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APRIL, 1967
235
X
Criticism of Nyāya
St X (1) Pramana. Mallisena examines and rejects the definition in the Nyāya-bhâsya by Vatsayana and in the Nyāyasāra arthopalabhdhihetuh pramānam and samyaganubhavasādhanam pramānam In neither of the two definitions, he says the essential fact that pramāna is jñāna is brought out Correct diefinition of pramāna, says Mallisena, is svaparavyavasāyi jhanam pramanam
(2) Prameya Sarira etc are included in Atman and are not required to be separately mentioned Pretyabhāva and apavarga are similarly states of Atman A more fundamental objection is it is not a prameya but pramaty
XI-XII
Criticism of Purvamimänsä
St XI The author next criticises the defence of himsā as made by certain Vedists To say that himsā is veda-yihita and therefore, dharmahetu is to condemn the Veda He rejects the plea of the Vedists that himsā though ordinarily a sin is not a sin when it is prescribed by the Veda Mallisena condemns also the frāddha ceremony which was a great occasion with the Vedist Brahmins for slaughtering animals and eating animal food Lastly, Mallisena takes up the scholastic problem whether Veda is to be regarded as pauruşeya or apauruşeya
St Xll Next Mallisena examines Puryamimänsä (that of a particular sect established by Kumarila Bhatta) Thus regarding the nature of jñāna The Jaina holds that jñana or consciousness has this dual nature (1) It reveals itself and (2) reveals also the world of object He rejects the view of Kumarıla that jñāna itself is known by a process of implication (arthāpatrı) being implied in the fact of jñātatā of the object, which is its effect With it he also rejects a similar theory of the NyāyaVaišeşikas who regards jñāna as anuyyavasāyagamya, ie, known by a further act of knowing directed upon the first fact of knowledge
XIII-XIV Criticism of Vedānta or of that particular tenet of the school which has made it famous, viz , māyāvāda
St XIII Hemacandra's criticism of mayāvāda is simple (1) If māyā is, there is no advaita (2) If māyā is not, how will there be this world, which it sought to account for by assuming māyā Moreover, to say that something is māyā (false) and that it serves to account for the world is a
