Nyaya Science of Thought

Author(s): Champat Rai Jain
Publisher: ZZZ Unknown
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/006711/1

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UCUCLCUCUCURUCUCUDUCUCUCLEUCUE EUCLCLCLCLCI nanananananan ananan nananananan THE. SCIENCE OF THOUGHT 400ON 00 VIBROTHEU C. R. JAIN SAYASASAYSAYAYAYAYAYAYAYAYAYAYAYASA

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OUR IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS. THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS. Vol. I.-Dravya-Samgraha (a rare work on Jaina Metaphysics) by Nemichandra Siddhanta Chakravarti.--Edited in English with Introduction, Translation, Notes, Padapatha, Glossary of Technical words, and various useful Appendices, with 18 plates, by Prof. Sarat Chandra Ghoshal, M.A., B.L., Saraswati, Kavya-Tirtha, Vidyabhushana, Bharati, General Editor, S. B. J. Series.-Price Rs. 4-8 or 7s. THE LIBRARY OF JAINA LITERATURE. The Pioneer, June 18, 1916. The Library of Jaina Literature-Are welcome! as steps in the excavation of the materials, for a history of human thought buried in Indian Literature, Mr. F. W. Thomas is pleased to possess these publications, which are well designed and well printed, and he wishes every success to the movement for making known the important literature of Jainism, Vol. 1.-Parmatma Prakasa of Sri Yogindra! Acharya. Translated into English, with valuable Notes, by Mr, Rickhab Dass Jain, B.A., with an introduction, by Champat Rai Jain, Bar-at-Law.-Price Rs, 2 or 3s. 6d. Vol. II.-The Nyayavatara.-The Earliest Jaina Work or Pure Logic of Siddha Sena Divakara.-Edited by Mahamahopadhyaya Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana M.A., Ph.D.-Price annas 8 or 1s. Vol. III.-The Nyaya-Karnika.-A Primer on Jaina Logie, by Mr. Mohan Lal D. Desai, B.A., LL.B.-Price annas 8 or ls, Vol. IV.-The Jaina Law of Inheritance or Bhadrabahu Samhita. Edited by Justice J. L. Jaini, M.A., M.R.A.S.Price Rs. 1-4 or 2s. Vol. V:-Husn-1-Avval (In Urdu).--An original work on Jainism, by Mr. Jineshwar Dass Jain.-Price Rs. 1-8 or Bs. Vol. VI-Jainism, by Mr. Herbert Warren, Hon. Secy., The Jaina Literature Society. London.---Price Re. 1. Vol. VII.-A Dietionary of Jaina Biography (in English). Part I by Mr. U. S. Tank, B A., LL.B.--Price Re. 1. Vol. VIII.- The Selenee of Thought or the Nyayas, by Champat Rai Jain.-Price-As. 8 or 1s. The Central Jaina Publishing House, Arrah, India,

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THE LIBRARY OF JAINA LITERATURE_Vol. VIII NYAYA THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT BY CHAMPAT RAI JAIN BARRISTER-AT-LAW. Author of THE KEY OF KNOWLEDGE. THE PRACTICAL PATH, etc., etc., PUBLISHER KUMAR DEVENDRA PRASADA THE CENTRAL JAINA PUBLISHING HOUSE, ARRAH, (India) 1916 (All Rights Reserved.)

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47: zrI vItarAgAya namaH It was customary with the ancients to offer obeisance to he Holy Tirthankara (God), by praising His divine qualities, before commencing any religious or educative work, so as to destroy and burn up, by the fire of contemplation of divine glory, all predisposition to bigotry, prejudice and other like causes of wrong knowledge. Having the same object in view, I also bow to the pure Veetraga (passionless) Arhanta (God), who has attained to omniscience by the destruction of the knowledge-obstructing energies of Karma, in whose all-embracing Jnana scintillate, like stars in the infinite firmament, all the objects of knowledge of the three periods of Time, the past, present and future, and whose Word is the final authority to be appealed to in case of doubt and dispute. C. R. JAIN.

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PREFACE. "The Science of Thought' is intended to be a brief exposition of the view of Jaina Philosophy on the nature and types of Jnana (knowledge) and the working of mind in reference to logical inference. The book is not a translation of any particular work, though it is principally based on two small treatises, the Pariksa Mukha and the Nyaya Dipika. The author of the first-named work was a certain Acharya (philosopher-saint) known by the name of Sri Manikyananda, who flourished about the commencement of the ninth century of the Christian era. The other book, the Nyaya Dipika, is a much later work, and was composed by Yati Dharmabhusana about the year 1600 A. D. Both the Pariksa Mukha and the Nyaya Dipika are, however, based on earlier and bigger works, and do not claim to be exhaustive. In presenting to the modern reader the views of the Jaina Siddhanta (Philosophy) on such an important subject as the Science of Chought, I cannot help giving an expression to a consciousness

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iv of my inability to do full justice to this important department of knowledge, but am borne up by the hope that the book may succeed in attracting to the field of research more competent hands who may be able to bring out the excellence of the Jaina view better than I have been able to do. C. R. JAIN. PREFACE. HARDOI : 15th November, 1916.

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NYAYA THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. CHAPTER I. The word Nyaya generally means a path or way, but in connection with philosophy it implies the method of accurate thinking, hence, the system of Logic, or, in general terms, the Science of Thought, which aims at the acquisition of right knowledge or truth. Right knowledge may be defined as that which is destructive of ignorance, the chief cause of mishaps. There are three kinds of ignorance, namely, (1) sansaya (doubt), (2) viparyaya (wrong knowledge) and (3) anadhyavasaya (absence of knowledge). Doubt is the state of uncertainty about the correctness of two or more possible views of a fact. Viparyaya signifies knowledge which is untrue,

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NYAYA. e.g., the idea that the whitish, shining surface of an oyster-shell contains silver. Anadhyavasaya is the state of mind which implies an attitude of indifference, indefiniteness or agnosticism. It is the state of consciousness in which the mind is aware of the existence of an object but does not know what it really is. Knowledge which is free from these three blemishes, that is to say which cognises the objects of knowledge as they exist in nature, is called pramana (valid knowledge). CHAPTER II. All things are knowable, that is to say they are capable of being the object of knowledge on the part of some one or other. That which is not capable of being known by any one at all cannot have an existence, for that which is not provable is non-existent. Hence, if things exist, they must admit of proof. But things which are not known to any one at all are incapable of being proved. Therefore, that which is not known to any one at all is non-existent. Were it otherwise, we would be proving that of which we have no knowledge whatsoever, and the very existence of which we have absolutely no reason to affirm. Therefore, all things are knowable.

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. CHAPTER III. Right knowledge depends on accurate observation and thought, and accurate thinking implies exact description of things. The very first step towards accuracy of thought is to give a name to the subject of enquiry. This is called uddesa, and is obviously a necessary step in the science of thought, for no discourse or discussion is possible without first naming or otherwise marking out the subject of controversy. The object of defining a thing is to enable it to be distinguished from all other things. Therefore, every true definition must mention the distinguishing feature (laksana) of the oject to be defined (lakshya). A laksana may be either (1) atmabhuta, i.e., an inseparable property of the laksya, as heat, of fire, or (2) anatamabhuta which is not an inseparable attribute of the thing defined, e.g., beard, of man. The main feature of distinction between these two kinds of laksana lies in the fact that while the absence of the atamabhuta quality would at once make the thing to be defined non-existent (e.g., fire without heat), the destruction of the anatamabhuta would not be fatal to its existence, e.g., a beardless man. Every true laksana should be free from the following kinds of faults : (1) Avyapti (non-prevalence or non-distribution

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4 NYAYA. amongst all the members of a class), as in the statement, man is a bearded being.' Here it is clear that the beard is not a distinguishing feature of all human beings, for females and children do not grow it. (2) Ativyapti (over-prevalence) which occurs when the feature is also found in things other than the laksya. The statement: the parrot is a winged creature,' is an instance of this defect, for all birds have wings. (3) Asambhava, or that which is contradicted by perception or some other kind of knowledge. To describe man as possessed of horns is an instance of this blemish. Thus, the true laksana is a quality which is actually found in every member of the class but which does not exist outside it. CHAPTER IV. Knowledge is the nature of the soul. If it were not the nature of the soul, it would either be the nature of the not-soul, or of nothing whatever. But in the former case, the unconscious would become the conscious, and the soul would be unable to know itself or any one else, for it would then be devoid of consciousness; and in the latter, there would be no knowledge, nor conscious

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. beings in existence, which, happily, is not the case. It might be urged that knowledge, consciousness, or the power to know or cognize is an independent quality which, when it comes in contact with the soul, enables it to perceive and know itself and other things, but this is untenable on the ground that qualities only inhere in substances * and cannot be conceived to exist independently of concrete things. The fact is that qualities are pure mental abstractions made after observation of a number of individuals; no one has ever seen them existing by themselves. Besides, it is permissible to ask whether these qualities be indivisible and all-pervading, or atomistic ? But if we say that they are atomistic, then the cause of abstraction is thrown over board, * That qualities inhere in substances is a self-evident truth, for they cannot be conceived to exist by themselves. If they could lead an existence independently of substance, we should have softness, hardness, manhood and the like also existing by themselves, which would be absurd. Moreover, if qualities were capable of leading an independent existence of their own, existence also would exist separately from all other qualities. But this would make existence itself a featureless function or attribute of nothing whatsoever, on the one hand, and all the other remaining qualities simply non-existent, on the other, because existence would no longer be one of their attributes. It follows, therefore, that qualities cannot be conceived to exist apart from substances.

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6 for the numerous atoms of conciousness are really only so many concrete individuals. On the other hand, if it be said that consciousness is an indivisible existence, then it must be all-pervading, so as to be able to enter into the constitution of every living being at different places in the world. But on this hypothesis the real knower or source of knowledge being one and the same throughout the universe, there should be no differences in respect of knowledge among the individuals, which is not the case, as every one's experience shows. There is only one other alternative, and that is that the quality is all-pervading but the differences in knowledge depend on the nature of individuals themselves; but in this case knowledge ceases to be a property of consciousness, and becomes dependent on the nature of souls, for if it were a function of an indivisible and all-pervading quality knowledge of one soul, wherever acquired, would immediately become the common property of every other soul, on the ground of the real knower being only one and the same. 6 NYAYA. " It follows, therefore, that consciousness cannot be separated from the soul. The absurdity of the opposite view may be further emphasized by studying the nature of both when separated from each other. Firstly, consciousness separated from a knowing

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. being would exist either as a knower, or as an object of knowledge. But not as a knower, for in that case the separation would mean nothing; nor yet as an object of knowledge, for as an object of knowledge it would only enjoy knowability, but not knowingness, or cognisance. Secondly, the soul separated from consciousness can exist only either as a knower, or as devoid of knowledge. But in the former case consciousness adds nothing to it, and may be ignored; and in the latter it is inconceivable how a thing whose nature is ignorance* can ever become a knower by its union with consciousness. It is thus clear that consciousness is nothing but the nature or function of the soul ; in other words, the soul is a substance which is characterised by knowledge or consciousness. CHAPTER V. Every living being is endowed with the capacity for infinite knowledge, because (1) all things are * If any one would seriously reflect on the difference between a living being and a looking glass in respect of knowledge, he would not be long in discovering that the former is capable of feeling the states of his consciousness, i.e., the modifications of the substance of his being, while the latter is not. Hence the image in the glass is not perceived by the glass, while an impression in consciousness is immediately cognized by the soul.

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NYAYA. knowable, and (2) because knowledge, or consciousness, is the very essence of the soul. In respect of the quality of knowability, it is sufficient to say that every thing that has existence for its characteristic must be known to at least one soul, as already proved. But since all souls are alike as regards their substantive nature, they must all be endowed with the same or an equal capacity in respect of knowledge. Hence, what one soul can know all others can also become aware of. As regards consciousness also, it is evident that the soul cannot but be possessed of the potency for infinite knowledge, unlimited by Time or Space, for knowledge consists in the modifications or aspects of its own substance (consciousness). Putting these conclusions together, we arrive at the inference that the soul's consciousness or knowing capacity is unlimited within the range of the possible, so that only the impossible lies beyond its knowing capacity. But since all that exists is also limited to the possible in nature, and since the possible in nature corresponds to the possible in knowledge or thought, on account of the quality of knowability which has been seen to be an inalienable attribute of things, it follows, with the certainty of logic, that nothing that the soul can never know can ever actually bappen or exist in nature.

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. Therefore, all souls are endowed with potential omniscience. Some people think that it would be more conducive to their peace of mind to have only one omniscient soul, but this is untenable on the ground that souls being pure spirit in reality, the essential nature of one must naturally and necessarily be the essential nature of all others. Thus, there would be no differences in the possibility of development in respect of knowledge among different souls, although they might differ from one another in so far as its actual manifestation is concerned. Thus, the positing of only one omniscient soul together with a large number of those with limited knowledge is clearly an instance of illogical thought. There can be differences in the quality or function of beings only if they differ from one another in respect of their substantive nature, but the fact that consciousness is common to them all, including the one postulated omniscient soul, shows that they are not different from one another in that respect. There remains the possibility of our postulating the presence of an extra conscious quality in the one omniscient soul, but even this supposition does not advance its case any further, because pure spirit is not a compound but a simple substance, or reality. Nor can it be called a compound without

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10 being deprived of its immortality, since all compounded effects are liable to dissolve and disintegrate. It follows from this that the one omniscient soul cannot be a real entity, or thing in itself, if it is to be regarded as a compound of the ordinary consciousness plus an extra conscious quality. Furthermore, the only substance which can become associated with spirit, is matter, an unconscious material which can only act as a veil to curtail knowledge, but which is otherwise quite incapable of augmenting it in the least. We thus conclude that omniscience is the very nature of the soul-substance, not of any particular soul exclusively. Those who deny the possibility of omniscience on the authority of certain pious rishis (saints) forget that if testimony were admitted on the point it would necessarily end by proving that which it was adduced to refute, for he who would deny the very possibility of omniscience in others would have to be omniscient himself. NYAYA. * The common error of materialism which imagines that musk, coffee and other similar substances actually give rise to consciousness seems to have arisen from the fact that these substances partially remove the obstacles from the path of the little gleam' with which we adjust our daily affairs. It is, however, quite inconceivable how an unconscious thing can possibly give rise to or increase the quantity of consciousness, when even the knowledge of one soul-a conscious beingcannot be tacked on to another. C

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. 11 CHAPTER VI. In knowing anything one only knows the states of one's own consciousness, for knowledge is the very nature of the soul. No one can possibly know another except by observing the effect of the presence of that other on one's own consciousness. Hence, the soul only takes note of the modifications of its own substance, called states of consciousness. CHAPTER VII. The soul is a reality, or substance, because it exists, and because existence is a quality of substance.* If existence were not a quality of substance, it would appertain to that which is devoid * The word substance used in connection with the soul need cause us no alarm, since it merely denotes subsistence, existence or being, and is not confined to matter. In philosophy, substance is that which underlies or is the permanent subject or cause of all phenomena, whether material or spiritual; the subject which we imagine to underlie the attributes or qualities by which alone we are conscious of existence; that which exists independently and unchangeably, in contradistinction to accident, which denotes any of the changes of changeable phenomena in substance, whether these phenomena are necessary or casual, in which latter case they are called accidents in a narrower sense.... Substance is, with respect to the mind, a merely logical distinction from its attributes. We can never imagine it, but we are compelled to assume it. We cannot conceive substance shorn of its attributes, because those attributes are the sole staple of our

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12 NYAYA. of all substantiveness. But that which is devoid of substantiveness cannot be the subject of any quality whatsoever, because qualities only inhere in substances. Hence, if existence were not a quality of substance, it would appertain to that which is incapable of being the subject of any quality whatsoever, and therefore, also of existence, which contradicts the proposition itself. Therefore, existence is an attribute of substance, and, conversely, that which exists must be a substance. CHAPTER VIII. Every soul is an indivisible unit of consciousness, that is to say, an individual. If it were not indivisible, it would consist of two or more parts, which would be either similar or dissimilar in function. But not dissimilar, because two dissimilar things cannot exercise a common function. Hence, consciousness, the distinguishing feature of conceptions; but we must assume that substance is something different from its attributes' (The Imperial Dictionary). Thus everything that exists must have some sort of substantiveness or subsistence; and it is this substantiveness or subsistence which is called substance. As Spinoza puts it, "existence appertains to the nature of substance." It is in this sense that the word substance is employed in philosophy. Thus souls and matter are both substances though of different natures as is evident from their attributes.

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. 13 the soul, cannot be a property of more than one substance. The parts must then be all made of the same substance. But this also cannot be true, for in that case each part would exercise similar functions, multiplying the operation of consciousness exactly as many times as there are parts in a soul. We should then expect to find not one impression of an object perceived, not one memory of a recalled experience, not one inference drawn from a given set of premises, nor even one act of desire, willing or judgment on the part of the soul, but a multiplicity of them, determinable by the number of parts of which any particular soul were made. But this is contradicted by direct observation. Therefore, every soul is an indivisible unit of consciousness, i.e., an individual. The simplicity of the subject of inference is further established by the fact that no conclusion is possible in logic unless the major and minor premises are cognized by one and the same individual, for if the proposition, 'A= B', be held in mind by one man, and the premise, 'B=C', by another, neither of them nor any one else can possibly draw an inference from them. If the soul were made up of parts, those parts would similarly cognize different portions of a syllogism, thus rendering it impossible to draw an inference. Therefore, the soul cannot be a thing made up of parts.

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14 NYAYA. The soul being an individual, or indivisible unit of consciousness, the idea of knowledge in reference to it is that of a state of consciousness which is neither the whole, nor a separated part of the life of the ego, but one of an infinity of interpenetrating and inseparable phases or aspects, each of which is pervaded by the all-pervading consciousness of the self. In different words, every soul is, by nature, an individual Idea which is itself the summation of an infinity of different, but inseparable ideas, or states of consciousness. But since all these ideas or states of consciousness are not simultaneously present in the consciousness of each and every soul, some of them must necessarily exist in a sub-conscious or dormant condition whence they emerge above the level whenever conditions are favourable for their manifestation. Thus, knowledge is never acquired from without, but only actualized from within. This is so even when we perceive a new object or are impressed with a new idea for the first time, for the soul can never know anything other than the state or states of its own consciousness. Hence, unless the soul be endowed with the capacity to assume a state corresponding to the stimulus from without, it would never have the consciousness of the outside object. This capacity really means the power to vibrate in sympathy with, that is to say at the

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. 15 same rhythm as the incoming stimulus. It is thus evident that an impression in or on consciousness differs from a statue in marble in so far as it does not signify the chiselling off or removal of any part of its bulk, but resembles it inasmuch as it is brought into manifestation from within the soul's consciousness itself. Thus, while all impressions may be said to lie dormant in the * That an impression is in reality a kind of rhythm is clear from the nature of recollection which implies a revived impression, Memory, it will be seen, is not a picture gallery containing ready-made photos or reprints of past events, for the memory-images that arise in recollection are, in many instances, bigger than the perceiver thereof. This is especially the case with dreams which, at times, reproduce large cities, oceans and the like. It follows from this that recollections do not lie stored up in the form of ready-made images in the body or brain or the soul-substance, but are formed and projected outside there and then. But the only other thing that visual memory can be, if not a collection of ready made images, is the capacity to produce images, that is to say, the power to mould the material which enters into the composition of memory-images into characteristic shapes and forms. This means neither more nor less than the capacity to vibrate at different intensities or rhythm which by acting on a kind of very fine matter give rise to forms. The same is the case with respect to the recollection of impressions formed through the media of senses other than sight. They are not images in their inception, and cannot but exist in memory as so many different kinds of potencies or possibilities of recollection. It is these potencies of recollection which we have designated as different intensities of rhythm for the want of a more suitable term.

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16 NYAYA. soul, in the same manner as all kinds of statues remain unmanifested in a slab of stone, they cannot be described as being created in the same way. There is no question of carving out anything in the case of an impression on the soul-substance, but only of a' waking up of a dormant state, or a setting free of that which was previously held in bonds. Hence, all kinds of impressions, or states of consciousness, lie latent in the soul, and only need the removal * of causes which prevent their coming into manifestation, to emerge from the sub-conscious state. For the foregoing reasons sense-perception implies no more than the resonance of an already existing impress, or idea-rhythm, set free to vibrate in response to the incoming stimulus. It is this responsive resonance of its own rhythm, hence, a state of its own consciousness, which is felt by the soul at the moment of cognition. It should be stated that the soul has no other means of knowing its own states than feeling them, though the word feeling is here used in its widest * It will be seen that impressions arise not only from perception, but also from the activity of thought, since whenever a new idea is formed as the result of perception or inference a new impression is dis-covered' to onrich the stock of one's knowledge.

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. sense, and includes sensations of touch, taste, smell, hearing and sight. CHAPTER IX. 17 The differences of knowledge among beings of different classes and kinds, as well as among individuals belonging to the same class are due to the operation of the Law of Karma, for the potentiality for infinite knowledge, that is omniscience, being the very nature of the soul, some outside influence is needed to prevent its becoming an actuality of experience. This external influence is the force of karmas, as is fully explained in such works as the Gommatasara.* It follows from this that knowledge really arises from within, and education is merely a drawing forth (from e, out, and duco, to lead) from the depths of consciousness. As the bondage of karma is loosened, new impressions are set free to manifest themselves, widening the field of perception and knowledge by bringing the soul in touch *The Gommatasara is a Jain work of great authority on the doctrine of karma, but unfortunately it has not yet been translated into English. Those who cannot have access to it are recommended to read the author's 'Key of Knowledge' and The Practical Path' which deal with the main features of the subject at some length. 2

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18 NYAYA. with something to which it had remained irresponsive hitherto; and, finally, when all the perception and knowledge-obstructing bonds of karma are destroyed, omniscience is attained by the potential becoming the actual. CHAPTER X. Knowledge illumines itself as well as its object at the same time, that is to say that in knowing anything the soul also knows itself simultaneously. If the soul did not know its own existence, nobody else could ever impart that knowledge to it, since instruction from without can never take the place of the feeling of awareness of one's own presence which is implied in self-knowledge. Besides, every one's experience will show that the one thing of which he is the most definitely and forcibly conscious is his own being. Furthermore, every act of perception, and, in general, every kind of knowledge, implies the statement, 'I know it thus,' whether or not the state of consciousness expressed by the words be actually translated into thought, or word, or both. It is to be noted that unless appropriated by the soul, knowledge would be reduced to the condition of an image in glass which is not cognized by the thing in which it is reflected. If the soul were

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. not an appropriative being, it, too, would resemble a looking glass, and would content itself by merely reflecting the image of the object before it; but it is obvious that it would have no knowledge in that case. 19 Further reflection would reveal the fact that the state of consciousness, 'I know it thus,' is not only necessary for knowledge to become the property of, or to be appropriated by the knower,' but would also be impossible unless consciousness illumined, that is to say knew itself. Now, since every one's experience bears testimony to this state, it must be conceded that the soul knows itself as well as the object of knowledge simultaneously, that is at one and the same time. In addition to the illumination of the self and the object of knowledge, the process and the result, or fruit, of knowledge also occur at the same time, for the functioning of consciousness is necessary for an act of cognition, and the acquisition of knowledge resulting in the destruction of ignorance is a concomitant of such functioning. CHAPTER XI. The determination of truth is independent of senses, though the validity of knowledge at times immediately follows perception. This is

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20 NYAYA. proved by the fact that the senses are not opposed to ignorance, which is to be removed, and since that which is not opposed to ignorance cannot be the means of its destruction, it follows that they are not directly concerned in the acquisition of right or valid knowledge (pramana). If sense-perception were the same thing as pramana, the Sun and the Moon should be of the size actually perceived. But this is absurd. That the senses cannot possibly be regarded as giving birth to truth, i.e., valid knowledge, is also evident from the fact that they are the causes of wrong knowledge also, e.g., the illusory appearance of water in mirage. Besides, that which does not know itself can never know another, because only that which is appropriated by a knowing being is called knowledge, as already explained. Hence, the senses not being appropriative-every one's experience and observation would bear this out-cannot give rise to pramana. They are merely instrumental in the passage of stimulus from the external object to the soul within, which is the true knower. In some cases it does undoubtedly seem that valid knowledge accompanies sensual perception, but analysis would show this to happen only in cases of great familiarity with the object of knowledge, dispensing with the necessity for the

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. ascertainment of truth, which is almost as good as already known. We thus conclude that the senses do not give rise to pramana, though they play no unimportant part in the process of perception. 21 CHAPTER XII. Pramana is distinguishable from error by the fact that it cannot be falsified by any means, so that whatever can be shown to be false is not valid. Pramana arises in one of the two following ways, (1) in the case of familiar objects, immediately, and (2) in all other cases, upon further enquiry or experiment. The same is the case with mental conviction, that is to say the consciousness of validity or certainty; it also arises immediately and from within in the case of familiar objects, but on further investigation in all others. CHAPTER XIII. Things in nature are characterised by manysidedness. Each of them presents a number of aspects which have to be known before we can be said to have exact knowledge of their nature. The different points of view for studying things

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22 NYAYA. are called nayas of which the dravyarthika (the natural) and the paryayarthika (changing or conditional) are the most important. The dravyarthika point of view only takes into consideration the nature of the substance or material of a thing, while the paryayarthika confines itself to the study of the form or forms in which substances manifest themselves. The importance of anekantic (many-sided, hence all-embracing) knowledge lies in the fact that no one-sided system of study can possibly aim at perfect validity and fulness of knowledge, being debarred from a general study of things from all sides by the very force of its one-sided absolutism; for it frequently happens that the natural attributes of a thing are quite at variance with its manifested properties, so that if the attention of the student be confined to either of them exclusively, the resulting knowledge cannot but be imperfect, and, therefore, misleading also. CHAPTER XIV. Pramana is either Pratyaksa (direct) or Paroksa (indirect). The difference between these two types of pramana consists in the fact that while the former springs from direct perception, the latter is

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. 23 dependent on memory, inference and the like. The one may be said to represent the intuitional side of life, and the other the intellectual. Pratyaksa pramana may be defined as that form of pure, unclouded clarity of Jnana which, being altogether beyond description, is essentially a matter for experience. The idea is that it is not possible to describe direct pramana by means of words, but that every one knows from personal experience what is meant by the term. Pratyaksa pramana is not to be taken as equivalent to pure, undetermined perception, which, not being antagonistic to doubt, wrong knowledge or ignorance, can never be termed pramana. The argument that the nirvikalpaka (unascertained or undetermined perception) is the pratyaksa pramana because it is caused or produced by the object itself, lacks the support of both the anvaya" and vyatireka* tests, since valid knowledge of unperceived things is a matter of common experience. * The Anvaya is the statement of the necessary logical connection between the Sadhya (that which is to be proved) and the Sadhana (that which is to prove the existence of the sadhya). The Vyatireka is the opposite of this, and implies the non-existence of Sadhana in the absence of its Sadhya. The following process of inference (syllogism) sufficiently illustrates both these types of arguments. There is fire (Sadhya) in this hill, because there is smoke(Sadhana) on it; for wherever there is smoke there is fire (anvaya); and wherever there is no fire there is no smoke (Vyatireka).

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24 NYAYA. Besides, the knowledge of many of the states of consciousness, such as 'I am happy,' 'I am pleased,' and the like is obviously incapable of being produced by any object or objects, since there are no objects corresponding to happiness, pleasure and other similar ideas which might be perceived. It follows from this that pramana cannot be said to be the product of objects. Similarly, those who maintain that light is the cause of pratyaksa pramana are also ignorant of the nature of valid jsiana, for aloka (light) is not even a cause of perception. If light were the cause of perception, it would be impossible to perceive its antithesis, i.e., darkness, for darkness could not exist in light, and yet light would be required for its perception. The part which light plays in visual perception seems to be confined to the enlargement of the field of vision, though even this does not hold good in the case of all kinds of living beings, since certain animals such as the owl and rat, can clearly perceive things in darkness. It is also evident that light plays no part whatsoever in the perception of objects with senses other than sight, and that dreams are also seen without light. It follows from all this that light is not the cause of pratyaksa pramana in any sense. For similar reasons it is impossible to regard sense-organs as the causes of pratyaksa pramana,

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. 25 for they are not endowed with consciousness and do not know themselves. Moreover, they can never reveal that which does not affect them immediately, e.g., events of the past or future, or the deductions of reason. They are also limited to a certain range of vibrations, beyond which nothing can be perceived, for instance, no one has ever perceived an atom with the aid of his senses, though it is certain that atoms of matter must exist in nature. We, therefore, conclude that senseorgans also are not the causes of the direct type of pramana. It only remains to deal with the argument, that the pratyaksa pramana is caused by the contact between sense-organs and the objects of knowledge, that is to say by the alighting of an organ of sensation on the object to be known. Here, too, it is obvious that the argument fails in the case of sight which perceives' the branch of a tree near by simultaneously with the moon which is at a considerable distance. Now, because actual contact is not possible at one and the same time between the organ of sight and two such objects as the branch of a tree close at hand and the moon, it follows that actual physical contact between sense-organs and objects of senses is not the cause of pramana; and since what is not the. cause of pramana can never be the cause of the

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26 NYAYA. pratyaksa pramana, it further follows that the theory under consideration is not founded on good reason. The absurdity of the position becomes perfectly clear the moment it is realised that there can be no contact between every object of knowledge and sense-organs, and that knowledge is not had of every object that comes even in physical contact with an organ of sensation--the eye, the ear and the like. CHAPTER XV. Pratyaksa is of two kinds, viz., samvyavaharika and paramarthika. The samvyavaharika pratyaksa is the kind of knowledge which is not characterised by full clarity. It is acquired with the aid of senses and mind, and is also known as mati-jnana. The paramarthika pratyaksa signifies pure intuition, that is to say knowledge acquired without the aid of senses and mind. This is also of two kinds, namely, sakala and vikala. The sakala paramarthika pratyaksa means omniscience pure and simple, implying full and all-embracing knowledge, unlimited by Time or Space. The vikala paramarthika pratyaksa also signifies knowledge acquired independently of senses and

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27 mind, but is not unlimited like the sakala. It embraces two types of jnana called avadhi and manahparyaya. Avadhi jnana (clairvoyance*) is the paramarthika or direct knowledge of material things within certain limits in respect of (i) dravya (substance), (ii) kshetra (place), (iii) kala (time), and (iv) bhava (property or nature); and embraces a knowledge of some of the past and future lives of the soul. Avadhi jnana, it may be pointed out here, is to be distinguished from the false clairvoyance (Kuavadhi), which, though a kind of pratyaksa, is not pramana. Manahparyaya jnana (telepathy)++ means intuitional knowledge of material things in the minds of others within the same four kinds of limitations as specified in connection with avadhi THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. * The word clairvoyance, it should be noted, is hardly a suitable equivalent for avadhi jnana which embraces a knowledge of some of the past lives of the soul, but in the absence of a more appropriate term we may as well employ it as such, +The simple perusal of most of the scriptures of the world would suffice to show that many an honest enthusiast has fallen a victim to this form of ajnana (false clairvoyance), and, unable to distinguish the genuine thing from a baseless substitute, has been led to instal himself, in his mind, as a seer and prophet of a divinity which had no existence whatsoever outside his own imagination. The word telepathy is adopted subject to the observations made in respect of clairvoyance.

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28 NYAYA. jnana. This is pure thought-reading, and is of two kinds, simple and complex. The simple form of manahparyaya jnana, technically known as rijumati, consists in the knowledge of simple impressions in the mind of another; the complex, called vipulamati, signifies a knowledge of all kinds of thoughts and impressions, whether simple or complex. CHAPTER XVI. Paroksa pramana signifies valid knowledge which is not characterised by the clarity of pratyaksa. Like pratyaksa, paroksa, too, is to be known from personal experience, and cannot be described my means of words. Some philosophers regard paroksa as that form of knowledge which has the general, as opposed * As a matter of fact, things in nature wear both the general and particular aspects at the same time, so that there can be no general without the particular nor the particular without the general. When the special feature of a thing which distinguishes it from other things of the same description happens to be the object of attention, it is the particular, otherwise, that is to say, when emphasis is to be laid on the properties common to the whole class, it is the general that is the object of knowledge. Whoever has realised the impossibility of the general and the particular existing apart from each other will readily perceive that, like the two sides of a coin, they are the two concomitant, complemental and inseparable aspects which all concrete things wear in nature.

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. 29. to the particular, for its object. But this feature is also to be found in pratyaksa, which directly enables us to perceive the general, and cannot, therefore, be said to be a laksana (distinctive mark or feature) of paroksa pramana alone. Paroksa consists of the following five types of pramana. (1) Smriti (memory), or the recalling of that which is already known. (2) Pratyabhi jnana which arises from the combination of perception and memory, as in the state of consciousness implied in the statement: 'this is the man'. In this instance, the word 'this' connotes present perception, the points to a recalled memory; and from their union arises the idea that the man now perceived is the same who was perceived before. Pratyabhi jna na also includes such knowledge as arises from a comparison between a thing perceived and some other thing remembered. This is like that'; 'that is different from this'; and the like are instances of this kind of pratyabhi j'nana. (3) Tarka or knowledge of the argument, that is of the invariable relationship, such as that of fire and smoke, between certain things. Tarka is the basis of inference, and relates to a rule of universal applicability to be deduced by induction and the observation of facts in nature. (4) Anumana (inference), i.e., knowledge of

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30 the existence or non-existence of a thing from the knowledge of the relationship it bears to another thing, e.g., the inference of the existence of fire at the sight of smoke. (5) Sruta jnana which implies knowledge acquired by the interpretation of signs, symbols, words and the like. This form of knowledge depends on mati jnana for its data, or raw material, and differs from it in respect of its extent, for while mati jnana is confined to things existing within the range of senses in the present, the sruta may transcend these limits both in respect of Time and Space. Thus while an eclipse actually perceived with the senses is known by mati jnana, the one now taking place in a far off country and the one which took place in the reign of Alexander the Great would be known by the sruta. The most important form of sruta jnana is Agama, or the Scripture of Truth, i.e., tho word of a Tirthankara (God). It is also called sruti on the ground of its having been heard from another, and is admitted as a form of pramana, because it is the most reliable form of testimony, being the word of an Omniscient Being who is completely devoid of all forms of attachment and aversion, and who has, therefore, absolutely no motive or reason for deceiving or misleading anyone. The word of all other persons is not sruta, but ku-sruta (false NYAYA.

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. scripture), because it amounts to testimony which falls short of truth. The characteristics of a true Scripture are : (i) that it should embody the word of an omniscient Teacher; (ii) that its teaching should be true to concrete nature, and not by way of a general discourse on certain abstract propositions of philosophy or on the metaphysical aspect of religion; (iii) that it should speak out the precise truth without fear or favour; and (iv) that its sense should be plain, and not concealed, so that it should not become the cause of misleading any one. The special attributes of a true Teachers are : (i) that he should have evolved out omniscience which is a guarantee of fulness and perfection of knowledge, (ii) that he should be absolutely devoid of all personal motives for love and hatred in any form, *It may be pointed out here that no disembodied spirit, hence fully liberated Soul, can ever become a teacher, because a purely disembodied spirit is incapable of teaching for the want of a material body, the medium of communication with men. Hence, Scripture is the word of omniscient, deified men, preaching truth before the attainment of final emancipation as pure disembodied Spirit. This is tantamount to saying that it is not possible for an eternally and naturally free Supreme Being, as some imagine their God or Gods to be, to be the author of the Scripture of Truth.

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32 NYAYA. (iii) that he should have completely conquered his lower uature, and (iv) tbat he should have destroyed the bondage of the four kinds of his ghatiya* karmas. OHAPTER XVII. Mati joana, to be distinguished from ku-mati (false mati jnana), arises from the functioning of senses and mind, the former furnishing the raw material for thought and the latter converting it into ascertained truth. Ku-mati includes all kinds of false and erroneous ideas and notions which may be entertained by thinking beings. The first step of mati jnana consists in darsana or pure sensing, that is in an undifferencing, detailless cognition of the general features of a thing. This results in the acquisition of knowledge of the class to which the object belongs. Attention then comes into play, and engages itself in marking out the details and features of distinction of the object of enquiry, so that when analysis has furnished all the necessary or required particulars of a thing, intellect sums up (synthesis) the result of the investigation and the culmination of thought, i.e., the ascertainment of truth, is reached. *These are: (1) jna navaraniya, (2) darsana --varaniya, mohaniya and antara ya.

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. The following four stages darsana (pure sensing) and the jnana (knowledge). 1. Avagrha which means the singling out of an object with reference to its class only, that is the knowledge of its general properties, e.g., to know an object as a man. 2. Iha, or the attitude of enquiry leading to the ascertainment of truth about the object of avagrha, for instance, to enquire whether the object known to be a man be a Londoner. Tha must be distinguished from doubt which is not a form of jnana. 3. Avaya, i.e., the ascertainment of truth in respect of the subject of enquiry, as for instance, the determination or knowledge that the man about whom it was asked, whether he was a Londoner or not, was in fact a Londoner. 4. Dharana, that is being impressed with the idea thus formed, so as to be able to recall it subsequently. 33 Occur between acquisition of CHAPTER XVIII. Omniscience includes a knowledge of all things that existed in the past, exist now or shall come into existence in the future. It arises from the free functioning of the 3

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34 NYAYA. substance of consciousness, unhindered by the knowledge-obstructing influence of matter.* * There can be no getting away from the fact that the soul can never know anything unless it be endowed with the knowing faculty. The senses only give us impressions, photos or images of objects, but not the knower to cognize them; and it would be a miracle if they could create the knower, for they are unconscious themselves. There can be equally clearly no doubt but that the soul only perceives its own conditions or states of consciousness in knowing anything else, for very often that which it knows is very different from what is actually perceived, and in many cases what is known is never really perceived with the senses, e.g., ether which is invisible to the naked eye. The existence of a capacity to know, then, is a condition precedent to the consciousness of the soul, and it is evident that this capacity to know is not anything foreign to or acquired by the soul, but its very nature, for, as already observed, the separation of jnana (consciousness) from the jnani (knower) is fatal to both. It is also evident that there can be no limit to the knowing capacity of the soul, for neither reason nor imagination are liable to be limited by aught but the impossible, and though the senses of each and every living being do not embrace the whole range of phenomena, still there can be no doubt but that different beings take cognizance of different things, so that what is invisible to one soul does not necessarily remain unperceived by all. Owls, for instance, perceive objects in the dark ; and it is obvious that the minute little insects which are quite invisible to us must be known at least to the members of their own fraternity, for they breed and multiply. The inference is that while the soul is the knower in its own right, its knowing capacity is obstructed, more or less, in the case of different beings, though consciousness with its special properties-individuality and knowledge-being common to all,

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT, 35 The destruction of the four kinds of ghatiya there can be no differences of quality or quantity in respect of the potentiality of knowledge among them. This conclusion is fully supported by the facts or phenomena of clairvoyance and telepathy of the very existence of which men are almost wholly ignorant in this age, but which have been fully proved to be the natural functions of the soul (see the Proceedings of the Psychical Research Society). The nature of the soul being pure intelligence, thought (knowledge) or consciousness, the differences in the degree of its manifestation, among the different kinds of beings, as well as among members of the same species, must be due to the influence of some outside force, or agent, whose association or union with the conscious substance (soul) has the effect of depriving it of its pure clarity of knowledge. Unconscious matter is just such an agent, which as described in * The Practical Path' enters into union with the soulsubstance and thereby cripples its knowing powers, more or less, according to the type of bondage (the state of fusion of matter and soul). Thus, the differing types of consciousness depend on the operation of the knowledge-obstructing energies of karma, so that where they are actually in full play the manifestation of the knowing faculty of the soul may be reduced to the sense of touch, as in the case of onesensed beings (metals and the like), while in the converse case, that is where they are totally eliminated, the full blaze of omniscience must be the reward of the conquering jiva (ego). All the intermediate degrees of manifestation of consciousness between these two extremes, it can be seen in a general way, also owe their existence to the destruction or quiescence, or partial destruction and partial quiescence of these energies of knowledge-obstructing karmas, for knowledge being the very nature of the soul may be covered over by the veil of ignorance and uncovered' as often as it may, but it cannot be acquired or developed anew, or engrafted

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36 NYAYA. karmas sets the soul free to vibrate at its natural on an originally unconscious stem. If we ponder over this statement, we shall not be long in realising that no originally unconscious substance can, by the centralisation, or mirroring of stimulus in a central part, convert it into sensation and itself into a knowing being. The gulf between the conscious and the unconscious is too wide to be bridged over in this manner, and no intellectual jump or acrobatic feat of imagination can even faintly suggest the method by which or the manner in which such a miracle might be effected. The soul, then, is the knower in consequence of its nature, the purity of which is defiled by the absorption of the unconscious substance-matter. It follows from this that the tearing asunder of the veil of matter, by destroying or checking the energy of karmas, which interfere with the knowing capacity of the soul, is tho real means of increase of knowledge. Observation shows that passions and emotions considerably interfere with one's knowing capacity and clarity of intellect; and the effect of bias or prejudice on the faculty of judgment is too well known to need comment. Thus, our personal likes and dislikes, as well as passions and emotions, are the causes which interfere with the dawn of jnana. They cause the inflow of matter into the conscious substance, and the fusion of spirit and matter prevents the soul from exercising its natural function in full measure. Another cause of obstruction is the interest in the physical concerns of life which narrows down the zone of knowledge to what is regarded as the immediately useful for the requirements of the physical body. Attention here acts as a porter at the gate, and admits only the desirable, thus shutting the door against all ideas other than those presenting themselves in response to the invitation of the desiring manas (lower mind, the seat of desires). We, therefore, conclude that the functioning of consciousness is obstructed by certain kinds of energies, springing into being from personal likes, dislikes,

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. rhythm*, and to exercise its function of unlimited knowing. 37 interests, passions, emotions and desires. These energies have been classified under four different heads by the Jaina acharyas, and constitute what are known as the ghatiya karmas. *The rhythm, that is to say, the energy of functioning, of the soul, is of a most complex type, for it knows itself in addition to the object of knowledge at one and the same time, and also because its capacity to know things embraces the whole range of possibility, that which it can never know having no manner of claim to existence. It follows from this that the natural energy of the soul, as pure spirit a condition in which no interests or motives or other forms of obstruction remain to shorten the range of consciousness-is of a most complex type in which the rhythm of self-awareness holds together, in an interpenetrating manner, all other possible rhythms of knowledge none of which is denied freedom of functioning and operation. As such, the soul resembles a great melody in which the rhythm of the tune hovers over the rhythms of the notes that enter into its composition, and in which each of the notes, though a separate entity in itself, is nevertheless only an indivisible and inseparable part of the whole. Now, since rhythm is but another word for an idea in connection with the soul, because knowledge consists in the states of one's own consciousness, by putting the above in the simple language of philosophy, we may say that each perfect, or fully-evolved Soul, being pure consciousness freed from the blinding influence of matter, is actually an all-comprehensive Idea which sums up, as it were, and includes all other possible ideas without a single exception. Hence, the fullest possible knowledge, unlimited by Time or Space, is always the state of consciousness of a deified soul. In other words, the emancipated soul is simply jnana mayee (embodiment of knowledge), being pure consciousness in essence.

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NYAYA. CHAPTER XIX. A being can have from one to four different kinds of knowledge, but if he have only one, it must be kevala jnana (omniscience); if two, mati and sruta; if three, mati, sruta and either avadhi (clairvoyance) or manahparyaya (telepathy); and if four, then all except the first named. The reason for this is that mati and sruta jnanas are enjoyed by all excepting those who have acquired omniscience. Avadhi and manahparyaya arise from the observance of rules of conduct laid down for the guidance of ascetics, so that those who acquire them enjoy them along with the other two (mati and sruta). * Kevala jnana however, arises only when the soul completely withdraws its attention inwards, and, therefore implies a cessation of the functioning of the outward-turned senses and intellect. Avadhi and manahparyaya, being super-sensuous, that is independent of senses and mind, are but limited forms of omniscience, and become merged in it when it arises. * Avadhi jnana, according to the Scripture, is also enjoyed by great personages, such as Tirthankaras, from their birth. In their case it arises as the result of the past good karmas of their souls.

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. CHAPTER XX. Anumand (inference) is of two kinds, svarthanumana and pararthanumana, the former implying an inference drawn for one's own satisfaction, that is by oneself, and the latter one that is drawn at the instance or through the words of another. A svarthanumana process consists of three parts, namely, (i) a sadhya, i.e., that which is to be proved, (ii) a sadhana, or that which can exist only in relation with, and is, therefore, the determinant of the sadhya, and 39 (iii) a dharmi, that is the abode of the sadhya. The sadhya also called dharma, with reference to its abode the (dharmi), and the dharmi are sometimes taken together for the sake of brevity, and called paksa. In such a case there are only two limbs of the svarthanumana syllogism, the paksha and sadhana or argument, also called hetu. The sadhya may be defined as that which is shakya or abadhita (not opposed to or contradicted by direct perception or inference), abhipreta or ishta (which the disputant wishes to establish) * The ancients employed the terms vadi and prati-vadi respectively for the theorist and the opponent who raises all sorts of objections against the validity of a proposition propounded by the vadi. The prati-vadi is an imaginary being whose sole raison d'etre lies in the desire to establish the

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NYAYA. and aprasiddha or asiddha (which has not been ascertained as yet). It will be seen that the insistence on the quality of shakya is intended to save fruitless speculation, while the confining of the investigation to an aprasiddha sadhya is calculated to prevent the re-opening of an already settled point. The sadhana is a necessary part of a syllogism, because it is the mark of that which is to be proved, while the dharmi is required to localize the sadhya, for otherwise we might have smoke on a hill-top giving rise to an inference of the existence of fire in a lake, which would be absurd. The absence of a dharmi reduces anumana to tarka, for in the absence of an abode, the inference only amounts to a repetition of the abstract relationship between the sadhya and the sadhana of a syllogism. The dharmi may be either, (1) pramana prasiddha, i.e., that which is known by pramana, (2) vikalpa prasiddha, which is taken for granted, or supposed, or (3) pramana-vikalpa prasiddha, i.e., that which partakes of the nature of pramana and vikalpa both. truth of a proposition by refuting all possible objections that can be raised against its validity. He is also useful as a nameless substitute for criticising a sensitive rival.

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. 41 Illustrations. (a) This hill is full of fire, because it is full of smoke. (b) The horns of a hare are non-existent, because no one has ever seen them. (c) Man is the master of his destiny, because he has the power to control his actions. [Illustration (a) is an instance of the prama na prasiddha dharmi, because this hill' (dharmi) is the immediate object of preception. The dharmi of illustration (b) is vikalpa prasiddha because the horns of a hare, (dharmi), being purely imaginary, can never be established by pratyaksa or any other kind of pramana. The dharmi of the third illustration is pramana-vikalpa prasiddha, because it (man) includes those who are the object of pratyaksa as well as those that are vikalpa prasiddha.] CHAPTER XXI. Pararthanumana means the knowledge of sadhya from its sadhana arising in the mind* in conse * Some logicians hold the speaker's word itself to be the pararthanumana, but this is not correct, for the speech of another may be the occasion for knowledge or inference, but is never so itself. The real basis of inference in pararthanumana, as in svarthanumana, is the logical connection (vyapti) between the sadhana and its sadhya. Suppose we hear some one say: 'there is fire in this hill, because there is smoke on it.' The statement fulfils all the requirements of a valid syllogism so far as the speaker himself is concerned, but it is obviously little or no better than verbal testimony for the hearer, for unless his own mind lend assent to the proposition, he cannot be said to have drawn an inference,

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42 NYAYA. quence of the speech of another. It consists of two* parts, pratijna, and hetu. Pratijna means the proposition to be proved, and * It is said in Gautama's Nyaya Darsana that there are not two but five limbs of a syllogism of the pararthanumana type, namely, (1) pratijna, (2) hetu, (3) udaharana (illustration), (4) Upanaya, (statement showing the presence of the sadhana in the dharmi), and (5) nigamana (conclusion). The following is an illustration of a five-limbed syllogism : (i) This hill is full of fire (pratijna) ; (ii) Because it is full of smoke (hetu); (iii) Whatever is full of smoke is also full of fire, as a kit chen (udaharana), (iv) So is this hill full of smoke (upana ya); (v) Therefore, this hill is full of fire (nigamana). Gautama, however, ignores the fact that pararthanumana differs from svarthanumana only in so far as it arises at the instance of another, so that the true basis of inference and the form of syllogism are identically the same in both the types of anumana. Hence, the statement of paksa, called pratijna in a pararthanumana, and hetu are alone needed in an inference at the instance of another. It is obvious that the true basis of anumana is always the force of vyapti (logical connection), so that the moment this relationship is asserted by mentioning the sadhana, smoke and the like, mind is immediately led to that which is inseparably connected there with, and discovers the sadhya. This operation is performed of one's own accord in svarthanumana, but at the instance of another in the second kind of inference. In both cases, however, it is one's own mind that

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. 43 hetu is the statement of the logical connection, called vyapti, advanced in proof thereof. Illustration. There is fire in this hill (pratijna), because there is smoke on it (hetu). draws the inference. Upanaya and nigamana, besides serving no useful purpose, are also objectionable as pure repetition of what is already stated in the pratijna and hetu; and udaharana would reduce logic to a child's play. For while it may be necessary to cite an actual instance of vyapti (logical connection) in a veetraga ka tha (lecture to a pupil) to enable little children to familiarize themselves with the basis of inference, it is bad rhetoric to do so in the course of a visigishu-katha (logical discussion) with a clever and presumably learned opponent. And, after all udaharana only tends to establish the validity of vyapti, and may be useful in showing the necessary relationship between the sadhana and its sadhya ; it is of no real help in anumana which pre-supposes the knowledge of this relationship. The modern syllogism of three steps, or propositions, as they are called, is also open to objection for similar reasons. It is the culmination of a highly elaborate system of ratiocination, it is true, but it is no less true that the system of which it is the outcome is not a natural but a highly artificial one. The prac. tical value of modern logic, as a science, is to be judged from the fact that its inferential processes, though suitable, to a certain extent, for the purposes of the school-room, are never actually resorted to by men--not even by lawyers, philosophers and logicians--in their daily life, nor can they be carried out without first bending the current of thought from its natural channel, and forcing it into the artificial and rigid frame-work of an Aristotelian syllogism. The syllogism that answers the practical requirements of life and is natural to rational mind, then, consists of two and only two stops-pratijna and hetu.

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44 CHAPTER XXII. There are two ways of stating the inseparable logical connection, affirmatively, called anvaya, as in the statement, wherever there is smoke there is fire'; or in the negative, known as vyatireka, e.g., 'where there is no fire there is no smoke.' NYAYA. " A hetu of the first kind is called upalabdhi, and of the second anupalabdhi. The upalabdhi and anupalabdhi hetus are further sub-divided into two kinds each, the bidhisadhaka and the nikheda-sadhaka. The bidhisadhaka are those which prove the existence and the nikheda-sadhaka those that establish the nonexistence of some fact. Hetu may also be of a contradictory or of a noncontradictory type. The former, called virudhi, implies the existence of a fact which is incompatible with the sadhya. Illustration. There is no fire in this pitcher, because it is full of water. The non-contradictory (aviruddhi) hetu is the argument which is not based on any fact incompatible with the existence of the sadhya. Illustration. There is fire in this hill, because there is smoke on it.

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45 THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. CHAPTER XXIII. The necessary logical connection, called sadhyanyathanupatti, avinabhava or vyapti, is the basis of inferential validity, for otherwise one might infer the existence of water at the sight of smoke. There are the following five kinds of logical relationship between the sadhana and its sadhya : (1) Vyapya, or the relationship of part to the whole, (2) kurya-karna, i.e., causal connection, (3) purvachara-uttarachara, that is antecedence and consequence, (4) sahachara, or co-existence, and (5) svabhava which means peculiarity of nature, or identity. Of these, the second and the third categories embrace two types each, because the relationship of cause and effect and antecedence and consequence may be made to yield an inference relating to either the cause or its effect and to antecedence or consequence respectively. Thus, there are seven different kinds of relationship which give rise to a valid inference. The following table will be found to combine the conclusions reached in this and the next preceding chapter, and to specify the different kinds of logical connection, with due regard to the classification of hetu,

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46 NYAYA. -Svabhava xxii, -Karana xxi. Anupalabdhi (Vyatireka). Viruddhanopalabdhi (bidhi-sadhaka). Karya xx. -Sahachara xix. Uttarachara xviii. Purvachara xvii. _Karana xvi. Karya xv. Aviruddhanopalabdhi (nikheda-sadhaka). Vyapya xiv. Svabhava (nature or identity) xiii. HETU. _Sahachara xii. _Uttarachara xi, Purvachara x. Viruddhopalabdhi (nikheda-sadhaka). __Karana ix. _Karya viii. Vyapya vii. -Sahachara (concomitance or co-existence) vi. Upalabdhi (anvaya). -Uttarachara (consequence) v. -Purvachara (antecedence) iv. Aviruddhopalabdhi (bidhi-sadhaka). -Karana (cause) iii. --Karya (effect) ii. _Vyapya i.

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. 47 Illustrations.* (i) Sound is subject to modification, because it is a product. (ii) There is fire in this bill, because there is smoke on it. (iii) We shall have rain, because rain-cloudst are gathering. (iv) It will be Sunday to-morrow, because it is Satur day to-day. (v) Yesterday was a Sunday, because it is Monday to-day. * The numbering of these illustrations corresponds to the figures in the tabulated classification of hetu. + Here sound falls in the larger category of products which is characterised by the quality of being subject to modification. Therefore, being vyapya (included) in the larger class paka), it is liable to have the distinguishing feature of the whole class predicated of itself. When put in the form of a modern syllogism, this illustration would read : All products are liable to modification ; Sound is a product; Therefore, sound is liable to modification. Some logicians do not consider karana (cause) to be a true hetu, on the ground that it is not always followed by its appropriate effect (karya); but this is clearly wrong, since the true karana always implies an active, potent (samarthya) cause which nothing can prevent from producing its effect. In the instance of rain-clouds, the absence of all those causes which prevent them from giving rain is presumed and implied. The following is an instance which fully illustrates the force of karana as a true hetu : there is shade in this place because we have an open umbrella (the cause of shade) here,'

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NYAYA. (vi) This mango has a sweet taste, because it is ripe yellow in colour.* (vii) There is no cold here, because its antithesis, that is) fire is present here. (viii) There is no feeling of cold here, because there is smoke here (which is the effect of the antithesis of cold) (ix) This man is not happy, because he has present in him the causes of misery (the antithesis of hap piness). (x) To-morrow will not be a Sunday, because it is Fri day to-day. (xi) Yesterday was not a Friday, because it is Tuesday to-day. (xii) This wall is not devoid of an outside, because it has an inside (the sahachara of the outerside). (xiii) There is no jar in this room, because its svubhava (identity) is not to be found (that is nothing resembling its identity is present) in it. (xiv) There is no oak in this village, because there is no tree here. (xv) There are no (samarthya=potent) rain-clouds here, because it is not raining here. (xvi) There is no smoke in this place, because there is no fire in it. (xvii) It will not be Sunday to-morrow, because it is not Saturday to-day. (xviii) It was not Monday yesterday, because to-day is not Tuesday. * This illustration proceeds on the principle of concomitance or co-existence of colour and taste, so that the presence of the one is an index to the existence of the other. Another instance of the principle of co-existence.

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. 49 (xix) The right-hand pan of this pair of scales is not touching the beam, because the other one is on the same level with it. (xx) This animal is suffering from some disease, be cause it does not look healthy. (xxi) This woman is feeling unhappy, because she has been forcibly separated from her lover. (xxii) All things are anekantic (possessed of different aspects), because they do not enjoy absolutely one aspect alone. CHAPTER XXIV. Many-sidedness" is an important characteristic of pramana (valid knowledge) because things in nature wear that aspect. The immediate fruit or effect of pramana is the * Obviously knowledge must correspond to nature to be valid, so that it should know things as they actually exist, The form in which things exist is dravya-paryaya-rupa (dravya= substance, paryaya=condition or form, and rupa=aspect) from one point of view, nitya-anitya (nitya=eternal and anitya= transient) from a second, and samanya-vishesa (samanya= general and vishesa=particular) from a third, and so on. A gold ring, for instance, is neither a substance (gold) nor a form or condition ('ringness') alone; it is gold in the form of a ring. This is what is meant by the dravya-paryaya-rupa, for no sabstance can possibly exist without a form. Similarly, every thing is nitya-anitya, for while incessant changes of form follow one another, on the one hand, no change whatsoever takes place in the material basis of those changes themselves, on the other. The same is the case with the samanya-vishesa nature of things, each of which belongs to a class and is yet distinct from all other members of its species. It thus exhibits

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50 NYAYA. removal of ignorance; indirectly, it enables one to adopt of that which is good and to avoid the harmful. Pramana ultimately leads to moksa (nirvana), the goal of soul's evolution. CHAPTER XXV. According to Buddhist logicians, the true hetu should possess the following three characteristics:(i) it should be present in the paksa, (ii) it should also exist in the sapaksa, and (iii) it should not be found in the vipaksa. The paksa has already been explained to mean the sadhya and its abode, the dharmi; but sapaksa is the place where the sadhana and sadhya are known to abide in some already familiar instance, while vipaksa embraces all other places where the very possibility of the existence of the sadhya is counter-indicated. Illustration. This hill (paksa) is full of fire, Because it is full of smoke; Whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen (su paksa): Whatever is not full of fire is also not full of smoke, as a pond (vipaksa). qualities which are common to the whole class together with those special features of its own which are not to be found in any other member of that class. This amounts to saying that neither the absolutely general nor the absolutely particular can ever exist by itself in nature.

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. 51 The Naiyayakas* add two more attributes to the above three of the Buddhist hetu, making them five in all. These additional attributes are : (iv) it should not establish the opposite of the sadhya by any forcible or necessary im plication, and (v) it should not leave the matter in doubt by equally forcibly suggesting the existence of the opposite of that which is to be proved. The distinction between these two attributes lies in the fact that while the former actually proves the existence of the opposite of that which was to be proved, the latter simply leaves the matter in doubt by affirming the existence of both, the sadhya and its opposite, with an equal degree of logical force. Both these views are, however, erroneous, for neither the first three nor all the five features, as enumerated by the Naiyayakas, constitute the true characteristics of a hetu, the distinguishing feature of which is the unvarying and the universally true connection between the sadhana and its sadhya. It is possible for a given hetu to exhibit all the five attributes insisted on above and yet to be no true hetu at all. *The Naiya yakas are the followers of the Nyaya school of philosophy founded by Gautama.

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52 NYAYA. Illustrations, 1. It will be Sunday to-morrow, because it is Saturday to-day. Here to-morrow is the paksa, Sunday the sadhya, and Saturday the hetu. Hence, if the argument of the Buddhists and Naiya yakas were correct, and hetu did reside in the pak$a, we should have Saturday residing in to-morrow, which is absurd.] 2. The unborn child of Z will be of a dark complexion like all other children of Z who aro dark-complexioned, because he will be a child of Z. [By analysing this example, we get : (i) paksa=the unborn child of Z, (ii) sapaksa = the existing children of Z., (iii) vipaksa=children of others, (iv) sadhya=having a dark complexion, and (v) hetu=the quality of being Z's child. Here it is obvious that although the hetu resides in the paksa and sa paksa and is not to be found in vipaksa, thus fulfilling the three requirements laid down by Buddhist logicians, it is none the less no true hetu, since there is no necessary connection between the unborn child of Z and a dark complexion, it not being the order of nature that whoever is a child of Z must be dark-complexioned. The same considerations apply to the view of the Naiyayakas, because the hetu (the quality of being a child of Z) also proves neither the existence nor the co-existence of th opposite of the sadhya (dark complexion). Thus the illustration furnishes all the five requisites of a Naiyayaka hetu, and yet the conclusion arrived at sufficiently demonstrates its invalidity.) It should be further observed that the sapaksa and vipaksa are not to be found in each and every argument.

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. 53 Illustrations. 1. Things invisible to us are perceivable by some one, because they are proved by inference; whatever is proved by inference is also perceived by some one, as fire, etc. [Here 'things invisible to us' is the paksa and 'fire, etc.' the sapaksa, but there is no vipaksa, for the first two, that is the paksa and sapaksa, exhaust all objects.] 2. A living organism is characterised by the presence of the soul, because it breathes; whatever is not characterised by the presence of the soul does not breathe, as a clod of earth. [This is an opposite case to that in the preceding illustration, as there can be no sapaksa here, for all things are either living organisms (paksa) or not characterised by the presence of the soul (vipaksa), the clod of earth being not an illustration of sapaksa (where the sadhya and sadhana are to be found together) but only a form of vryatireka vipaksa.] Where the hetu does not admit of a vipaksa it is called kevalanvayi (purely anvaya in form); where it precludes the possibility of sapaksa, it is termed kevala (purely) vyatireki ; and in all other cases, that is where it takes both the anvaya and the vyatireka form, it is known as anvya-vyatireki. It must be clear now that the Buddhists and the Naiyayakas have altogether lost sight of the kevala nvayi and kevala vyatireki forms of hetu. CHAPTER XXVI. Abhasa (fallacy) is a falsehood which has the appearance of truth. There are many kinds of fallacy--one corresponding to every limb, or part,

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54 NYAYA. of pramana. The important ones of these will alone be described here. Pramanabhasa includes all those forms of ignorance-doubt, error and the like-which are characteristic of untruth. Tarkabhasa is the setting up of an inseparable connection between objects which are independent of each other, e.g., wherever there is smoke, there is lime.' Paksabhasa is the fallacy of proposition, and arises in the following cases :-- (a) When an unproved proposition is taken as proved, e.g., 'there is a maker of the universe.' (b) When the statement made is incapable of being proved, e.g., 'everything is perishable.' (c) When it is opposed to truth as established by direct perception, e.g., ' things are not characterised by many-sided-ness.' (d) When it involves a construction which is opposed to the accepted sense of words, e.g., taking a sister to mean a wife. (e) When it contradicts anumana, e.g., there is no omniscient being.' (f) When it is fatal to its own validity, e.g., "nothing exists.' Hetvabhasa is the fallacy of hetu (reason), and is of four kinds. "

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. 55 (1) Asiddha hetvabhasa which is either (i) sarupasiddha, whose faleshood is a matter of certainty, as in the instance,"sound is perishable because it can be seen with the eye'; or (ii) Sandigdhasiddha which implies an uncertainty about the existence of the sadhana itself. It will be seen that where the very existence of the sadhana be involved in doubt, validity of inference cannot be guaranteed, as for instance where it is uncertain whether what is seen be smoke or only vapour, no valid inference can be drawn about the existence of fire in the paksa. (2) Viruddha hetvabhasa which is inseparably connected not with the sadhya, but with its antithesis. An instance of this is : 'sound is eternal, because it is an effect.' Here obviously the quality of being an effect is connected with perishability, since effects are always compound and, sooner or later, resolve into their elements. (3) Anaikantika hetvabhasa occurs when the hetu is to be found in all the three, the paksa, sapaksa and vipaksa. The effect of the presence of the hetu in the vipaksa is to rob the conclusion of that logical validity which anumana directly aims at. The anaikantika hetvabhasa is of two kinds, (1) the nishchita vipaksa vritti where it is certain that the hetu resides in the vipaksa, and (2) the

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56 NYAYA. sankita vipaksa vritti where the matter is involved in doubt. Illustration, (i) Sound is perishable, because it is knowable. [This is an instance of the nischita vipaksa vritti type, because it is certain that the quality of knowability resides not only in perishable things, but also in those that are imperishable, e.g., space, souls and the like.] (ii) Watches are fragile, because they are manufactured with machinery. [This is an instance of the sankita vipaksa vritti. The fallacy in this case lies in the fact that it is not certain whether the quality of being manufactured with machinery does or does not reside in things which are not fragile, i.e., the vipaksa.] (4) Akinchitkara hetvabhasa is the fallacy of redundancy. This is also of two kinds. (a) The siddhasadhana which means the establishing of that which has already been proved by some other kind of pramana. Illustration, Sound is heard by the ear, because it is sound. (6) The badhita visaya which relates to a proposition inconsistent with pratyaksa (direct observation, or jnana), logical inference, scriptural text or its own sense. Illustrations. (i) Fire is not endowed with warmth, because t is a substance (inconsistent with pratyaksa.) (ii) Sound is unchanging, because it is not an effect (inconsistent with anumana.)

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. 57 (iii) Dharma (virtue or righteousness) is the cause of pain, because it resides in man. (Inconsistent with Scripture according to which dharma is the cause of happiness.) (iv) Z is the son of a barren woman, because she has never conceived (inconsistent with the proposition itself). Drstantabhasa occurs when a drstanta is not an appropriate illustration. This is of two kinds : (i) Sadharmya or anvaya drstantabhasa and (ii) Vaidharmya or vyatireka drstantabhasa. The Sadharmya fallacy arises when a negative illustration is given in place of an affirmative one. Illustration. There is no sarvajnya (omniscient being), because he is not apprehended by the senses, like a jar. [The illustration should have been of something not perceivable with the senses.] The raidharmya is the opposite of the sadharmya. Illustration. Kapila is omniscient, because he is beset with desires, like the arhanta (Tirthankara). [Here the comparison should have been with some one who became omniscient without giving up his desires, not with the Arhanta who is absolutely desireless.] Every illustration has reference to either the sadhya, or Sadhana, or both. This gives us three forms of the anvaya and three of the vyatireka drstantabhasa.

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58 NYAYA. Illustrations. (i) Word is apaurusheya (unproduced by man), because it is devoid of sensible qualities; whatever is devoid of sensible qualities is a paurusheya, like (a) sensual pleasure, (b) an atom, or (c) a jar. [Here (a) is an instance of the wrong illustration of the sadhya (because sensual pleasure is the opposite of apaurusheya), (b) of the sadhana (an atom is not devoid of sensible qualities), and (c) of both, the sadhya and sadhana (for a jar is neither upaurusheya nor devoid of sensible qualities). These are instances of the anvaya drstantabhasa.] (ii) Word is apaurusheya, because it is amurtika (devoid of sensible qualities); whatever is not apaurusheya is not amurtika, as (a) an atom, (b) sense-gratification, or (c) Space. [This is a threefold illustration of the vyatireka drstantabhasa. The atom, being apaurusheya, does not furnish an instance of the not-apaurusheya quality; sense-gratification is not not-amurtika, and space is neither not-apaurusheya nor not-amurtika.] Anvaya drstantabhasa also occurs where the order of the sadhya and sadhana is reversed in the exemplification of hetu. Illustration. There is fire in this hill, Because there is smoke on it; Wherever there is fire there is smoke (anvaya drstanta bhasa.) [The true form of the anvaya exemplification here should be: wherever there is smoke there is fire.']

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THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. 59 Similarly, vyatireka drstantabhasa also occurs when the sadhya and sadhana replace each other in vyatireka exemplification. Illustration. This hill is full of smoke, Because it is full of fire ; Whatever is not full of smoke is also not full of fire. [The fallacy is obvious, for there may be fire without smoke.] Balaprayogabhasa (bala=pertaining to children, prayoga=practice, and abhasa=fallacy) consists in not mentioning all the necessary limbs--proposition, hetu, udaharana, upanaya and nigamana (see footnote to p. 42 ante)-of a school-room syllogism. This fallacy also occurs when these limbs are given in a wrong order. Sankhyabhasa is a fallacy in reference to the sources of pramana (valid knowledg) which are (i) pratyaksa (direct knowledge), (ii) anumana (inference), and (iii) agama (Scripture). This kind of fallacy consists in denying any or all of these three sources, because while pratyaksa is the immediate destroyer of doubt and ignorance, the validity of logical inference cannot be ignored, and testimony, provided it be the word of a qualified observer and absolutely unimpeachable, is certainly the only source of knowledge of things beyond perception and inference both.

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60 NYAYA. Agamabhasa is that form of fallacy which consists in regarding the word of an unqualified teacher as the Scripture of truth. This fallacy also occurs when the true Scripture is misquoted to support a false proposition. THE END. Printed by Apurva Krishna Bose, at the Indian Press, Allahabad.

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