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chaos To this the Jaina replies Not necessarily so For many may cooperate to produce a single result, e.g, the bees that make their hive.
(3) Since his making takes place in all parts of the universe, he must be supposed to be everywhere and he must be also all-knowing If he is everywhere, he, says the Jaina, absorbs everything into his own self leaving nothing to exist outside it If he knows everything he knows, we suppose, even hell and knowledge in his case being direct experience, he is supposed to experience hell
The Jaina continues, we may agree that certain souls are all-knowing, in which case, God would be one of such souls, that is to say, he would be on a par with emancipated souls "But mark", says Mallisensa, the commentator revising his position, "that knowledge does not actually travel from the knower to the known, and therefore, ominscience does not necessarily involve omnipresence Moreover, what is the proof of his omniscience ?-he asks It cannot be pratyakşa unless we ourselves are omniscient or become so in process It cannot be anumāna, for you cannot argue from the finite to infinite It cannot be arthapattı, that is, a hypothesis or assumption necessary for explaining the wonderful variety and richness of the world For, the adṛşta of living beings including the vegetable kingdom will explain one part of it and the remaining part which belongs to the inanimate kingdom may well be existing eternally so and eventually become the object of the joys and sorrows of the sentient beings It cannot be sabda or the authoritative text of the sacred scriptures for, the scriptures on which you rely are full of contradictions
(4) By the very nature of the case he is said to be independent Then why does he create a world so full of misery and inequalities unless he is wantonly cruel and unjust If misery is punishment for a foul deed and inequality is due to our varying karmans, this hypothesis of karma will suffice to explain everything and God will be superfluous
(5) He is said to be eternal If so, he should be eternally active, or eternally inactive In the former case, his work would at no point be finished and so nothing could be ever accomplished In the latter case, nothing could ever begin Moreover, how could he have eternally conflicting natures viz., making and unmaking at the same time.
St VII Next doctrine of the Vaiseşikas to be criticised is that of samavaya also called vṛtti which is supposed to connect two absolutely
