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Vol XXI, No. 1
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Another example is presented to make this controversial point clearer. He says : he who takes a vow to live on milk, does not take curd, he who takes a vow to live on curd, does not take milk; and he who takes a vow to live on food other than that supplied by a cow, takes neither milk nor curd. Thus Samantabhadra concludes that utpäda, vyaya, and dhrauvya may exist in a relative sense :
Na sāmanyātmanodeti na vyeti vyaktamanvayāt. Vyetudeti višeśätte sa haikatrodayādi sat. Ghatamaulisvarņārthi nāšot pādasthitişviyam. Šokapramodamād hyasthyam jano yāti sahetukam. Payovrato na dadhyatti na payotti dadhivrataḥ. Agorasavrato nobhe tasmāttattvam trayātmakam.
The etymology of the word "dravya" itself indicates that a thing is permanent-in-change taking a new form simultaneously with the disappearance of the previous form. This view was also accepted by Durvekamiśra according to Kțdanta section.10 Santarakṣital and Arcața 12 have also recorded this conception in their respective works. Trayātmakavāda and Arthakriyāvāda
The arthakriyākāritva (causal efficiency) is the result of the doctrines of Bhedvāda, Abhedavāda, and Bhedābhedavāda. The Satkāryavāda of Sankhyas, Asatkāryavāda of Naiyāyikas and Buddhists and Sadasatkāryavāda of Jainas are well-known to us in this respect. Here we are concerned with the views of the Buddhists and Jainas.
The Buddhists assert that the particular is the only real element of an entity characterised as svalaksaņa (thing-in-itself) It is supposed to be momentary and a congregation of atoms. A thing accordingly is born and immediately afterwards it is destroyed. The substance is pirhetuka (devoid of causes) in the sense that it originates without the assistance of causes other than its own cause of origination. Each moment produces another moment destroying itself and thus it presents a sort or continunity of existence. Thus it manages to maintain a cause and effect (kāryakāraṇabhāva) relationship.
According to Buddhism, momentariness (kşaņabhanguratā) and causal efficiency (kāryakāraṇabhāva) are inseparable. It treated momentariness, efficiency, causality and reality as synonyms, and hence argued that an entity is momentary because it was efficient and it was efficient because it was momentary, On the basis of this idea, the Buddhists criticise causal efficiency in a permanent thing. They say that entities come into being either simultaneously (yugapadena) or successively (kramena). But in a permanent thing, both thoso
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