Book Title: Theory of Atom in Jaina Philosophy
Author(s): Jethalal S Zaveri, Mahendramuni
Publisher: Agam and Sahitya Prakashan

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Page 105
________________ 99 in the realm of metaphysics, he denies such status to it in the realm of epistemology because he does not accept that sensory qualities exist objectively in matter A CRITIQUE This is in opposition to the Jain view Jains argument in rebuttal to Eddington's view is 'if it is the consciousness that creates sensory qualities and if the matter itself is devoid of these qualities, how can a single object be perceived identically by different percipeints with normal sensory equipments?"" Sir James Jeans another eminent physicist, is also a supporter of philosophical idealism According to him 'the objective and material universe consists of little more than 'construct' of our own minds The universe is created by a pure mathematician who does not concern himself with material substance but with pure thought His creations are not only created by thought but consist of thought In his views both subjective and objective fall within what is inside our minds ' It would be rather difficult to compare Sir Jeans' views with Jain views because unfortunately his presentation of his own views is extremely ambiguous and obscure However, we may try to do so on the basis of our interpretation of his views Jeans has accepted the reality of mind (psyche), which according to him is a non-mechanical reality The Jain philosophy asserts that soul is a nonphysical reality Thus 'mind' of Jeans and 'soul' of the Jains being non-mechanical in nature, describe the same reality Jeans, however, has not explained the nature of the structure of the non-mechanical reality (ie mind) and therefore, we are not in a position to compare his concept of mind with the 5 C.f Ibid.

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