seen different from a human being. Neither we get any human being bereft of manhood i.e. manusyatva. Thus, the reality or being is universal qualified with particular (sāmānyavišeşātmaka) and if denotation of a word is experienced fact, then we must accept that the word neither denotes absolute-universal, nor absoluteparticular but the particular (individual) qualified with universal (Sāmānya-viśista-višeșa). Refuting the Mimāṁsaka's contention that words can denote and receive universal only, Jainācāryas maintain that the word denotes according to its symbols (samketa) and symbols can be possible only in particular qualified with universal. Only universal can not be arthakriyākāri (compatible of action or pragmatic). The universal 'gotva' (cowness) can not give milk and ghatatva (pitcherness) can not hold water. What does the word denote is particular possessed of universal or universal possessed of particular?
Although the Jainas, with Naiyāyikas regard that, the word denotes particular qualified with universal (sāmānya-vićişta-viśeșa) but they do not support the Naiyāyikas contention that the word first comprehends universal/common and then particular/individual. Had there been separate existence of universal and particular or cause and effect relation between the two, the Naiyāyikas view would have been considered as valid. When universal and particular are intertwined in one and single object, then to