________________
Vol. XXI, No. 1
formed only to their possible modes, not to others. Therefore the identity between the modes of curd and came cannot leed to the truth. Their transformations do not have the tādātmyasambandha and niyatasambandha."
[1
In fact, Akalanka and other Jaina philosophers tried to meet the arguments of the Buddhist philosphers in forceful words. The innumerable examples of scathing attacks against Buddhists can be seen in Akalanka's and others Jaina Acāryas' works. The caustic remarks, such as "aḍyahetavaḥ", "ahnikalakṣaṇam", "Paśulakṣaṇam" etc. made by Dharmakirti himself on opponents' views are criticised by Akalanka in the Pramaṇa-sangraha.50
27
Thus the Jaina philosophers do not accept any self-contradiction in the nature of reality in Jainism. Likewise, the other defects such as confusion, commingling etc. which are based on the self-contradiction, are also proved as "mithyadoṣāro pana". And, according to them, the criticism made by the Buddhists or others is not effective in this context. As matter of fact, in their opinion, the nature of reality in Jainism has no defects provided it is clearly understood.
Nature of relation of an entity
The nature of an entity is also a controversial point among the philosophers. For instance, the Naiyayikas, the extreme realists, think that relation is a real entity. According to them, it connects the two entities into relational unity through conjuntive relation . (samavāya sambandhā). Samavāya is said to be eternal, one, and allpervasive, 51
The Vedantins and the Buddhists, the idealists, are against the view of Naiyayikas. The Buddhists assert the subjective view of relations. A relation, according to Dharmakirti, is a conceptual fiction (sambandhaḥ kalpanākṛtaḥ), like universal, and hence it is unreal.52 He also rejects the two possible ways of entertaining a relation in universal. They are dependence (pāratantra sambandha) and interpenetration (rupaśleṣa sambandha). 53
On the other hand, the Jainas, on the basis of non-absolute standpoint, try to remove the extreme externalism of the Naiyāyikas and the extreme illusionism of idealism of Buddhism and Advaitism. They maintain that a relation is a deliverance of the direct and objective experience. Relation is not merely as inferable but also as an indubitaly perceptual fact. Without recognising relation, no object can be concrete and useful and atoms would be existing unconnected.54
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
