Jain Theism

Author(s): Hemant Shah
Publisher: Hemant Shah

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Jain Logic
According to Jain theory of knowledge, "the laws (laws of thought) can be true and valid only if they are laws of reality..." The problem of truth is a logical problem and must be determined with logical means. "The criterion of falsity is contradiction."]2 The subjective experiences in a dream, when we wake up, are rejected by us as false because they are contradicted by our waking experiences." "The problem of falsity is thus ultimately a question of experience. The problem of truth is no less a matter of experience and a priori logic is absolutely incompetent to deal with it'3. Unlike the other realist systems of Indian philosophy, Jainism, proves to be more liberal in using the word ‘experience' (Anubhava) as it includes even memory within the fold of experience. Here the term 'experience includes both internal and external cognitions.” Valid knowledge, is a faithful representation of objects, and is therefore practically useful. Invalid knowledge represents things in relation in which they do not exist."'!4
The knowledge characterised by 'Samsya' or doubt, “Viparyaya' or mistake, and 'Anadhyavasāya' or wrong knowledge due to carelessness are erroneous knowledge.
“We have eight kinds of knowledge, the five right and the three wrong ones. Only one kind of knowledge is active at a time.''}"
From a brief narration of Jain theory of knowledge, what is most remarkable to note is that a Jain does not believe in the a-priori validity of the laws of thought. To him, "the fund of experience, is the ultimate source of knowledge and the final court of appeal in dispute about the nature of things."'16 Thus, in Jain theory of knowledge, we find that the nature of real can be understood from experience while the reflective thoughts are simply helpful to clarify our conception. All the three popular, 'laws of thoughts' : (i) The law of identity, (ii) The law of contradiction, and (iii) The law of excluded middle, all these, according to Jainism, are absolutely vague, useless and misleading. “If things were absolute, particulars having no character apart from its own self identity and if the predication of characteristics were only a figment of intellect, it would not be possible to explain the emergence of different concepts and their affiliation to different entities."7 The
12. S. Mookejee, The Jain Phi. of Non-Absolutism (1978) p. 4 13. Ibid., p.
4 1 4. Dr. Radhakrishnan, I.P. Vol.I (1977) p. 295. 15. Tattvarthasutra, 130 16. S. Mookerjee, The Jain Phi. of non-Absolutism (1978) p. 7 17. S. Mookerjee, The Jain Phi. of non-Absolutism (1978) p. 11