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distinct things, viz , dharma and dharmin, it itself being distinct from both. This says the Jaina is contrary to all experience We never perceive three things, one binding the other two Next, samavāya, it is said, 18 one, eternal and all-pervasive If so the moment one thing perished, its samavāya would perish and with it all things in the world to which It belonged
In this stanza three more doctrines of the Vaisesikas
St VIII were criticised
(1) Saltā (the highest sāmānya or universal) which is supposed to reside not in all that exists, that is in all reals, but in certain reals only viz, dravya, guna and karma the remaining being denied the right The latter are sāmānya, viteșa and samavaya together with abhāva, the latter being added by commentators to Kanada's list of categories
(2) Cartanya which one would expect to be regarded as the very essence of Atman is treated by the Vaisesikas as an advertitious (aupādhika) quality which comes temporarily into Atman as a result of the working of the machinery of cognition (jñāna)
(3) Liberation of Atman is not a positive state of samvit (consciousness) and ananda (joy) but negative condition in which there is no consciousness and no joy
St IX The doctrine next examined is that of the bibhutva of Atman--that Atman is everywhere-a doctrine which on the face of it, says the Jaina, is contrary to our experience for, all are agreed that a thing must be where its quality is found Since the Vasesikas held that Atmans are many, if each of them is bibhu also as he believes, what a wonderful clash and interpenetration of Atmans would ensue It may be urged unless Atman was bibhu, how could the Atman draw to himslef the particles for the body in which he has to dwell in the next life Or even if he could, would not his body-sized Atman, as a consequence, be săvayava and therefore a kāryya just like the body itself The Saina, however, is prepared to accept the logical consequence The Jaina beheves that Atman is savayava, is parināmin and does change from time to time It may be asked in support of the bibhutva theory If Atman were bodysized how could Atman enter the body? For two mürta things cannot occupy the same space at the same time The Jaina answers the objection by denying mürtarva in one sense (materiality) and affirming in another (asarvagatatya)
