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On the Quadruple Division of the Yogaśāstra
333
actually had said, and, to wit, also with respect to the particular procedure of the Sūtrakāra, was that « liberation as an absolute freeing oneself from Suffering by means of stopping egotism and by creating (in oneself] the state of indifference with respect to ["objects of valid cognition"] like the body and so forth is not possible if [these objects] are not ascertained as having the form of that which has to be avoided, etc. »; and what he shows in the second passage is precisely the cognitive and spiritual development of a Naiyāyika who reflects upon the twelve « objects of valid cognition on the basis of the more important division of heyam, etc.! Therefore, not only his earlier statement that « [the object of valid cognition] even if twelvefold is subsumed in the four groups [of that which is to be avoided, etc.] », but also what he says here, viz. that « the fourfold division is taught samksepabhāvanārtham », are fully intelligible in that, understood thus, the fourfold division in fact comprises in itself the twelve prameyas and for this very reason forms the quintessence of their bhāvanā. In the light of these deliberations it is hence more probable that what Bhāsarvajña wants to intimate by his final remark is but the superior importance of the cāturvidhya as emphasized by him already at the very outset.
Space being limited it is not possible to deal here with the same extensiveness as hitherto with what Bhāsarvajña says in the subsequent paragraphs of his Bhūsaņa. The gist of his exposition, however, may be briefly outlined, following mainly the Nyāyasāra: in order to define the concept of heyam he quotes YS 2.16 132 and adds that suffering is of twenty-one kinds, i.e. that it comprises the body, the six senses (manas is included), their six objects, the [corresponding] six [types] of cognition, pleasure and pain in that all — except for the body which is the seat of pain and except for pleasure which is nothing but pain because it does not occur without pain 133 and, of course, except for pain itself which is duḥkha par excellence as it consists in bādhā, pīdā and santāpa — of them lead to suffering. That which brings about the heyam (tasya nirvartakam), i.e. its specific cause, is stated to be nescience (avidya) and « thirst » (trsnā), on the one hand, and merit and demerit (dharmādharmau), on the other; nescience is then defined as false knowledge of that which has been shown by true adhyātmavids 134, and it is made clear that it includes the mental impression left by nescience 135,
132. See above p. 295. 133. NBhūş 444.5-19; cf. also 441.9-15 and 445.24 ff.
134. Of the two Slokas quoted by Bhāsarvajña to give an example of what «true knowers of the ātman >> and «those blind with passion >> say (NBhüş 444.27-20), not identified by the editor, the first one is from Mbh. (Poona) 12.316.42 and 43; the second one seems to belong to the vast stock of floating stanzas one finds so often quoted in anthologies and Indian narrative literature; it is included in 0. BÖHTLINGK's, Indische Sprüche, I, repr. Osnabrück, 1966, p. 98 (no. 3565); for further references see L. STERNBACH, Supplement to 0. Böhtlingk's Indische Sprüche (AKM XXXVII.1), Wiesbaden, 1965, p. 9.
135. Cf. NBhūş 444.23-30 and 445.4-7. Note that by duḥkhasūtre (which is met with also NBhūş 443.22, 445.20, 446.14 and 584.16) Bhäsarvajña refers to NS 1.1.2 dealt with in detail NBhūş 72.15 ff.
