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(94) : Jaina Philosophy of Language alternative is not tenable because that will not make the comprehension of the particular meaning of the sentence possible. If we accept the second then the knowledge will cease to be determinate because (according to (Mimāmsakas) that determinate particular which is denoted by word will produce doubt while understanding the qualified (višesya), because the qualified may have several qualifiers. On behalf of Prabhākara, it may be argued that if the qualifier determined by the intention of the speaker is combined by the qualificand, then it is not reasonable because the intention of the speaker cannot be regarded by the person to whom the word is spoken. Hence, the determination of qualifier regarding qualified is not possible. If it is said that the speaker himself knows his own intention, therefore, the determinate qualifier will also be determined by him. In that case, the verbal statement will be redundant, because a statement is always made to communicate the meaning to others and not for one's own self.
If the third alternative is accepted in which the qualificand is correlated with both the particular and the universal qualifiers, then it will also suffer from the demerits of both. In other words neither it will be able to communicate the specific meaning of the statement nor it will yield determined knowledge.
The similar objection may be raised if we accept that the qualificand is correlated with verb and adverb. If the Mimāṁsakas argue again that from the denotation of a term, the denotation of other terms is determined and then it determinates the denotation of meaning, then by the knowledge of forms (rūpa), the determination of odour etc. would be possible which is illogical. In other words, in that case, the object of the sense of smell will be known by sense of sight, which is not tenable. Hence, the Prabhākara's view is not acceptable according to which a term depicts the meaning of other terms correlated with it and these correlated terms cause the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence. Hence, the theory of Anvitäbhidhāna is not tenable.
In fact, both the theories of Mimāńsā - Abhihitānvayavāda and Anvitābhidhānavāda are one sided. The Jaina philosophers agree with the former that the terms/words have their own meanings but they also agree with the latter that every term used in a sentence is dependent upon other terms for the comprehension of its meaning i.e. the terms used in a sentence are correlated. We get the meaning of a sentence only after
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