Book Title: Theory of Atom in Jaina Philosophy
Author(s): Jethalal S Zaveri, Mahendramuni
Publisher: Agam and Sahitya Prakashan

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Page 107
________________ A CRITIQUE 101 scendental We have already compared Kant's vicw with the Jain view and need not repeat here the whole discussion In brief, it can be said that the Jain philosophy also declares that the ultimate essence of substances cannot be comprehended through the sensory knowledge and hence at least in this aspect, Jeans' view is consistent with the Jain view Lastly we shall discuss the concept of substantialsty Jeans defines 'substantially as a 'purely mental concept measuring direct effect of objects on our sense of touch 'Now if it is so je if substantiality is not inherent in the substances, how do the objects (or substances) exist without substantiality'! Also Jeans' discussion of the degrees of substantiality is not only equivocal but almost absurd On the other hand the Jain philosophy furnishes us with the crystal clear definitions of the terms substance, substantiality, etc and proves objectiveness of substantialty on logical and empirical grounds Substantiality as a purely mental concept is definitely not acceptable to the Jain philosophy Thus both views vehemently differ from each other on this pointy Some other scientists, Weyl, Mach, and Poincare are also denying the objective existence of the material universe Weyl's views are very much similar to Sir Eddington's selective subjectivism In Mach's view, even the atom is only a construct and in Poincare's view it is impossible that a wholly objective world can exist * It would be interesting to compare the eminent philosopher-scientist Sur Albert Einstein's views supporting the Jain's philosophy's assertion regarding the reality of atom and the objective existence of the 7 See ibid., 8 Sec ibid.,

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