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JAIN JOURNAL
All reality, according to Jannas is both nitya and anitya, although from different points of view, so that there is no logical contradiction. The Jaina rejects the definition of nitya which is generally given by other schools, viz, apracyutänutpattisthuraikarüpam nityam, which means absolute changelessness He defines it thus tadbhāvāvyam nityam (dhrovyayuktam) ie, nitya is that which continues to exist inspite of utpada and vināša. To what would utpada and vināša belong, argues the Jaina, if nothing continue ? Therefore a continuous reality, he says, must be posited for the very possibility of utpada and vinata in fact, says the Jaina, modes and substance ie, change and permanence exist together neither is possible without the other
Note that the Jaina differs equally from (1) those who held that all is eternal, (2) those who held that all is evanescent and also from (3) those who hold that some things are eternal and some evanescent According to him all things are both eternal and evanescent although from different points of view In a way, says the Jaina, even the Varseşika absolutist admits without being aware of it, that prthví is both nuya and anitya, that citra-rūpa is a conglomeration of several mutually exclusive rūpas which belongs to a single whole substance, that things are supposed to be kālāntarasthāyi, 1 e , enduring for a certain limited length of time
St VI The doctrine of Nyāya-Vaišesika regarding the existence and nature of God is criticised God according to this school is
(3)
(1) Maker of the world,
one, all-pervading by his presence and knowledge, ie, ubiquitous
and omniscient, (4) independent and (5) eternal
(1) That the God is the maker of the world is criticised by the author mainly on two grounds First, that the anumāna is precluded by pratyakşa which definitely bears witness to the fact that these things (earth, mountain, etc) have no maker Secondly, in the cases in which we have observed making, the making belongs to persons with a body If to escape the difficulty you say that he can put on a body through his infinite power or that he may possess it owing to our own adışta, it is a gratuitous assumption which amounts to begging the question
(2) He is one For, the world is one consistant whole and not a congeries of several conflicting forces, since it is a cosmos and not a
