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to be admitted as another possibility that Buddhist monks themselves have taken it to mean the cause of Suffering, i.e. that which causes duḥkha to arise. And it is this possibility that alone matters in the present context; for, if understood thus, the second Noble Truth would indeed fully correspond to the second vyūha.
As for duhkhanirodha, similar observations can be made. In view of its formation, the term could denote the process of suppressing or destroying, viz. that which causes Suffering; or else it could mean the result this process is ultimately to lead to, viz. the final suppression or rather cessation of Suffering. Again, there are passages indicating that Buddhist authors themselves may well have taken the term to denote the result; e.g. at S III.158 it is defined as tanhāya asesavirāganirodho cāgo paținissaggo mutti anālayo, and explained at ND 1.94 by nibbāņam. There are two possibilities of interpreting the first of these two statements: either it is a definition proper; in this case, the implicit equation of dukkhanirodha with tanhānirodha (which is expressly given at A III.416) precludes the possibility of taking nirodha to denote the result; or it is a quasi-definition, i.e. an inexact explanation where the substitution of the result by that which causes it, i.e. of dukkha by tanhā, is quite understandable, and not only in terms of metonymy; in this latter case, it would have to be regarded as evidence warranting the assumption that the term dukkhanirodha has in fact been used to denote the result. Interpreted in this manner, and, to be sure, this interpretation is more probable, the third Noble Truth could be said to be quite similar to the third vyūha, i.e. ārogya/hāna 32. This assumption is further corroborated by the fact that the nirvāṇa is compared also in the Abhidharmakośabhāşya to the state of arogya 33
However, the fact should not be lost sight of that the latter term virtually means the state of being again free of disease », i.e. that the basic idea is in this case palpably different in that, in accordance with biological facts, a previous state of health is presupposed which is but regained. The Buddhist analysis of existence does not, of cours, know of an analogous previous state of freedom from Suffering; on the contrary, Suffering is recognized as the fundamental constituent element of existence. However, this conceptional difference does not really detract from the conclusion arrived at above, viz. that the third Noble Truth in fact corresponds to the third element in the quadruple division of the Cikitsāśāstra; for, what has been said with regard to the
32. Note that hāna is explained by Yoga authors to consist in the non-existence (abhāva) or in the coming-to-an-end (nivstti, uparama) of that which causes Suffering or in liberation (mokşa).
33. P. 202.8; I thank Dr. Ch. Lindtner for having drawn my attention to this passage. According to the Hôbôgirin p. 229 « le Nirvāņa est déjà comparé à l'absence de maladie ... dans une stance gnomique du Madhyamāgama... [MN 1.510.9-10] ». Cf. also Pancaskandhaprakarana, ed. by Ch. Lindtner, in AO, 40 (1979), p. 122, fn. 28, as well as the references s.v. arogya- in the CPD.
