Jaina Philosophy of Language

Author(s): Sagarmal Jain
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith

Page 92

(66) : Jaina Philosophy of Language
individual, there is no existence of universal which is subjective but even then, it is real and not fictitious. According to Jainas the reality is multifaceted (Anekāntātmaka). An object has infinite qualities. Some qualities of every object are similar and some are dissimilar to the other objects. These similar qualities are called universal in Jainism. Jainas maintain that the universal is not followed by many but it is subjective. In other words universal is not a single element inherent all individuals but the similarity or resemblance in qualities/characteristics of every individual is called universal, which being present in every individual classify them in one class, cast or community. Similarity is the quality of an individual and in the form of a quality, it is real. As the subject of perception (pratyakṣa) is the individual possessed of universal (jātyanvitasāmānya) or the object qualified by universal as well as particular, so also the subject of word is also real object qualified by universal as well as particular and not something imaginary. According to the Mīmāṁsakas, if we think that a word denotes only a universal, or, as the Buddhists believe an imaginary universal, then by hearing the word the individual will not be able to apply his mind towards the object denoted by word at all. When we hear the word 'cow' (universal) we look for individual 'cow' and not for the universal cowness (gotva). Thus, the word denotes a real thing qualified by class and not an imaginary universal.
(2) If we regard the meaning of word as something imaginary, it would not be possible to determine the truthfulness or the falsehood of a statement, because truthfulness or otherwise of a statement is based on the real experience that we get or don't get in the experiential world. The statement is regarded as truth, if the object corresponding to is found in the external world. If the object is not found corresponding to the statement, that is called false. According to the Buddhists, the basis of the validity of knowledge is its avisaṁvădită (correspondence with the thing) and the avisaṁvāditā can be determined on the basis of the external meanings only and nothing else. We call the statement false if the objects corresponding to it are not found in the external world. Thus, the meaning of word can only be real objects, and not the imaginary one.
(3) Jainas further argue that if you (the Buddhists) regard anyapoha the very reflection of the object reflected in determinate intellect,