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On the Identity of the Liberated Jiva in Jainism
Sean Butler
The philosophical mind is not satiated by doctrinal assertions. The philosopher requires rational explanations. As a student of Western philosophy studying Jainism I have had some difficulty coming to understand the Jaina concept of the soul, particularly as regards its identity. I presume that the difficulties I have faced are not uniquely my own for there seem to be some philosophical problems with the Jaina doctrine of the soul. In this paper I will explore what I take to be the problems with the identity of the soul in Jainism. Further, I will demonstrate that Jaina philosophy has a solution to most, but not all, of these problems and their caveats. Essentially this paper has two purposes: 1) to demonstrate that the identity of the soul in Jainism is coherent, and 2) to put forward philosophical problems with the identity of the soul in Jainism that remain unsolved.
Before we discuss the philosophical problems of the soul in Jainism, it is prudent to first discuss the Jaina concept of the soul. In Jainism, each individual soul (jīva from now on) is understood as a substance. Now there are two ways of understanding this term
substance'. Jains describe substance as identity in difference' whereas "when philosophers discuss ‘substance', [.. it] is the concept of object, or thing,"2 or that which is capable of independent existence. Both of these understandings of 'substance' work for the Jaina concept of jīva, however as the identity of the jiva is concerned, we will be using the philosophical understanding of substance for two reasons: 1) defining substance as identity in difference is problematic in that it posits both a substance and the modes of the substance; thus defining substance in terms of substance, and 2) because Jainism does in fact endorse the distinct individuality of jīvas that do not depend on anything exterior to themselves for their existence.
