Nayakarnika

Author(s): Vinayvijay, Mohanlal Dalichand Desai
Publisher: ZZZ Unknown
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/011105/1

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The Library of Jaina Literature-Vol. III. - THE NAYA-KARNIKA A WORK ON JAINA LOGIC BY SRI VINAYA VIJAYA MAHARAJ Edited with Introduction, English Translation and critical notes BY MOHANLAL D. DESAI, B.A., LL.B: VAKIL, BOMBAY HIGH COURT AND HONORARY EDITOR, THE SWETAMBARA CONFERENCE HERALD, ETC., ETC. ' PUBLISHER KUMAR DEVENDRA PRASAD THE CENTRAL JAINA PUBLISHING HOUSE ARRAH, (Ind..)

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TRINTED NY APURVA KRISHNA BOSE. AT THE INDIAN IHRESS, ALLAHABAD

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CONTENTS. Preface . . Introduction . . . . . . . Author's Biographical Sketch . . . Text with English Translation and Critical Notes, Etc. . . . 27 . 39

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PREFACE THE Naya-Vada, or philosophy of standpoints, is a unique feature of Jaina metaphysics, and has been fully dealt with by some of the great acharyas of the past. The text of the present work--the Naya Karnika--is by Sri Vinaya Vijaya Upadhyaya, a famous Logician of the 17th century A. D., and has been selected for translation on account of its general freedom from tiresome technicalities as well as for its brevity. The Naya-Vada, it is to be observed, is an essential department of knowledge by itself, and bears the same relation to philosophy as logic does to thought, or grammar to language, or speech. I have ventured on a general outline of the subject in the introduction for the benefit of the non-Jaina readers, though the observations of one so little acquainted, like myself, with the basic principles of the rules of Thought, laid down by the Giant-Philosophers of the NayaVada, are hardly likely to throw much light on the subject. I avail myself of the present opportunity to acknowledge my indebtedness to the authors of the

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PRETAOC different works, such as The First Principles of Jaina Philosophy,' <Page #9
INTRODUCTION THE philosophy of Nayas (standpoints) is an integral part of Jaina Metaphysics, and Jaina philosophers have always laid the greatest emphasis on its proper comprehension. It is maintained that no one who is not fully acquainted with this department of philosophy is likely to make any real progress in knowledge, and none whatever in religion, however much he might make himself familiar with other matters. To estimate the true value of this statement it is necessary to determine the nature of knowledge itself, in the first instance. The object of knowledge is to make us acquainted with the nature of things, so that when we know a thing fully we are said to have knowledge of it. Now, knowledge arises in one of the two following ways: (1) it is either perceived directly, or (2) is inferred from facts of observation or record. The first kind, called Pratyaks'a, includes the kevalajnana (Omniscience) of the Siddhatman', the Manahprayaya? 1. A Perfect or Deified Soul. 2. Knowledge of the thoughts of others.

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INTRODUCTION. and Avadhi' of the Muni', and the sense-perception of the ordinary living beings in the world. The second category comprises mostly what has been called the indirect, or mediate, knowledge. Leaving aside the first class of knowledge with which we have no concern in the present work, we notice that the indirect, or mediate, knowledge ilself is of two kinds, namely, (1) that which is heard from others, and (2) that which is intellectually inferred. It is in respect of these two kinds of non-immediate knowledge that the greatest care is to be observed in accepting the statements of others or the deductions of our own reason. A number of tests have been laid down by the wise for the purpose of testing the accuracy of both these kinds of indirect knowledge. One of these tests, and the one with which we are mostly concerned at present, is the relativity of knowledge. Obviously, everything exists in relation to a number of other things, and is liable to be influenced by them. Hence, knowledge to be complete must describe it with reference to its relations with other things. Similarly, when things are described by men they are described generally from some particular point of 1. 2. A kind of telepathy. A Jaina ascetic.

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INTRODUCTION. exhaustive, adheres that of view, though some people are led to imagine this onc-sided description to be exhaustive, as, for instance, is the case with Advaitism which adheres to the standpoint of qualities alone and neglects that of evolution. This kind of knowledge, though true from the particular point of view from which it is arrived at, is certainly not true from any other. It is thus obvious that no piece of information, judgment, or scriptural text, can be relied upon to impart full knowledge of a thing, unless it is comprehensive enough to embrace the various descriptions thereof obtained from the different points of view. Jainism, therefore, warns us against falling a victim to imperfect information and being misled by it. Hence the importance which is attached to the philosophy of standpoints by the Jaina Metaphysicians. The oft-quoted parable of the blindmen and the elephant is admissible here to illustrate the point under consideration. Each of these persons, desirous of knowing what an elephant was like, touched and felt a separate part of its body, and went home pleased with the information they derived concerning its form. They then sat down to compare notes, and soon discovered that there was no agreement among them as to the form of the animal. The man who had only touched its leg described it

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INTRODUCTION. as a huge column, the one who had felt the ear as a winnowing fan, and so forth. They soon came to words and then to blows; and still no one was willing to admit that he was in the wrong. At last, there appeared another man on the scene who was not blind, and he was with difficulty able to pacify them and settle their disputes by convincing them of their partial knowledge. The lesson to be learnt from this instructive parable is that unless all the different aspects of a thing have been enquired into and studied, the partial knowledge based on any one aspect alone is liable to lead us into error and conflict with others. All the confusion of thought which is prevailing in the world is thus the outcome of inexhaustive research, and of the acceptance of a part for the whole. A single instance would suffice to satisfy the reader that most, even if not all, of our disputes only betray the pig-headedness of the blindmen of the parable in ourselves. For a long time past a keen controversy has been raging among philosophers as to the nature of will, some holding that it is free, others denying it. As a matter of fact, both parties are right, but only from their respective standpoints. If we approach the question from the point of view of the nature of will, that is to say, in respect of its

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INTRODUCTIOX. natural qualities, we must, with Bergson, arrive at. the conclusion that it is free, but if we look at it as regards its manifested appearance, that is to say, from the point of view of evolution, it is certainly subject to predeterminism of karmas (actions). It is thus clear that both the parties to the controversy have only got hold of partial truth, and are trying to pass. it off for absolute wisdom. The truth is neither in the view of the one nor in that of the other, but in a perfect synthesis of both, since will is free by nature, but liable to predeterminism of karmas as an incarnating ego. It is thus evident that the greatest care must be taken in accepting all one-sided statements. of facts, whether they come from gods or men. It must be remembered that our language makes it impossible for us to describe things in all their aspects at one and the same time, and, for that reason, is liable to lead us into error to a considerable extent. He who would avoid falling into the pitfalls of error must, therefore, first of all, try to understand and masterthe philosophy of Nayas. Jainism aims, from the very commencement, at a. systematic classification of the subject-matter of knowledge, and divides the philosophical standpoint into. two main heads, the Nis'chaya and the Vyavahara..

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INTRODUCTIOX. Of these, the former deals with the permanent -qualities, hence, the essential nature of things about which there can be no possibility of doubt, and which remains true under all circumstances, conditions and .slates. For this reason, it is called the Nis'chaya, i.e., the nalural or certain. The latter, however, only deals with things not with reference to their real or essential nature, but with respect to their utility, or non-natural states and conditions. The statement, This is a jar of clay '-is an illustration of the Nis'chaya Naya, while, "This is a jar of butter,' is true only from the Vyavahara, or the practical, point of view. Nis'chaya Naya is again divided into two kinds, namely, (1) the Dravyarthika and (2) the Paryayurthika. The former of these is the substantive point of view, since it describes things with reference to their general qualities or substances. The latter is the standpoint of evolution and gives prominence to forms or conditions, which souls and matter assume, from time to time, in the course of evolution. From the Dravyarthika point of view, it is correct to say that souls are all alike, since they are made of the same substance and have the same nature, but from that of the Paryayarthika Naya they -differ in respect of their special qualities, which have

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INTRODUCTION. evolved out in the course of transmigration or evolution. The Dravyarthika Naya is further sub-divided into three classes, Naigama, Samgraha, and Vyavahara. The Paryayarthika is also sub-divided into Rijusutra, S'abda, Samabhiridha, and Evambhuta. According to some achiryas (philosophers), the Rijusutra is to be treated as a sub-division of the Dravyarthika Naya, but this is only a matter of classification and has no bearing on the general aspect. of the subject. It is not to be supposed that there are only seven Nayas or standpoints of view: there are many subdivisions, and, according to the author of the original text, their number is seven hundred. But as the *principal ones are the seven described here, it would serve no useful purpose to enumerate the others. We may now proceed to consider these seven principal Nayas separately. (1) Naigama, from na, not, eko, one, and gama, certainly, hence the non-distinguished, is a point of view which does not distinguish between the general' 1 The word Vyavahara occurs twice in this classification, firstly, as one of the two main divisions of philosophical standpoint, and, secondly, as a sub-division of the Dravyarthika Naya. lo the first case it means thepractical siandpoint, and in the second the particular as defined later on.

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INTRODUOTION. and special qualities of a thing. For instance, when the word bamboo is used, a number of general as well as special qualities are at once referred to without a distinction being made among them. The .bamboo tree has a number of qualities which are common to it and other trees, and, in addition, it is possessed of a number of special qualities which are peculiar to it alone, and are not to be found in the remaining members of the genus tree. The word bamboo, therefore, at once refers the mind to a large number of qualities, some of which are the special property of the bamboo alone, while the rest are common to it and all other trees in general. Since it is not possible to separate these two kinds of qualities in an actual bamboo, the particular qualities thereof remain undistinguished from those common to all the trees in existence. This kind of description is, therefore, called the non-distinguished. It is not to be supposed that no distinction whatever is implied in the Naigama Naya, inasmuch as the mere mention of the word bamboo is sufficient to exclude all other trees from consciousness. What is meant is only this, that as the concept bamboo is equivalent to the con-cept tree plus a number of special qualities added tolit, the word bamboo at once calls to mind a class of concepts in which the qualities of a tree are

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INTRODUCTION . intermingled with those of a bamboo without distinction or demarcation among them. (2) Samgraha is the description of a thing from the standpoint of its general qualities alone. It is the standpoint of genus. For instance, when the word jiva (soul) is uttered, it refers to all kinds of jivas, without distinguishing among them, in respect of type, form, etc., etc. (3) Vyavahara, or the particular, is that point of view which makes a distinction between a genus and its species. The feature of distinction between the Samgraha and the Vyavahura lies in the fact that, while the former takes into consideration only the general qualities of a thing, the latter deals only with the particular attributes thereof. The Samgraha is the standpoint of a genus, but the Vyavahara that of species. (4) Rijusutra is the standpoint which only takes into account the present form of a thing, without reference to its past or future aspects. When a statement is made from this standpoint it is not to be taken as an absolute truth under all conditions, since the speaker only confines his observations to the present condition of the thing he describes, without troubling himself as to its past and future possibilities

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INTRODUCTION. , or aspects. The Rijusutra recognises nothing but the thing itself as it appears at the moment, and has no concern with its name (nama), or image (stha. pana), or with the causes which bring it into existence (dravya). A certain class of philosophers attach great importance to this point of view, and maintain that one ought to consider things only as they appear at the present moment, and should not worry oneself over their past or future. This view is certainly not likely to result in the perfection of knowledge or happiness by any means, being only confined to a very limited aspect of things. (5) The S'abda, or the verbal standpoint, observes the distinctions of gender, number, case, tense, etc., in synonymous words. For instance, the words Dara, Bharya and Kalalra differ in their grammatical gender, though they all signify wife. We may, therefore, say that the S'abda Naya is the standpoint of the grammarian who distinguishes between the meaning of words, on the ground of gender, number, etc. According to some writers, the S'abda Naya ignores the differences of synonymous words and treats them as if they all signified identically the same thing. This seems to be the view of the author of the original text of this work.

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ISTRUDUCTION. (6) The Samabhiridha Naya distinguishes belween words on etymological grounds. For instance, the words Indra, S'akra and Purandara, though of the same gender and applicable to the rulers of the Heaven-worlds, yet differ in meaning from one another, S'akra signifying strong, Indra, the possessor of many divine powers, and Purandara, the destroyer of the cities of the enemy. The difference between the S'abda and the Sams'abhiradha Nayas seems to lie in the fact that, while the former is the standpoint of a grammarian, the latter is that of an etymologist who tries to trace words to their roots. (7) The Gvambhuta Naya is that mode of comprehending things which takes into account their special functions or activities, and describes them by such words as are justified by their actual functions or activities. For instance, a pujari (worshipper) is called a pujari when he performs puja (worship). Similarly, only a strong man is entitled to be called S'akra. Indra can be called Purandara only when he is engaged in the act of destroying the cities of enemies, and so forth. This Naya is also the standpoint of etymologists. As the fallacies of these different kinds of Nayas throw considerable light on the nature of the Nayas themselves, they may also be mentioned here. There

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INTRODUCTION. are the following seven fallacies, corresponding to the seven Nayas : (1) Naigameibhusa is the fallacy of the Naigama Naya, and consists in making a separation between the general and special properties of things, e.g., to speak of the existence and consciousness of soul as if they could be separated from one another. (2) Samgrahabhasa, the fallacy of the Samgraha Naya, occurs when we describe the generic properties alone as constituting a thing. This gives rise to confusion of thought, because the general qualities alone can never constitute an actual object. For instance, the general qualities of a tree only give us the idea of tree-ness, never an actual tree. The latter will have to be some particular kind of treean oak, a mango, a nimb, or the like--and will, therefore, possess its own special qualities along with those of a tree in general. Whenever this fallacy has crept into a system of philosophy, the harvest of the scholar has been only a whirlwind of wordy abstractions instead of a knowledge of things as they exist in nature. (3) Vyavahiribhrisa lies in a wrong selection of species, as, for instance, is the case with Charvakism which makes wrong distinctions between substances and qualities, eta

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INTRODUOTION. 13 (4) Rijusutribhasa occurs when permanence, hence reality, of things is altogether denied, as is the case in the philosophy of Buddhism. (5) S'abdibhusa, the verbal fallacy, occurs when we ignore the distinguishing features of the S'abda Naya and deal with empty words as if they were applicable without reference to time, number, gender, etc., etc. (6) Samabhiruchibhusa consists in treating the words Indra, S'akra, Purandara, elc., as synonymous. (7) Guambhutubhusa lies in making the existence of a thing depend on the performance of the special function with reference to which its has been given a particular name, e.g., to say that a pujuri is a non-entity because he is no longer engaged in performing puja, is fallacious. From the above classification of Nayas it is clear that the first four of them relate to things (vachya) and the last three to words (vachaka). The former, strictly speaking, are the true standpoints of philosophy, since the latter are meant specially for linguists, grammarians and etymologists alone. But since the S'istras (scriptures) are couched in words only, and since the selection of words depends on the rules of grammar and is determined by their

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14 INTRODUCTION. derivations, the last three standpoints have also to be taken into consideration, in the interpretation of scriptural text. The above is necessarily a brief explanation of a subject which is capable of an enormous amplitude. If the reader is desirous of studying it fully, he should make himself familiar with works such as the Vis'e. suvas'yaka, the Naya-Chakra, etc., where the philosophy of Nayas is more elaborately and fully explained. As a result of the foregoing analysis of the different kinds of standpoints, we may say that the Nayas constitute the very foundation of the science of Thought. They are not rules of logic as understood in its strict sense, but in a very much wider though simpler aspect. As Mr. A. B. Lathe points out (see 'An Introduction to Jainism,' p. 108): "Logic, as applied to our present subject, is not a term denoting formal laws of thought. It constitutes the essence of Jain philosophy, without an adequate conception of whose importance, it would be impossible to realize the place of Jainism in the philosophical systems of the world, and the contribution it has made to the progress of human thought. As will be indicated further on, Anekant Logic is

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INTRODUCTION. 15 the doctrine which means to examine the very foundations of knowledge, and also to explain the autological problems that have beset philosophical speculations in all times. The value that Jainism itself attaches to this basis of its philosophy may appear extravagant to any superficial observer. It is asserted by a great Jain Acharya that this logic is as important as the Absolule Wisdom possessed by the Kevalin. it differs from the latter only in being 'indirect,' as distinguished from 'immediate' which is the characteristic of Absolute Wisdom. This loss caused by its being 'mediate' (.Apratyaksha or Shruta) is fully made up by its exclusive capacity lo demonstrate the truth of Absolute Wisdom to mankind. Thus Absolute Wisdom itself, not to speak of inferior degrees of knowledge, is baseless, without the Anekant Logic. Obviously, the reason of this is that this Logic is that which guarantees our capacity to know and provides us with criteria by which we should be able to test our knowledge. In one word, it may be called the 'method of philosophy, or that instrument of thought by which Tattva-)nyan or philosophy is polished (Sanskrit). It bears therefore the all-comprehending sense that logic' is invested with in Hegel. It is in Jainism what the science of ideas is in Plato or the Metaphysics in Aristotle."

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16 INTRODUCTION. Coming to the place of Nayas in Jainism, it is o be observed that the most prominent feature of its philosophy is the quality of many-sidedness, the anekanta-vuda. If the reader has followed me thus far, he will have no difficulty in following me still further when I say that all one-sided systems of Thought are liable to error and inaccuracy because of their very one-sidedness. There are more aspects than one of each and everything in nature, and it is obvious that the system which deals, not with all such' sides, but with only one of them, can have absolutely no claim to perfection or comprehensiveness of knowledge. Jainism avoids this one-sidedness of knowledge, and is enabled by the many-sidedness of its philosophy to deal effectively with all the moot points in their entirety. With the aid of its Anekinta method, it effectually disposes of all those hard problems of theology and metaphysics which have proved a fruitful source of error and dispule to the followers of all non-Jaina religions in the world. This many-sidedness of the Jaina philosophy is the true secret of its irrefutable perfection, though modern Orientalists have hitherto only discovered it to be a feature of indefiniteness. If these gentlemen had taken the trouble to understand the primary basis of philosophy, they would not have failed to observe

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INTRODUCTION. 17 that all knowledge is only relative and has to be described from different points of view to avoid falling into the errors which abound in all departments of Absolutism. One can readily find an excuse for their error, especially as they are not philosophers, but linguists, laboriously trying to force the concepts and ideas of a persect system of living Thought into the imperfect and rigid frames of modern speculation. The absolute deliverance of the soul from the bondage of Karmas is the final goal of knowledge and the secret craving of every animate being. There is no religion, worth the name, which does not aspire and profess to secure it for its votaries. This is what Jesus of Nazareth referred to when he said : 'Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect' (Matthew, v. 48). This 'father-like' perfection is to be attained by knowledge, and knowledge alone, in the first instance. Even here we find Jesus giving out the plain truth in plain language. He said : "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." --John, viii. 32. Knowledge of truth, then, is the means of the attainment of the perfection of gods and of freedom from the bondage of Karmas. The Bible is, however,

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INTRODUCTION. silent as to the things to be known, but Jainisme points out that right knowledge (Samyak Jnina), right belief or faith (Samyak Dars'ana) and right conduct (Samyak Charitra), combined together, constitute the path to Nirvana. Analysis shows that right conduct characterises only those beings who possess faith in its power to procure deliverance for the soul from the bondage of Karmas. Thus, no one who is devoid of right belief, or faith, can possibly realise the great ideal of perfection and bliss expressed by the simple word moks'a. Now, right belief depends on right knowledge, and cannot be thought of apart from it. Where knowledge is not made the foundation of faith, where reason does not endorse the formula of belief and where the germ of doubt is not destroyed by the fire of wisdom, nothing but confusion, bigotry, and sin are to be found there ; for the smothering of the voice of intellect can only give us fanatics of bigotry and prejudice ; it can never enable men to. acquire the wisdom of gods which shall make them free. Knowledge, and knowledge alone, then, is the door to power and freedom from bondage. But knowledge is not to be acquired by the perusal of scriptures alone, since the scriptural text has to be understood and reconciled to one's own limited knowledge in the first instance, and where, as in the case of the

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INTRODUCTION. 19: non-Jaina scriptures, the text is jumbled up regardless of the standpoint from which alone it is true, the necessity of reconciling its sense to the judgment of one's own intellect becomes a matter of the utmost degree of importance. Hence, the Naya-Vida is the touch-stone of the dogmatic pronouncements of all one-sided scriptures. There are three kinds of scriptural text, called S'ruta Inuna, namely, (1) Kunaya S'ruta, or Nayabhasa S'rula, (2) Naya S'ruta and (3) Sunaya S'ruta or Syadvada Sruta. Kunaya S'ruta means one-sided knowledge only; Naya S'ruta is also one-sided knowledge, but it does not disregard the other sides of things, while Sunaya Sruta, or Anekuntavada, also called the Syidvadaor Pramuna S'ruta, recognizes all the sides of things. The qualities, or properties, of a thing are ascertained from its different aspects, and constitute its true knowledge. Sunaya or Pramuna S'ruta, i.e., the Syadvada recognizes all of them ; Naya S'ruta recognizes the one which has been ascertained from a particular standpoint, without denying the rest ; but Kunaya, or Nayabhasa, recognises only one of them, to the exclusion of the rest. True Naya always predicates one of the innumerable qualities of a thing, without denying the rest. If it deny the rest, or any

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INTRODUCTION. of the qualities not in consideration, at any particular moment of time, it becomes Nayabbasama fallacy, that is, a Naya, which appears to be correct, but is not so in fact. It is thus clear that no one who has not mastered the philosophy of Nayas and is not in a position to find out from which point of view a certain passage in the Sruta Jnana is true, is at all likely to benefit by the study of scriptures. According to Jainism, the kind of knowledge which leads to the realisation of the great ideal of divine perfection, consists in the mastery of tattvas (principles) which are seven in number. They are : (1) Jiva, the living or animate substance, or essence, (2) Ajiva, the inanimate things, or substances, (3) Asrava, or the inflow of matter (karmas) into souls, or the causes of the bondage of jivas, (4) bandha, the absorption of matter (the energy of Karmas) into, or the union of karmas with, the soul, (5) Samvara, the stopping of the inflow of matter into the soul, (6) Nirjara, the gradual removal of the matter already in combination with the soul, i.e., its partial deliverance from karmas and (7) Moks'a or complete deliverance of the soul from its Karmas. If merit (punya) and demerit (papa), the results produced by the varying good combinations in the case of punya, and by the varying bad combinations in the

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INTRODUCTION, case of pupa karmas of Soul, be considered as separate principles, instead of being included, as they are here, under Asrava, there will be 9 principles. The knowledge of these principles is acquired by means of pramunas (proofs of knowledge) and nayas (the methods of comprehending things from different standpoints). Thus nayas are essential to the acquisition of true knowledge. In the parable of the blind men we saw that the knowledge of each of them was only partially true, and that their different and seemingly conflicting views only needed a comprehensive and all-embracing statement to be reconciled to one another. Precisely the same is the case with philosophy and religion, and the comprehensive survey of the different aspects of things presented by Jaina philosophy enables us, at once, to reconcile the seemingly hostile and irreconcilable views of all the non-Jaina doctrines of the ekuntavada (one-sided) type. Comprehensiveness of thought, then, is the real basis of philosophy. But since ordinary speech is ill suited to the requirements of such a system of Thought, the acharyas had to resort to a unique system of predication to carry on their metaphysical discussions. This system, known as the Saptabhangi, is the basis of the synthetical comprehensiveness of

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22 INTRODUCTION. knowledge which is characteristic of Jainism. The Nayas give us what may be termed the analytical knowledge of things, and the Saptabhangi, literally, the seven-fold or seven-branched system of predication, enables us to sum up the results of investigation, without departing from the strict rules of Logic. To understand the basic principles of this method, it is necessary to understand the nature of predication first of all. Predication is the statement of our conclusions in respect of things. Of all kinds of possible judgments, the affirmative and the negative are necessary for the description of things when the truth is known with certainty, since they affirm or deny the existence of a property or quality in reference to them. So far there is no difficulty involved in predication, but things assume a very different aspect when comprehensiveness of thought is aimed at, for then the results of enquiry from different standpoints have to be incorporated in one and the same judgment and al one and the same time. The greatest confusion is likely to result from the summation of affirmative and negative conclusions in one and the same judgment, unless there be a method of logical predication to avoid inconsistency of thought. To avoid this possibility of confusion, the acharyas have laid down seven

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INTRODUCTION. different lypes of predication which cover all possible cases of simple as well as complex judgments. Each of these predications begins with the word syat, (literally somehow, hence, from a particular stand point, or in a certain manner,) to avoid denying the other possible aspects. These seven kinds of predications are : (1) Syadasti (exists). (2) Syannasti (does not exist). (3) Syadasti nasti (affirmation of existence from one point and of non-existence from another). (4) Syadavaktavya (indescribable). (5) Syadasti avaklavya. (6) Syannasti avaktavya. (7) Syadasti nasti avaktavya. Of these seven kinds of predications, the first two alone are simple judgments. The rest are all complex predications, describing things from different points of view at the same time. A thing is said to be avaktavya, i.c., indescribable, when existence and non-existence are both attributed to it at one and the same time, as must be the case with pure abstractions, such as heat, cold, goodness, etc., etc. They cannot exist by themselves, that is, apart from the substances in which they inhere, and yet are capable of being mentally conceived in the abstract.

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INTRODUCTION. Hence, they are indescribable and unanalysable any further. Thus, the Saptabhangi is the method of synthesis devised to express the comprehensive knowledge of things, without being inconsistent or illogical. The Nayas enable us to study the nature of things from the analytical point of view, and the Saptabhangi sums up the results of the investigation in a systematic logical way. To conclude, the different kinds of Nayas are the instruments of analysis whereby different aspects of things are isolated and studied from different points of view, and the Saptabhangi is the method of synthesis which sums up the results of investigation in logical thought. They are both essential to avoid the common errors of the ekanta-vadins of the non-Jaina schools of philosophy and for arriving at the true nature of things. It is the philosophy of the Syad-Vada propounded, in full, for the last time, by Bhagvan Sri Mahajira Svami, the last of the 24 Tirthankaras, which alone is characterised by the feature of many-sidedness, the sole test of the relativity of knowledge, and which, in the words of a great American thinker, is "competent to descend into the utmost minutiae of metaphysics and to settle all the vexed questions of abstruse speculation by a positive

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INTRODUCTIOX. method (not merely asserting na iti, na ili, not so, not so)--to settle at any rate the limits of what it is possible to determine by any method which the human mind may be rationally supposed to possess. It promises to reconcile all the conflicting schools, not by inducing any of them necessarily to abandon their favourite 'standpoints,' but by proving to them that the standpoints of all others are alike tenable, or at least, that they are representative of some aspect of truth which under some modification needs to be represented ; and that the integrity of Truth consists in this very variety of ils aspects, within the rational unity of an all-comprehensive and ramifying. principle."

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AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. SRI VINAYAVIJAYA was born in a Vanika (Sravaka) family, in Gujarat, his father's name being Tejapala, and his mother's Rajori.* When and at what place he was born and then be was initiated into the Jaina Monks' order (took diksa) remain in oblivion. Notwithstanding this, from the traditions and a crop of legends that have surrounded his name, the date of his birth may be assigned to S. Y. 1670. This would make him a co-student and a co-worker of Sri Yashovijaya, who received a command for reforming the Jaina Church from Vijayasinha Suri f. Vijayasinha Suri who is referred to in the * Vide a concluding verse of all the chapters of his great work . Loka-Prakasa,' vis. vizvAzcaryadakIrtikIrtivijayazrIvAcakendrAntipad rAjazrI tanayo'taniSTa vinayaH zrItejapAlAtmajaH / kAvyaM yatkila tatra nizcitajagattatvapradIpopame saMpUrNaH khalu saptaviMzatitamaH sargo nisargojjvalaH // | Vijayasinha Sari was born in S. Y. 1644 at Merta, and initiated into the Monks' order in S. Y. 1654. He got the title of Upadhyaya in S, Y. 1073, became Acharya in S. Y. 1882, and died on Asarha Sukla 2nd, s, Y. 1709, at Ahmedabad.

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28 AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHICAL SKETOII. concluding verse of this book) died in 8. Y. 1709, when our author inust have been more than 30 years old. From his works it is certain that Vivayavijaya's preceptor's name was Kirtivijaya Upadhyaya, who was a disciple of Hiravijaya Suri, while Yashovijaya was the pupil of Nayavijaya wliose guru, Labhavijaya, was & disciple of Kirtivijaya's co-pupil Kalyanavijaya, as will appear from the following list of succession of acharyas : Hirarijaya Suri? (No. 58). Vijayasena Suri Kalyanavijaya. Kirtivijaya. Vijayadeva Surit Lablarijaya. Vinayavijaya. (No. 60). Nayavijaya Vijayasinha Vijayaprabha Yashovijaya, sari. Suri (No. 61.) * Hiravijaya Sari was the 58th Pontiff of Tapa Gachha from sri Mahavira. He was born on the 9t de was born on the 9th of Margasirsa Sukla. S. Y. 1083, at Prahladanapara (modern Palanpar), and was initiated on Kirtika Krisna 2nd of S. Y. 1596, at Patan. He got the title of Upadhyaya on Magla Sukla 5th, at Naradaptri, and that of acherya in S. Y. 1010, at Shirohi. Ho died at Una, on 11th Bhadrapada Sukla, S. Y. 1652, + Vijayadeva Suri, the 60th Pontiff, was born in S. Y. 1643. He got the title of Pandvyasa (pandit) in S. Y. 1655, and that of Acharya Sari, in S. Y. 1050. On account of his great austerities and learning, the then Emperor Jebangir awarded him the title of Maha-Tapa,' He died on Asadha Sukla 11th, 8. Y. 1713, at Una, near Junagadh after Vijayasinha Sari.

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AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCU. 29 Thuis Vinayavijaya and Yashovijaya trace their descent from the illustrious Jainacharya Hiravijaya Suri who lived in the time of Akbar the Great. Hiravijaya, whose memory is preserved in the Mahakavya, entitled the Hira Saubhagya, was of the Swetambara sect, and is especially known for the great service he did to the cause of Jainism, by obtaining several firmans from the Great Emperor Akbar in favour of the Jainas. One of these firmans (Royal Warrants) recognised the right of Jainas to their Tirthas (holy places) which the Emperor made over to certain Jainas, and another prohibited the slaughter of animals during the Pajusana and on the dates held sacred by the -Jaina community. Vinayavijaya studied from his gurre all the -Jaina scriptures, and then asked his permission to go to Benares, well-known from ancient times -as the most famous centre of learning, to study the metaphysics of the non-Jaina schools of philosophy. Yasovijaya joined him on his journey to Benares, and they soon reached that famous city. Here they found themselves compelled to put off their Jaina-ascetic's dress because of the prejudices of Brahmanas against the Jainas who were termed Nastikas (heretics or atheists). The nature of tbe batred of the Brahmanas for the Jainas may be judged from

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30 AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. the following saying which was openly taught by the Pandits: hastinA tADyamAno'pi na gacchejjainamaMdiram / [Trans. Even if one be killed by an elephant one should not take shelter in a Jaina temple.] Under the circumstances, no Bralmana Pandit was expected to accept a Jaina as his pupil. Vina-- vijaya and his companion Yasovijaya therefore, changed their dress, and calling themselves Vinayalal and Jasulal respectively appeared before a learned Brahmana who was trell known for his erudition in the six famous darshanas (systems) of Hindu metaphysics. They rere readily accepted as pupils, and began to pursue their studies, Yasovijaya taking a great interest in Lagic aud Vinayavijaya in. Grammar. In due course of time, they successfully completed their study of the six darshanas and other subjects counected with philosophy. Both Yasovijaya and Vinayavijaya Tere endowed with wondrous memory, and used to astonish the peoplewith their memorizing seats. Their guru's library contained a certain book which hall descended to him from his ancestors, and which was only meant to be taught to his own progeny. One day it so. happened that Jasulal tras sitting by the side of his preceptor when he was giving lessons to his eldest son from that book. He noticed the embarassment. of the old Pandit in explaining a particular passage

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AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCU. 31 of the text, and, being a brilliant logician himself, respectfully threw a suggestion as to the true mode of its interpretation. The guru was delighted with his pupil's intelligent explanation, and acceded to bis request for a loan of the manuscript for a day. The book contained twelve huvdred verses, but both Vinayalal and Jasulal managed, between themselves, in the short interval of 24 hours, to commit to memory the whole of it ---Jasulal 700 verses and Vinayalal the remaining 500. It took Vinayavijaya and Yasovijaya twelve years to complete their course of study, at the end of which they both adopted their original Jaina ascetic's dress. Yasovijaya succeeded in winuing a victory over a great disputant, who surrendered his two diplomas of Mahamahopadhyaya and Nyaya Visarada. Subsequently, Yasovijaya also acquired the covetous title of Nyayachurya* on his composing one hundred works. Yasovijaya and Vinayavijaya finally took leave of their gulr'u and departed from Benares. They separated from one another, and travelled to different places. Vinayavijaya came to Junagadh, in Kathiawad, on pilgrimage to the holy Jaina Tirtha, Girnar Hills, in S. Y. 1708, in which * This is borne out by the following verse at the end of the Jaina Tarka Paribbasa : pUrva nyayavizAradatvavirudaM kAzyAM pradattaM budhaiyAyAcAryapadaM tataH kRtazatagraMthasya yasyArpitam /

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32 AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHICAL. SKETOL. year he also finished his grand and voluminous, work, the Loka-prakasa. About this timo he niust have repaired to the seaport Diva (Dwipa), where he composed the 'Naya-karnika.' Then he went to Radbanpur, in S. y. 1710, where he composed a commentary on Hemachandra's Grammar, caller. Haimalaghu-prakriya. As the tradition goes, Vinayavijaya Jalted at Cambay for four months. At this time Cambap iras a gseat commercial port and its Jaina Sravakas rrere wealthy and prosperous, firm in faith and obedient to the monks. In this town there were many Brahinana Pandits. They often came and debated. with Vinayavijaya, when the latter would proceed with his morning sermon (Vyakbyana). On account of this, Vinayavijaya could not go on sinoothly with his lecture, and the Sravakas found the constant interruption a source of annoyance, and felt irritated and disappointed. Vinayavijaya sent for Yasovijaya to pula stop to the disturbance. Yasovijaya came and derised a novel plan. He wrote out a verse: containing a large number of labials and affixed it. to the door of the UI pasraya, with a note to the effect that he who wisher to debate could enter within and debate only if he could repeat that verse without allowing his lips to come together. The test of a successful fulfilment of the condition consisted in the application of red lead (sandura) to the lower

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333 AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. lip, so that if the upper lip received any colouring matter the candidate must be deemed to have failed in his attempt. In the morning, the sermon proceeded, and the Brahmana Pandits came as usual to carry on their debates. They read the verse and the remarks on the door, and, finding themselves unable to fulfil the condition, went away. The sermon went on without any hitch, and the Sravakas were pleased. Subsequently, Yasovijaya, when asked by the Brahmanas to repeat his verse according to his condition successfully perforined the feat, as he had acquired the proper knack of doing so by long practice. Though the matter should have ended here, Yasovijaya offered his readiness and willingness to open regular debates. He defeated his adversaries in argument, and in consequence five hundred Brahmanas became converted to Jainism, in fulfilment of the condition transcribed on a copper-plate in the State assembly. (It is said that this copper-plate is still preserved in some Upasraya temple or Bhandar at Cainbay.) Vinayavijaya passed the rainy season of S. Y. 1716 at Surat, and of S. Y. 1723 at Gandhar, in Marwar, where he finished his composition 'Santasudha-rasa. He spent the Chaumasa (rainy season) of the Samvata years 1729 aud 1738 at Rander in Gujarat, and died at that place towards the end of 1738, leaving his Gujarati work 'Sripalas Rasa' .

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34 AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. half finished. This unfinished work was completed by Yasovijaya.* The following is a list of some of the works written by Sri Vinayavijaya Acharya. Sanskrita Works. 1. The Sukhabodhika.--A commentary on the well-knowu Kalpa-Sutra, which is read by the Jainas during their Pajusana holidays. This was composed on Jyestha. Sukla 2nd, S. Y. 1696. It has been published by Devacbanda Lalbhai Pustakoddhara Fund, Javeri Bazar, Bombay. 2. The Lola-Prakasa. An original voluminous work of 20,621 verses, dealing with the Jaina view of the Universe (cosmos). The author has cited more than 700 anthorities, showing that be was a voracious reader and an exact writer. The work was completed at Jirnadurga, (modern Junagadh, in * Refer to the last prasasti of the said Rasa sUri hIra gurunI bahukIrti , kIti vijaya uvamAyAjI / ziSya tAsa vinayavijaya vara , vAcaka suguNa sohaayaajii| vidyA vinaya viveka vicakSaNa , lakSaNa lakSita dehAjI / sobhAgI gItAratha sAratha / saMgata sakhara sanehAjI / saMvata sattara aDatrIsA varase , rahi rAMdera caumaaseNjii| saMghataNA AgrahathI mAMDyo , rAsa adhika ullAseMjI / sAdhaM saptazata gAthA viracI , pahotA te surlokejii| tehanA guNa gAveche gorI , mali mali thoke thokajI / - - -

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AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCII. 35 Kathiawad) on Jyestha Sukla 5th, S. Y. 1708. This has been published by Pandit Hiralal Hansaraj of Jamnagar. 3. The Naya-karnika.--A small elementary priwer for those who want to understand the a, b, c of the Jaina philosophy of standpoints (nayas). This was composed before or at the end of S. Y. 1708, as appears from its concluding verse, which mentions tbe name of Vijayasinha Suri, who died iu S. Y. 1708, at Dwipa (modern Diva), near Junagadh, in Kathiawad. This, with its commentary by lluvi Sri Gambhiravijaya, since deceased, is published in Jaina Stotra Saugraha, Part I, by The Yasovijayi Jaina Pathasala of Benares. 4. The Haima-Ingh-prakriyd. -A commentary on Sri Hemachandracharya's Great Grammar, entitled 'Sri Siddha-Haima Sabdanukasana, in 2,500 slokas (verses). It was completed at Rajadhanyapura, modern Radhanpur, in Gujarat. This has been published by The Jaina Dharma Prasaraka Sabha of Bhavnagar. The author has written a commentary on this very pork, in 35,000 verses, which is still unpublished. 5. The Santasudharasah.--A treatise on the sixteen bhavna (points of moral and mental culture for meditation and concentration), including the four chief ones, maitri (friendship, and the like, and the stwelve subordinate ones, anityatva (transitoriness),

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36 AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHICAL SKETOH. etc. This with a comwentary by Muni Sri Gamblinravijaya, since deceased, has been recently published by the Jaina Dharma Prasaraka Sabba of Bhavnagar. The work was composed at the seaport towu of Gandhapura (modern Gaudhar, near Cambay) in S. Y. 1723. Gujarnti Compositions, These with the exception of the Sripala llasa are all short poens composed br the author. The following are a few of liis more important works in Gujarati : A prayer in glory of Dharmanatha, entitled the Laghu-upamitibhava-prapancha. The Stavana is a short allegory on this illusory world. This was composed in S. Y. 2716, at Surat, The Stavana, embodying the siguilicance of the five causes necessary for the accomplishment of a thing, viz., kula, svabhdvu, niyati, pirva karma, and purusartha, was composer in S. Y. 1723, The Punyaprakasa-stavnna or Aradhana-stavana, was coinposed in S Y. 1729 ou Vijaya Dasami, in glory of the last 'l'irthankara Nabavira, in angiver to a question How can the rail of salvation be attained ?' The Vinaya-Vidsa is a collection of 37 spiritual poems which are simple, street, and full of pathos.

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AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. The Sripala Rasa is the author's long descriptive and narrative poetical work, which was left unfinished on account of his sudden death, in S. Y. 1738, at Rander (in Gujarat), and was completed by bis co-student, Sri Yasovijaya Upadhyaya, as stated before. The poetry of our author can vie with that of the premier Gujarati poet, Premananda, who was his contemporary. 37 In the end, it can be said of the author that he has rendered a valuable service to the cause of Jainism by utilizing his abilities in writing useful works on its philosophy and religion in Sanskrit and Gujarati.

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nayakarNikA NAYA-KARNIKA. TEXT AND TRANSLATION. Naya-karnika is coinposed of two words, naya and karniku. Naya means a standpoint or an aspect of viewing a thing from that standpoint or aspect. Karnika means a pericarp, or the central point, of a flower. The thing which is to be viewed from different aspects is the pericarp or the central point, and the various standpoints from which it is viewed form the various petals surrounding thepericarp. Thus the title 'Naya-Karnika' is fully appropriate to the subject-matter of this book. Taken as a whole, Naya-karnika means a flowerwhich bas for its pericarp, or central point, the thing to be viewed ; and for its petals the various standpoints from which it is to be viewed. Benediction and subject-matter. vardhamAnaM stumaH sarvanayanavarNavAgamam / sNksseptstdunniitnybhedaanuvaadtH||1||

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40 VAYA-KARNIKA. Vardhamanam stumah sarvanayana-dyarnargania, Sauksepatastadunnitanayabhedanuvadatah.-1. Tauri Shri Vardhamana or Lord Mahavira the last, jue., 24th Tirthankara, who attained nirvana in 527 B.C. *: (we) praise ; pa all ; 74 standpoint; te river ; arNava ocean; aAgamaM scripture; saMkSepata: briefly; tad (from) it; eta culled ; tam various aspects ; vgaga: transcribing). We offer our praise to Lord Vardhamana, whose gospel is an ocean, with all kinds of rayas as so many streams flowing into it, by transcribing, in brief the various view-points culled from it (the -ocean-like gospel).- 1. [This verse is in anustup metre, and the following 20 verses are also in the same metre, while the last two are in vasantatilaka metre.] Names of Standpoints. naigamaH saMgrahazcaiva vyvhaarrjusuutrko| zabdaH samabhirUDhevaMbhUtau ceti nayAH smRtaaH||2|| Naigamah Sangrahas' chaiva Vyavaharajjusutrakau. S'abdah Samabbirualaivambhutau cheti nayah Smtitah-2. [Ana: the non-distinguishod (standpoint); dae: the -collective-generic, and also, Baer the practical, gan and the straight-espression, Tee: the verbal, Tarietate the subtle and the such-like, efa and that -79: aspects, a: are spoken of.]

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SAYA-KARNIKA. The standpoints are the non-distinguished (Naigama), the collective-generic (sangraha), the practi*cal (v'yavahora), the straight-expression (rijusttra), the verbal (sabda), the subtle (samabhiridha and the such-like (exambhuta. General and Specific Properties of Things. arthAH sarve'pi sAmAnyavizeSA ubhayAtmakAH / sAmAnyaM tatra jAtyAdi vizeSAzca vibhedkaaH||3|| Arthah Sarvepi Simanya viseka Ublayatrakab, Samanyam tatra jatyadi visesa cha vibledakab. -3. [mai: objects; sa all;. ut also ; margin: having general and particular properties; e ht: possessed of both; sAmAnya general properties ; tatra therein; nAtyAdi (expressing) : jate (genus), etc., fan: the particular properties; 9 and; Ferie: (are) differentiating). All objects possess two kinds of properties, viz., (1) Samanya or the generalizing (general), and (2) visesa or the differentiating (specific) properties ; the general expressing the genus (jali), etc., and the specific expressing the species, differences and . distinctions. .Distinction between General and Specific properties, or Illustrations of Sumunya and Vis'esa. yabuddhirghaTazate bhvetsaamaanydhrmtH| roSAca nijaM nijaM lakSayanti ghaTaM jnaaH||4||

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42 NAYA-KARNIKA. Aikyabuddhirghatasate bhavet Samanyadhar matah, Vesisachcha nijam nijam laksayanti ghatam jauah.-4. [ aikyabuddhi: recognising oneness ; ghaTazate in each of a hun - dred jars; (there) would be; : by means of general properties; fa by means of specific or particular properties; and; faci fi one's own, as the case may be; fa distinguish; ghaTa a jar; people]. By means of general properties in each of a hundred (hundred here means 'all') jars, one idea (that of jar-ness) is recognised, and by means of specific properties, people distinguish each individual-particular jar as their own.-4. Explanation.-Suppose there are lying here many jars; if we look at them from the standpoint of their general properties, we know only their jar-ness which is common to all of them: but if we view them from the aspect of their differentiating properties, we notice their differences, since they are not all alike, some being large, some small, some of red colour, some of black, some belonging to A, some to B, and so on. The Characteristics of the Non-distinguished (Naigama) Standpoint (naya). naigamo manyate vastu tadetadubhayAtmakam / nirvizeSaM na sAmAnyaM vizeSo'pi na tadvinA // 5 //

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NAYA-KARNIKA. -5. Naigamo manyate vastu tadetadubhayatmakam, Nirvisesam na samanyam videsopi na tadvina. 43 [the non-distinguished (standpoint); regards, considers; an object, thing; those, aforesaid; possessed of both (specific and general properties); fafa devoid of-without specific property; not; the general property; fan the specific property; also; not; af without that, i.c., general property.] The non-distinguished (naigama), regards an object as possessing both the aforesaid (general and specific) properties; (because) no particular thing in nature is possessed of a general property unaccompanied with some specific property, nor even of a specific property unaccompanied with the general one common to its class. 5 Explanation.-Naigama (+/7!i a aspect, view, standpoint} means that which does not consider (only) one aspect, that is, which regards both the samanya and visesa. This aspect of Naigama is true, because samanya is not irrelative of visesa or vice versa. In the third verse we saw that all objects are possessed of both general and specific properties. not, one, Characteristics of the Collective (Sangraha) Standpoint (naya). saMgraho manyate vastu sAmAnyAtmakamevahi / sAmAnyavyatirikto'sti na vizeSaH khapuSpavat // 6 //

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44 NAYA-KARNIKA. Sangraho manyate vastu samanyatmakamevali, Samanyavyatiriktosti na visesah kbapuspavat. -6. saMgraho collective standpoint, manyate deals with; vastu an object; ATARIAT possessing the general property ; taip only as it were ; re faith! apart from the general property; an is; 7 pot; paita: the specific property ; rycyna like a sky-flower.] The collective (sangraha) deals with the general properties alone of an object, while recognizing that there exists no visesa (specific property) apart from scimanja (general property), i.c., both visesa and sa manya arla co-existing and coincident. Samanya, devoid of /visesa, is like a khapuspa (sky-flower), quite a nomentity, i.e., existing " no wliere." 6. Sangraha illustrated, or instances of the Collective standpoint. vinA vanaspati ko'pi nimbAnAdirna dRzyate / hastAntarbhAvinyo hi nAgulAdyAstataH pRthak // 7 // Vina vanaspatim kopi nimbannradirna drisyate. Hastadyantarbhavingo hi nanguladyastatah prithak.-7. [feat without ; at fa vegetable; firsfa any single; fafaranga: A nimab tree, a mango tree and others; a not; Erta is seen, -conceived ; Fimeahiraman being included in the hands, &c.; fe in the same way--as for an example; 7 not; megaGT: the fingers, &c.; 'wa: from them (fingers, &c.); que separately.] 1

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NAYA-KARNIKA. 45 Not a single nimb, mango or any other tree is ever conceived, apart from (its general property) vegetable-ness. In the same way, fingers, etc., which are included in the idea of hands, etc., cannot be conceived of separately from the hands, etc. 7. Explanation. In this verse, the emphasis is on the fact that special qualities can have no existence without a substratum of general properties. No one has yet seen a mango plant which did not possess the general quality of tree-ness. Characteristics of the practical (vyavahara) standpoint. vizeSAtmakamevArthaM vyavahArazca manyate / vizeSabhinnaM sAmAnyamasatkharaviSANavat // 8 // Visesatmakamevartham vyavaharascha manyate, Visesabhinnam samanyamasat kharavisanavat. -8. [vizeSAtmakaM possessing special properties ; eva only; artha an object; : the practical standpoint; and; takes into consideration; f apart from the specific quality; sAmAnyaM general quality : asat false ; kharaviSANavat like a donkey's horns.] The practical (vyavahara) takes into consideration an object as possessing specific properties only; as the specific, apart from the general, is a nonentity like a donkey's horns. S.

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.46 NAYA-KARNIKA, Instances of the Practical standpoint. vanaspatiM gRhANeti prokte gRhNAti ko'pi kim / vinA vizeSAnnAnAdAstanirarthakameva tat // 9 // Vanaspati gribaaeti prokte grihnati kopi kim, Vina Vissesinnamradinstau nirarthakameva tat.-9. [mmenfa vegetable; Tera take, bring; fa that; ali on being asked,--told ; horfa brings; hisfa anyone; far what; fram without; Fagara specified ; at a mango tree, etc.; m; therefore; farctai vain, purposeless; ma simply; ma that (general quality)]. If one is askeri to bring vegetable,' can one do so? Withont the specification of particularity, e.g., mango, etc., such speech is vain. 9. Explanation. This is to illustrate the principle that general qualities have no existence of their own. If they did, we should have manhood, stupidity, wisdom, etc., existing apart from living beingswhich is absurd. Another Illustration. vraNapiNDIpAdalepAdike lokaprayojane / upayogo vizeSaiH syAtsAmAnyena hi kahicit // 10 // Vranapindipadalepadike lokaprayojane. Upayogo Vfsesaih syat saimauye pa bi karhichit. -10 [RO & wound, sore, bruise or hurt ; fovergaats a kind of

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NAYA-KARNIKA. unguent; sed and in other such things; arquerora in the interests of the people ; gut any act contributing to the fulfilment of a desired object, usefulness ; faza: by means of the specific properties; tura would be (accomplished); Warna in the general property ; fe by no means, not at all; affra at any time] No wound, bruise or scratch can possibly be healed by the applicatiou of the general property of poultice-ness or ointinent-ness. The healing properties only inhere in specific poultices or ointments. 10. The Characteristics of the Straight Expression (Rijusiltra naya.) RjusUtranayo vastu nAtItaM nApyanAgatam / manyate kevalaM kintu vartamAna tathA nijam // 11 // Rijusutranayo vastu natitam napyauagatam, Manyata kevalam kintu vartamanam tatha nijam.--11. ( A straight expression ; e a standpoint ; un an object ; 7 not; a past; 7 not; i even ; mini future; How considers ; i solely, only; Feries but; anti present ; fat and; fasi one's own, natural state.] The straight expression (rijusutra naya) does zot trouble itself with the past nor the future aspect of a thing; it is only confined to the present and refers to the nijan,' i.e., the natural state. 11. Explanation.--This standpoint does not consider

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48 NAYA-KARNIKA. the past because of its having ended, nor the future because of its having not arisen, but solely deals with the present and natural aspect of a thing because that alone is karyakurin, i.e., useful for the moment. Argument as to the characteristics of the Straight Expression standpoint. atItenAnAgatena paraskIyena vastunA / na kAryasiddhirityetadsadgaganapadmavat // 12 // [atItena with the past ; anAgatena with tho future ; parakIyena with non-natural ; vastunA with a thing ; na not; kAryasiddhiH the serving of purpose; fa becausc; this; wrong, false ; gaganapadmayat like a sky-lotus.] Neither the past, nor the future, nor the non-natural qualities serve any purpose. They are false; [they are like] a sky-lotus (non-entity.) -12. Explanation. The argument underlying the rijusutra view point is that of immediate utility which naturally must be grounded upon the present aspect of a thing. For instance, it is of no use to a beggar in his present life if his son of a previous birth, or the would-be daughter-in-law of a future incarnation, i. e., re-birth, happens to be a ruling prince. In the same way, qualities not belonging to a thing would stand it in no good stead in the immediate concerns of life.

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NAYA-KARNIKA. Alodes of recognizing things (niksepas), and their bearing on the grijusulra, and the succeeding rayas. nAmAdicaturveSu bhAvameva ca mnyte| na nAmasthApanAdravyANyevamagretanA api // 13 // Nainadichiatursvesu blavameva cha manyate, Na namasthilpanadravganyeramagretana api. -13. [are the name ; ma and other ; aguong among the four (niksepas---inodes of recognizing things); pri the nature real natural state ; ta only-truly; and ; para considers ; # not ; * the name ; farq an image, form. ano and the causes which bring a thing about; s in the same way; MAT: the succeeding (nayas); a algo.} (The risusutra naya) recognises only the real natural state of a thing out of the four, the name nama niksepa, etc; in the same way, the succeeding nayas. 13. Explanation. - thing is recognised (1) by its name (nama niksepa), (2) by its shape or image (sthaparri niksepa), (3) by the causes which bring it about (cravya wiksepa), or (4) by its nature, i.e., the real, natural state (bhciva nziksepa). Neither name nor shape, nor image, nor the causal antecedents cau, however, be termed the true attributes of a thing. They are all its unreal, attributed qualities. The only natural attributes (bhdva niksepa)

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NAYA-KARNIKA. of a thing are those which really constitute its nature. The Rijusutrn and the succeeding three nayas, viz., Sabdn, Samabhiridha and Evambhuta take cognizance of the fourth, or the bhara nikesepa only. They only stndy the real, natural aspect of things, and attach no iniportance to the unreal, attributed state, viz., name, shape-image, or causal antecedents. The Naigama, Sangraha, and Vyavahara however, recognise all the aforesaid 'modes. or niksepas. T'he Characteristics and Instances of the Verbal (Sabda) standpoint. artha zabdanayo'nekaiH paryAyairekameva ca / manyate kuMbhakalazaghaTAghekArthavAcakAH // 14 // Artham Sabdanayonekaih paryayairekarneva cha, Manyate kumbhakalasagliatadvekartha vachakah..--14. [w sense ; Teath the verbal standpoint ; w : many; nofa: by synonyms ; of one ; an only; 9 and ; taera treats ; kuMma ajar ; kalaza a jar'; paTa n jar; prAdi etc.. skArthayAcakA: signifying the same sense.] The Sabda Nayn treats synonymous words as all having the same sense, for instance, kumbha, kalasa, ghata, etc., are all expressive of one and the same object (viz., a jar). 14.

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NAYA-KARNIKA. 51: Dxplanation.--The meaning is that the Sabda Naya does not concern itself about the differenceof synonymous words, but simply deals with them as if they were pure eguiralents of oneanother. The Characteristics and Instances of the subtle (Samabhiridho) standpoint. brUte samabhiruDho'tha bhinnpryaaybhedtH| bhinnArthAH kuMbhakalazaghaTA ghaTapaTAdivat // 15 // Brute ramabhirudhortham bhinnaparyayabledatah, Bhinnarthih kumbhakalasaghatii ghaaspitadivat.--15. [ga speaks of; one the subtle standpoint; na' sense ;fingefarea: by the difference in different synonyms ; furt: having different senses ; 417 2: the kumbha, kalasa and ghata--a jar, a jug and a pitcher ; vuelicaa like a ghatu-- a jar, a prta-cloth, etc.] The Sambhirudha naya holds that, with the difference of the words expressing the object, the sigoificance of the object also differs : just as a jar (ghata) and a piece of cloth (pata) are different, so. a jar, a pitcher and a pot (kumbha, kalasa, and ghata, though synonyms) signify different things (according to their derivative sense': for instance, a ghata is that which makes a noise like ghat, ghat, and so on.) 15.

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NAYA-KARNIKA. - Explanation--The meaning is that, while the - S'abda naya wonld treat synonyms as equivalent words, the Samabhirudha would distinguish them from one another on etymological grounds. : ; Argument as to the Characteristics of the subtle (Samabhirudha) Standpoint. ' yadi paryArAbhede'pi na bhedo vastuno bhavet / bhinnaparyAyayorna syAt sa kuMbhapaTayorapi // 16 // Yadi paryayabhedepi na bhedo vastuuo bhavet, Bhinnaparyayayorna syat sa kunbbahaatyoTapi.-16. yadi if ; paryAyabhede in the different synonyms ; na not; bhedo difference; aegas of a thing; wa (there) would be; fifte Tapeet: possessing different words; a not; Fira (there) would be; o that (difference); H9zar: of kumbha and pata, 2.c., a jar and a cloth ; ara also.] [For] if different synonyms (paryayas) of a thing do not distinguisli that thing, (there) can be 110 such (distinction) between a jar and a cloth, which have also different words (paryayas) for them. 16. The Characteristics of the suck-like (Evambluta) standpoint. - ekaparyAyAbhidheyamapi vastu ca manyate / . Faili mafute and 1 30.11. Ekaparyayenhidhegarnapi rastu cha manyate,

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VALA-KARNIKA. 53 Karyam svakiyam kurvanamevamblutanayo Chruvam.-17.. . . .. .....' [ekaparyAyAmidheya expressed by one controvertible term; api only, however ; ag an object ; tra recognises ; mai function ; Faretira one's own, natural; said in the state of. doing ; tomater the such-like standpoint; na verily, surely.] Evambhuta raya (the such-like standpoint) verily recognises an object denoted by a word only when the object is in the actual state of performing its own natural function (as suggested by the derivative meaning of that word). 17. .'' Argument as to the Characteristics of the such-like (Evambhita) standpoint. ' yadi kAryamakurvANA'pISyate tattayA sa cet / . . tadA paTe'pi na ghaTavyapadezaH kimiSyate // 18 // Yadi karyamakurvano pisyate tattaya sa chet, * Tada patepi na ghatavyapadesah ksmisyate.-18. [yadi if ; kArya function ; akurvANa: not doing ; api even'; iSyate. is recognised ; aerar really; a It (object); ta if ;. per then ; e in a cloth ; efa also ; , not ; veyaz: an appellation of -a jar; for why; sva is accepted.] [For) if a thing be really recognized, even when it does not fulfil its function, then why can cloth be not called a jar? 18. . * Explanation.--If a thing is 'not in the state of of performing its function, as 'expressed by the -term at the moment of recognition, and still it ::

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NAYA-KARNIKA. .be recognised as that thing, then even a jar cans be called a cloth, though it is not in the state of discharging the function of a cloth. Etymologically, Evanbhuta means 'true in its entirety to tlie word and the sense.' This means that all the 'qualities denoted by the word are prominent and observable; the Samabhimdha is also true to the word and the sense, but not entirely, some of the qualities being in the background or not yet realized. Similarly, the Sabda is also true to the word and the sense, but not so true as the Samabhi-- rusha, since it throws a larger number of qualities. into the background than the last-named standpoint. Thus each of these namas is purer than each preceding one, although they all belong to the same type, more or less. Inter relation between the said standpoints, their importance and divisions. yathottaraM vizuddhAH syurnayAH saptApyamI tthaa| ekaikaH syAcchataM bhedAstataH saptazatApyamI // 19 // Yathottaram visuddhah syurnayah saptappami tatha. Ekaikah spachchhatam bhedastatah soptasapyami.-19. (reme in regular order or succession, one by one; Farreta pure ; : would be ; : standpoints ; 67 seven ; sufa also; son these anger and ; vt each of them; tata would be;

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NAYA-KARNIKA. 55 mi a hundred; star: divisions; ma: therefore ; porta seven hundred ; nfa also; w these.] Each succeeding standpoint of these seven nayas is purer than the preceding one : cach of them bas a lundred sub-divisions ; therefore there are seven bundred nayas (in all). 19. athaivaMbhUtasamabhirUDhayAH zabdaeva cet / antarbhAvastadA paMca nayapaMcazatIbhidaH // 20 // Athaivambhatasamahhirudhayoh sahda eva chet, Antarbhavastada pancha naya panchasatibhidah.--20, zriya but, evaMbhUtasamamiruDhayoH of the Bramblastta and Samabritirildha nayas; toe in the Sabda naya; a only; 9if; antarbhAva: inclusion; sadA then ; paMca five; nayapaMcazImidaH (would be) divided into five hundred nayas ] But if we include the subtle (Samabhirudha) and such-like (Erambhuta) in the verbalt (sabaal * Compare with the bhigya on Umasvatis's Tattvarthidhigana sutra, 1.85 saying 1 yathArthAbhidhAnaM shbdH| Of. ANARQUERERTOGT 29T: 11 8 11 3811 --Tattvarthidhigama Satra. + Note - From both of the above quotations, it will appear tbat Umasviti makes a mention of five nayas, including the subtle and such-like (Samubhiridha and Evambluta) standpoints in the verbal (sabda), and, while doing so, he gives a different Dame, viz.,-the suitable (Samprata) to what is here described as the .Verbal' (Subda.)

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NAYA-KARNIKA. standpoint, then there would be five standpoints, and the same could be divided into five hundred.. 20. drvyaastikpryaayaastiphyorntrbhvntybhii| AdAvAdicatuSTayamantyecAntyA'strayastataH // 21 // Dravyastikaparyiyastikayoranlarbhavantyami, Adavadicbatustayainrntyechantyastrayastatah.. 21. [conferuabari : in the Dravya stila and Paryayastila nayas; ifra are included; of these; set in the first, 2.e., in the dravyastika naya; nauceri the first four ; para in the last, i.e., in the paryayastika naya ; and ; #TAT: final; 72: three (nayas); aa: therefore.] These (seven aspects) can be included in or grouped under [two, i.e.,](1) the dravyastika (which considers the common attributes of all the dravyas, that is to say the general properties of substances) and objects) and (2) the paryayastika (which leals with the specific attributes, qualities and conditions of objects) nayas. The former of these. includes the first four, and the latter the last three. 31. According to sowe Acharyas, the former includes jhe first three and the latter the last four, * The dravyastika and the paryayastika are more commonly called druvyarthika and paryayarthik nayas,

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XAYA-KARXIKA. 57 How are all these aspects embodied in the Jaina Philosophy? sarve nayA api virodhabhRto mithaste, sambhUya sAdhusamayaM bhagavan bhajante / bhUpA iva pratibhaTA bhuvi sArvabhauma pAdAmbujaM pradhanayuktiparAjitA drAk // 22 // Sarve naya api virodhbntito mithaste, Sambhuya sachusamayam blagavan bhajante ; Bhapa iva pratibhati bhuvi sarvabharma, Padambujam yaadhanayukti parajita drak.-22. [ca all; mut: standpoints ; nfh also; fadeya: bearingdifference; faz: inutually ; a they ; tira gathered together ; wygai good scriptures ; #797 Oh Lord ! Hora worship,'. serve; bhUpAH kings; iya like ; pratibhaTA: hostile warriors; bhuvi on earth; grafraumile the lotus-like feet of the SovereignEmperor; prathanayuktiparAjitA: defeated in military warfare; drAk. quickly.] Oh Lord ! although all standpoints differ from themselves inter se, they collectively serve your Gospel, just as on earth kings, though hostile to each other, after baving been defeated in military warfare serre at the lotus-like feet of, or pay homage to, the Sovereign-Emperor. 22. * This verse is in the Vasanta-tilaka metre.

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.58 NAYA-KARNIKA. Conclusion. itthaM nayArthakavacaH kusumairjinenduaftisfaa: afani faqeniran | zrIdvIpabaMdaravare vijayAdidevasUrIziturvijayasiMhagurozca tuSTane // 23 // Ittham nayarthakavachahkusumairjinendur, Virorchitah savinayam Vinayabhidhena ; Sri Dvipabandaravare Vijayadideva Surisiturvijayasinhaguroscha tustyai.-23; [ itthaM thus ; nayArthakayacaH kusumaiH by means of flowers, in the form of words, explaining the significance of nayas (standpoints); r: the moon among the Jinas (conquerors) or kevalins, the omniscient ones; ar: the Lord Mahavira; da: worshipped; af with modesty; fan by (me), named Vinayavijaya); in the beautiful auspicious seaport of Dvipa, the modern Diva; feof the disciple of Vijaya-deva Suri; fegy: of the preceptor, Vijayasinha; get for the satisfaction.] Thus the Lord Mahavira-the moon among the Jinas or Kevalins-was, with modesty, worshipped by means of flowers, in the form of words, explaining the significance of nayas (standpoints) by me, named Vinayavijaya, in order to satisfy the Guru (preceptor) Vijayasinha, a disciple of Vijayadeva Suri, in the beautiful, auspicious seaport town of Dvipa (the present. Diva in Kathiawad). 23. *This verse is also in the Vasanta-tilaka metre.

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