Book Title: Tulsi Prajna 1995 04
Author(s): Parmeshwar Solanki
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

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Page 143
________________ 24 TULSI-PRAJNA of the theory of sui-gcneris. Opposing this theory, Arcața points out that Narasimha is a compendium of atoms which cannot be transformed into Narasimha. Due to a combination of the forms which is called Sabalarūpa, a place of existence of diverse natures. How then could a unity in nature be proved ? Arcața finally remarks that is the philosophy of block-heads (darşanakrto'yam viprayāso mūļhamatīnam). This criticism is based on the understanding that the nature of Teality is completely in two different forms. This is the view of Vaise şikas' not Jainas. This criticism made by Aranyakas is answered by the later Jaina philosophers such as Vadirājasūri, Anantavirya, Prabbacandra. Santarakṣita examined the Syâdvāda doctrine of Jainas in a separate chapter of his Tattvasangraha. He points out there that if thoughtness between substance and modes is real (aguņa), then the substance also should be distructive like the form of the successive factors or those successive factors themselves should be comprehensive (anugatātmaka) in their character, like the substance. Therefore it should be admitted that either there is absolute destruction of all characters or it consists of the elements of permanence, exclusiveness and inclusiveness, which cannot exist in any single thing. Hence he turns to the universal and the particular character of an entity. He says: there would be a commingling (sankarya) and a confusion (sandeha) in the dual nature of reality, the result of which would not be helpful to decide which is general and which is particular. If the general and the particular are regarded as non-different from one and the same thing, how could there be any difference in the nature of these two character ? And being non-difference why should it not be regarded as one ? Karnakagomio in the Primaņavartikasvavsttiţika and Jitari in the Anekantavadanirāsa refuted the Jaina conception of reality on the same arguments put forth by their predecessors. Evaluation As a matter of fact, the Buddhist philosaphers misunderstood the theory of Syādvāda, since they treated the dual characteristic of the nature of reality as absolutely different from each other. The theory is originally belonged to the Vaiścșikas. The foremost argument against this doctrine is the violation of the Law of Contradiction, which means that "be" and "not be" cannot exist together. But the Jainas do not accept this formula in Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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