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330
A. Wezler
dayanirodhamārgākhyacaturāryasatyajñānam muktyartham istam /... 122 ... tad evam paramate 'pi heyādicatustayajñānam muktinimittam istam / tanmatanişedhārtham ātmādibhedopanyāsaḥ krtaḥ 1.
To put it in a nutshell: according to Bhāsarvajña — who, on the one hand, almost grotesquely comes short of historical truth, but, on the other, i.e. if his presuppositions are taken for granted, argues in a quite understandable and remarkable manner - Gautama did not expressly state the prameya to be fourfold, but instead confined' himself to teach and define the twelve different « objects of valid cognition », because he wanted to refute the opinion of others, viz. the Samkhya-Yogins and the Buddhists, who equally considered the knowledge of the four elements of heya etc. to be a means for liberation. His final remark may be taken as a hint at the importance Bhāsarvajña attributes in this connection to the concept of ātman and the Nyāya view of it. This is corroborated by what he says in introducing the next paragraph, viz. 123 tatrātmajñāne sati paralokākāmkşā bhavati nānyatheti vāksyāmah ), «the desire for the other world (i.e. the wish to attain liberation) arises [only] when among these [different kinds of knowledge] there is knowledge of the ātman, not otherwise this I shall teach '[later] >> 124
But before examining the further development of his argument it is necessary to dwell on the passage just quoted. Bhāsarvajña was evidently not the first to realize that the idea of the doctrine of salvation being divided into the four systematic parts does not constitute a peculiarity of Nyāya; but Uddyotakara's relevant remark 125 looks rather colourless in that he still confines himself to claiming for the Nyāyaśāstra the status of being, among other things, an adhyātmavidyā, too, and does not deem it necessary to determine more precisely the relation in which his school stands in this respect to other doctrines of salvation. Viewed against this background Bhāsarvajña's corresponding remarks are not only much more informative, but are also evidence of a considerable progress in analysis. For he not only points out the basic doctrinal correspondence between the school of Nyāya and particular other systems which he does not hesitate to name, but he also enters into a discussion of the specific doctrinal differences. It is, of course, by no means surprising that what he right from the beginning aims at is to prove the claim that, inspite of the quadruple division being common to other doctrines also, it is the Nyāya doctrine of salvation alone that stands a critical test and should hence be universally accepted. This claim is not, however, connected with the fourfold division as such, but with the definitions of the four systematic parts as given by the Sāmkhya-Yogins
122. Read thus against the edition! In the passage left out here, viz. NBhüş 442.11-19, Bhäsarvajña gives a brief explanation of the Four Noble Truths.
123. NBhūş 442.22. 124. Viz. NBhūş 461.15 ff. 125. Cf. above p. 326.
