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(82) : Jaina Philosophy of Language
Prabhācandra does not see any difference between successivism and the theory of complex or aggregation. The only difference is that while the latter emphasises the coexistence of the terms, the former underlines their order. Successivism has all those limitations with which the theory of aggregation suffers. Here also the question of space and time arises. An order is not possible in a single space and in a single time. If we regard the existence of the terms in different spaces and times, there will be difficulty in the comprehension of meaning. Though in the structure of a sentence, the succession of the terms is an important element but this order is possible only in those relative terms, which are existent in a relatively different and relatively identical manner in a sentence. (6) The comprehension theory of meaning of a sentence: nature and criticism
Some philosophers are of the opinion that words and wordcomplex are only external. They don't contain the meaning of a sentence. The sentence, therefore, is that which is comprehended by the intellect. We speak a sentence with an objective concentration of the intellect and we comprehend the meaning only with such an intellect. The cause and origin of a sentence is, in fact, the intellect-factor. A speaker speaks only when he has a desire to speak something in a coherent way. The intellect or the intelligence therefore, is the originator of a sentence. Without intelligence neither it is possible to pronounce a sentence nor it is possible on the part of the listener to comprehend its meaning. The basis of sentence is, therefore, the intellectual comprehension.
While criticising the view, Jainācārya Prabhācandra asks, if the basis of a sentence is the intellect, the nature of sentence then is physical (dravya) or psychical (bhāva)? We cannot call intelligence as a physical sentence because the physical sentence is unconscious and is of the nature of word and sound while the intellect is conscious. Hence, there is contradiction in terms. We cannot regard intelligence as a physical sentence. Further, if we regard the intellect as psychical sentence then, there will be the fallacy of proving something, which is already proved. Because, the intellect as psychical sentence, is already established. The rationalists and the Jaina philosophers carry the same opinion in this regard. To
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