Jinamanjari 1996 09 No 14

Author(s): Jinamanjari
Publisher: Canada Bramhi Jain Society Publication
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/524014/1

Page #1
JINAMANJARI International Journal of Contemporary Jaina Reflections Volume 14 Number 2 October 1966 ISSN 1188-0287 Comprehending Contemporary Japanese Scholarship Early and Medieval Jainism Philosophy, Mathematics and Literature with Theme Guest Editor Dr. Fuginaga Sin Miyakonojo National College of Technology Bi-annual Journal from North America BRAMHI SOCIETY PUBLICATION

Page #2
JINAMANJARI for the expansion and diffusion of Jaina knowledge and reflection a bi-annual Journal published every April and October Editor-in-Chief Dr. S.A. Bhuvanendra Kumar Associate Editor S.N. Prakash Production Navita Jain Kumar Mikal A. Radford Papers for publication must accompany with notes and references seperate from the main body. Send to the Editor 4665 Moccasin Trail, Mississauga, Ontario Canada, LAZ 2W5 Telephone: (905) 890-3368 Copyright of Articles is Reserved Publication Council President Dr. Dilip K.Bobra Tempe, AZ, USA Members Dr. Pradip Morbia Port Neches, TX, USA Mr. Jitendra A. Shah Edmonton, ON Mr. S.N. Prakash Sylvania, OH Prof. Srimandhar Kumar Bangalore, India Dr. C. K. Khasgiwala Andover, MA Dr. Mahaandra Jain Scarborough, ON Dr. Mahendra R. Varia Martin, KY. dv

Page #3
IN THIS ISSUE 1 Recent Jaina Scholarship in Japan - Dr. Atsushi Uno 8 The Concepts of Bhavya in Early Jainism - Dr. Fuginaga Sin 19 Mati in the Tathvarthdhigamasutra - Dr. Eiichi Yamaguchi 38 A Select Comparison of Passages From Early Buddhist and Jain Texts - Dr. Kenji Watanabhe 53 Geometric Formulas in the Dhavala of Virasena - Dr. Takao Hayashi 77 Laxmichand Jain: A Modern Jaina Mathematician - Dr. Padmavatamma 84 Book Review - Mikal A. Radford

Page #4
Recent Jaina Scholarship in Japan Dr. Atsushi Uno Professor Emeritus, Hiroshima University Jainism, a great religious tradition which arose from the spiritual soil of Indian long before the Christian era. It has a longer history than Buddhism, the other major philosophical system which has exerted a considerable influence on the spiritual life of India. The cultural heritage of India has, in fact, been sustained by three great religions - Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism. Jainism and Buddhism bear a close resemblance to each other in many respects -- especially in matters of tenet -- yet, it is deplorable that so little is known about Jainism outside India. For hundreds of years in Japan, the study of Buddhism was undertaken almost exclusively on the basis of Chinese translations of the Buddhist canons and its commentaries. These early Japanese scholars, however, aimed at spiritual peace rather than a fulfillment of intellectual curiosity. Since their study of Indian thought was chiefly centred on Buddhism as a religion, "Indian philosophy" has been understood by the Japanese as synonymous with "Buddhismism." Japanese scholars of the past have no doubt made a considerable contribution to the study of Buddhism. In the present state, however, Indological studies in Japan show a great deal of variety, but, on the whole, Buddhism is still the chief object of scholarship. The beginning of Jaina studies in Japan came much later. Buddhist sources, however, do not

Page #5
seem to have described Jainism accurately; instead they present distorted accounts of other traditions in order to demonstrate the superiority of Buddhism to other philosophies. This practice is hardly confined to Buddhist materials. When one system of thought tries to present a striking contrast to another with the intention of justifying its own theory, there invariably arises a sort of purposeful distortion. It is chiefly the philosophical aspect of Jainism that has drawn the interest of Jaina scholars in Japan. This is due to the fact that the purely philosophical approach to Indian systems of thought has long since taken root in Japan, while in the West the philosophical approach is frequently combined with methodologies from other disciplines such as linguistics, social science or history. However, some change in this Japanese academic tradition is being effected by younger scholars who have had a chance to study Jainism at various institutes abroad. In our country, due to a long-term tradition of the institutes, governmental or private, we cannot expect any one individual scholar to be a specialist or researcher dedicated exclusively to the study of Jainism. Some scholars, however, do tend to focus on parallels in the Jaina Agama and Pali Buddhist canons, while others seem to find a keen interest in the comparative study of logic and epistemology in the later Sanskrit works. Although Jainism, independently, invented several unique methods of logic at an early date (i.e. nuva, svadvadu, and niksepa), its systematization of epistemology cannot actually be studied without an understanding of Buddhist logic. It is interesting to note that Buddhist texts of a less religious character, such as the logical works by Dignaga and Dharmakirti, missed their Chinese translation. These particular texts, therefore, remained unknown to Buddhists-at-large for hundreds of years. Recently, however, it has become known that many Buddhist-Sanskrit manuscripts, the greater part of them long regarded as lost, have been well-preserved in various

Page #6
Jaina bhandaras, and traditionally studied by Jaina monks. It is an irony of fate that Buddhist materials have been handed down and preserved by a rival system, and it is only thanks to this care that these manuscripts have escaped falling into oblivion. Although scholars in this country, on the whole, are not yet in a position to do full justice to the vast collection of Jaina texts and commentaries, I am looking forward to the achievements of young scholars who avail themselves of this primary source material. Strange to say, but a few Japanese students have studied Buddhist logic and epistemology, sitting at the feet of eminent Jaina monks and scholars in Gujarat -- a situation which I have no doubt will continue into the future. And although these young scholars may possibly lack fundamental training in various areas, I hope Jaina friends at large will, far from offering discouragement based on fanaticism and self-righteousness, extend them kind encouragement and spiritual support. In Japan the first academic study of Jainism, to the best of my knowledge, came to fruition in a work entitled Sacred Books of Jainism by Shigenobu Suzuki (1890-1920), and published as part of the series of the World Sacred Books written by various Japanese scholars. It consists of Japanese translations of the Tattvarthadhigumasutra, thc Yogasastra, the Kalpasutra, and a summary of Jaina theory and history (342pp.). Prof. Ensho Kanakura (1896-1987), who published two books on Jainism in Japanese, must be mentioned as a pioneer of Jaina studies in Japan. One treats the tenet of Jainism in relation to other Indian systems of thought (445pp), and the other is devoted exclusively to Jainism and contains Japanese translations of the Tattvathahigamsura, Nyayavatara, and Pancastikavasara (1st chap.), the Pravacanasara (2nd chap.), etc., together with exhaustive accounts of Jaina history (506pp.). Prof. Kanakura once studied under Dr. Hermann 3

Page #7
Jacobi, and he was followed by two eminent Indologjsts, i.e. Prof. Seiren Matsunami (1903-1979), a student of Dr. Walther Schubring, and Prof. Hajjme Nakamura. Both of them have discussed several matters of importance on Jainism in their books. In 1986, The Society for Jaina Studies was founded. The main activities of the Society are 1) holding meetings once a year where three members read papers on Jainism, 2) exchanging necessary information on Jaina studies, both domestic and abroad, and 3) publishing a yearly journal. Although a number of theses on Jainism have been published by Japanese scholars, here I will confine myself to a discussion of recent articles of the last decade. Independent books dealing with Jainism: (1) H. Nagasaki: A Study of Jainu Epistemology (Japanese Translation of Hemacundru's Prumanumimamsa), (452pp.) Kyoto, 1988. (2) S. Ohira: A Study of the Bhagavatisalru: A Chronological Analysis (Prakrit Text Series NO.28), (287pp.) Ahmedabad, 1994. (3) T. Hayashi: Indian Mathematics (in Japanese), (299pp.) Tokyo, 1993. The fourth chapter deals with Mathematics in Jainism. (4) M. Yamazaki and Y. Ousaka: A Pada Index and Reverse Puda Index to Early Jaina Canons [Ayaranga, Suyagada, Uttarajjhaya, Dasaveyaliya, and Isibhasiyaim), (537pp.) Tokyo, 1996. This work was originally published in five separate volumes in 1994-95. Articles Included in Commemoration Volumes or Independent Books: (1) T. Tanigawa: "Agamic Jainism (in Japanese)," included in the Serial Issues of Oriental Thought, vol. 5, Tokyo, 1988.

Page #8
(2) A. Uno: "The Development of Jaina Philosophy ( in Japanese)," included in the above. (3) A Uno: "Vyapti in Jainism," included in Studies on Buddhism: the Commemoration Volume in Honour of Prof. A. K. Warder, Toronto, 1993. (4) S. Ohira: An Abstract of "A Study of the Bhagavatisutra": A Chronological Background, included in the Commemoration Volume in Honour of Prof. Jozef Deleu, Tokyo, 1993. (5) K. Watanabe: "Notes on the Bhavana, 3rd Cula of Ayaranga-sutta II," included in the above volume. (6) M. Yajima: "A Road to Satrunjaya - Visits to Jaina Tirthas (in Japanese)," included in the Cultural History of Roads in India, Tokyo, 1994. (7) T. Kamiya: "Jaysalmer: A Wonderful City in the Desert (in Japanese)," included in the Architecture Magazine "" Tokyo, 1995, The author a well-known architect introduces the city of Jaysalmer from various aspects, with abundant photos and illustrations of his own. Papers from 'The Society for Jaina Studies' 1) At the 2nd Meeting (July 18, 1987): (1) S. Fujinaga: Samantabhadra and His Philosophy. (2) K Watanabe: On the Bhavana, the 3rd Cula of Ayarangasutta II. 2) At the 3rd Meeting (Oct 29 1988): (1) N. Sugioka: Karma Doctrine in Jainism, with Special Regard to the Relationship of Five Indriyas to Klesas. (2) R. Honjo: Parallel Verses Found in the Dasaveyalia and Buddhist Agama Texts. (3) Y. Ando: Some Aspects of Jaina Philosophy. 3) At the 4th Meeting (July 15, 1989): (1) S. Fujinaga: On Sarvajna in Akalanka. 5

Page #9
(2) H. Nagasaki: A Visit to Terapantha Sect of the Svetambara Jains. (3) M. Yajima: A Study of Mona (muni-margu). 4) At the 5th Meeting (July 21, 1990): (1) M. Enomoto: On Yoga in Jainism. (2) K. Watanabe: The Doctrine of Makkhali Gosala. (3) T.Tanigaua: Bhavyatva and Abhavyatva: a Jaina Doctrine of Predestination. 5) At the 6th Meet'ng (Oct 5 1991): (1) M. Manda: Brahmana Depicted in Jaina Agama, With Special Regard to the Comparison with the Pali Texts. (2) E. Yamaguchi: Visits to L. D. Institute and Hemacandra Jnamandir(patan) (3) A. Uno: Inference in Jainism. 6) At the 7th Meeting (Oct. 3, 1992): (1) E. Shimizu: Some Aspects of Jaina Rituals. (2) M. Yamazaki: The Metre of Early Jain Canons: toward Computer Aided Metrical Analysis (3) E. Mikogami:A Study of Niyogavada Propounded in Vidyananda's Astasahasri. 7) At the 8th Meeting (Oct. 5, 1993): (1) G. Asano: Some Aspects of Jaina Thought in the Medieval Period (2) F. Enomoto: A Study of Nirvana (3) K. Watanabe: Water and Life Described in the Jaina Agama 8) At the 9th Meeting (Oct.1, 1994): (1) T. Uno: A Kind of Demonstrative Proof for Jiva in the Case of Jinabhadra.

Page #10
(2) N. Sugioka: Some Remarks on Cakravartin, With Special Regard to Jaina Agama. (3) S. Fujinaga: On Sarvajnatva in Jainism. 9) At the 10th Meeting (Sept. 30, 1995): (1) T. Hayashi: Jaina Mathematics Propounded in Dhavala. (2) H. Nagasaki: The Structure of Jaina Inference in Hemacandra. (3) S. Sakamoto-Goto: The Usage of Verb in Middle Indic, with Reference to Uttarajjhaya X, 1 -36d, "samayam Goyama ma pamayae." (4) Michael Hahn (Professor, Marburg University, Germany): Recent Jaina Studies in Western Countries (in English) The Journal of Jaina Studies, vol.1, published in September 1995, includes the following articles (all in Japanese): (1) A Study of the Pramananayatattvaloka (1) - An Annotated Japanese Translation, by A. Uno. (2) Textual Traditions of the Mahavira Bibliography, by K. Watanabe. (3) The Tale of Muladeva - A Japanese Translation from Jacobi's Ausgewahlteerzahlungen, by Y.Honjo. (4) A Visit to the Terapantha Sect of the Svetambara Jains, by H. Nagasaki. (5) Report on the International Conference on Jainism, by S. Fujinaga. I

Page #11
The Concepts of Bhavya in Early Jainism Dr. Fujinaga Sin Associate Professor, Miyakonojo Kosen Miyakonojo National College of Technology, Japan Though the paths may vary, the various schools of Indian philosophical thought put moksa, or the liberation from transmigration, as the final and ultimate end-goal in life. Some schools say, for example, that through penance moksu can be attained, while another school maintains that knowledge of the Bhagavatgita leads to the final goal. The Jainas emphasize spiritual liberation, and their activities throughout history, both for the lay persons and monks and nuns, have been in preparation for this final goal. But when we come across the word bhavya in Jaina literature, there appears to be a perplexity to the Jaina doctrine of moksa. The Jainas use the word bhavya in a rather particular and important context. Usually it means "being," "existing" or "good," but the word can also be translated as "fit" when used as an adjective, or "future time" or "fruit" when used as a neuter noun. In Jaina texts such usage can be found, but to the Jaina writers mostly mean, as we will see later, a person who has the possibility to achieve spiritual enlightenment or moksu, and with abhavya a person having no such possibility. Naturally, the general and specific usage can have a relationship with each other; a person who has potential to reach the liberated state or who will be in good karmic position in the future must be addressed with the term bhavya in the

Page #12
Jaina context. The meaning of this word also seems to be very important in two ways; first, the Jainas maintain that their final aim is to achieve the state of spiritual freedom --an idea which is a concern of the highest beatitude -- and second, its importantance is expressed as a counter-point to the other Indian atheistic school, the Mahayana Buddhists. In this paper we will outline of the concept of bhavya according to the approach of the Jaina philosophers. The concept of bhavya and its counterpart abhavyatva were late development in the history of Jaina thought. These words do not appear in the old Agamas, but are frequently used in the latter works which belong to a later period.2 Moreover, in the Agama texts the Jainas emphasize only the possibility that we can liberate ourselves from spiritual bondage, and do not refer to the non-possibility of liberation. We have two main sources to consider this concept; the first is Umasvati's Tattvartha Sutra (here onwards abbr. as TS) and its many commentaries, and the other is Kundakunda's aggregation of works and commentaries. Other texts also are useful for this topic. For example, there are some verses concerning bhavya in Dr. P.S. Jaini's translation of the Visesavasyakabasa and commentary. From an epistemological point of view, Aptamimamsa (abbr. AM) is also important in understanding this concept. We will study relevant sections of AM with commentaries. 4 Bhavya and Abhavya in Kundakunda Kundakunda can be said to be the first Jaina author that referred to the concepts of bhavya and abhavya.He describes bhavya and abhavya as follows; abhavya is such person who does not believe that the happiness of those who have destroyed ghatiyakarma is the best even after they heard it, while bhavya desires that (such highest happiness). Here the persons who have no ghatiyakarmas is meant as a liberated soul or, more specifially, the Jaina tirthankaras.? So the

Page #13
abhavya denies the existence of such souls while the bhavya acknowledge it. In other words, Kundakunda understands the abhavya as a non-Jain follower, and the bhavya as a follower of the Jina. It should be noted here that he does not intend to say that there are some persons or souls which cannot be liberated: a man may deny another's ability to do something, even when he himself may be able to do so, but Kundakunda established that we can purify our own souls by ourselves. He argued that if the self cannot become pure or impure by itself, then karmic transmigration must be impossible for all of lifeprinciples. In the reality of the Jaina doctrine, transmigration occurs for every soul. Logically speaking, all souls, including those of the non-Jainas, can reach the pure state of final liberation through their own efforts or behavior ( that is to say, by their karma -- using it in the broader sense of the word). No gods, or Gods, can decide the future for the individual. Kundakunda wants to say that there are two kinds of persons or souls, one is good and admits the tirthankaras, while the other is bad and denies them. For those who acknowledge the former, they we can liberate ourselves and have perfect knowledge. Some schools of Indian thought, such as the Miassakas, deny the existence of the omniscient. On the other hand, the Jain tradition to which Kundakunda belongs progressively maintains that there exist omniscient persons in this universe. 10 In discussing this topic Kundakunda never used the methodology of inference, but stressed his position as opinion. There is the suggestion that such tendencies in arguement may have been common to the Jaina philosophers of his days. Of course, he must have noticed his opponents and their doctrine, but he seldom tries to persuade them, and therefore, no need of inference, Bhavya and Abhavya in Umasvati 10

Page #14
As mentioned above, Umasvati, who belongs to an earlier Jaina philosophical history, 11 used the word bhavya and abhavya in his TS twice. 12 His style is, as the title of the compendium indicates, appears to be simple and to the point, but to get a truly clear meaning of his opinion we sometimes have to rely upon commentary. In this paper the interpretation of the original meaning depends upon Pujyapada's Sarvartha Siddhi (abbr. as SS). In the second chapter of TS, Umasvati explains the various natures of a soul, or the jiva. First he classifies the states of the soul according to the relationship of the soul with karma. Having done the same with the other four states of a soul, the author says that bhavyatva makes one part of the innate nature of a soul as abhavyatva and jivatva.13 A soul shall have jivatva which distinguishes it from other substances, such as material substances. This of course begs the question: what does bhavyatva mean? Pujyapada suggests the following for the concept of bhavya: it is one who obtains the quality of the right faith, and so on, is bhavya. 14 Here "right faith, and so on" clearly refers to the three jewels of Jain philosophy -- right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. These three constitute the path to liberation as described in the very first sutra of the TS. Thus a soul which has the nature of bhavyatva has the ability to attain the ultimate beatitude. This can be understood from the other portion of the TS where the author uses the word bhavyatva. The third sutra of chapter ten reads that moksa will take place when the four states of a soul and bhavyatva in the innate state have vanished. 15 To achieve liberation an individual must eliminate the bhavyatva and other states. Without their presence it is surely impossible to destroy them. We can conclude that a soul with the nature of bhavyatva will get rid of the transmigration and reach the moksa. On the other hand, the abhavya soul would not achieve moksa even if he or she exerts religious effort for uncountable

Page #15
years. Two things must be understood here. The first is that not all souls have bhavyatva (note: Some souls, such at the tirthankurus, have already been liberated and will not return to the bonded state. They have no need for further liberation.). The other is that one and the same soul has either bhavyatva or abhavyatva. That is to say, the two natures, which contradict each other, cannot exist in one soul even within the interval period. For example, we have two contradictory natures, such as happiness and misery, within the course of time. When a person becomes sick he feels miserable, but after a short interval, usually a week or so, he will be happy again. But this does not happen with the bhavyatva and abhavyatva since they are not temporal natures of a soul or jiva, but rather, innate nature (parinamika). In this way, Umasvati uses the concept of bhavya, and uses relevant words in the relationship of a soul with karma -- more precisely, with karmic matter. This is a common tendency among the authors in the Agamic period. 16 Besides, he puts the word, so to speak, as it is without any explanation. Such attitude is not seen in Pujyapada's writing. As we have seen previously, he at least gives a definition to the word, although it is not detailed. He also shows its connection with topics other than the karmas. Pujyapada seems to have noticed the relationship between knowledge and the concepts of bhavya and abhavya when he mentions supposed questions concerning it. For example: Can an abhavya person have the capacity of manahparyaya or omniscience? If the person has, he can no longer be an abhavya. If not, there is no use to suppose the two hindrances of those kinds of knowledge. The answer to this apparent quandry: there is no contradiction because the word only indicates, not determines, meaning (adesa). From the view-point of substance, it has the power of manahparyaya or kevalajnana, but from the view-point of mode, it has no such power. 17

Page #16
In Jaina philosophy occurrence and the disappearance of knowledge has a firm relationship with karmas. So the inquiry, that an abhavya cannot have omniscience because the person could not destroy all the karma, naturally arises. The nature of bhavya and abhavya are thought as innate to the soul; this means that such nature is not a result of karma. Here, Pujyapada seems to try to show that abhavya has no connection with karma by applying the typical Jaina concept of naya to knowledge. 18 Bhavya and Abhavya in Samantabhadra The next author we shall examine on the concept of bhavya is the Digambara saint, Samantabhadra. 19 Many works have been attributed to him, but among them the Aptamimamsa, as mentioned above, and the Yuktyanusasa, Svayambhustotra, and Ratnakarandasravacara. All are important for this philosophical discussion. Again, we cannot specifically find the word abhavya or abhavyatva amoung these texts, but he uses the word bhavya twice in verse eight of the Svayambhustotra and in verse forty-one of the Ratnakarandasravacara the sense of one who has the capability of achieving moksa. The former says that a Jaina tirthankara exists for the bhavya person who has accumulated karmic dust in his soul, and to clean it out as a shining sun for a lotus to bloom. In the latter verse, the author shows that a bhavya with devotion to a Jina will attain happiness. 20 In these two verses bhavya is used as a concept closely related to karmic theory, and are quite similar to the conceptual discussion presented by Kundakunda. Samantabhadra also discusses this topic elsewhere, although he does not use the word bhavya itself. The ninth chapter of AM consists of five verses dealing with the problem of how to attain moksa using knowledge. In the first two verses the author puts forth hypothetical opinions of the opponent schools and the criticism to them from the Jaina perspective. 13

Page #17
The Jaina philosophy is presented in the last three verses. In the last verse Samantabhadra says there are two types of human nature: pure and impure. This classification of nature corresponds to that of bhavya and abhavya as demonstrated below. The following is the Sanskrit texts and translation of AM 96-100.21 Verse 96: ajnanac ced dhruvo bundho jnevanantyan na kevali. jnanastokad vimoksus ced ajnanadbuhuto 'nyatha. If you may say that with non-knowledge one surely will obtain bondage (the condition of transmigration), then you should admit that there would be no omniscient beings because of infiniteness of objects to be recognized. And if you again may say that with a few quantities of knowledge one can get liberation, even then you must admit that the other condition (the bondage] will happen because of much of the non-knowledge. Verse 97: virodhan nobhayaikatmyam syadvadanyayavidvipam. avacyataikante 'pv uktir navacyam iti. A Person who hates the theory of svadvada of the Jainas says that the liberation can be attained through the both of the ways (through much knowledge as well as a little knowledge], but it is not possible because it is a contradiction. In the absolutism of non-describability nothing cannot be expressed concerning this matter because to say that anything cannot be describable is not logical Verse 98: 14

Page #18
ajnanan mohino bandho na jnanad vitamohatah. jnanstokac ca moksah sya amohan mohino 'nyatha. One who has the karma called moha will get bondage through ignorance but it is not so in the case of one who destroyed the mohas. And even through a little knowledge, without the mohas, one will attain the liberation while the other situation [the bondage) will occur in a person with the mohas. Verse 99: kamadiprabhavas citrah karmabadunurupatah. tac ca karma svahetubhyo jivas te suddhyasuddhitah. The occurrence of sexual desire and others is various owning to the variety of the bondage by the karmas which are material to cause such situation. And this karmic material becomes so because of their own causes. According to you[Jinas or Mahavia] the jivas are of two kinds with criteria of the pure nature and the impure. Verse 100: suddhyasuddhi punah sakti te pakyukyasuktivat. sudyanadi tayor vyakti svabhavo 'larkagocarah. Again, the powers of the pure and impure are similar to the nature of beans, boilablility and non-boilability. The one of these two powers appears at certain time while the other is beginningless. The difference between the innate natures is beyond our reasoning (as well as perception). After these verses the author begins to explain the omniscience or kevalajnana. According to Jaina philosophy, as

Page #19
it is well known, there are surely omniscient persons in this universe. In this work, the main purpose of Samantabhadra was to establish the existence of such a person, and that only the Jain tirthunkaras are such people.22 They have become omniscient through their own efforts to destroy all karma. But why must they exist for us? What is the reason for their existence for ordinary persons like us? The liberated soul has no interest in things in this world. Therefore they do not give us any bliss. Our happiness as well as misery is all the result of our own activities. But we naturally have the curiosity to know our predestination. And the tirthankaras know that all matter that occurs, has occurred, and will occur in the future in this universe. Their knowledge must therefore include whether or not we can liberate ourselves; something which ordinary people cannot recognize (see the 100th verse of the AM). So the Jain omniscient exist, in a sense, to satisfy our curiosity to know whether we are bhavya or abhavya. U ENDNOTES See P.S. Jaini, "Bhavyatva and Abhavyatva, a Jaina Doctrine of Predestination," in Mahavira and his Teachings, ed. A.N. Upadhye et al., Bombay, 1977:102. 2 Dr. P.S. Jaini, in his article mentioned above, stated that the Jaina Agamas abound in references to thc terms bhavya and abhavya. We cannot find bhavya or bhavva, the Prakrit world for bhavya in the Agamas. K.K. Dixit shows this word appearing in the Prajnapanasutra and gives the meaining of, capable of attaining moksa (Jaini, Ontology, Ahmedabad, 1971:52). But in the text we have only the form of bhavya, but not bhavva. Of course the Prakrit word is found in such philosophical works as the Pravacanasara, as we shall see later. 3 See note 2. 4 Naturallly, there are also other Jaina literatures dealing with the bhavya and abhavya. For those of a philosophical nature, see Jainendra Siddhata Kosa, cd. Jinedra Varni (1985, Delhi). 16

Page #20
It is a rather difficult task to determine whether or not he is prior to Umasvati who also referred to abhayva in his Tattvartha Sutra. Here, for the sake of conveninece, we take the hypotheses that Kundakunda is prior in history. This assumption is based on Kundakunda using Prakrit, while Umasva writes in Sanskrit. For the date of Kundakunda see A.N. Upadhye's, Introduction to Pravacanasara (Agas, 1964). 6no saddhamhati sokkham suhesu paramam ti vigadaghadinam | sunuduna te abhavva va tam padicchamti || Pravacanasara 1:62. Commentary by amstacandra on this verse paraphrases the word vigadagadina as kevalinam and bhagavatam. jadi so suho ca asuho na havadi ada sayam sahaveno! samsaro vi na vijjadi savvesim jivakayanam || Pravacanasara 1:46 9 Here we must remember the original meanings of bhavya and abhavya: good and bad. 1 Kundakunda discusses the omniscience in his Pravacanasara and other texts. Even before Kundakunda, the Jainas maintain the existence of the omniscient persons in the Agamas, and later on, it becomes one of the main tenets of Jainism. For the history and debates amoung the various schools of Indian philosophies, see Upadhye (op.cit.). 1 We have no certain materials to determine his actual date, nor the authorship of the so called autocommentary on the TS. This much can be said, his era is prior to Pujyapada who wrote a commentary on the TS called, Sarvartha Siddhi. As said in note 6, we take the position that Kundakunda lived prior to Umasvati. 12 An other work of Umasvati, the Prasamarati, does not contain the word bhavya or abhavya. Moreover, we cannot find any concept demonstrated by these words or any other. See Prasamarati, ed Y.S. Shastri, Ahmedabad, 1989 (L.E. Series 107).] 13 TS II:7: jivabhavyavyani ca. TA 14 SS on TS 2-7. Akalanka also adopts this explanation in his Rajavartika on the same sutra. 17

Page #21
1) Aupasamikudibhavyatvanam ca. The text of the Svetambara edition adds a compound, anyatra kevalasamyaktvajnanadarsanasiddhatvebhyah, which the Digambara treat as the next independent sutra. 10 The whole history of Jaina thought can be roughly divided into the Agamic Period, and the Age of Logic. For the details sce, K.K. Dixit (op. cit.). 17 ss 742: abhavyasya manahparyayajnanasaktih kevalajnanasaktis ca syad va na va. vadi syat tasyabhavyatvabhavah. atha nasti tatravaranadvayakalpana vyarhteti. ucyate adesavacanan na dosah. dravyathadesan manahparyayakevalajnanasaktisambhavah. paryayarthadesat tacchaktyabhavah. 18 It is rather strange that Pujyapa does not explain the relation between bhavya and omniscience when he coments on Sutra 3 in the tenth chapter of TS. Umasvati uses the word bhavyatva concering kevalajnana. 19 About his date, we also have no indisputable materials, however, we can say that he is prior to Akalanka, who was the first person to write a commentary on Samantabhadra's work (c. 7th century). Samantabhadra may be an elder contemporary of Pujyapada. 20 A commentator on this work paraphrases the word as samyagdrsti (= one who has right knowledge). This parallels Pujyapada's interpretation mentioned above. 21 The texts are quoted from Astasahasri, ed. Vamsdhar, Bombay, 1915. 22 See the first six verses of AM. For Private For Privat 18 Personal Use Only

Page #22
Mati in the Tattvarthadhigamasutra Dr. Eiichi Yamaguchi Ariake National College of Technology, Omuta. Fukuoka. Japan Introduction The first extant Jaina work, which systematized all of the early Jaina teachings, is the Tattvarihadhigamasutra (TAS) of Umasvami. This work, particularly in the leading sections, advances many topics on epistemology and metaphysics, and emphasises an exceptional concern with the source of cognition and the foundations of knowledge from the Jaina perspective. The word mati is used in Jaina philosophy mainly in the sense of a special type of knowledge which can incorporate such meanings as sense perception, memory, recognition, cogitation and inference. At the same time, translators of this text have employed the term mati in the narrowest meaning of sense perception alone. In this paper we will try to correlate the term mati with manana, the third stage of the fourfold scheme (darsana, sruvana, manana, and vijnanu or nidhidhyasana), which was prevalent in Upanisadic circles and referred to in the Acarangasutru. In this paper I shall descuss mali with special reference to TAS, its commentaries, and other Jaina texts.

Page #23
Five types of knowledge mati-sruta-avadhi-manahparyaya-kevalani jnanam (TAS 1.9) Knowledge is [divided into five types]; mati, verbal testimony, knowledge of temporally and spatially distant objects, knowledge of state of mind of the other person, omniscience. Here mati stands for all the forms of knowledge(jnanas) except sruta-avadhi-manahparyaya-kevala. Again, mati and sruta are the only forms of knowledge possible in ordinary people. As a matter of fact all living beings, except omniscient ones, always have these two forms of knowledge. That means mati covers all the forms of knowledge that non-omniscient ordinary beings have except verbal testimony. This is the broad sense of mati and in this paper we employ the term mati-A for mati having this broad sense. Subtypes of Mati-A matih smrtih samjna cinta abhinibodha ity anarthantaram (TAS 1.13) Mati, memory, recognition, cogitation and inference are synonyms. 2 The author of the TAS composes this sutra to explain mati in its broad sense. He says that mati, etc., are synonyms (anarthantara). It is difficult to understand mati in this sutra as mati-A. If we accept it in the sense of mati-A, then it should be regarded as the common name for the memory, recognition, cogitation and inference. In that case, sense perception will be left out and find no place in mati-A. For this reason, these five 20

Page #24
cognitions (pramana = means of knowledge) are sub-divisions of mati-A, and mati in this sutra has a special narrow sense, namely sense perception. That mati in the sutra has the meaning of sense perception only, is supported by Siddhasena Gani who specifically states that the object of mati is present, and that of memory is past, etc. This meaning of mati is clearly different from that of mati-A. We shall call this form of mati as mati-B. Now we should consider why mati-A covers sense perception, memory, recognition, cogitation and inference, which are mutually so different in nature. We can get the first answer for this question in the Sarvarthasiddhi (SAS) of Pujyapada, the oldest extant commentary on TAS. Pujyapada notes that all these cognitions in 1.13 (sense perception, memory, recognition, cogitation and inference) are caused by the subsidence-cum-destruction of matijnana-avuruniya-karma (substance veiling matijnana), as in subtype A. But this is not a satisfactory answer. The concept of matijnana-avaranivakarma is dependent on matijnana, but not vice versa. Again, this should be considered a dogmatic explanation, and not an acceptable logical Jaina argument. To give the satisfactory answer to this question, we should take into account the scheme of four stages for selfrealization, viz. darsana, sravana, manana, and nidhidhyasana. These four gradual stages are recognized in the spiritual field for self-realization of the soul, and are mentioned in Upanisads 6 Jaina, and Buddhist canonical works. The four stages are: darsana: faith in the teaching sravana: hearing from the mouth of teacher manana: thinking over what is heard from the mouth of teacher nidhidhyasana: meditation, concentration (vijnana) 21

Page #25
The third stage of manana in this scheme means reflecting over what one has heard from the mouth of teacher. Then in reflection, the spiritual practitioner employs all the pramanas (means of cognition or knowledge -- namely sense perception, memory, recognition, cogitation and inference) without knowing which pramana he is employing or the nature of that pramana. This shows that manana, in the scheme of four stages for self-realization, includes all the pramanas. When you are pondering over or examining something, you employ all the ramanas from sense perception to inference. This explanation poses another question: when mutually opposed cognitions (memory, recognition, cogitation and inference) are brought under one head of mati-A, then what prevented Jaina thinkers from including sruta (verbal testimony) in the concept of mati? In the original scheme of darsana, sravana, manana, and nidhidhyasana, the sravana stage necessarily precedes manana. It is because all these means of knowledge are employed by a person conducting manana (thinking over), after hearing what his teacher has said (sravana). Therefore, sravana is to be separately mentioned in that scheme as the preceding stage. Sravana and manana are replaced by sruta and mati respectively in the classification of five jnanas. The necessity of a separate stage of sravana preceding the stage of manana compelled the Jaina theoreticians to formulate their theory of five forms of knowledge to keep srutajnana separate from matijnana. Originating Instrument of Mati tad indriya-anindriya-nimittam (TAS 1.14) That [mati-A] is caused by sense organs and non-sense organ [i.e. mind]. 22

Page #26
Bhasya by Umasvati explains by this sutra that there are two types of mati: what is caused by sense organs (indriyanimitta) and what is caused by mind (anindriya-nimitta). In the case of cognition generated by sense organs, they have colour, flavour, smell, touch and sound as their respective objects. This form of matijnana, however, is simply an indeterminate sense perception. The determinate sense perception is generated by both sense organ and mind. Where, therefore should we put it? In the mati generated by sense organs or in the mati generated by mind? The possible answer is that it should be included in those forms of matijnana that are generated by sense organs only, because in the determinate sense perception, the operation of sense organs is predominent while that of mind is secondary, meager, and unnoticeable. The forms of matijnana, viz. memory and cogitation, should be regarded as generated by mind only. Regarding recognition and inference, though they are generated by both sense organ and mind, they could be included in the forms of matijnana generated by mind alone. This is because in both cases the operation of mind is principal while that of sense organs is secondary. Siddhasena Gani's Tattvarthadhigamasutrabhasvatika (BHT) gives the explanation of the phrase indriya-anindriyanimittam as three types of mati depending on their instrument of origination. -- 1) indriya-nimitta: having sense organs only as its originating instrument. 2) anindriya-nimitta: having mind only as its originating instrument. 3) indriya-anindriya-nimitta: having both of them as its originating instrument. 1) Siddhasena Gani informs us that there is matijnana having only sense organs as its instrument of origination (in the case of living beings having no mind at all, i.e., one-sensed to five 23

Page #27
sensed beings without mind).' From this we can safely conclude that even in the case of living beings having mind, their matijnana involves no mental operation, i.e., indererminate sense perception (nirvikalpaka-pratyaksa). This type of matijnana has only sense organs as its originating instrument. This means the acceptance of the fact that for human beings with five sense organs and mind (samjni pancendriya), there does take place an indeterminate perception at the initial stage. This will become more clear when we analyse TAS 1.18. 2) BhT includes memory in this type of matijnana, and offers the following explanation: tatha anindriyanimittam smrtijnanam itarendriyanirapeksam caksur-avyapara-abhavat (BHT P.79, 4) Similarly (matijnana of the form of] memory has mind only as its origination; it does not require operation of sense organs. Because [memory involves) no operation of sense organs such as eyes etc.. 3) BhT gives an illustration for this type of mati having both sense organs and mind as its originating instrument. tatha indriya-anindriya-nimittam jagrad-avasthavam, sparsanena manasa upayuktah spristy usnam idam sitam nalo iti (BhT P.79,5) Similarly, in the state of awaking, somebody is touching the thing and his mind is also attentive and operating, [and he arrives at the judgment] "it is hot, not cold." This perceptual judgment is caused by sense organ and mind. So what we call "savikalpaka-pratyaksa" 24

Page #28
(determinate sense perception) involves the operation of both sense organs and mind. Siddhasena does not say anything in the BhT about the causal instrument of recognition, inference and cogitation. But we can say the former two require both sense organ and mind as their causal instrument. This explanation finds support from Siddhasena Gani, as he states that the object of recognition is both past and present (rather co-ordination of the past object with the present one), and that of cogitation is the future object. 12 Again inference requires perception of logical reason and memory of invariable concomitance. 13 Subdivisions of Sense Perception (Mati-B) There are four gradual stages of matijnana and the order of their occurrence is fixed. avagraha-iha-avaya-dharanah (TAS 1. 15) [Mati-B has four subdivisions:] avagraha, iha, avaya, and dharana. We refer, in short, to the nature of the four stages based on the explanation by Sukhlalji. 14 avagraha: Unspecified cognition to the effect that something ought to be here or there. iha: The thought-process that is undertaken with a view to specifically ascertaining the object that has been grasped by avagraha. avaya: Final ascertainment after thinking over and examining the particular feature grasped at the stage of iha. 25

Page #29
dharana: 1) constant stream of this final ascertainment. 2) The impression left behind by it. 3) The memory made possible by this impression. All these operations of the form of matijnanu are dharana. Now to examine the meaning of matijnana in the context of the former sutra. The question to be answered: How to apply these four stages to matijnana? In the case of matijnana by sense organs, there is no problem, however, in the case of mind-born matijnana, there is. The mind-born matijnana can be given two meanings. One, is mental perception, and the other is all forms of matijnanu (mati-A), except sense perception (namely memory, recognition, cogitation and inference). Normally, commentators on the TAS do not discuss the four stages, even the impossibility, in the case of mind-born matijnana having the second meaning. But they do discuss them in connection with sense perception and mental perception only. As a matter of fact, avagraha, iha, avaya, and dharana. are gradual stages of mati-B (sense perception).15 There are originally four stages of manana, and when Jaina logicians turned manana into the special type of knowledge called mutijnanu, they also transferred these four stages to matijnana. Here is an example of a dream-reader (interpreter) to demonstrate this concept. 16 When the queen had a dream, she and the king would recount the dream to one who interprets the meaning of such phenomena -- a dream reader. First, the dream-reader grasps what is told by the king and queen. After hearing the dream, he starts to contemplate the meaning of the dream. He [she examines many alternative meanings insinuated in his [her] mind, and after deep reflection, begins to eliminate each interpretation one by one until left with only one interpretation. The dream-reader has now ascertained the final meaning of the dream. This 26

Page #30
demonstrates how avagraha, etc., operates as the four stages of manana. After that, the dream-reader keeps the single meaning in mind, and starts to think about other things. 11 We should also examine the meaning of matijnana in this particular sutra. It is possible to apply these four stages to the entire process of manana, but it is not possible to apply them to any pramana * except sense perception -- employed in the process. For example, it is not possible to apply them to memory or cogitation. In the case of matijnana, it is not possible to apply the stages to all forms of matijnana, but it is possible to apply them to matijnana in the form of sense perception. As the four stages are applicable to the entire process of manana taken as a whole, the Jaina theoreticians cannot help but apply the four stages to all the forms of matijnana. This is due to the fact that they inherited the old legacy of manana that does not fit well with matijnana. Therefore, the "new transformation" of manana took place. Subtypes of Avagraha, Iha, Avaya, and Dharana bahu-bahuvidha-ksipra-anihsrta-anukta-dhruvanam setaranam (TAS 1.16)17 [Matijnana cognizes] many objects, or one object. It cognizes many types of objects, or one type of object. It cognizes its object quickly or slowly. It cognizes its object based on sruta, or not based on sruta. It cognizes its object inarticulately or articulately, and constantly or inconstantly. We can take two meanings for matijnana in this sutra, manana and sense perception (mati-B). Here, we shall now consider both these meanings. For Private 2 Personal Use Only

Page #31
bahu and alpa (many and one): When we perceive any object, it requires the attention of mind. It is impossible for us to have attention to more than one object at the same time. In such a case, how can mind attend to many objects? To solve this difficulty they explain that bahu (many) makes one group or pattern. 18 bahuvidha and ekavidha (many types and one type): Here the objects belong to different groups or classes. One and the same perception which cognizes a cow and a horse at the same time is considered possible. The question here arises as to how things belonging to two different classes can be attended to by mind at one and the same time. The answer may be that a cow and a horse are perceived as members of a bigger group (or class). viz., the animal class. Even though they are different types of things, the object is one whole entity (class) of which they are members. We always grasp one thing or one pattern. nihsrita and anihsrita (based on sruta or not based on sruta): The literal meaning of these words are "based on or not based on". Here we understand the meaning to be matijnana is based on sruta (verbal testimony) or not based on sruta, 19 This reading supports the explanation of matijnana as meaning manana in the scheme of four stages for selfrealization, manana in that scheme is definitely based on sravana (sruta). There is, however, a possiblity of manana not being based on sravana (sruta), but, being based on one's own experience. After converting manana to a special type of jnana called matijnana, it is perhaps thought that matijnana does not require sravana (sruta) as its grounding. In that case they have to explain nihsrita and anihsrita differently. If matijnana is 28

Page #32
considered as sense perception (mati-B), then it is impossible to explain ninsrita and anihsrita as based on sruta or not based on sruta. How can sense perception take place based on verbal testimony? Sukhlalji reads nihsrita and anihsrita as, based on a logical reason (linga) or not.20 This is applicable to sense perception, but his example does not properly explain the situation. He gives an example: the four stages of matijnana which cognize juhi-flowers, employing logical reason of an earlier experienced cold, soft, smooth touch. This is called nihsrita-grasping avagraha (grasping on the basis of logical reason) etc. The four stages of matijnana that cognize the flower without the help of a logical reason is called anihsritagrasping (avagraha) etc. But this example is a case of iha, and cannot be applied to avagraha. Now we take another illustration to explain niusrita and anihsrita as meaning, "based on a logical reason or not" for sense perception. For example, a person can say, "this mango looks or smells sweet." This statement is based on a perceptual judgement, and this perception is based on a logical reason. Actually, it involves a form of inference. Even though the sweetness is the object of the tongue, we say, "it looks or smells sweet." This perceptual judgement is based on a logical reason, because the flavour cannot be grasped by the eyes or nose. But once we have experienced the sweetness of mango, which is associated with a special colour or a particular smell, we know the relationship associated with them, and therefore, colour or smell works as a logical reason to give the perceptual judgement. In this illustration it is clear that linga-nisrita and alinga-nisrita are applicable to sense perception. dhurva and adhurva: Sukhlalji explains them with the help of internal purity or impurity yielding inevitable sense perception or not inevitable sense perception. The conception of internal purity and impurity, however, 29

Page #33
can be understood as a dogmatic Jaina explanation. If we take matijnana in the sense of manana, manana can be constant (dhurva) or inconstant (adhurva). It is also possible to apply dhurva and adhurva to matijnana in the sense of sense perception. Dhurvu as sense perception means continuous (dhurva) perception, which means a series or stream of perceptual cognitions of one and the same object in contact with sense organ (dharavahi pratyaksa). sandigdha and asandigdha: Svetambara Jain texts employ sandigdha and asandigdha (= definite and indefinite) instead of ukta and anukta. This reading is difficult in the situation where matijnana has the meaning of sense perception. As for avaya and dharana, it is impossible to be indefinite, but manana can be clear (sandigdha) or not clear (asandigdha). These two subdivisions, therefore, are possible if mali is taken in the sense of manana (reflection). If we understand mati to be a sense of sense perception, then at least some of the subtypes enumerated here are difficult to demonstrate. But if we interpret mati in the sense of manana, then it is easy to demonstrate all the subtypes. Object of Matijnana (Mati-B) arthasya (TAS 1.17) [matijnana grasps] a thing. Here matijnana is sense perception (i.e. uvagraha, iha, avaya, and dhuruna), and then artha becomes the sense of a thing (vastu). In Jaina theory a thing has two natures: substance (dravya) and mode (paryayu).21 Mode includes various forms or states of substance, plus qualities and their changes. Just as 30

Page #34
substance undergoes changes, mode also undergoes changes. When qualities are regarded as the modes (paryaya) of a substance, changes of qualities and transformations also become part of the modes. When we say the sense organ grasps the thing a question arises: which sense organ grasps substance (dravya)? Sense organs grasp only qualities, according to Umasvati. sparsana-rasana-ghrana-caksuh-srotruni (TAS 2.19) sparsana-rasa-gandha-varna-subdas-tadarthah (TAS 2.20) The object of a tactile sense organ, tongue, nose, eye, and ear is touch, taste, smell, shape (or colour), and sound respectively. As we see here dravya (substance) is not mentioned as an object of sense organ. This led some non-Jaina thinkers to contend that there is no substance over and above qualities. Thus what we call substance is nothing but a bundle of qualities, and it is not true reality. Jainas, however, who believe in the reality of substance say that sense organs primarily grasp qualities, and through these qualities they grasp substance. Therefore, it is said that both substance and qualities are the objects of matijnana, or sense perception. First Stage of Sense Perception vyanjanasya avagrahah (TAS 1.18) na caksur anindriyabhyam (TAS 1.19) [There is an initial first stage called vyanjanasya avagrahuh where] the cognizer grasps simply senseobject contact. So in the case of eyes and mind 31

Page #35
[which do not come in contact with their objects, this stage] is not [possible]. This is the first stage of matijnana (sense perception) in the case of some sense organs (i.e., not in the case of eyes and mind). It is not possible for the eyes and the mind to have sense-object contact in Jaina theory. Those two sense organs are called aprapyakarin,22 "the sense organ which works without coming in contact with the object." Akalanka gives an illustration to explain this stage: a dry clay dish does not get wet, even it has a few water drops on it. But when it has continuous drops of water, it becomes wet. Similarly, we cannot grasp a sound at the first few moments; we grasp the sound only after it continuously strikes the eardrum.23 The Order of Mati and Sruta srutam matipurvam dvi-aneka-dvadasa-bhedam (TAS 1.20) Matijnana precedes sruta which is devided into two, numerous, and twelve. If mati is taken in the sense of sense perception, then this will give the following sense of the word. Knowledge is acquired by hearing the words of the teacher or reading the words written by the teacher. Through auditary or visual medium, he grasps the perception of the words. First we hear the words, this is the auditary perception. If you read the words written by the teacher, then we have the visual perception first. In either case, this appears to be followed by the signification of the words. Here sense perception takes place first, and sruta follows. 24 If we take mati in the sense of manana, the order is reversed. This tends to be reinforced by Siddhasena Gani's 32

Page #36
commentary on 1.27: 25 that a person having matijnana reflects over the substances which are known through srutajnana. Thus, it clearly points out that matijnana is based on srutajnana, and mati should be taken in the sense of manana (i.e., reflection). Moreover, a subtype of matijnana namely sruta-nihsrita clearly suggests that srutajnana precedes matijnana in the sense of manana, and matijnana, which is caused by mind, is to be taken as reflection. We are then told that the object of mind is sruta,26 that is, mind reflects on what is heard from the mouth of the teacher. This also shows that mati is to be taken in the sense of manana. Actually we know that in that fourfold scheme sravana takes place after darsana (sraddha). This is normally accepted in spiritual science (adhyatmasastra). Even in the Gita we have: sraddhavan labhate jnanam (Gita 4.39) One who has sraddha acquires knowledge from the teacher. Here jnana means teaching from the teacher (acaryaupadesa). Here also sraddha leads to sruvana, and even though sravana does have the causal condition of auditory sense perception, neither the spiritual science nor the practioner has any use for it. I would draw the attention of scholars to the apparent correlation between sutra 1.20, and the Nyayasutra 1.1.5. tatpurvakam anumanam trividham purvavat sesavat samanyatodrastam (NS 1.1.5) It (sense perception) precedes inference which is divided into three: 33

Page #37
purvavat, sesavat, samanyatodrastam. The Limitation of Congition of Mati and Sruta mati-srutayor nibandho [sarva27] dravyesv asarvaparyayesu (TAS 1.26) Matijnana and srutajnana can cognize [all] the substances, but not all their modes. Here also we can understand mati in the sense of manana. Matijnana in the sense of manana (reflection) is based on srutajnana, and srutajnana cognizes all the substances. It is impossible even for the omniscient teacher to express all the aspects of the substance through words which themselves have limitations. Conclusion Through this paper we have come to understand mati in the sense of manana, the third stage in the scheme of four stages of self-realization. In fact the TAS, in its attempt to build up its own system of the Jaina theory of fivefold knowledge, has discarded the original sense of the term mati and presented with an entirely new meaning. This, at times, has led to some contradictions. This study demonstrates how mati as manana gives a natural explanation, and thus, helps to remove obscurities. [] BIBLIOGRAPHY TAS: Umasvami, Tattvarthadhigamasutra, in SAS, (Svetambara version in BhT) Bhasya: Umasvami, Tattvarthadhigamasutrabhasya, in BhT. SAS: Pujyapada, Sarvarthasiddhi, ed. Phoolchandra Shastri, Jnanapitha Murtidevi Jain Granthamala 13, Delhi 1983 (3rd). TAV: Akalanka, Tattvarthavartika, ed. Mahendra Kumar, two volumes, Jnanapitha Murtidevi Jain Granthamala 10/20, Varanasi 1953/1957. 34ersona For Private Personal Use Only

Page #38
BhT: Siddhasena Gani, Tattvarthadhigamasutrabhasvalika, ed. Iliralal Rasikdas Kapadia, first volume. Sheth Devchand Lalbhai Jaina Pustakoddhar Fund Series 67, Bombay 1926. Sukhlalji: Pt. Sukhlalji's commentary on Tattvartha Sutra of Vacaka Umasvati, trans. K.K. Dixit, L.D. series 44. Ahmedabad 1974. mkov 1026 ENDNOTES Dr. Tatia translates all mati as "empirical knowledge". Nathmal Tatia tr.: Tattvartha Sutra -- That Which Is, Harper Collins Publishers (New York) 1994. - abhinibodha is used as meaning matijnana in the Agamas. But here we follow the explanation by Mahendra Kumar in his Hindi introduction p.11, Nvavaviniscayavivarana vol.2, jnanapitha Murtidevi Jain Granthamala 12, 1944. cf. Nathmal Tatia: Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Varanasi 1951, p.30. 3 BhT P.78,2-3: matijnanam nama yad indriya-anindriya-nimittam vartamanakalavisayaparicchedi | 4 BhT P.78,4-5: smrjnanam, tair eve indriyair yah paricchinno visayo rupaadistam yat kalantarena vinastam api smarali tat smrtijnanam, atitavastyalambanam ekakartykam caitanya-parinati-svabhavam manojnanam iti yavat | S SAS p.76.8-9. 6atma va are drstavyah srotavyah mantavyah nididhyasitavyah|| maitreyi, atmano va are darsanena sravanena matya vijnanena idam sarvam (Byhadaranyaka Vanisad 2.4.5; 4.5.6) 7 dittham sulam mayam vinnayam | (Acarangasutra 4.1.9) In Sanskrit: drsam srutam matam vijnatam | 8 BhT P.79,1-2: evam ca etad drstavyam -- indriyanimittam ekam, apuram anindriyanimittam, anyad indriya-anindrivanimittam iti tridha || 9 Jains classify living beings depending on the number of sense organs; ekendriya (the living beings having only one sense organ), dvindriva (having two sense organs), trindriya (having three), caturindriva (having four), and asanjnin-pancendriya (having all five sense organs but not having a mind). 35

Page #39
10 Text is ca, but from the meaing of this part, it should be read na. 1 BhT P.78, 6-7: samjnanam, tair eva indrivair anubhutam artham prak punar vilokya sa eva ayam yam aham adraksam purva-ahna iti samjnaam etat| 12 BhT P.78, 7-9: cintajnanam afamino vastuna evam nispattir bhavati anyatha na iti, yatha evam jnana-adi-trayasamanvite tatra eva paramasukhav aptir anyatha na iti etac-cintajnanas manojnanam eva 13 lingadarsana and vyaptismarana -- these two conditions are necessary to generate inferential knowledge. 14 Sukhlalji pp.23-24. Dr. Tatia discussed these four stages. Nathmal Tatia: Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Banarasi 1951 p.34ff. 1 Commentators should apply these four stages to mati-A. They never have the demonstration for all the forms of matijnana covered by mati-A, but they apply these stages to mati-B (sense perception) only. 10 tae nam se suminapadhaga senivassa ranno amtie eyamattham socca nisamma hatiha java hiyava tam suminam oginhamti orinhamta ihan anupavisamti ... (srutava ... avagrhanati, avagrhya iham anupravisati) || Navadhammakahao, prathuma adhyava 35. 17 TAS by Svetambara takes usandigdha instead of unukta, asnisrita instead of anihsrita. 18 These explanations for subdivisions of mati by Sukhlalji is not given in Bhasya, BHT, SAS, TAV. 19 1% suyanissie ceva asuyaissie ceva (srutanihsrita | asrutanihsrita) Sthanangasutra 71, ed. Sagarananda Suri. Lala Sundarlal Jain Agamagranthamala 2, Delhi 1985, p.33, 24. 20 Sukhlalji p.26, 1.181f. 21 dravya-paryaya-atma arthah .... Akalankagranthatray p. 3 22 Akalanka discusses prapyakaritva in detail in his TAV. cf. Yamaguchi: On avagraha in Jaina Epistemology -- A Japanese Translation of 36

Page #40
Akalanka's TAV and TAS 1.18-19, Essays in Ilonor of Dr. Shoren Thara on His Seventieth Birthday, 1991, pp.451-470. (in Japanese) 23 TAV p.67,3ff. 24 BhT p.89, 10-11: etac ca srutajnanam evam atmakam indriyamanonimittam granthaanusari vijnanam tad iti. 25 BhT P.105,1 71f.: matijnani tavat srutajnanena upalabdhesu arthesu yada aksaraparipalim antarena svabhyastavidyo dravyani dhyayati tada matijnanavisayah sarvadravyani, na tu sarvan parvavan, alpakalatvan manasas ca asakter iti, tatha srutagranthanusarena sarvani dharmadini janati, na tu tesam sarvaparyayan iti. 26 srutam anindriyasva (TAS 2.22) 27 Only Svetambara text has this sarva. (This paper is a part of the research in L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad India, supported by Overseas Research Grant 1995-1996 provided by Japanese Government.) 37

Page #41
A Select Comparison of Passages from Early Buddhist and Jain Texts* Dr. Kenji Watanabe As Buddhism and Jainism share many common elements in their phraseology, the purpose of this paper is to draw attention to some analogous passages which appear to have been overlooked by modern scholarship. The texts used for this study are Ayarungasutta II.15 and Dhammapada 183: Isibhasivam 29.19 and Dhammapada 360, 361) 1.1 The Pali Dhammapada (=Dhp.)183 reads as follows: sabbapapassa akaranamm kusalassa upasampuda sacittapariyodapanum etam Buddhana sasanam Not to do any evil acts, to cultivate what is good, to purify one's mind, this is the teaching of the Buddhas. This verse, which is very famous among Buddhists, and is said to have been taught by Kasyapa Buddha, one of the seven Buddhas of the past. It is regarded as the very source of all the teachings of Buddhism, from which sprang the various tenets of both Mahayana and Theravada sects. 38

Page #42
In one of the oldest Jain scriptures, Isibhasiyaim, a parallel pada was traced by H. Nakamura as the sayings of the first disciple of Gautama Buddha. evam buddhana sasanam (Isibhasiyaim 38.4) etam buddhana sasanam (Dhammapada 183; Milindapnha p. 394) 1.2 With the padas illustrated above, one can compare the famous prose passage of the Ayarangasutta II.15. In this text Mahvira expressed his vow to abstain from all sinful acts, after he has plucked out his hair in five handfuls and paid obeisance to all Liberated Souls (siddhas): savvam me akaranijjam pavakammam ti katsu samaiyam curittam padivajjai I should not commit all sinful acts, and [I] adopt the samayika caritra. Samayika is defined as an equanimity of mind and right conduct, and the concentration on spiritual matters for fortyeighty minutes, in accordance with mahavvayas. Its importance lies in the fact that it helps restraining the karmic influx and exhausting past karmic material. It is worth noting that samayika caritra in the pre-Mahavira lore, meant the fourfold restraint caujama of Parsva, according to the Viyahapannatti. This suits well with the fact that Mahavira's parents were followers of Parsva, as described in Ayarangasutta II.15. 1.3 What is the correlation of the Buddhist term, kusala, and the Jaina term, samayika curitra? Gautama Buddha explains to his last disciple, Subhadda, about his motive to renounce the world: 39

Page #43
ekunatisso vayasa Subhadda, yam pabbajim kiskualanuesi By twenty-nine I renounced the world, Subhadda - To seek kusala (good). Again, we see the use of kusala in Dhp. 173ab: yassa papaskatam kummam kusalena pithiyat so'mam lokam pabhaseti abbha multo va candima Whoever by good deed covers the evil done, He illumines the world like the moon freed from clouds. Here, kusala indicates the stopping of karmic influx (caused by evil acts), which has the same meaning as sumavika caritru (checking influx and exhausting past kamma). The word kusala generally means 'karmically wholesome': all karmic volitions and associated consciousness accompanied by absence of greed (alobha), hate (adosa), and delusion (amoha), contain the seeds to happy destiny for they result in the causes of favorable karma. Thus, Buddhist kusala, is very similar to the Jaina samayika curitru, as illustrated in the following passage of the Mulacara 23: jividamarane labhalabhe samjoyavippaoge ya bamdhurlsuhadukkhadisu samada samaivam nama Samayika is equanimity (of mind) in the midst of life and death, gain and loss, friends and foes, pleasure and pain. not very Similarly, Mulacara 523 and 524 seem different from Dhp. 173ab (see above): 40

Page #44
raga dose slirohitta sumada savva kummesu | sattesu ya parinamo samaiyam ultamam ja || (523) virado savva savajjam ti-gutto pihid'imdio | jivo samaiyam nama samjamatthanam uttaman || (524) These verses imply the avoidance of all sinful tendencies, keeping equanimity in body, speech and mind, whose organs of sense are barred against karmic inflow in all kinds of actions. 1.4 Further, let us note the Dhp. 183c: sacittapariyodapunam (to purify one's mind) has an interesting rendering in the Bhiksuni-Vinaya of the Mahasamghika Lokottaravadins: sarva papasyakaranam kusalasyopasanpada sva-citta-paryadamanam etad buddhanusaunan The expression sva citta paryadamanam means "to subdue one's mind" (pary a dum), and in the Patna Dhammapada we can find, payirodamana. This is closer to the Jaina term, samayika (equanimity of mind). Interestingly, the Chinese translation of jobuku (conquest of the passion in mind) -- which supports this interpretation -- is found in some verses in the Sarvastivada Vinaya, Yogacara Bhumi (Yu ch'ieh shi ti lun). 1.5 With the above in mind, we find the following correspondences: savvam me akaraaijjam paakammam (Ayar. II.15) subbapapassa akaranam (Dhp. 183a) and 41

Page #45
BUSINESS REPLY CARD Please attix Stamp DILIP K BOBRA 2072 ELAVIEVE TEMPE, AZ 85284 BUSINESS REPLY CARD Please affix Stamp DILIP K BOBRA 2072 E LAVIEVE TEMPE,AZ 85284

Page #46
International Journal of Contemporary Jaina Reflections JM IM M JINAMANJARI Bramhi Jain Society Publication International Journal of [Contemporary Jaina Reflections JM M M JINAMANJARI Bramhi Jain Society Publication Name : Address: City/zip: Signature: Name Address: Life Subscription $ 251.00 Annual Subscription $15.00 Donation : BRAMHI JAIN SOCITY a non-profit organization in USA & Canada City/zip: Signature: Please tick one and mail your check Subscriptions and donations are tax-exempt BRAMHI JAIN SOCITY a non-profit organization in USA & Canada Please tick one and mail your check Life Subscription $ 251.00 Annual Subscription $15.00 Donation Subscriptions and donations are tax-exempt

Page #47
BUSINESS REPLY CARD Please affix Stamp DILIP K BOBRA 2072 ELAVIEVE TEMPE, AZ 85284 BUSINESS REPLY CARD Please affix Stamp DILIP K BOBRA 2072 E LAVIEVE TEMPE,AZ 85284

Page #48
International Journal of Contemporary BRAMHI JAIN SOCITY a non-profit organization in USA & Canada Name laina Reflections Address City/zip Signature: Please tick one and mail your check Life Subscription S 251.00 Annual Subscription $15.00 Donation ...... ...... Subscriptions and donations are tax-exempt JINAMANJARU Bramhi Jain Society Publicatos BRAMHI JAIN SOCITY a non-profit organization in USA & Canada International Journal of Contemporary Vaina Reflections Name Address : Citylzip : .................................................. Signature: .............................. Please tick one and mail your check Life Subscription $ 251.00 Annual Subscription $15.00 JINAVANJARI Donation ............ Bramhi Jaia Soricty Publication Subscriptions and donations are tax-exempt

Page #49
samaiyam carittam padivajjai (prati v pad] (Ayar. II.15) kusalassa upasampada (upa sam v pad] (Dhp. 183b) Although the words are different, the concepts and purpose of the two passages -- especially of kusala and samayika caritra -- are very close to each other. 2.1 It is known that Buddhism and Jainism are based in the same sociological bedrock. Therefore, it is quite natural that there are many common elements between them. This is amply reinforced of expressions of restraint (samvara) of the sense organs to ward off the influx of karmic matter. Some of the phrases in Dhammapada 360, 361 are identical to those in the more senior Jaina Canons. The following section will illustrate some examples of such similar phrases. 2.2 From Dhammapada 360, 361: cakkuna sumvaro sadhu, sudhu sotena samvaro ghanena samvaro sahu, sudhu jivhava samvaro || (360) Restraint in the cye is good; good is restraint in the car; in the nose restraint is good; good is restraint in the tongue. kuvena samvaro sudhu vacaya sam varo! manasa samvaro sadhu, sadhu sabbatiha samvaro sabbattha samvuto bhikku sabbadukkha pamuccati || (361) In the body restraint is good, good is restraint in speech; in thought restraint is good, good is restraint in everything [in all senses). A mendicant who is restrained in everything is freed from all sorrow. 42

Page #50
Restraint (samvara), in this case, means to ward off the karmic influx through the eye, the ear, the nose and the tongue -- the same meaning as the Jaina usage of the word, samvara. Furthermore, in Dhammapada 281: vacanurakkhi manasa susanvuto kayena ca akusalam na kayira ete tayo kammapathe visodhaye, aradhaye maggam isi ppaveditam || (281) Guarding his speech, restraining well his mind, let a man not commit anything evil with his body. He who keeps these three ways of action pure, will achieve the way expounded by sages. The verse also mentions "restraining well his mind" (samvaru). This expression, "the way expounded by the sages," indicates that the religious thought pre-dates Buddha. 2.3 Mahavira preached the restraint of the sense organs. In the explanation of five great vows (panca mahavvaya), he used the restraint of sense organs to check karmic influx. In the Avarngasutta 11.15 (the section titled Bhavana) panca mahavvaya is stated as follows: sotaenam jive manunnaim saddaim sunei, manunnamanunnehim saddehim no sejja, no rajjejja, no gijjhejja, no mujjhejja, no ajjhovajjejja, no vinigghayam avajjejja, ...na sakku na aoum sadda soyavisavam agata raga dosa u je tattha tam bhikkhu parivajjae || sodo jivo manunnamanunnaim saddaim sunei... (Ed. by Muni Jambuvijaya) 43

Page #51
If a creature with ears hears agreeable and disagreeable sounds, it shoud not be attached to, nor delighted with, nor desiring of, nor infatuated by, nor covetous of, nor disturbed by the agreeable or disagreeable sounds.... If it is impossible not to hear sounds which reach the ear, the mendicant should avoid love or hate, originated by them... (Tr.by H. Jacobi, p.209) 2.4 The theme of restraint in Ayarngasutta II.15, with some slight verbal variations, is also available in the older Jaina text, Isibhasiyaim (chap. 29). A section from this collection of the teachings of Mahavira is included in the following: saddamspta, ivadaya manunn va vi pavagam manunnammi na rajjejja, na padussejja hi pavuc (3) manunn arajjhante adutthe iyarammi ya asutte avirodhinam evam soe pihijati (4) ruvam cakkhum vuadaya...(5) (6) gandhum ghanam uvadaya... (7) (8) rasa jibbham uvadaya (9) (10) phasam taytam uvadaya (11) (12) (Isibhasvaim, 29. ed. by W. Schubring) Hearing through the ears - Pleasant words should arouse no delights Nor unpleasant ones should make annoyance One who remains unruffled and equanimous - At either of the two, He smothers karmic flow. Again, the ear, nose, tongue and the organ of feeling are repeated. 44

Page #52
2.5 As for the "samvara," this tendency seems to appear as the famous passages of Nigantha Nataputta's teachings in Samannaphalasutta (SphS), the so called "Teachings of the Six Heretics", which is said to render the words of Mahavira. Despite the years of scholarly research, its meaning is still somewhat unclear. Nigantha Nataputta's portion runs as follows: idha maharaja niganto catu yama samvara samvuto hoti.... idha maharaja niganto sabba vari varito ca hoti sabba-vari yuto ca sabba vari-dhuto ca, sabba-variphuttho ca... Before continuing, I would first like to discuss the meaning of sabba-vari in the Samannaphalasutta. I prefer the reading of vari as it is found in the following text editions: the Royal Thai Edition, the Burmese Chattha Sangavana, the Sri Lankan Simon Hewavitarne Bequest Series Edition, the PTS edition of the Sumangalavilasini, and the PTS dictionary. On this passage, Buddhaghosa's atthakatha is: nata putta vade catu yama samvara samvuto ti catu kottasena samvarena samvuto. sabba vi varito cati varita-sabba udako, patikkhitta sitodako ti attho. so kira sitodake satta sanni hoti. tasma tam na valaneti. sabba vari yuto ti sabbena papa varanena yutto. sabba vadhuto ti sabbena papa varanena dhuto papo. sabba vari puttho ti sabbena papa-varanena phuttho. The term sabba vari occur here four times. Catu yama samvara samvuto means being protected/restrained (sam VR) by the four kinds of restraint/rules (samvara). Buddhaghosa goes on to explain the first sabba vari varito as, "restraining 45

Page #53
from all water, refusing cold water. They say that cold water contains (the consciousness of a) living being(s) and therefore one does not use it. Curiously enough the following three times sabba vari is explained differently, "sabba vari yuto" means, being intent (yutto) upon warding off (vara) all evil". Vari being explained as vara, the "warding off the inflow of all evil karmic matter" is a familiar expression in Jain literature. Western Pali dictionaries, the Abhidhanappadipika, the Sadduniti, and the Puli-Burmese Dictionary (the Tipitaka Palimrunma Abhidhan) present only "water" as the translation for vari. Why would Buddhaghosa have given two meanings for the same word in the same passage? The Papancasuduni, the commentary on the Majjhimanikaya, repeats the same explanation of the Sumungalasni: "One should not use cold water as there are living creatures in it," after which is added, "or (athava), sabba vari varito means having all evil warded off by warding off all evil (subbenu papa varanena varila papo)." The second explanation in both texts agrees with its meaning in a Jain context. As vari only means "water" in Pali, we can assume that Buddhaghosa properly knew the Jain meaning of the word. If he had read varana in sabba vari varito, this would have meant that Nigantha, "was restrained -- warding off all (evil)," and this is hardly fit for a passage which aims at extolling Buddhism and refuting other religions. The precepts of early Buddhism and Jainism were extremely similar, and giving descriptions of them must have been a delicate matter, especially in parts containing common religious idioms like samvara. I would like to add, that among many scholars, only L. Renou has consistently interpreted vari as varunu: "...le Nigantha s'abstient de toutes choses en les ecartant." 2.6 From Jaina text, Suyagadanga 1.6.28., I will now give some examples of the use of vari (ya), and comparable words - 46

Page #54
in Jain texts. In its chapter "In Praise of Mahavira (Virattjhui)," the old work, Suy(gada) 1.6.28. reads: se variya itthi sa rai bhattam, uvahanavam dukkha kkhay'atth'ayaeram ca, logam viditta aram param ca, savvam pabhu variya savva varam (ed. by Muni Jambuvijaya) = He abstained from women and from eating at night, he practised austerities for the removal of pain, he knew this world, and that beyond: the lord renounced everything at every time. (H. Jacobi, SBE 45. p. 291) The "savva varam," is explained by some of the commentators as follows: "the Suy.curni has, srava-vari sarvavarana-sila ity artha srava-vari means the practice of warding off everything." This explanation comes close to Buddhaghosa's sabbena papa varanena varita-papo. The Suy.tika (and the dipik) have: "sarvavaram bahuso nivaita (Skt. sarvavaram, one who has repeatedly warded off). The Nagarjuniya recension gives no explanation on this problem. It should be noted at this juncture that the Angasuttani edition of Canon I (p. 304) mentions a 16th century manuscript containing the variant, vare. 2.7 Turning now to the twenty-ninth chapter of a text attributed to sayings of Mahavira, the Isibhasiyaim, stanza 19ab reads: savvattha virae dante, savva varihim varie (ed. W. Schubring) Schubring has explained this vari as "absonderung" in the notes to the 1942 edition. He seems to have changed his 47

Page #55
opinion in his German translation of 1969 where he gives "pforte" (Skt. dvara > vara). The late Prof. Seiren Matsunami, a student of Schubring, has adopted Schubring's first explanation in his Japanese translation of the text. Another possibility would be interpreting this as "always," from the Sanskrit, vara = "time, turn" (as in Jacobi's translation of Su 1.6.28 - supru). In this context. "every time or always" (savva vara) contrasts with 'everywhere" (savvattha, Skt. = sarvatra). In terms of the sloka metre, the reading savva varihi varie would also be possible as the syllable preceding varie should metrically be a short one. This would accord with Suv(gada) curni variya suvva-vari. Furthermore, Isibhasivaim 29. 3-12, and 19, are parallels passages with Dhammapada 360 and 361 (especially, Isibh. 29.19ab and Dhammapada 361cd). 2.8 We get, therefore, the following readings from the referred texts: Isibh. - suvva varihim vari, or savva vari hi vari Suy.curni - variya savvu-vari Suy.tika - variva savva varam (text; v.1.vare) SPhS - savva vari varito (only PTS has vari) and, savvattha virae dante, suvva varihis vari, suvva dukkha ppahineva, Isibh. 29.19abc - sabbattha sumvuto bhikku sabbadukkha pamuccati (Dhp. 361cd) Phonetic confusion between "j" and "e", and orthographical confusion between "i e" and "am" in Jaina manuscripts are likely to occur. Moreover, the Burmese letter for "i" and "am" are very similar. Although it is impossible to indicate the source of Buddhaghosa's interpretation, it seems to be close to the Suv.curni' s. The fact that these tenets are found in both Buddhist and Jaina sources makes it highly probable 48

Page #56
that they formed a kernel of Mahavira's teachings. Therefore, it appears that these difficult passages recorded as Nigantha's sayings in the Buddhist Canon, are actually based upon Jaina sources as stated in the text itself. They can be understood when compared with the old Jaina Agumas. 2.9 Although the words are slightly different, the concepts and purpose of the texts are very close to each other. We can recognize from the comparison that both Buddha and Mahavira sought the avoidance of all sinful acts, and control of the mind, in order to ward off karmic influx via the sense organs: they renounced the world. It is quite possible that the thoughts of both the Buddha and Mahavira, who flowered within a similar socio-religious tradition -- samana mahana religious thought -- were just the same at the starting point of their religious careers. I ENDNOTES * This article is based on my Japanese papers: "Niganta Nataputta setu Saiko. Jainakyo bunken kara mita Shamongakyo no rokushi" (N.N.) Sayings reconsidered, The Six Heretics in the SPS according to Jaina Literature): Sanko Bunka Kenkyujyo Nenpo. vol. 13 (1981). "Varam to-vari wo megurite" (Some Notes on varam and vari-): Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu Vol.34. no.2. 1986. pp. 917 912.("Jainakyo to Bukkyo niokeru Shoakumakusa" (Dhap. 183 and Ayar. II.15), in Japanese, Journal of Religious Studies, Vol. LXVIII 4.No.303. Japanese Association for Religious Studies. The University of Tokyo, 1995. [This paper was presented at the 53th Conference of the Japanese Association for Religious Studies held at the Rissho University in Tokyo, Japan. (September 9 -11, 1994)). On my English papers: K.WATANABE: "Some notes on the expression sabba varilsavva varam," Bulletin d'Etudes Indiennes, no. 5 (1987), Paris.K.WATANABE:"Avoiding all sinful acts by both Buddha and Mahavira" (Dhammapada 183 and Ayarangasutta II.15) Bulletin d'Etudes Indiennes, nos. 11,12 (1993-94) Paris. These papers owe much to the thoughtful comments and encouragement of Nalini Balbir. About an investigation of the close parallels which can be traced between Pali and AMg: Hajime Nakamura: Common Elements in Early Jain and Buddhist Literature (Indologica Taurinensia. Proceedings of the 49

Page #57
International Symposium on Jaina Canonical and Narrative Liteirature. Edited by Nalini Balbirand Colette Caillat. Strasbourg. Junc16-19, 1981). Vol. XI 1983, pp. 302-330.) Colette Caillat: Jainology in Western Publications II (Jain Studies in Honour of Jozef Deleu. Edited by R. Smet and K. Watanabe) Tokyo, 1993. Especially pp.50-51. Dhammapada. Edited by O.von Hinuber and K. R.Norman. Pali Text Society. Oxford 1994. First, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu) Vol.XIV no.2. March 1966. Later. in "Genshi Bukkyo no Seiritu" ( The origination of Early Buddhism) "The earliest Buddhism represented by Sariputta," in Japanese. Tokyo. Shunjusha. 1969) pp. 379-89. 4 Ayarangasutta. Edited by Muni JambuVijaya. Jaina Agama Series no.2(1). Bombay 1976. p.273. Agamodaya, ed. 424a, 11.Jacobi's edition runs thus: savvam akaranijjam pavam ti katlu samaiyam carittam padivajjai. (The Ayaramga Sutta os Svetambara Jains. Pali Text Sociaty. London 1882) p. 129. However, I accept the readings of Muni Jambuvijaya's edition. > Klaus Bruhn: Avasyaka Studies. Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus. Gedenkschrift fur Ludwig Alsdorf HIrg. von K.Bruhn und A. Wezler.(Alt und Neu Indische Studien 23). Wiesbaden, 1981. pp.22 and 24. Nalini Balbir: Avas/yaka Studien. Introduction Generale et Traductions (Alt und Neu Indische Studien. 45.1) Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart 1993. pp.34-5. R. Williams: Jaina Yoga. A Survey of the Mediaeval Sravakacaras. London, 1963. Jozef Deleu, Vivahapannatti (Bhagavati): The Fifth Anga of the Jaina Canon. Rijksuniversiteit te Gent. no. 151). Brugge 1970. p.289."For samaiyas, the Fourfold Restraint (caujjama. i.e.Parsva's lore) is the highest dharma, and he who practises it in the three ways is s~maiya-s. He who adapts the Fivefold Restraint (panca jama. i.e. Mv.'s lore) after having quitted his former spiritual rank is a cheovatthavaniya-s and uttarajjhaya." XXVIII, 32.cf. Mulacara 524. Mahaparinibbana suttanta. The Digha Nikaya. ed. by T.W. Rhys Davids and J. Estin Carpenter. vol. II. London. The Pali Text Society. 1947. p.151. See the excellent works of Fumio Enomoto: "asrava(ro) no seiritunituite" (= On the origination of asrava) Bukkyo Shigaku Kennkvu. no. 22.1. Kyoto, 50

Page #58
1979. And "Shoki Bukkyo ni okeru Go no shometsu" (Perishment of Kamma in Early Buddhism) The Journal of The Nippon Buddhist Research Association, vol.54. Tokyo, 1989. And see Kenji Watanabe: Some notes on the expression sabba-vari/savva varam. Bulletin d'Etudes Indiennes, no.5. (Association Francaise pour les Etudes Sanskrites. Edite par Nalini Balbir et Georges Pinault) Paris, 1987. pp.375-386. 9 Nyanatiloka: Buddhist Dictionary. Manual of Buddhist Terms and Doctorines. Colombo, 1950. p.78. 10 Shrivattakeracharya's Mulachara. (= Jnanpiti Murthidevi Jaina Granthamala: Prakrit grantha, no. 19) New Delhi, 1984. 11 Gustav Roth (ed.): Bhiksuni Vinaya. ( Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series Vol.XII) Patna 1970. p.52, 67. 12 Cf. In Jain expressions on upa sam pad:.... caujjamao pamca mahavvayaiyam sa padikkamanam dhammam uvasampajjittanam viharai. (Viy.998a). Padhame mahavvae. tassa upasampajjanartha [m]. Ayar. Cunni 377. 13 W.Schubring. Isibhasiyaim. Ausspruche der Weisen aus dem Prakrit der Jainas (ANIS 14). Hamburg, 1969. 14 Dighanikaya I 57 (PTS ed.) Sumangalavilasini I 167, 168 (PTS ed.). 16 J.Bloch. J.Filliozat. L.Renou. Canon Buddhique Pali. tome I. facs. 1. Paris, 1949. p.51. 15 17 Cf. Agamodaya samiti ed. Bombay, 1917. 152a. 18 Ed. Prakrit Text Society Series. Varanasi. 1975. p.150. Agamodaya samiti ed. Bombay. 1917. 152b. 20 Muni Nathmal (ed.), Angasuttani I. Ladnun, 1974. 19 21 W. Schubring. Isibhasiyaim. Ein Jaina Text der Fruhzeit: Nachrichten von der Akad. Wiss. in Gottingen. Philologisch Historische Klasse. Jahrgang 1942. Nr. S.481 576; Jahrgang 1952. Nr.2 S.21, 52. 51

Page #59
22 W.Schubring. Isibhasiyaim. Ausspruche der Weisen aus dem Prakrit der Jainas (ANIS 14). Hamburg, 1969. 23 S. Matsunami. Seisen no goroku ( A Translation of the Jain Text Isibhasivaim: Studies in Commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Existence of the Department of Literature in Kyushu University, 1966 (in Japanese). 52

Page #60
Geometric Formulas in the Dhavala of Virasena (780 C.E.) Dr. Takao Hayashi Introduction The Dhavala, Virasena's commentary on the Chakkhandagama (Canon in Six Books', abbr. CK) of Puspadanta and Bhutabali, was completed on November 3, 781 C.E. (See CESS 5, 714a for the date). In it, he uses many geometric formulas in relation to the computation of the fields (khettas) which the jivas ('souls' or 'spirits') occupy or live in at various stages of their evolution. Some of those formulas bear special importance in the history of Indian mathematics. So far as is known, Virasena is the first in India to calculate the value, 355/113 (= 3.14159292 ...), for "r." He also used, for the first time in India, a formula for the sum of an infinite geometric progression. The geometric formulas used by him in Chapters 3 (khetta-unugama) and 4 (phosana-anuguma) of Book I (jivathanu) are examined in the following. (For Virasena and his mathematics, see also J.P. Jain 1948, L.C. Jain & A. Jain 1985, L.C. Jain 1982 and 1992, and Singh 1984.) Rate of Increase The rate of increase is used for calculating the length of a horizontal section of a trapezoid, which occurs in the Jaina cosmography as a vertical section of the Lower and the Upper Worlds. 53

Page #61
muhabhumivisesumhi du ucchehabhajidamhi sa have vaddhi vaddhi icchagunida muhasahida su phalam hodi || When the difference between the top (a) and the base (b) is divided by the height (h) [of a trapezoid), it will be the (rate of increase) (r). The (rate of) increase, when multiplied by an optional number (x) and increased by the top, becomes the fruit (y). (Cf. Fig. 1) (Stanza 17 cited in the Dhavala on CK 1.3.5; vol. 4, p. 57) y=rx+ a, where r= Cf. T'iloyupunnatti 1.176 177. X Figure 1: Rate of increase 34

Page #62
Figure 2: World-space according to the Digambara Cosmography Prisms According to the Digambara cosmography, the Lower World has the form of a cane-seat (vettasana) or of a trapezoidal prism, and the Upper World (including the Middle World) has the form of a drum (muinga) or of a hexagonal prism. (See Fig. 2, where a = t= h = 7 rajjus, b = c = 1 rajju, m = 5 rajjus.) The Lower World measures 4 x 72 cubic rajjus and the Upper World 3 x 72 cubic rajjus, the total being 73 cubic rajjus. Cf. $6 below. Volume of a trapezoidal prism: muhatalasamasuaddham vussedhagunum gunum ca vedhena | 55

Page #63
ghanaganidam janejjo vellasanasamthiye khette || Half the sum of the top (b) and the base (a), multiplied by the height (h) and also by the depth (1), should be known as the cubic value (V) of a field like a caneseat. (Stanza 9 cited in the Dhavala on CK 1.3.2; vol.4, p. 20 = Stanza 16 cited in the Dhavala on CK 1.3.4; vol. 4, p. 51) = a+b.h 2 V= Cf. Tiloyapannatti 1.165. Volume of a hexagonal prism: mulam majjhena gunam muhasahidaddham ussedhakadigunidam | ghanaganidam janejjo muimgasamthanakhettamhi || The base (b), multiplied by the middle [line] (m), increased by the top (c), halved, and multiplied by the square of the height (h), should be known as the cubic value (V) of a field like a drum. (Stanza 10 cited in the Dhavala on CK 1.3.2; vol. 4, p. 21 Stanza 15 cited in the Dhavala on CK 1.3.4; vol. 4, p. 51) .h.t =a+b V = .h.t This formula suffers from dimensional inconsistency, and contains a term in the fourth degree (bmh2), but happens to 56

Page #64
yield the correct result (3 x 72 rajjuy) for the given values. This may be called an 'adapted' formula. Volume of a trapezoidal and a hexagonal prisms combined: muhasahidamulamajjham chettunaddhena sattavaggena hastunegatshakade ghanarajju homti logamhi || When one has cut in half the base (a) and the middle (line) (m) (each) increased by the top (b or c), multiplied (the result) by the square of seven, and made (them) into one, there will be the cubic rajjus (V) of the World. (Stanza 1 cited in the Dhavala on CK 1.4.2; vol. 4, p. 146) V=470*7* + 6* * 72 This is also an 'adapted' formula. Circles and Cylinders The volumes of cylindrical spaces with circular bases are calculated several times. Let V and h be respectively the volume and the height of a cylinder, and d, C and A be respectively the diameter, the circumference and the area of its base. The formula for the volume, V=Ah, is taken for granted by Virasena. Area of a circle: vyasardhakrtitrikam samastaphalam 57

Page #65
Three times the square of half the diameter (d) is the entire fruit (area, A) (of a circle). (Dhavala on CK 1.4.8; vol. 4, p. 168) A= 3) A=31 vikkhambhacaubbhugo pariravagunido have gunidam || A fourth of the diameter (d), multiplied by the circumference (C), will be the value calculated (i.e., the area, A). (Stanza Scd cited in the Dhavala on CK1.4.28; vol. 4, p. 209) A=C. The first formula is cited in a different wording as a formula of 'practical' (vyavaharika) nature as against 'exact' (suksma) one by Bhaskara I in his commentary (AD 629) on Aryabhutiya 2.7ab (p. 60). The Jaina mathematician Mahavira also prescribes it in a section for geometrical formulas of 'practical' nature of his Ganitasarasamgruha (7.19; ca. AD 850). The second formula and its variation, A (C/2).(d/2), has been used in India since at least the times of Umasvati (Tattvarthadhigumasutrabhasva 3.11, the 5th (1st? or 6th?) century AD) and of Aryabhata (Aryabhaliya 2.7, AD 499 or a little later). Circumference of a circle: vikkhumbhuvagyudasagunakuruni vatlussa puriruo 58

Page #66
hodi | The square rooi of ten times the square of the diameter (d) is the circumference (C) of a circle. (Stanza Sab cited in the Dhavala on CK 1.4.28; vol. 4, p. 209) C= V10 vyasam sodasagunitam sodasasahitam triuparupahrtam vyasatrigunitasahitam suksmad api tad bhavet suksmam The diameter (d) is multiplied by sixteen, increased by sixteen, divided by one-one-three (113), and increased by three times the diameter. It will be (a value for the circumference (C)) more accurate than the accurate one. (Stanza 9 cited in the Dhavala on CK 1.4.38; vol. 4, pp. 221 - 222) C = 3d + 160 + 16 C= 30 + 113 ( = 355d + 16 113 ) 113 113 In the acutal use of the first formula, the approximation, 19/6, is employed instead of V10. The verse for the second formula is repeated with a minor variant (triruparupair bhaktam for triruparupahatam) as Stanza 14 on CK 1.3.3 (vol.4, pp.42 43). The same formula is silently employed also on CK 1.3.2 (vol.4, p. 12) and on CK 1.3.4 (vol.4, p.48 and p.49). On CK 1.3.2 (vol.4, p. 13, lines 6 7), V'rasena uses, in addition to the above, 59

Page #67
C = 3d+ 16d 113 We have shown elsewhere (Hayashi et al. 1989) that this formula was invented as an approximation to Aryabhata's (Aryabhatiya 2.10): (-355). 113 Thus, Virasena uses the three approximations, 3, 10 and 355/113, for l: the first value for the area and the rest for the circumference. jivas samkha (a conch-shell) gomhi (a centipede) bhamara (a bee) maccha (a fish) C 62832 20000 Approximate Volumes of Irregular Solids The volumes of the fields occupied by various jivas living outside Svayamprabha mountain, and having two to five sense organs, are given an approximate calculation. The 'depth' (ogahana) or the height of each creature is stipulated in the following verse, and the other sizes are given by Virasena in his calculation of each volume. samkho puna baraha jovanani gomhi bhava tikosam tu | bhamaro joyanam egam maccho puna joyanasahasso || (Stanza 12 cited in Dhavala on CK 1.3.2; vol. 4, p. 33) number of sense organs depth 23 2 4 5 60 12 joyanas 3 kosas 1 joyana 1000 joyanas

Page #68
A formula is given for the first step of the calculation of the conch-shell but none for the rest. A bee (bhamara): Approximation by a semi-cylinder. tattha tava bhamarakhetanayanavidhanam bhanissamo punajoyanayamam addhajoyanusseham joyanaddhaparihivikkhambham vikkhambhaddham ussehagunam ayamena gunide ussehajoyanassa tinni attabhaga bhavamti || thaviya Among them, in the first place, I shall explain the method for calculating the field of a bee. Now, the field of a bee has a length (a), a height (h) and a circumference (C/2) equal respectively to one joyana, a half joyana and the circumference for (the diameter equal to) a half joyana. When one has put down half the circumference multiplied by the height, and multilpied (it) by the length, three eighths of one (cubic) ussehajoyana are produced. (Cf. Fig. 3.)(Dhavala on CK 1.3.2, vol. 4, p. 34) where V= C/2 xhxa= a = 1, h= 1 422222242 6/2 200 3 =TX usseha-joyana3, 112 = 61 312 (with p = = 3).

Page #69
Figure 3: Semi-cylindrical field occupied by a bee/ The word, vikkhambha ( = Skt. viskambha), is usually used in the sense not of 'a circumference' but of 'a diameter' of a circle, but Utpala cites a Sanskrit verse that uses the word, viskambha, in the former sense in his commentary (p. 600, AD 976) on the Brhatsamhita of Varahamihira. It is interesting that the verse too prescribes formulas for the circumference and the area of a circle with 3 for a. A centipede (gomhi): Approximation by a rectangular solid. gomhiayamo ussedhajoyanatinnicaubbhago tadathabhago vikkhambho vikkhambhaddham bahallam ede tinn vi puroppuram gunide ussedhajovanaghanassa samkhejjadibhago agacchadi | The length (a) of a centipede is three fourths of an ussedha-joyana, the width (b) an eighth of it, and the thickness (h) half of the width. When all these three (quantities) are multipleid mutually, a countablenumber-th part of a cubic ussedha-joyana is obtained (lit. comes). (Dhuvala on CK 1.3.2; vol. 4, pp. 34 35)

Page #70
3 3 3 | 27 | 1 V = adh = ussedhe joyana, where n is a countable number. For an elaborate system of countable-uncountable-infinite numbers developed by the Jaina people, see Anuogaddaraim 497-519 and Dhavala on CK 1.2.2 (vol. 3, pp. 11-26). A conch-shell (samkha): Approximation by an irregular cone. -- barahajoyanayamacadujoyanamuhasamkhakhettaphalam -- vyasam tavatkrtva vadanadalonam mukhardhavargayutam dvigunam caturvibhaktam sanabhike 'smin gaaitam ahuh || (Stanza 13 cited) edena suttena aniya muhahinussehasahidussehacadubbhagena guniya ussehaghanajoyanani aniya puvvuttagunagarena gunide pumanaghanamgulani hosti || When one has obtained the fruit (i.e., the area, A) of the field of a conch-shell, whose length (a) is twelve joyanas, and the value of whose mouth (m) is four joyanas, by means of this versified rule (sutta): The diameter (dl), multiplied by itself, decreased by half the mouth, increased by the square of half the mouth, multiplied by two, and divided by four, is, they say, the calculated value of this (figure) having a center; multiplied (the result) by a fourth of the height (h) decreased by the mouth and increased by the height, 63

Page #71
obtained the (volume (V) in) cubic ussehu-joyanas, and multiplied (the result) by the multiplier told before, the (volume in) cubic pamuna-umgulas is produced. (Dhavala on CK 1.3.2; vol. 4, p. 35) The data is incomplete since the 'height' (h) is not given. Taking the 'length' (a) of the conch-sell to be identical with the 'diameter' (d) in the cited verse, we have: A = {# -*+ (%) *}*2+1, and V = Ax -m+husseka-joyapa", or h-m V=AX +h usgeha h- m V=AX +h **1536 pamana-amgula3 The meaning of the factor, (h-m + h)/4, is not known, but it is perhaps a modified height. The number, 15363, in the last step is the change ratio between the cubic pumanu-amgulas ('standard' amgula) and the cubic ussehu-joyanas ("height' = joyana). According to the Digambara table of measures (cf. Tiloyapannatti 1.102 116), 1 pamana-amgulas = 500 ussehu-umgulas, 1 ussehu-joyana = 768000 ussehu-umgulas Therefore, 1 ussehu-joyunu} = 15363 pumanu-umgulas According to the Svetambara table of measures (cf. Anuogadduraim 358), 1 pumana-umgula = 1000 ussehu-ungulas

Page #72
The above formula for A has some inconsistency in its dimension. This problem, however, is easily resolved. Without violating its meter, one can interchange the two compounds, tavatkytva ('multiplied by itself) and vadanadalonanam (decreased by half the mouth') in Stanza 13, and we would have: A={(1-7)*+()}}x2+4. This emended formula reminds one of the formulas for the 'conch-shell-circle' (kambukavitta/ sankhavrtta) given by Mahavira (Gaaitasarasamgraha 7.23 and 7.65-6, ca. AD 850) and by Narayana (Gaaitakaumudi, ksetra 10-11, AD 1356). And quite interestingly, if we emend the first word, dvi-, of the second line of Stanza 13 to tri-, Virasena's formula would become equivalent to their formulas employing 3 for a. Figure 4: Conch-shell-like plane figure vadanardhono vyasas trigunah paridhis tu kambukavitte 65

Page #73
valuyardhakriitryamso mukhardhavargatripadayutah || In the case of a conch-shell-circle, the diameter (d), decreased by half the mouth (m) and multiplied by three, is the perimeter (p). One third of the square of half the perimeter, increased by three quarters of the square of half the mouth, (is the area A). (Cf. Fig. 4.)(Ganitasarasamgraha 7.23) p=3(2-), A = }(0)+ (%)' mukhadalarahito vyasas trighnah sankhe prajayate paridhih | vyasadalakstir vrtyarkamashatasyonita phulam trighna | vadanadalono vyaso vadanadalar yat tadurdhavargaikyam | trigunitam atha vaganitam sthulam sankhakrtau bhavati || In the case of (a figure like) a conch-shell, the diameter (d), when decreased by half the mouth (m) and multiplied by three, becomes the perimeter (p). The square of half the diameter, decreased by the product of the mouth and one twelfth of the perimeter and multilpied by three, is the area (A). Or, the diameter is decreased by half the mouth, and the mouth is halved. The sum of the squares of their halves, multiplied by three, is the gross area of a conch-shell-like figure. (Gaaitakaumudi, ksetra 10-11) 66

Page #74
2 A-3{(4=m/a)+ (72)"} Mahavira gives another set of formulas employing v10 for n. vadanardhono vyaso dasapadagunito bhavet pariksepah | mukhadalarahitavyasardhavargamukhacaranakstiyogah| dasapadagunitah ksetre kambunibhe suksmaphalum etat || The diameter (d), when decreased by half the mouth (m) and multiplied by the square root of ten, will be the perimeter (p). The sum of the square of half the diameter decreased by half the mouth and the square of a quarter of the mouth is multiplied by the square root of ten. This (result) is the accurate area (A) of a conchshell-like figure. (Ganitasarasamgraha 7.65-6) p=vod-.) A=vio{(4=;/2) + (7)"} Whether my emendations of Stanza 13 cited by Virasena are correct or not, it is certain that the origin of Mahavira's problem of 'conch-shell-circle' can be traced back to the calculation of the volume of a conch-shell in the Jaina 67

Page #75
canonical works. For a discussion about the derivations of the formulas of Mahavira and Narayana, see Hayashi 1992. A fish (maccha): Approximation either by an elliptic cylinder or by a rectangular solid. joyanasahassayamapuocusadussehatadaddhavittharamahamacchakhetiam pi samkhejjani pumamaghanamgulami horti || (For) the field of a big fish, too, whose length (a), height (h) and width (b) are respectively one thousand joyanas, five hundred joyanas, and its half, a countable number of cubic pumana-amgulas are produced (as its volume). (Dhavala on CK 1.3.2; vol. 4, p. 36) V=n pamana-amgula), where n is a countable number. The figure meant here is not certain since no computation is given. A god (deva) : Approximation by an irregular(?) cylinder. tesim ogahana sattahatthusseha amgulagunanae atlisadussedhamgulupumana edassa dasabhagavikkhambha || kudo jado devamanussuneraiyaunam ussedho dasanavaatihatalapamanena bhanido || puno vasaddham vaggiya viguniya atihasatihisadussedhamgulehi guniya ghanikadapamcusadurgulehi ovattide pamanaghanamgulassa sumkhejjadibhago agacchadi | 68

Page #76
Their depth (h) is seven hatthas high or, in comutation with amgulas, one hundred and sixty-eight ussedhaamgulas. A tenth part of it is the width (d). Why? Because the heights of a god, a man, and a resident of the Nether Worlds are explained by means of the measures, ten, nine, and eight talas respectively. Now, when one has squared half the diameter (d), multiplied by two, multiplied by one hundred and sixty-eight ussedha-amgulas, and divided by five hundred angulas made into cube, a countable-number-th part of one cubic pamama-amgula is obtained (lit. comes). (Dhavala on CK 1.3.3; vol. 4, p. 40) V=2x )**+500* = pamana-angula", where n is a countable number. The multiplier, '2' (viguniya), is perhaps an intentional modification of '3' in: with a view to estimating less, if it is not a mistake for '3' (liguniya) crept into the verse in the course of transmission. It is not a misprint in the published edition since the Hindi translation attached to it also accepts viguniya. This last formula is actually used by Virasena. See , $4 above. Volume of a Truncated Cone According to the Jaina cosmography, the 'world space' (loga-agasa) consisting of the Upper, Middle and Lower Worlds (logas) is located in the midst of the 'non-world space' (aloga--agasa) of infinite dimension. The Digambara tradition 69

Page #77
takes the volume of the 'world space' to be equal to one cubic loga or the cube of one jaga-sedhi ('world line') of seven rajjus. Hence the volume of the 'world space' is 73 = 343) cubic rajjus. This mathematical requirement perhaps caused the Digambara Jainas to invent the rectilinear figure of the Three Worlds. See, $3 above. According to the Svetambara tradition, on the other hand, the Three Worlds consist of three truncated cones piled one above another (Fig. 5), whose total volume is less than half of 73 cubic rajjus. Virasena actually carries out the computation of the volume of each truncated cone in order to prove it (Dhavala on CK 1.3.2; vol.4, pp. 12 18). Characteristic features of his computation here are the use of the sum of an infinite geometric progression and the transformation of geometric figures without changing their volumes. Formulas Used Virasena employs the following formulas and properties in his computation of the volume of a truncated cone (see Singh 1949/50 for the actual process of Virasena's computation) 1. Formula for the circumference of a circle: C = 3d + 160 + 16 45 113 160 and C= 3d + 10 113 2. Formula for the area of a circle: A-Cd 70

Page #78
teniju Figure 5: World-space according to the Svetambara Cosmography 3. Formula for the volume of a cylinder: V = Ah. 4. Formula for the volume of a rectangular solid: V = abh. 5. Formula for the volume of a right-triangular prism: V = bh 71

Page #79
6. Formula for the sum of an infinite geometric progression: ap S=Q+- +- + - + oc, where I Page #80
He also uses the formula for the sum of a finite geometric progression: S(n) = a + ar + a2 + ans + ... + ar n-1 = (1 -1) 1- 1 in his computation of the number of the heavenly bodies (Dhavala on CK 1.4.4; vol. 4, pp. 150-159) and of the areas of the concentric islands and oceans (on CK 1.4.24 25; vol.4, pp. 193 202). It is, therefore, not improbable that the inventor of the fornrula took the limit of n in: s(n) = ^{(0)" - 1} Another derivation of the same formula seems to have been equally possible for him. By multiplying both sides of the equation, S=a+ + +...+70), by p, he could obtain: pS = op+{c++-+-+0)} = ap+5. Hence the above formula. The expression ''in the above equations indicates a 'space point' (agasa-padesa). This notion is clearly seen in Virasena's expression of the 'thickness' of a plane figure' 'The circumference of its (the cylinder's) top, horizontal circle whose thickness (bahalla) is one 'space-point is this much 371/113 (on CK 1.3.2; vol. 4, p. 12). As for the transformation of geometric figures without changing their areas or volumes, I simply point out that it was 73

Page #81
one of the most popular topics in Indian mathematics since the times of the Sulbasutras (ca. 6th century BC and later). For Mahavira's treatment of frustum-like solids including a truncated cone, see Gupta 1986. Formulas Not Used Why Virasena did not use the formula for the volume of a truncated cone, _di + d1d2+2h, = V=T 12 which can be obtained through his own computation, is an interesting question. The only plausible answer is that he did not know it. This may suggest that the date of the composition of the Dhavala (C.E. 781) is an upper limit of the date of Sridhara, who gave the correct formula for a truncated cone ( Trisatika 54): 10 { d2 + d2 + (d2 + db)2 } 2 24 x h It is, however, observed that Virasena did not use even the formula for the volumes of a cone and of a triangular pyramid, Ah V = 3' (p = 10). which would have made his computation of the volume of a truncated cone much easier. This last formula had already been known to Brahmagupta (Brahmasphutasiddhanta 12.44, C.E. 628). The upper limit of Sridahara's date stated above is, therefore, not at all definitive, and why Virasena did not use these formulas is yet an open question. [] 74

Page #82
REFERENCES Anuogaddaraim. 1987. Anuyogadvarasutra. Ed. with a Hindi transl., notes, etc. by S. Bharill. Jinagamagranthamala 28. Beawar. Aryabhata I. 1976. Aryabhatiya. Ed. with the comm. of Bhaskara I and Somesvara by K.S. Shukla. New Delhi. Bhaskara I. 1976. See Aryabhata I 1976 above. Brahmagupta. 1902. Brahmasphutasiddhanta. Ed. by S. Dvivedin. Benares. Caillat, C. 1981. The Jain Cosmology. Basel-Paris-New Delhi. Datta, B. 1929 'The Jaina School of Mathematics' Bulletin of the Calcutta Mathematical Society 21, I 15-145. Gupta, R.C. 1986. 'Mahaviracarya's Rule for the Volume of Frustum-like Solids.' Aligarh Journal of Oriental Studies 3, 31-38. Hayashi, T., T. Kusuba and M. Yano 1989. 'Indian Values for p Derived from Aryabhata's Value.' Historia Scientiarum, No. 37, 1 16. Hayashi, T. 1992 'Mahavira's Formulas for a Conch-like Plane Figure' Ganita Bharati 14, I 10. Jadivasaha. 1984/86. Tiloyapannatti. Ed. with a Hindi comm. of Aryika Visuddhamati Mataji by C. Patani. 2 vols. Jodhpur. Jain, J.P. 1948. 'The Birth Place of Dhavala and Jayadhavala' The Jaina Antiquary 14, 46 57. Jain, L.C.and A. Jain. 1985. Philosopher Mathematicians Yativrsabhacarya, Virasenacarya and Nemicandraacarya: The Jaina School of Mathematics. Hastinapur. Jain, L.C. 1982. Basic Mathematics. Exact Sciences from Jaina Sources, Vol. I. Jaipur-New Delhi. Jain, L.C. 1992. The Tao of Jain Sciences. Delhi. 75

Page #83
Mahavira. 1912. Ganitasarasamgraha. Ed. with an English transl.by M. Rangacarya. Madras. Mahavira. 1963. Ganitasarasamgraha. Ed. with a Hindi transl.by L.C. Jain. Sholapur. Narayana I. 1936/42. Ganitakaumudi. Ed. by P. Dvivedin. Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Texts 57. Benares. Pingree, D. 1970-94. Census of the Exact Sciences in Sanskrit (abbr. CESS), Series A, Volumes I 5 (in progress). Philadelphia. Singh, A.N. 1949/50. 'History of Mathematics in India from Jaina Sources The Jaina Antiquary 15, 1949, 46 53, and 16, 1950, 54-69. Singh, A.N. 1984. 'Mathematics of Dhavala;.' Introduction to Vol.4 of the Satkhandagama, pp. (1)-(21). See Virasena 1940-58 below. Umasvati. 1926/30. Tattvarthadhigamasutra. Ed. with the auto-comm. and the comm. of Siddhasena Gani by HI.R. Kapadia. Bombay. Utpala. 1968. Brhatsamhitavivrti. Comm. on the Brhatsamhita of Varahamihira. Ed. by A.V. Tripati. Varanasi. Virasena. 1940-58. Dhavalatika. Comm. on the Satkhandagama of Puspadanta and Bhutabali. Ed. with a Hindi transl. by H.L. Jain et al. 16 vols. Amaraoti. Reprinted, Solapur 1984. 76

Page #84
Laxmi Chand Jain A Modern Jaina Mathematician Dr. Padmavathamma Department of Studies in Mathematics University of Mysore The ancient religion of Jainism is well-known for its excellent culture, tradition and heritage. This religion has produced eminent scholars such as Pampa, Ponna, Ranna, and Janna, who have made monumental contributions to Kannada literature. The celebrated works of the Adipurana and Vikramarjunavijaya by Pampa, the Santipurana, Bhuvanaika Ramabhyudaya and Jinaksaramala of Ponna, and the five famous works the Sahasabhimavijaya, Parasuramacarita, Ajitapurana, and Rannakanda of Ranna, and the Yashodharacarite and Anantapurana of Janna, are all wellknown. The contribution of Jainas is not confined to literature alone, but has also extended to the sciences in general, and mathematics in particular. The very fact that there was a "Jaina School of Mathematics" during the ancient period is proof of this. Acharya Nemicandra Siddhantacakravarthi, a contemporary of (the commander-in-chief) Camundaraya (of the Rastrakuta dynasty) was a mathematician, and his celebrated works are the Gommatasra and Trilokasara. For an excellent account of his mathematics, one can refer to the article "Mathematics of Nemicandra," by B. Datta (The Jaina Antiquary, Vol.1, No.2, 1935, pp. 25-44). 77

Page #85
Todaramala of Jaipur was a Jaina philosophermathematician. His commentaries in Dhundhari (a dialect of Rajasthan) on the celebrated Jaina works of the Gommutasara, Labdhisara and Ksapanasara are of great value. He also wrote the Bhasa Vacaanika in Dhundhari, wherein he describes, amongst other things, the eight well-known fundamental operations of mathematics. Mahaviracarya was an eminent Jaina mathematician in ancient times. He was a contemporary of King Amoghavarsha, and enjoyed his patronage. In his text the Ganitasarasamgraha, a text which was used for several centuries throughout South India, Mahaviracarya has skilfully condensed all the known mathematics of his day. Today there are still a good many Jaina mathematicians whose contributions are of immense importance to the continuous growth and development of mathematics. The purpose of this paper is to introduce one such talented mathematician, Professor L.C. Jain. Laxmi Chandra Jain was born on July 1, 1926 in Saugar of Madhya Pradesh, India. His father was Damru Lal Jain, and his mother was Chameli Bai Jain. He had a brilliant multifaceted academic career comprising of learning, teaching, preaching, and also worked as an able administrator. He obtained his Master's degree in Applied Mathematics form the University of Saugar in 1949. He also got a diploma from the State council of Homeopathy of Bhopal in 1971. During the years 1951 to 1981, L.C. Jain was in the teaching faculty of Madhya Pradesh State Education Service which included different Government Colleges at Nagpur, Jabalpur, Balaghat, and Khandwa. His final posting was as the Principal Government Post-Graduate College at Chindwara during 19811984. Since this time he has been the Honorary Director of the Acharya Vidyasagara Research Institute, in the Pisanhari Hills of Jabalpur.

Page #86
He is a proliferous writer in both Hindi and English. He has a vast knowledge of Indian languages including Sanskrit, Prakrit, Urdu, Kannada and Gujarati. He is also familiar with Russian, German, and French. L.C. Jain is an intelligent, as well as an industrious person. The depth of his knowledge has diverged from regional to national, and even to international dimensions. He is actively associated with various religious, social, and scientific organisations. He is a life member of the Digambara Jaina Akhila Bharatiya Vidva Parishad, the Einstein Foundation International (Nagpur), and the Indian Society for the History of Mathematics. As well, he was the Chairman of the Board of Studies in Mathematics (University of Saugar), and the Senator of Vikram University (Ujjain). He actively participated in the Summer School on Galois Theory organised by the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (Bombay) in 1964. Researches and writing of Shri Jain can be broadly classified into two categories: 1) On Einstein's Unified Field Theory (and related topics), and 2) Advanced Learning on Indian Mathematical Sciences (including Jaina mathematics). The first group comprises of his twenty-four research papers published in various national and international journals. This has been carried out by him independently, and also along with the collaboration of R.C. Jaiswal, R.C. Soni, K. Keller, S.S. Lishk, Anupam Kumar, M. Jain, R.M. Keller, R.K. Sharma, and M. Samiuddin. The second groups includes as many as seventy research papers of Shri Jain which are written in Hindi and English, and have been published in the Indian Journal of History of Science, The Jaina Antiquary, Arhat Vacana, Tulsi Prajna, etc. The Ganitasurasamgraha of Mahaviracarya was first translated into English by Professor M. Rangacarya in 1912. By 1963, L.C. Jain translated this text into Hindi, and it was published by Jain Samskrti Samraksaka Sangha (Sholapur). Professor Jain has also written two books entitled Basic 79

Page #87
Mathematics, and Astronomy and Cosmology. He has been awarded the Kundkundjnanapith Award for his book, The Tao of Jaina Sciences. Further, he was appointed a Research Associate of Indian National Science Academy (INSA - New Delhi) for operating a project on the History of Science in the Physics Department of Rani Durgavathi University (Jabalpur) during 1984-87. He is also the Honorary Director of D.J. Institute of Cosmographic Research (Hastinapur) since 1983. He has completed two INSA Research Projects on the Labdhisara and the Prastara Ratnavali. The first volume of the Labddhisura, which deals with an advanced theory of the Karma System, has been published in 1994. Professors Kazero Kondo (University of Tokyo), R.E. Kalman (University of Florida), and Takao Hayashi (University of Doshisha, Kyoto) have expressed high opinions on this book. At present he is operating on the third INSA project, The Mathematical Contents of the Digambara Jaina Texts in the Karunanuyoga Group L.C. Jain is an authority of the Jaina exact sciences. He has dedicated himself for more than three decades to the study of ancient mathematics, and in particular, to Jaina mathematics. He has also written many popular articles on general topics, and on the History of Science. Recently L.C. Jain has been honoured with the Prakrit Jnana Bharati Education Trust (Bangalore) Award for his meritorious services in the scientific studies in Prakrit literature. Even at his advanced age, he has kept himself fully engaged in active research, studying contemporary work, and contributing articles and books on (Jaina) mathematics -- articles that cater to the needs of both the young and old. There is a lot for others to learn from this highly qualified, versatile, and yet down-to-earth person. Although quite religiously orthodox, Jain has a great respect for other religions. He is always very eager to collect

Page #88
valuable ideas from various sources, and takes great pleasure in sharing them equally with others. Earth and water, fire and wind, Grass, trees, and plants, and all creatures that move, Born of the egg, born of liquids - These are the classes of living Beings. Know that they all seek happiness. In hurting them men hurt themselves, And will be born again among them... Even plants are beings, capable of growth, Their bodies need food, they are individuals. The reckless cut them for their own pleasure, And slay many living things in doing so. - the Sutrakratanga, 1.1-9., the Jain text composed in c. 4th B.C..E. Sources of Indian Tradition, Ed. WM. Theodore De Bary. 81

Page #89
Book Review The Archetypal Actions of Ritual: A Theory of Ritual Illustrated by the Jain Rite Of Worship. By C. Humphrey and J. Laidlaw. xiii + 293 pp., figs. 4 + 11 plates, with glossary and index. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994. ISBN 0-1982747-7 (Pbk.) In a radical shift from the metatheories of ritual by such scholars as Van Gennep, Turner and Levi-Strauss, this latest contribution by Caroline Humphrey and James Laidlaw breaks from the closure presented in traditional anthropology. It attempts to shatter the prevalent consensus of ritual action as an all-explanatory hidden code of communication begging to be deciphered. Reverberating with echoes of Frits Staal and Catherine Bell, the work through anecdotal documentation shows that rituals are intrinsically "meaningless," and to decode them as a single, unchanging, universal structure of communication between performer and performer, or performer and audience, falls to interpretative twists and spirals imposed by the theorizing observer. Humphrey and Laidlaw question the "meaning" of ritual performance in the Jaina religious tradition, and question the very nature of ritual itself. Citing the ashta prakari puja performed in the Dadabari Temple as an example, the coauthors reinforce their primary question when it was noted that many of their informants made "offerings" (they were sensitive to the shortcomings of this word) to the Jina murti (idol), and yet, were fully cognizant that the Jinas, as perfected beings, transcend the mundane cosmos. More importantly, several of the informants view the performance of puja, particularly external actions, as irrelevant to the transformation of the soul. So where does this leave ritual performance? Humphrey and Laidlaw note that the informants who perform puja bring with them a variety of meanings and intention to their action. 82

Page #90
This by itself, however, does not give ritual action a singular identity or meaning. The prescribed action of the ritual tends to modify or eradicate the intended meaning of the participant, and this effect is compounded when ritual performances are either compressed or stretched from one day to the next. Citing the abhishek (act of anointing the murti) as an example, the co-authors note that different purposes, indeed whole different vocabularies, interpretations, and meanings are attached to the prescribed act. "Thus ritualization, in two distinct ways, obscures the relation between action and the goals people might wish to achieve by it: first, the acts can be made symbolic, metaphorical, and so forth, because there is no need for them to conform to practical requirements; second, ritualized acts need have no sequential rationality of one in relation to another. In response to the argument presented by some that ritual is a non-linguistic instrument to communicate "meaning" and societal intent, Humphrey and Laidlaw argue that the relation between socially held purposes for rituals and the form and occurrence of ritualized acts is far from straightforward. Although they agree that ritualized performance can "communicate" a mental-emotional state conveyed by chanting, music and gestures, it became evident from the informants' interpretative "meanings" of Jain puja that ritual linguistic action -- is very limited in communicating meaning, ideas or concepts. as non Despite the use of what, at times, appears to be the incorporation of a quasi-western/Protestant template, Humphrey and Laidlaw have continued to open the current discourse in ritual theory. Therefore, the discursive models and meanings of rituals as one of the possible responses to ritual rather than as underlying it constitution, create a dialogue rather than closure. More interestingly, this fresh approach to anthropological discourse tends to redistribute authority and power from those who chose to call themselves the -- 83

Page #91
observer/participant to the ritual performance. Although quite technical in style, this text is an indispensable reference for teachers, students, and educated layperson interested in a scholarly treatment of Jaina ritual theory and practices. O Mikal A. Radford is a Graduate student of South Asian Studies at McMaster University JAIN HUMANITIES PRESS a Unit of Bramhi Jain Society will be publishing three monographs in the current year related to Jainism Jainism in Tamilnadu Art, Archaeology and Literature Canadian Studies in Jainism An anthology Jainism in America A social Survey of Jains For enquiries Jain Humanities Press 4665 Moccasin Traail, Mississauga, ON Canada LAZ 2W5. Fax: (905) 890-7797

Page #92
Jain Quarterlies from India Jain Journal Editor Dr. S. R. Banerjee P-25 Kalakar Street, Culcatta - 700007 Annual Subscription US $ 10 Arhat Vacan Editor Dr. Anupam Jain 584 M.G. Road, Jukoganj, Indore - 452 001 Annual Subscription US $ 15 50 bhArata INDIA HR INDIA Bramhi Jain Society 1331 Clinton Street Buffalo, N.Y. 14206 Dr. Lalit Shah 21 Saumya Apts Ahmedabad 380014